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“We stand at the gates of an important epoch, a time of ferment, when spirit
moves forward in a leap, transcends its previous shape and takes on a new one.
All the mass of previous representations, concepts, and bonds linking our world
together are dissolving and collapsing like a dream picture. A new phase of the
spirit is preparing itself. Philosophy especially has to welcome its appearance and
acknowledge it, while others, who oppose it impotently, cling to the past.”
G. W. F. Hegel, in a lecture on September 18, 1806,
quoted in Francis Fukuyama’s End of History (1992)
 
 
“There is enormous inertia – a tyranny of the status quo – in private and
especially governmental arrangements. Only a crisis – actual or perceived –
produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend
on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop
alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the
politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.”
Milton Friedman, Preface to
Capitalism and Freedom (1982)

Preface
It is always difficult to know where a book begins and where it ends. The origins
of this book most likely lie far back in my own past and, ultimately, in the histor-
ical roots of humanity. Put somewhat less philosophically, while I was growing up
I would often ask myself if ‘this’ is the only ‘reality’ that has ever existed. By ‘this
reality’ I meant – in an unconscious and general way – the prevalent form of social
organization based on competition and economic monetary growth, or what most
people call ‘capitalism’. It always seemed strange to me that human beings are ever
so intelligent, yet appear to have set up rather peculiar organizations and institu-
tions in which they seem to be forced to perpetually accumulate wealth, ultimately
undermining the ecological and socio-political conditions of their own existence.
Furthermore, I was for some reason always suspicious of the widespread belief that
humans are independent beings and that freedom is primarily considered as the
non-interference of others. I always had a hunch that people’s existences depended
on one another and that these interdependencies also include the ecological webs
that people find themselves in. These intuitions have not let me go since and have
led me to deal with these issues in a more fundamental, theoretical and systematic
manner. Even though this book was originally written as a dissertation, the intel-
lectual endeavor was never merely an exercise in arm-chair philosophy, nor was it
ever solely aimed towards an academic audience. Before beginning this book, I was
inspired by numerous commons projects, such as housing cooperatives and com-
munity supported agriculture, that opened my eyes to ‘another reality’ or another
way of organizing social activities and life in general. These people rejected the be-
lief that the invisible hand of the self-regulating market will look after them and
took their economic activities and fates into their own hands by democratically self-
regulating their common realities. But soon enough, I realized that commons were
not merely charming niches in a belligerent environment. Instead, these shared re-
alities and the cooperation that results from them constitute the bedrock of all of
life.
Such a perspective radically puts into question the narrative that Western so-
cieties have been telling themselves for some time now: that life is “solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and short” (Thomas Hobbes). Obviously, a positive and optimistic
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understanding of reality can easily be put off as naive or utopian. Yet this positive
take on humanity and reality does not mean that everyone should get along and
live in harmony with one another. Instead, I believe that the way we understand
ourselves influences how human beings interact with each other, with non-human
beings and with ‘nature’ in general. Theory is not merely an objective analysis of a
given reality, but influences what type of world is created. Simply in virtue of their
mutual interdependence as living beings, human beings co-create their common
realities whether they like it or not. That is one of the main points being made in
this book. And that’s why theory matters. It is in this sense that commons and ba-
sic forms of democratic cooperation can be understood as fundamental pillars in
the constitution of reality. Yet democratic cooperation implies that conflicts are not
suppressed or wished away, but actually dealt with through confrontation, negoti-
ation and deliberation. And commons provide the institutions and organizations
where this can take place. Yes, commons and democratic cooperation are difficult
and tiresome. Hence only by thinking of reality as shared can people be empow-
ered to claim their rights in the democratic organization of their interdependent
lives in the form of commons. This path is stony and strenuous. And I believe that
only by taking these ideas seriously is it possible to reconcile human freedom with
ecological flourishing.
This being said, a book on commons can never be understood as an individ-
ual endeavor or achievement. As already mentioned, I was deeply inspired by the
many people who initiate andmaintain all sorts of commons projects. In this sense,
I am largely indebted to the many commons activists who already paved the way
to this book by formulating these activities, organizations and institutions into
words, arguments and theories. These include the people from the Commons In-
stitute in Bonn, including Johannes Euler, Silke Helfrich and Stefan Meretz, and
those frommy regional community supported agriculture project ortoloco in Zürich,
such as Tex Turtschentaler, Christian Müller, Ursina Eichenberger and many oth-
ers. Within academia, I am extremely grateful for the institutional and financial
support from the National Centre of Competence in Research “Democracy – Chal-
lenges to Democracy in the 21st Century” and the Doctoral Program in Democracy
Studies at the University of Zurich. Even thoughmy topic did not fit into any single
academic discipline, I nevertheless was made to feel welcome to pursue my inter-
ests and research rather freely. At the University of Zurich I am otherwise extremely
thankful for Urs Marti-Brander’s time, support and critical comments, who, being
my first supervisor, was probably the most difficult person to convince with my
arguments. I am also grateful for my second supervisor, Francis Cheneval, for his
work on democratic theory and his critical feedback on my work. Furthermore, I
appreciate the feedback I received in the colloquium for political philosophy at the
University of Zurich. A big thanks goes to Alice El-Wakil for her collaboration and
support throughout the doctoral program and in the academic association Democ-
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racyNet. Importantly, I also wish to thank my third supervisor, Philipp Gonon, at
the Chair for Vocational Education and Training at the University of Zurich for
enabling me to be a research assistant during my doctorate and for generously
allowing me to write my dissertation in another academic field. Here, I am also
grateful for having been able to learn about Vocational Education and Training,
which openedmy eyes to more widespread institutions of democratic coordination
andmanagement of economic activities. I also appreciate the support from Philipp
Eigenmann, Michael Geiss, Barbara Hof, Stefan Keller and Lea Zehnder from this
department throughout my doctorate. Closer to the end of my project, I am greatly
indebted to my fourth supervisor, Ugo Mattei, who seemed to be one of the few
academics who understood what I was on about and who supported me by taking
part in the Law of the Commons workshop in 2016 at the University of Zurich and
by inviting me to the Common Core of European Private Law Project in 2017 in
Turin. I am also grateful for the feedback that participants at that workshop gave
me, particularly José Luis Vivero Pol, Christine Frison and Samuel Cogolati. For the
finalization of the book, I am thankful to the Swiss National Science Foundation
for their generous grant, which has enabled me to publish it under an open-source
commons license, to transcript for publishing the book and to my manuscript ed-
itor Marc Hiatt, who spent many hours meticulously going over the document.
Last but not least, I am very grateful for the support of my wife, Anita Weiss, my
children, Bruno and Moira, and my parents, who cheered me on no matter what I
chose to devote myself to.

Introduction
Since the end of the Soviet Union in 1989, it has largely been assumed that liberal
democracy or democratic capitalism provides people with the best social institu-
tions possible. While capitalism ensures individual economic freedom, democracy
provides people with political freedom. Private property coupled with markets and
periodic elections ensure that people receive the most efficient economic and polit-
ical systems that they could possibly want. Francis Fukuyama famously propagates
this thesis in his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man. Here, Fukuyama
writes,
The apparent number of choices that countries face in determining how they will
organize themselves politically and economically has been diminishing over time.
Of the different types of regimes that have emerged in the course of human his-
tory, frommonarchies and aristocracies, to religious theocracies, to the fascist and
communist dictatorships of this century, the only form of government that has
survived intact to the end of the twentieth century has been liberal democracy.
(Fukuyama 1992: 45)
Although Fukuyama admits that much can be improved in this system, he nev-
ertheless believes that “we have trouble imagining a world that is radically better
than our own, or a future that is not essentially democratic and capitalist” (ibid:
46; emphasis added). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, people’s ability to imagine a
better and, importantly, different world has supposedly come to an end. Thus, hu-
manity has reached the end of history, at least regarding its political and economic
institutions.
It might appear somewhat tedious to begin a book on democracy, markets and
commons with a reference to Francis Fukuyama.Many people have already written
about his bold thesis. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that Fukuyama’s book
articulates an idea that has taken hold of Western society – that democracy and
capitalism exist in a mutually supporting relationship. However, the assumption
that open, competitive markets and the material wealth that results from them are
preconditions for democracy is not new and has also been espoused in more recent
studies (Lipset 1960: 48-50; Boix/Stokes 2003; Boix 2011; Acemoglu/Robinson 2006;
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Bühlmann/Kriesi 2013: 31-33). A central pillar of this argument is theHobbesian and
Lockean postulate that individual private property secures the basic liberty that is
necessary for a free and pluralistic society (Hobbes 1985: 234; Locke 2008: II, V;
Epstein 2011a, b; Hayek 2013). As Jan Narveson succinctly puts it, “Liberty is Prop-
erty” (1988: 66). Generally speaking, the justification of individual private property
is largely based on a critique of the idea of holding property in common with ref-
erence to two diverse yet interrelated arguments. Firstly, it is largely assumed that
common property would normally not be cared for and overused.This age-old idea
is already expressed by Aristotle who says that “what belongs in common to the
greatest number, receives the least looking after” (Aristotle 2002: 24). A more re-
cent interpretation of this notion is formulated by Garrett Hardin in his articleThe
Tragedy of the Commons from 1968. Here, he concludes that “freedom in a commons
brings ruin to all” (Hardin 1968: 1244). As Hardin – andmany others – believe, there
are only two alternatives to this tragedy: State ownership or privatization or, in
other words, socialism or capitalism.This leads us to a second critique of common
property. Here, it is often argued that the historical examples of socialist regimes
during the 20th century demonstrated that common property arrangements ulti-
mately lead to an inefficient economic system, totalitarianism and oppression. A
combination of these theoretical assumptions and historical experiences has thus
led to a widespread consensus that individual private property or, more generally,
democratic capitalism is the only game in town. Or, in the (in)famous words of
Margaret Thatcher: “There is no alternative” (Berlinski 2008).
However, since the turn of the millennium, diverse political, economic and en-
vironmental crises have increasingly put this grand narrative of democratic capi-
talism into question. I am aware that the term ‘crisis’ is problematic because it in-
duces an alarmist and apocalyptic interpretation of reality. Apocalyptic narratives
have probably existed since the beginning of human history and crisis theories
have been prevalent ever since democracies and capitalist market economies were
developed (Merkel 2014b: 11-12). Nevertheless, the existence or resurgence of these
debates in diverse fields suggests that democratic capitalism is facing some fun-
damental challenges. Without going into the details, I would like to mention some
central issues. Firstly, current political ‘crises’ revolve around a decline in political
participation since the 1980s in many Western countries (Whiteley 2012; Merkel
2014a: 118-120; Schäfer 2015), the internationalization of politics and democratic
deficits in many supranational political institutions such as the EU, the IMF and
the World Bank (Held 1991, 1995; Glenn 2010; Bellamy/Staiger 2013; Lavenex 2013;
Habermas 2015) and, finally, themore recent resurgence of populism (Mudde 2004,
2014; Gherghina et al. 2013). Secondly, economic ‘crises’ became most apparent in
the global financial crisis of 2007/8 and have their roots, among other things, in
the deregulation and denationalization of the economy (Streeck 1998; Stiglitz 2010)
and in increasing socio-economic inequalities in many Western countries since
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the mid-1970s (Piketty 2014; Streeck 2014). Thirdly, environmental ‘crises’, which
can generally be defined as the overstepping of planetary boundaries in ways that
lead to the degradation of soil fertility, the loss of biodiversity and global warming,
appear to be increasing (Rockström et al. 2009; Steffen et al. 2015). These changes
have led scientists to argue that humans have, after approximately 11,700 years,
left the geological epoch of the Holocene behind them and entered the new and
increasingly unstable epoch of the Anthropocene (Steffen et al. 2011). As we see,
contemporary democratic and capitalist societies are facing diverse and rather se-
rious political, economic and ecological challenges.
Yet what do these diverse political, economic and environmental ‘crises’ have
to do with each other – and with democratic capitalism? This is one central yet
underlying question that I will attempt to answer in this book. For now, it is suffi-
cient to declare that I do believe that these crises are interrelated and have a com-
mon core: An open and competitive economic system based on individual private
property that enables and, importantly, requires perpetual and exponential eco-
nomic growth – on a finite planet. I will demonstrate that these background social
arrangements lead to the appropriation and unequal accumulation of resources
from socio-ecological systems, which not only cause detrimental effects on the en-
vironment but also large socio-economic inequalities which, in turn, both hinder
political participation and cause economic instability or ‘crises’. Furthermore, the
prioritization of negative rights in individual private property and a belief in the
self-regulation of competitive markets structurally limit people’s ability to demo-
cratically alter their social arrangements and thus to collectively deal with the neg-
ative effects of these market arrangements. It is interesting to note that this situ-
ation is similar to – if not identical with – Garrett Hardin’s previously mentioned
tragedy of the commons. However, it is not the commons that is the main cause of
tragedy here, but rather privatization and the open and competitive market. Or, in
other words, Hardin’s theory of the tragedy of the open and unregulated commons
also turns out to be a story of the tragedy of the unregulated and supposedly self-
regulating market. Put in this perspective, it appears as though we might have to
reinterpret Margaret Thatcher’s slogan with an ironic twist: There is no alternative
– but to search for alternatives.
As a reaction to the widespread acceptance of Hardin’s theory, one answer to
this tragedy of democratic capitalism that has increasingly been debated since the
turn of the millennium is the notion of the commons. A main reason for this up-
surge of interest in commons is the work of the political economist Elinor Ostrom
who received the so-called Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009. Since the 1960s, Eli-
nor Ostrom and her colleagues have extensively studied existing examples of sus-
tainable self-governance of common pool resources such as water systems, fish-
eries, forests and alpine meadows. A central point that can be drawn from her
work is that her empirical research refuted the widespread belief that commons
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inherently lead to destruction. Instead, she was able to demonstrate that the man-
agement of common property by those who use the specific resources was an alter-
native form of democratic and ecological governance “beyond markets and states”
(E. Ostrom 2010). This, in turn, has led to an explosion of literature on commons
that developed the concept in relation to diverse goods and resources such as in-
formation, open-source software, genetic code, seeds, food, land, housing, urban
space, firms and credit (Shiva 2005; Benkler 2006; Hess/Ostrom 2007; Tortia 2011;
Bollier et al. 2012; Bollier/Helfrich 2015, 2019). A main focus in this literature is
often the contrast of commons to individual private property. As the renowned
commons scholar Yochai Benkler states in his bookTheWealth of Networks,
‘Commons’ refers to a particular institutional form of structuring the rights to ac-
cess, use, and control resources. It is the opposite of ‘property’ in the following
sense: With property, law determines one particular person who has the author-
ity to decide how the resource will be used. (Benkler 2006: 60)
Although, as I will later show, commons can be understood as property arrange-
ments, Benkler’s juxtaposition remains significant: While individual private prop-
erty is based on exclusion and dominion, commons are often structured according
to the principles of (regulated) access and democratic (network) governance. The
emphasis of commons theorists on inclusion and democratic regulation has, more
generally, made commons a name for an alternative, emancipatory and emerg-
ing form of social organization. Here, economic activities are based on needs-ori-
ented and non-hierarchical ‘peer-production’, which short-circuits the competitive
market, the price mechanism and perpetual economic growth (Rifkin 2015; Mason
2015). In this sense, it can be said that commons are providing people with concrete
examples of how to create amore inclusive, democratic and ecologically sustainable
society within or beyond democratic capitalism.
To assess this possible solution to the diverse challenges contemporary soci-
eties face, I will examine whether – and if so, how – the concept of commons can
strengthen democratic practices and institutions by limiting or even overcoming
negative socio-economic, political and ecological effects of capitalist markets. I will
begin my paper with a discussion of democracy to lay an important stepping-stone
for subsequent arguments. Here, I will reflect on the diverse and conflicting defini-
tions of democracy and conclude that democracy fundamentally implies the rights
and capabilities of people to codetermine their shared social conditions. In a sec-
ond step, I will turn to the justifications of competitive and self-regulating markets
and analyze their relations to the (democratic) state. I will demonstrate that a belief
in the self-regulating market undermines people’s ability to solve social, economic
and ecological problems in collective and democratic ways. As an answer to this, I
will turn to the concept of commons as a possible alternative to themarket-state di-
chotomy that underlies democratic capitalism. I will begin this discussion with an
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analysis of Garrett Hardin’s article “The Tragedy of the Commons” from 1968. After
this preliminary discussion, I will examine theworks of Elinor Ostrom and her hus-
band, Vincent Ostrom. Here, it will be demonstrated that tragedy can be overcome
through communication, reciprocity and trust, on the one hand, and democrati-
cally governed institutions of shared resource systems, on the other hand.
As will become clear, however, the Ostroms’ work not only lacks a critique of
privatization and markets but also a more fundamental, normative justification
of commons in the name of ecological sustainability and human freedom. Due to
this weakness, I will then develop an ecological understanding of commons that
prioritizes the common reality of humans, the non-human world and their co-
creation thereof. In turn, this will enable us to develop an ecological understanding
of freedom that recognizes the rights of humans and non-human beings in the
codetermination of their shared socio-ecological systems. I will thus argue that
ecological freedom is based on the principles of care for others and on the civic
tradition of democracy, which enables us to understand commons not simply as a
resource, but rather as a practice of commoning in, with and through nature.
With this theoretical background, I then shiftmy focus and explore what a com-
mons theory of property might look like. To do this, I contrast such an exemplary
theory with John Locke’s classical labor theory of property and John Rawls’ more re-
cent theory of a property-owning democracy. In my critique of Locke’s labor theory
of property, we will discover that the pillars of a commons theory of property are
guardianship, non-domination and needs satisfaction. In the following reinterpre-
tation of John Rawls’ property-owning democracy, I argue that a more ecologically
sound theory of (pre)distribution should not focus on productive monetary assets,
but rather on the access to resources and their sustainable maintenance. In a final
step, I emphasize that a commons theory of property must also include access
to collective consumption goods, thereby increasing the freedom of individuals
and the number of convivial social arrangements, while simultaneously decreas-
ing humans’ detrimental ecological impact. Ultimately, I hope to demonstrate that
commons property arrangements enable the creation of a relative abundance on a
planet with limited resources.
After this development of a commons theory of property, I examine the rela-
tions between commons and the state and then between commons and themarket.
In both cases, I argue that a commons-based or commons-creating society requires
a significant democratization of both the state and the market. With reference to
the Ostroms’ notion of coproduction, I maintain that a commons-creating society
would not only imply that access to vital goods and resources should be provided
by the state, but, more importantly, that state provision of public goods is trans-
formed into a state support of commons and commoning. I illustrate this through
the examples of housing, health care and education. Finally, in my analysis of the
market-commons relationship, I contend that we should not simply condemn the
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market, but that we should, rather, transform the open and competitivemarket into
what I call a market commons. While the former is supposedly self-regulating, the
latter is democratically governed and regulated by those significantly affected by
it. I explore this notion of the market commons with reference to the concepts and
examples of associative and corporatist democracy, the social and solidarity econ-
omy and, finally, community-supported modes of production. In all these exam-
ples, antagonistic and thereby competitive relationships between isolated agents
are mitigated through institutional arrangements of democratic negotiation and
cooperation. Ultimately, I will argue that this democratic form of governance that
lies at the heart of commons has the potential to solve the diverse and interrelated
political, economic and ecological problems that we face today. That being said, it
becomes clear that commons provide us with normatively robust and, simultane-
ously, practical alternatives to the tragedies of democratic capitalism. Yet as I will
show, this alternative does not exist beyondmarkets and states, but lies, instead, in
the democratic and ecological transformation of these institutions through com-
mons and commoning.
1. The concept of democracy
I begin my analysis of the relationship of democracy, markets and commons with
an analysis of the concept of democracy, because it can generally be said that during
the 20th century democracy has become, as Hans-Peter Kriesi affirms, the “only
legitimate [political] game in town” (Kriesi 2013: 1). Despite this broad agreement,
it often remains rather unclear what democracy actually means. For this reason, I
will firstly discuss the contested nature of the concept of democracy. In a second
step I will critically reflect diverse models of democracy, with a main focus on the
work of the political scientist Wolfgang Merkel. In a third step, I will argue that
we must unearth a more foundational meaning of democracy that lies at the heart
of all of these different models. Here, I will conclude that democracy inherently
entails that people have the rights and capabilities to codetermine their shared
social conditions. This definition of democracy will ultimately lay the normative
foundation for my subsequent development and defense of the commons.
1.1 Democracy as a contested concept
As is common knowledge, the word ‘democracy’ etymologically means the rule
(kratos) of the people (demos) (Held 1987: 2). What this precisely means, however,
is quite unclear and often highly contested. With Michael Saward (2003), we could
even say that democracies exist wherever there is a debate over the definition and
interpretation of democracy (Cheneval 2015: 18). Or, in more general terms, it can
be agreed upon that there is no agreement on the definition of democracy.
Despite this general disagreement, most democratic theorists assume that
democracy provides a method of legitimizing political authority or rule and that
different models of democracy exist. Let us therefore begin with the legitimate
use of political power. Although he was no democrat, since Thomas Hobbes, it
has generally been assumed that the use of political authority and a monopoly
on the use of coercive force in society should be legitimized through the consent
of the people – be that with an actual or hypothetical social contract or periodic
elections and votes in a ballot box (Held 1991: 203). Democratic or, in the words of
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Rawls, liberal legitimacy makes it possible for social order to be created through
the understanding and acceptance of and therefore the identification with the
rules and institutions governing society (Rawls 2005: 137).1 This form of legitimacy
differs, for example, from a theocratic or customary legitimation of political and
legal power in which the right to use coercive force is either justified on the basis of
a specific religious order of society (transcendental beliefs) or hereditary rights. In
both cases, however, the people in power are not necessarily accountable for their
actions and their responsibility towards others because their positions and rights
– at least theoretically – cannot be questioned, challenged or altered. In contrast,
democratic legitimacy not only requires consent, but also provides people and
citizens with the possibility to criticize and alter the rules and regulations of one’s
society either through public debate and the ballot box. Ideally, the withdrawal of
support from a political authority increases the responsiveness and accountability
of those in power to the demands of the people (Bühlmann/Kriesi 2013).
There are different implicit factors in this notion of legitimacy that lead us,
in turn, to a better understanding of democracy. These are most clearly formu-
lated in Robert Dahl’s classic statement in which he broadly defines five criteria
for a democratic process.These include effective participation, voting equality, en-
lightened understanding, exercising final control over the agenda and the inclu-
sion of all adults (Dahl 1998: 37-8). Similarly, Francis Cheneval defines the essence
of the adjective “democratic” as “members recognized with equal status that are
included in collective decision-making processes” (Cheneval 2015: 19; transl. LP).
While these definitions are very broad, I would agree with Bühlmann and Kriesi
that “under contemporary conditions, democracy essentially means representative
government” (Bühlmann/Kriesi 2013: 46). Although representative democracy ap-
pears to be the most widespread, it can take on different shapes, including “liberal
democracy, protective democracy, competitive elitism, pluralism, or legal democ-
racy” (ibid.: 45). Despite these differences, a common feature of representative
models of democracy – in comparison, for example, to more participatory models
– is that there is a clear separation between governors and the governed. Further-
more, the democratic process and the legitimacy that results therefrom are con-
fined to the public sphere and the state’s use of coercion. While this may be the
most widespread understanding, to assume that representative democracy is the
best form of democracy would be a naturalistic fallacy. In contrast to this assump-
tion, I will argue that democracy and democratic legitimacy cannot be confined to
1 According to Rawls, “our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised
in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their
common human reason. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy” (Rawls 2005: 137).
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elections of representatives in government but that they must deal with the ques-
tion of power more generally and be extended to the sphere of economics in spe-
cific. To make a case for this, I will now turn to incremental models of democracy
as described by Wolfgang Merkel and with reference to those developed by C.B.
Macpherson and David Held.
1.2 Models of democracy
In discussing the question whether contemporary democracy is in a crisis, Wolf-
gang Merkel distinguishes between minimalist, medium-range and maximalist
models of democracy.Merkel associates the minimalist model with Joseph Schum-
peter’s competitive and elitist model of democracy. Here, “free, equal, and secret
ballots are not only the core of democracy, but democracy itself” (Merkel 2014b: 12).
Other names for this type of democracy are, for example,MaxWeber’s “plebiscitary
leadership democracy” (Held 1987: 158) or the “pluralist elitist equilibrium model”
(Macpherson 1977: 77). Competitive elitist democracy emphasizes the existence of
social inequality in the form of a ruling elite as political producers vis-à-vis the less
well-off and less educated masses as political consumers. The model presupposes
a pyramidal and bureaucratic structure of society and is based on what Vincent
Ostrom calls “machine politics and boss rule” (V. Ostrom 1997: 19). Political power
is located at the center and top of society and is made responsive and vertically
accountable through competitive elections. Due to the danger of such centralized
power, this competitive elitist model of democracy is often coupled with protec-
tive and legal models of democracy (Held 1987: 37-71, 243-254; Macpherson 1977:
23-43). To further limit the power of the state and the representatives in office,
the minimalist concept of democracy also requires a clear separation of the public
from the private and of political from economic spheres. This separation suppos-
edly provides people with a realm of private economic freedom that protects them
from state coercion. This is what is normally understood as negative freedom: The
freedom from arbitrary interference by the state or public (Berlin 2008: 169-78). In
turn, this freedom also disciplines the state through the power of private individ-
uals, which is mostly based on their “countervailing power of private capital” (Held
1987: 160). We will return to this model of democracy when discussing the justifi-
cation of open and competitive markets later. According to Wolfgang Merkel, this
minimalist model does not provide us with the information to discern whether a
democracy exists or is in crisis, because we cannot knowwhether the elected repre-
sentatives are governing on behalf of the people or “on behalf of large corporations,
banks, lobbies, and supranational regimes” (Merkel 2014: 13).
In comparison to this minimalist model, Merkel argues that a medium-range
democracy goes beyond periodic elections and vertical accountability. Here, he ar-
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gues that a medium-range democracy must be “embedded in guaranteed human
and civil rights and in checks and balances” (ibid.). AlthoughWolfgang Merkel only
discusses the rule of law as a central element of democracy in themid-rangemodel,
I would argue that Merkel does not differentiate between specific types of the rule
of law. In a minimalist model, the rule of law is limited to the protection of private
property, the enforcement of contracts and the guarantee of periodic elections. In
the medium-range model, the rule of law is extended to other civil rights which
include, most importantly, the right to participation in political decision-making
processes (Merkel 2015: 12). This comes close to Cheneval’s second definition of the
adjective ‘democratic’, which “means a decision-making procedure of a political
community or people, in which all citizens have the right to participate in the or-
ganization of collective action and to control the use of political authority/power”
(Cheneval 2015: 19; transl. LP).The focus lies here on the input-dimension of democ-
racy and background institutions that provide just procedures. The specific output
of democracies is not included in this definition, but, rather, depends on the out-
comes of deliberation processes. Input and output, form and substance are sepa-
rated. The emphasis on political procedures and participation implies that a mid-
dle-range democracy includes certain forms of developmental democracy such as
the one propagated by John Stuart Mill, in that it enables people to develop their
intellect and moral capabilities through political participation (Macpherson 1977:
44-76).This can, in turn, be understood as a formal understanding of positive free-
dom, or the freedom to reflexively develop one’s self in deliberative interaction with
others (Honneth 2014: 29-41). Furthermore,Merkel (2015: 12) argues that this model
of democracy also theoretically includes more demanding forms of participatory
democracy as propagated by Benjamin Barber (1984) and Archon Fung and Erik
Olin Wright (2003). It appears, therefore, that Merkel’s notion of medium-range
democracy is very broad and includes a wide variety of specific democratic con-
cepts ranging from representative to more participatory forms of democracies.
In contrast to this procedural understanding of democracy in the medium-
range model, Merkel argues that the maximalist model of democracy emphasizes
the output dimension. According to Merkel, this
include[s] public goods, such as internal and external security, economic welfare,
welfare state guarantees, fairness in the distribution of basic goods, income, social
security, and life chances. In particular, they emphasize the need to avoid extreme
inequalities in the distribution of income, and view the provision of primary and
social goods at the core of democracy. (Merkel 2014: 13)
This, in turn, comes close to Cheneval’s third concept of the adjective ‘democratic’,
which “generally means the normative ideas of a form of living that is egalitar-
ian, inclusive, deliberative, transparent, free fromoppression and exploitation, fair,
etc.” (Cheneval 2015: 19). The inclusion of the output dimension or, rather, specific
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normative content into the definition of democracy implies an extension of the
rule of law to include social and economic rights such as the right to education,
housing, health, a minimum wage or the means of production. This maximalist
model attempts to deal with the problem of a purely procedural concept of democ-
racy in which the door to participation might be wide open, but if people lack the
resources and capabilities to enter the realms of politics, participation becomes
an empty promise. The model attempts to give substance to form – and trans-
form formal freedom into a more substantive, positive freedom. However, Merkel
is critical of the maximalist model because it does not necessarily require demo-
cratic procedures and can easily be realized in more authoritarian regimes (Merkel
2015: 13). Furthermore, Merkel rejects the maximalist model because normative
standards are supposedly so high that “only a few democracies can pass their ‘so-
cial-democratic test’” (Merkel 2014: 14). And because the minimalist model is so
meager, Merkel argues that it is necessary to adopt a medium-range definition of
democracy that enables people to measure the grades of a democracy without au-
tomatically assuming that all democracies are either in perfectly good health or
permanently in crisis (Merkel 2015: 14).
1.3 Foundational and surplus dimensions
of the concept of democracy
Wolfgang Merkel’s three-tier model of democracy is sufficient if one wants to mea-
sure existing democracies. Yet, because themodel’s focus is onmeasuring the qual-
ities of existing democracies, especially with reference to their procedural institu-
tions, it obviously lacks the ability to grasp the full potentiality of democracies.
This would be like attempting to measure a child’s future height and weight when
it will be an adult. Nevertheless, this is not to say that a democracy must forever
remain in the specific form that it currently exists in. Simply because a certain
form of democracy is more widespread or easier to measure does and should not
imply that this specific model of democracy must be maintained. Put in a more
general perspective, I agree with Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe that all terms
and identities are “polysemic” and therefore “overdetermined” (Laclau/Mouffe 2001:
121). This implies that terms bear a “surplus of meaning” that disrupts, breaks up
and goes beyond the present dominant and hegemonic understanding of a word
(ibid.: 97-114). In the words of Laclau and Mouffe:
The practice of articulation, therefore, consists in the construction of nodal points
which partially fix meaning; and the partial character of this fixation proceeds
from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing
of every discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity. (ibid.: 113)
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While this potentiality cannot be easily measured, this does not imply, in turn, that
it does not exist. On the contrary, it implies thatmeanings and realities change over
time – for better or worse. In relation to democracy, this is easily shown by the ex-
pansion of the enfranchised population from only male adults who own property
to all male adults, to women and to people who were previously considered to be
slaves. However, the understanding of democratic inclusion must not stop there
but could, in the future, also include immigrants, teenagers and children or, as I
will later argue, even non-human beings. The same can be said about the under-
standing of democratic equality which is for some the central aspect of democracy
(Christiano 2010: 199; Christiano 2008). There exist, however, different interpre-
tations of democratic equality. We can, for example, understand equality as the
equal protection of property rights for the existing distribution of resources and
the equal right of citizens to elect a representative every four years (minimalist
model). Another notion of equality implies the equal right to participate in pol-
itics more actively (medium-range model). Yet another denotes the more or less
equal distribution of material resources to enable people to lead a self-determined
life in concert with others. Merkel, for example, accepts the shift in the rule of law
from minimal property rights to other basic civil rights that aim to secure political
participation but, in turn, rejects the further shift to equal socio-economic rights.
Furthermore, he completely ignores the question of why democracy is limited to
the public sphere. Put in such an historical context, Merkel’s normative demarca-
tion appears contingent and arbitrary, suppressing a more fundamental, dynamic
and normatively demanding understanding of democracy. To be fair, we must dis-
tinguish here between political science that aims to measure reality and political
theory that opens up possibilities of how this reality can or should be transformed.
While Merkel is of the former camp, I would position my argument, which I will
develop here, in the latter group.
That being said, I would like to push this argument for a more demanding un-
derstanding of democracy a little bit further. In our discussion ofmodels of democ-
racy, there appears to be an implicit normative linearity from bad to good to best.
One could argue that this linearity corresponds with the chronological linearity of
the development of democracy from a minimal model in the late 19th and early
20th centuries to a medium-range, proceduralist model since the Second World
War and possibly to more substantive forms of democracy in the future. Here,
substantial participation is nice to have, yet not a necessary and inherent aspect
of democracy. Contrary to this account, I would argue with numerous others such
as Chantal Mouffe, Axel Honneth and Charles Taylor that both minimal and pro-
ceduralist accounts of democracy are already expressions of substantive values. As
Mouffe explains with reference to Wittgenstein:
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Rules [of law], for Wittgenstein, are always abridgements of practices, they are
inseparable from specific forms of life. The distinction between procedural and
substantial cannot therefore be as clear as most liberal theorists would have it.
In the case of justice, for instance, it means that one cannot oppose, as so many
liberals do, procedural and substantial justice without recognizing that procedu-
ral justice already presupposes acceptance of certain values. It is the liberal con-
ception of justice which posits the priority of the right over the good, but this is
already the expression of a specific good. (Mouffe 2000: 68; original emphasis)
Aswe can see, this procedure–substance dichotomy is based on the “liberal” distinc-
tion between the right (form/procedure) and the good (substance). Mouffe argues,
however, that the specific definition of the right is also always an expression of a
specific good. In other words, while procedural democracy emphasizes an individ-
ual or particularistic concept of the good, the realization of such individual rights
is based on more fundamental social freedom. Along these lines, in his book Free-
dom’s Right (2014), Axel Honneth defines the concept of social freedom in contrast
to negative and reflexive positive freedom:
While the idea of negative freedom […] must fail because the ‘content’ of action
cannot itself be grasped as ‘free’, the idea of reflexive freedom is insufficient be-
cause it opposes the actions it views as free in substance, viz. as self-determined
acts, to an objective reality that must continue to be regarded as completely het-
eronymous. […] Not only must individual intentions be developed without any
external influence, but the external, social reality must be able to be conceived as
being free of all heteronomy and compulsion. The idea of social freedom, there-
fore, is to be understood as the outcome of a theoretical endeavor that expands
the criteria underlying the notion of reflexive [positive] freedom to include the
sphere that is traditionally set in opposition to the subject as external reality. […]
The idea is rooted in a conception of social institutions in which subjects can grasp
each other as the other of their own selves […] Because the individual’s striving for
freedom can thus be fulfilled only within – or with the aid of – institutions, the
‘intersubjective’ concept of freedom expands once again into a ‘social’ concept of
freedom. A subject is only ‘free’ if it encounters another subject, within the frame-
work of institutional practices, to whom it is joined in a relationship of mutual
recognition; only then can it regard the aims of the other as the condition for the
realization of its own aims. (Honneth 2014: 43-4)
Or in somewhat simpler terms: “We must first regard all subjects as integrated in
social structures that ensure their freedom, before they then participate as free be-
ings in a procedure thatmonitors the legitimacy of the social order.” (Honneth 2014:
57)This implies that form and content, procedure and substance, other and self, and
an objective social order and subjective freedom always exist in circular, dialectical
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and interdependent relationships that advance each other. In the debate between
liberalism and communitarianism, this implies that social, democratic freedom
and the definition of a common good are inherent ontological preconditions for
individual freedom (Taylor 2003). Or in other terms, democratic rights can only
be realized through substantial participation in collective action – which often in-
volves questioning and contesting existing democratic norms and laws. Translated
back into the debate on democracy, this implies that the supposed ‘maximalist’
model of democracy in fact underlies both minimalist and medium-range models.
Norms that underlie the maximalist model can be understood as the foundation of
all other existing forms of democracy.
This normative reversal of the sequence of democratic models opens our in-
sight, firstly, to the fact that procedure and substance in democratic models can-
not be so clearly separated and that means and ends are reciprocally determined
(Dorf/Sabel 1998: 284). Second, it has become clear that democratic freedom should
be inherently understood as deeper and broader than minimalist and medium-
rangemodels. But what does thismean for our definition of democracy? It suggests
that although democracy is often understood either as representative democracy
or the more active participation in political decision-making procedures, the word
democracy simultaneously bears a normative surplus, which invariably points to
transformations and – in an optimistic interpretation – improvements of social
arrangements.
On the one hand, and in Rawls’ somewhat technical language, this refers to
the realization of a more just or democratic basic social structure that realizes
“the fair value of the equal political liberties that enable citizens to participate in
public life” (Rawls 2001: 148). On the other hand, this dynamic and social reading of
democracy also demonstrates that democracy has an inherent tendency to overflow
from political spheres into other spheres of social life, be that the family, church,
media or the economy. Or more precisely, democratic politics constitutes these
other social spheres. However, this does not imply that democracy originates in
the political sphere. Instead, I would agree with John Dewey’s well-known saying
that a “democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of
associated living, of conjoint communicated experience” (Dewey 2008: 93). Here,
democracy is understood as an inherently intersubjective and social form of being
in everyday life. Or, that our everyday and intersubjective reality is or, rather, has
the potential to be democratic.
Nevertheless, I would go further than this somewhat vague notion of every-
day associative democracy and specify with Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers that a
democratic way of living implies “the idea that free and equal persons should to-
gether control the conditions of their own association” (Cohen/Rogers 1983: 18). In
this definition it remains unclear, however, how the specific relation between the
individual and democratic freedom is to be understood. To comprehend this rela-
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tionship, it is helpful to turn to David Held’s “principle of autonomy”, which takes
the relationship between individual and democratic freedom into account:
Individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of
their own lives; that is, they should enjoy equal rights (and, accordingly, equal
obligations) in the specification of the framework which generates and limits the
opportunities available to them, so long as they do not deploy this framework to
negate the rights of others. (Held 1987: 271)
Although this concept of autonomy is framed as individual, it is essentially social
and democratic in that it enables people to participate in the codetermination of
the institutions that structure one’s life. Important aspects of this principle forHeld
are the “key conditions for the realization of the principle of autonomy” (ibid.: 275),
which include, for example, the limitation of private property, access to resources
and necessary changes in the organization of household or care activities. Here,
our concepts of democracy and politics are broadened to deal with the distribution
of resources and questions of power more generally. As Held writes, democratic
politics
is about the capacity of social agents, agencies and institutions to maintain or
transform their environment, social or physical. It is about the resources that un-
derpin this capacity and about the forces that shape and influence its exercise.
Accordingly, politics is a phenomenon found in and between all groups, institu-
tions (formal and informal) and societies, cutting across public and private life. It
is expressed in all the activities of cooperation, negotiation and struggle over the
use and distribution of resources. It is involved in all the relations, institutions and
structures which are implicated in the activities of production and reproduction
in the life of societies. Politics creates and conditions all aspects of our lives and it
is at the core of the development of problems in society and the collective modes
of their resolution. (ibid.: 275-7)
For this reason and according to Held, politics are considered “a universal dimen-
sion of human life” (ibid.: 277), which should be subject to democratic legitimacy
based on the principle of autonomy and democratic decision-making procedures.
It can be said here with Laclau and Mouffe that politics become more ‘political’ in
that they are now understood as “a practice of creation, reproduction and trans-
formation of social relations [that] cannot be located at a determinate level of the
social” (Laclau/Mouffe 2001: 153). Democracy thus becomes more ‘political’ as it is
understood to be the ability to alter and determine the diverse arrangements that
structure society. Furthermore, democracy is understood as a means to deal with
the distribution of resources, power and the problems that result therefrom. It is
this broad yet fundamental concept of democracy that I will further develop in
relation to the ecologically grounded concept of commons.
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For the moment, however, let us now turn to an analysis of the relationship be-
tween the market and the state, for I will now show that this concept of democracy
is ultimately incompatible with the open and competitive market.
2. The competitive market and the state
Besides democracy, the other main social institution that has gained widespread
acceptance over the last 200 years is that of the capitalist or open and competitive
market. In this section, I therefore analyze the justifications of the open and com-
petitive market and its relation to both the state and to democracy. I will begin this
analysis with a short discussion of Thomas Hobbes’ influential work on the state-
market relation. In a second step, I argue with reference to Montesquieu and,most
importantly, Adam Smith that two key justifications of the competitive market are
its creation of a peaceful social order and the unlimited generation or, rather, ac-
cumulation of monetary wealth. Thirdly, I demonstrate with reference to several
more recent economists that a central feature of the competitive market is that it
operates in a self-regulating manner, which requires both limited state interfer-
ence and an open institutional structure. In a final step, I argue with reference to
Friedrich August von Hayek that the strict implementation of an open and com-
petitive market severely undermines democracy and can potentially lead to a type
of authoritarian liberalism.
Before beginning with this discussion, however, I would like to briefly explain
why I do not refer to capitalism here, but instead use the term market or, more
precisely, open and competitive markets. The reason for this is not only because
capitalism is often used in a critical or pejorative manner, but also because it de-
scribes a more encompassing historical socio-economic transformation of society
(Kocka 2014: 6). In contrast, the terms ‘market’ or ‘market economy’ is not only
less polemical, but also refers to a more idealized, and thus somewhat ahistorical,
model of the market. It is this idealized institutional arrangement of the open and
competitive market that I would like to focus on here. As I demonstrate later, in
my discussion of the market commons, openness and competition are, however,
not characteristic of all markets, but merely specific institutional arrangements of
capitalist markets. And within the existing “varieties of capitalism” (Hall and Sos-
kice 2004), they refer to the ideal model of liberal market economies. But for now,
let us turn to the origin, justification and implications of the open and competitive
market in the history of political thought.
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2.1 Hobbes: anarchy, leviathan and the competitive market
In the history of ideas, it can generally be said that the concept of the competi-
tive market arose withThomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and his individualistic portrayal
of humans in antagonistic relationships (1985).1 In Hobbes’ book Leviathan, an ab-
solute sovereign should overcome the anarchic state of nature, thereby enabling
people to pursue their self-interest in a less destructive manner. By possessing the
monopoly on the use of coercion, this Leviathan can secure individual property
rights and enforce contracts. As in the minimalist notion of democracy, freedom is
here understood negatively, as non-interference that provides people with the le-
gal framework and security to trade and accumulate goods freely in a competitive
market. Simply put, the monopoly of the state shall overcome an anarchic state of
nature by creating a competitive market economy.
Because it is important to understand Hobbes’ theory in its historical context,
I would argue with C.B. Macpherson (2011) that Hobbes’ Leviathan was not pri-
marily an answer to an imagined anarchic state of nature, but more concretely to
the development of a merchant class with “market-made wealth” that then led to
the English Civil War of 1642, which lasted until 1651 (ibid.: 65). Here, “war was an
attempt to destroy the old constitution and replace it with one more favorable to
the newmarket interests” (ibid.).This social disorder that Hobbes experienced was
then projected onto a theoretical state of nature. In turn, Hobbes’ concept of the
Leviathan was not used to legitimate and secure a minimal, parliamentary democ-
racy, but to legitimate the rule of an absolute sovereign. It could be argued that
with Hobbes’ contractual theory of the state, absolute authority was secularized
and shifted from the Church to a socially legitimated state monopoly. Neverthe-
less, both the Leviathan and its laws were understood as virtuous and absolute
and the people constituting the social order as corrupt. Social order was there-
fore conceived by means of a dichotomy of coercion and repression from above
and obedience by the people below. Here, the sovereign is to be understood as the
watchmaker of an “automated machine” (ibid.: 31) of a competitive market society
that is held together by the overarching monopoly of the state.
2.2 Justifying the market: social order, protection
from arbitrary powers and unlimited wealth
Writers soon began to look to the rise of bourgeois society and Hobbes’ new un-
derstanding of a competitive market economy as things that would not only legit-
1 For a discussion of this individualistic and antagonistic portrayal of social reality, see for ex-
ample, C.B. Macpherson’s introduction to Hobbes’ Leviathan (Macpherson 1985: 48-53).
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imize the existence of Leviathan, but also create a more peaceful and prosperous
social order. As Albert O. Hirschman convincingly explains in his bookThe Passions
and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (1997), the pursuit
of economic self-interest was not only intended to overcome the capricious and
belligerent passions of feudal lords, but also to limit the monopoly of power of ab-
solute monarchs. Hirschman shows that this assumption is set out most clearly
by Montesquieu in his book De l’esprit des lois (1748), who assumes that “commerce
[…] polishes and softens barbarian ways” (Montesquieu quoted in Hirschman 1997:
60). Put somewhat simply, the idea is that steadfast economic interests in trade
and commerce will tame wild and capricious passions. Or, conversely, irrational
passions should be channeled into rational economic interests as in a process of
sublimation. For these reasons, commerce can not only tame feudal lords, but also
pacify entire peoples and nations. Furthermore, in enabling people to pursue their
economic interests and move their capital about freely, Montesquieu saw an eco-
nomic means of checking the abuse of unlimited political power (ibid.: 77-8).2 This
is what was implied by the “countervailing power of private capital” (Held 1987:
160) in our previous discussion of the minimalist model of democracy. Thus, mar-
ket competition is expected not only to overcome the anarchy of warring feudal
lords, but also to limit the monopoly of power of absolute sovereigns.
We find another twist to this general legitimation of competitivemarkets in the
works of two other writers of the same time period, BernardMandeville (1670-1733)
and, more importantly, Adam Smith (1723-1790). It could be said that Mandeville
made the point most bluntly in his postulate that through competition and com-
merce, “private vices” turn into “publick benefits” (Mandeville 1924). Although Adam
Smith was unlike Mandeville in that he was not a cynic, Mandeville’s conviction is
very similar to Smith’s well-knownmetaphor of the “invisible hand” inTheWealth of
Nations from 1776 in which self-interest leads to social order and an increase in so-
ciety’s material wealth (Smith 1994: 485).3 The importance of this paradigm shift in
moral and political philosophy cannot be underestimated. In line with other ‘mod-
ern’ thinkers such as Hobbes and Machiavelli and, possibly, for the first time in
human history, social order and well-being did not arise when vice was opposed by
virtue, but instead when the vices or self-interest of individuals were opposed by
2 It should be noted here that while Montesquieu was concerned with limiting the unlimited
power of kings, Adam Smith was more concerned with the pacification and limitation of the
power of feudal lords (Hirschman 1997: 102).
3 It must be mentioned that the “invisible hand” is only mentioned twice in Adam Smith’s
works. Once in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith 2009: 215) and a second time in The
Wealth of Nations (Smith 1994: 485). Although the term is onlymentioned twice in his works, I
would argue that the concept itself retains a central position throughout his economic theory
and is also implicitly expressed in his concept of harmony between supply and demand.
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the vices or self-interest of other individuals. As with Hobbes, in the social arrange-
ments of Mandeville and Adam Smith individuals are conceptualized as separate
and self-interested entities that find themselves in antagonistic and competitive re-
lationships with each other. Similar to Montesquieu, Smith emphasizes his some-
what surprising and paradoxical conclusion that by unleashing self-interest and
competition, a more disciplined and orderly society should arise. Smith explains
this in relation to corporations (i.e. guilds) and the monopoly on coercive force:
The pretence that corporations [i.e. guilds] are necessary for the better govern-
ment of the trade is without any foundation. The real and effectual discipline which
is exercised over a workman is not that of his corporation, but that of his customers. It
is the fear of losing their employment which restrains his frauds and corrects his
negligence. An exclusive [monopolistic] corporation necessarilyweakens the force
of this discipline. (ibid.: 149; emphasis added)
Adam Smith’s notion of corporations is to be equated with the guild system that
monopolistically controlled most trades and markets in medieval Europe. In con-
trast to the belief that a monopoly on coercion, which in this case takes the form
of the guild system, is the best instrument for providing social order, Smith argues
that it is the competitive market that does a better job of disciplining its citizens.
The reason for this is that, in order to survive in a competitive market, people have
to satisfy consumer demands and offer (better) products at lower prices. Simply
put, the fear of losing one’s job forces people to work harder and produce more. In
this sense, competing interactions between self-interested individuals on the mar-
ket create a disciplinary mechanism that is not exerted by any individual or orga-
nization. This is not to say that the coercion from overarching institutions should
disappear, but rather that the power of the guilds should be replaced with that of
the state in its enforcement of property rights and contracts, on the one hand, and
that social order will simultaneously be reinforced by the disciplinary mechanism
of the competitive market, on the other.
This market mechanism leads to Adam Smith’s second important assumption,
that the competitive market – or what he calls “perfect liberty” (ibid.: 63) – leads
to greater material wealth. The increase in material social wealth results not only
from the mechanism of competition, but also from the positive connotation of
self-interest and therefore the release of egotistical springs in human action from
other moral obligations.4 This moral transformation is closely intertwined with
4 Although Adam Smith expresses an ambivalence towards this paradigm shift and empha-
sizes the importance of non-economic motives in human action (Smith 2009; Hirschman
1997: 108), he argues similarly toMontesquieu that economicmotives enable the satisfaction
of all other non-economic values – or conversely, that all non-economic motives (including
“passions”) “feed into” and “reinforce” economic motives (Hirschman 1997: 109-110). I agree,
however, with Hirschman that although Adam Smith endorsed the positive outcomes of a
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the changes in the legal framework that made new ways of accumulating property
possible. It can generally be said, therefore, that a shift occurred both in moral phi-
losophy and in political and legal philosophy. Similar to John Locke’s labor theory
of property, Adam Smith declares, “The property which every man has in his own
labour, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred
and inviolable.” (ibid.: 140; emphasis added) This concept of individual property is
a clear critique of earlier, medieval forms of property that were based on feudal,
customary law and, in certain cases, collective rights, in which individual appro-
priation was highly regulated and the possibility that property would be arbitrarily
confiscated by lords andmonarchs was pervasive (Holt 1972; Schneider 1997; Blickle
2000; Zückert 2003; Linebaugh 2008).With this new concept of property – and the
increase in durable, mobile property (i.e. money) – individuals could, at least the-
oretically, appropriate property through their labor and trade and accumulate it
freely (Locke 2008: II, §25-51).
We will discuss Locke’s theory of property in further detail later on, but for
the moment, it is important to note that this economic right to private property
was understood as a natural or sacred right that stood above the political rights of
absolute monarchs and states. We must therefore understand these new property
rights as a central means to not only limit the power of the state, but also to open
the door for wealth generation and accumulation. Here, the monopolistic struc-
ture of the sovereign ruler over a clearly delineated territory is replicated in the
absolute sovereignty of an individual over their clearly delineated private property.
From this perspective, the sacred character of the subject and of the right to ab-
solute rule is maintained yet shifted to the hierarchical and Cartesian structure of
the human being’s ownership over res extensa, irrespective of whether one merely
has property in one’s own person or also in other things of the world. In this sense,
the “possessive individualism” (Macpherson 2011) of the competitive market should
not only limit the monopoly of power of absolute rulers, but should also – at least
theoretically – undermine the monopoly power of corporations and guilds (Smith
1994: 136-156). Thus, the divine right to private property should ultimately decen-
tralize economic power, protect the individual from arbitrary political intervention,
and enable the freedom to accumulate property without limit, thereby supposedly
increasing the general material wealth of society.
competitive market (social order and an increase in material wealth), he found the means
to this end problematic and unfortunate (ibid.: 105). This ambivalence can be found in his
description of the flipside of the division of labor which greatly increasesmaterial wealth yet
simultaneouslyweakens themoral and intellectual capabilities of laborers (Smith 1994: 840).
Elsewhere in Adam Smith’s Lectures, he also expresses the problem of commerce leading to
“debilitating luxury and corruption” (Hirschman 1997: 106).
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2.3 Self-regulation, limited politics and the open-access market
Aside from these moral and legal paradigm shifts to a society geared towards the
accumulation of material wealth, let us now discuss the concept of the invisible
hand a little more. Although the invisible hand has often been criticized (Stiglitz
2006; Dupuy 2014; Amir-ud-Din/Zaman 2016),5 it can be said that the metaphor
still holds a central place in both economic thought and the social imagination in
Western societies, ultimately laying the foundation for the legitimacy of the com-
petitive market. Besides its disciplinary and wealth-generating functions, another
aspect of the market’s ability to create social order is its supposed ability to enable
the self-regulation of economic activity. First and foremost, this notion of self-reg-
ulation is not to be understood as the kind of democratic self-governance I have
already mentioned. Instead, the supply of goods and services is brought into equi-
libriumwith the demand for them–without political or state intervention. But how
does this magical mechanism work? In the words of Adam Smith:
It is thus [in a competitive market] that the private interests and passions of in-
dividuals naturally dispose them to turn their stocks towards the employments
which in ordinary cases aremost advantageous to the society. But if from this nat-
ural preference they should turn too much of it towards those employments, the
fall of profit in them and the rise of it in all others immediately dispose them
to alter this faulty distribution.Without any intervention of law, therefore, the pri-
vate interests and passions of men naturally lead them to divide and distribute
the stock of every society among all the different employments carried on in it
as nearly as possible in the proportion which is most agreeable to the interest of the
whole society. (Smith 1994: 680; emphasis added)
In this passage, it is assumed that a competitive market economy will, first and
foremost, serve the demands of consumers and therefore society at large. As we can
see, the motivation for this service is a pecuniary profit. If too much investment
from competing firms flows into a certain line of business, however, then both the
price and the rate of profit decrease.This allocates investments into the production
of other goods and services that are in demand and into placeswhere greater profits
can be realized. This balancing process also occurs for changes in demand, which
5 In this rather famous interview, Joseph Stiglitz argued that “Adam Smith, the father of mod-
ern economics, is often cited as arguing for the ‘invisible hand’ and free markets. […] But
unlike his followers, Adam Smith was aware of some of the limitations of free markets, and
research since then has further clarified why free markets, by themselves, often do not lead
to what is best. […] [T]he reason that the invisible hand often seems invisible is that it is often
not there.” (Stiglitz 2006)
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drive prices and profit rates up or down and thus theoretically bring about changes
in production.
These descriptions, images and metaphors that Adam Smith presented dur-
ing the 18th century are readily found in today’s economic discourse. The image
that arises from this description of self-regulating competitive markets is that of
individual entities of resources, producers, products and consumers freely and har-
moniously interacting in a vacuum-like space. This is portrayed by the well-known
simple graphs of introductory economics courses in which supply and demand
curves shift and intersect according to changes in production and consumption.
Neoclassical economists such as Walras, Arrow and Debreu have since dubbed
this balancing-out process between supply and demand the general or compet-
itive equilibrium theory (Walras 1965; Arrow and Debreu 1954). Named after the
economist Vilfredo Pareto, the terms ‘Pareto efficiency’ or ‘Pareto optimality’ refer
to the assumption that a competitive market economy is the most efficient way to
allocate society’s resources.6 Although Friedrich August von Hayek later criticized
these notions of perfect equilibrium and Pareto optimality, his notion of catallaxy
must still be understood as a reinterpretation of this old notion of a social or-
der that spontaneously arises from the dynamic self-regulating functioning of the
competitive market (Hayek 2013; Butos 1985; Vaughn 2013).
Furthermore, the self-regulation of the market must also be understood as
a process in which power is supposedly shifted from producers to consumers.
This has already been mentioned in relation to Adam Smith’s quote on the dis-
cipline of the market. Today, this notion is discussed under the name of consumer
sovereignty, as presented by William H. Hutt (1936, 1940) and as propagated by
Milton and Rose Friedman in their book Free to Choose (1980). Along the same lines,
Ludwig von Mises likened the decision to buy a product on the market to the cast-
ing of a vote. Mises writes,
Whenwe call a capitalist society a consumers' democracywemean that the power
to dispose of the means of production, which belongs to the entrepreneurs and
capitalists, can only be acquired by means of the consumers' ballot, held daily in
the marketplace. (Mises 1951: 21)
This interpretation of consumer sovereignty gives the market a political twist and
reinterprets the competitive market as a consumer or market democracy. While
6 Amartya Sen criticizes the term Pareto optimality because it “is an extremely limited way of
assessing social achievement” (Sen 1988: 35). He explains this with a rather alarming exam-
ple: “A state in which some people are starving and suffering from acute deprivation while
others are tasting the good life can still be pareto optimal if the poor cannot be made better
off without cutting into the pleasures of the rich – nomatter by how small an amount. Pareto
optimality is faint praise indeed.” (Sen 1984: 95)
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decisions are made daily and producers must react accordingly to regular changes
in demand in the market, in political democracy, citizens often only have the possi-
bility of electing a representative every four years. According to this argument, the
competitive market not only exercises a quasi-divine and harmonizing self-regu-
lating authority but is ultimately also a better, more responsive form of authority
than any other secular, political organization.
For specialists in the field of economics, it might appear to be highly imprecise
and anachronistic to superficially compare classical economists with neoclassical,
Austrian, and Chicago school economists. Nevertheless, I would emphasize that
despite their different interpretations of (partial) equilibrium theory, in the end
the main gist of their arguments often boils down to a common belief in the self-
regulating abilities of the market and a more general common political vision. As
has already been mentioned, Adam Smith saw both the monopoly of power that
guilds possessed and the interference of the state in the pursuit of material wealth
as important economic problems. In fact, Smith argues that it is precisely the in-
tervention of politics in economic matters that lead to inequalities or disequilibria,
first, by restraining the competition in some employments to a smaller number
than would otherwise be disposed to enter into them; secondly, by increasing it
in others beyond what it naturally would be; and, thirdly, by obstructing the free
circulation of labour and stock, both from employment to employment and from
place to place. (Smith 1994: 136)
The state should therefore neither limit nor support free competition. This being
said, it remains quite unclear where this “perfect liberty” truly lies. Nevertheless,
the prevailing consensus amongst economists is that for markets to be competi-
tive, no monopolies should exist, and this supposedly works best in markets that
are open and free. Here, it is assumed that unlimited and self-regulating com-
petition will eventually destroy all monopolies and decentralize economic power.
While Adam Smith’s work was mostly aimed against the monopolies of guilds and
the support they received from the mercantilist system, economists of the late 19th
and 20th centuries criticized the socialist and welfare states for similar reasons. In
all these cases, the state’s use of its monopoly of power to interfere in the ‘private’
sphere of economics is a prominent target of criticism. The objection to state in-
terference is thus not only based on the principles of negative rights to individual
private property, but also on the maintenance of the self-regulating mechanism of
the competitive market. States should therefore keep their hands off the invisible
hand; their attempts to ‘artificially’ constrain or abolish competition by regulating
markets or managing economic affairs need themselves to be placed under strict
limitations.
Since Adam Smith, the answer to this state interference has therefore gen-
erally been, at least in principle, the opening of markets. In this sense, the new
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institutional economist Douglass North understands capitalist markets as “open
access orders” (North et al. 2009). Similarly, Friedrich Hayek argues that economic
freedom7 cannot be limited to any community or nation, but that it is inherently
open and international (Hayek 2007: 226). All national boundaries restricting the
free movement of people and capital should be kept to a minimum, integrating all
economies into one single common market (Hayek 1980: 258). Since the open mar-
ket is international, nation states must, he thinks, pass their powers on to interna-
tional bodies. In other words, Hayek urges that the role of the state be limited to
the impersonal and impartial implementation of international economic laws and
the preservation of the apparent mutual independence of economic and political
realms of human interaction. As Douglass North et al. explain,
Open access societies limit access to violence [through the state monopoly on co-
ercion] while ensuring open access to political and economic activities. Because
the political system in an open access order does not limit economic access, it
appears that the economy exists independent of the political system. As the neo-
classical economists’ fiction holds,markets exist and then politics intervenes. This
seeming independence of politics and economics in an open access society over-
lays a much deeper and fundamental connection. It is here that impersonality oc-
cupies central stage. (North et al. 2009: 121; emphasis added)
As we see, this political neutrality of the state should create a legal setting in which
all humans are, at least theoretically, equal and included in the impersonal market
exchange.The separation of political from economicmatters is ultimately supposed
to secure the desired competition in the market that, in turn, is meant to enable
self-regulating markets to function properly (ibid.: 110-115, 121-2).8
7 I refer here to the ‘negative’ freedom to trade or exchange goods with others through con-
tracts and the freedom to accumulate private property – without illegitimate state interven-
tion.
8 As Douglass North et al. explain, “Open access orders prevent disorder through competition
and open access. Consolidated, political control over violence combines with the rules gov-
erning theuse of that violence to reduce and control access to violence. Constitutions and rule
of law provide limits on governmental policymaking, thus limiting the ways in which citizens
can feel threatened by the government that in natural states induce them to support the use
of violence and extra-constitutional action to protect themselves. In addition […] competition
is intimately involved in enforcing the constitution and rule of law that support these limits
on violence.” (North et al. 2009: 115)
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2.4 Economist kings, authoritarian liberalism
and structural constraints
In all these theories of the competitive market fromHobbes to Douglass North, the
political question remains: Who shall rule? And who possesses the knowledge and
insight to create economic laws and policies that will ensure just the right amount
of competition – neither too little nor too much? The problem becomes most clear
when we juxtapose the assumption of humans as self-interested and egotistical
beings, on the one hand,with the necessity of a strong and neutral government that
impartially imposes law, on the other hand. Furthermore, another tension appears
to arise between the necessity of a strong and overarching Hobbesian state that
enforces strict property laws and contractual agreements and its simultaneous self-
limitation when it declines to interfere in economic affairs.
For this reason, it is interesting to turn to the work of Friedrich August von
Hayek, who provides a rather insightful solution to these tensions between the
state and the market. Importantly, Hayek transforms the simple mechanistic un-
derstanding of equilibrium theory into a more dynamic and evolutionary concept
of perpetual social adaptation. This evolutionary adaptation occurs in a sponta-
neous manner and therefore cannot be planned by any political body. Here, we
are again reminded of the invisible hand of the self-regulating market. Further-
more, he also admits that the distribution of wealth in a market economy is not
just. More to the point, he argues that the category of justice cannot be applied to
markets at all. The reason for this is that there exist no individuals or groups who
are responsible for the “spontaneous” distribution of resources (Hayek 2013: 233).
Put somewhat bluntly, Hayek acknowledges that the open and competitive market
can create a good deal of human suffering through bankruptcies, unemployment,
inequalities and economic crises (Dupuy 2013: 163-4). Yet for Hayek, these effects
are merely natural occurrences in what he understands as a dynamic and sponta-
neously evolving social order. For this reason, he recognizes that if people possessed
the power to alter their social conditions – in what he named an “unlimited democ-
racy” – they would most likely do away with the competitive market or would not
develop it in the first place. In his words:
If in a society in which the spirit of enterprise has not yet spread, the majority has
power to prohibit whatever it dislikes, it is most unlikely that it will allow competi-
tion to arise. I doubt whether a functioning market has ever newly arisen under an
unlimited democracy, and it seems at least likely that unlimited democracy will
destroy it where it has grown up. To those with whom others compete, the fact
that they have competitors is always a nuisance that prevents a quiet life; and
such direct effects of competition are always much more visible than the indirect
benefits which we derive from it. (Hayek 2013: 415)
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From Hayek’s perspective, people do not desire an open and competitive market
arrangement because it implies a threat to what he calls “a quiet life”. But under-
stood more generally, the opposition to such a social arrangement is not only due
to a desire to lead a calm and peaceful life, but also most likely due to a deep aver-
sion towards the perpetual change, injustices and existential insecurities that open
competitive markets bring about. Here, it is interesting and important to note that
Adam Smith also recognized this widespread aversion towards open and compet-
itive markets, as he writes,
To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in
Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be
established in it. Not only the prejudices of the public, but what is muchmore un-
conquerable, the private interests ofmany individuals, irresistibly oppose it. (Smith
1994: 501; emphasis added)
According to Smith, this aversion is due to the monopoly position of guilds and
manufacturers who perceive open and competitive markets as a threat to their
economic power – and security. Nevertheless, Smith admits here that open and
competitive market arrangements are a somewhat utopian goal, given the egotis-
tical nature of human beings.
But isn’t this peculiar? Suddenly, we see that both Smith and Hayek believe
that people are in fact too self-interested and that they therefore want to limit mar-
ket competition to their advantage. This egotistical aversion to competition can be
interpreted as a social counter-reaction to the creation of open markets through
economic deregulation that Hayek’s contemporary Karl Polanyi describes as the
“double-movement” in his book The Great Transformation (Polanyi 2001: 136-157). In
his book, Polanyi understands this reaction to open and competitive markets as
an attempt that people make to alter and socially “re-embed” economic activities
in order to satisfy their own needs and desires (i.e. the desire to have a secure in-
come and lead a somewhat stable life). In contrast, it appears as though Smith and
Hayek perceive these people to be blinded by their egoism, which prevents them
recognizing the supposedly more subtle and “indirect” achievements of a compet-
itive market economy and, ultimately, from believing in the providential nature of
the self-regulating market.
But who, then, is there to implement the rules of such a social arrangement
that a large portion of the population does not desire? Interestingly, Adam Smith
remains silent on the question of who shall rule. For Hayek, the creation of a spon-
taneous social order requires people who have an insight into its hidden fruits
and impartial laws. Only these people are able to restrain themselves from the
hubris of collectively creating social institutions according to their particular needs
and desires. Paradoxically, only such rulers can implement political institutions
against the self-interest of the people, enabling a social order to ‘spontaneously’
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arise through the pursuit of people’s self-interest in economic affairs. While peo-
ple should pursue their self-interest on a competitive market in ‘private’ economic
affairs, they should not, however, pursue their self-interest in political or ‘public’
matters. Because most people do not possess this insight and humbling knowl-
edge, Hayek literally argues that democratic politics must therefore be “dethroned”
(Hayek 2013: 481-5). This is supposed to occur by creating a body of universal rules
that primarily protects individual negative freedom from arbitrary interference
and coercion, which is nothing other than the Hobbesian protection of individual
private property rights and the enforcement of contracts (ibid.: 447). Furthermore,
the democratic state should include both a Legislative Assembly and a Govern-
mental Assembly that is elected by the entire population every couple of years. The
Legislative Assembly consists of adults of a “relatively mature age for fairly long
periods” (ibid.: 448), more specifically between 45 and 60 years old and for a period
of 15 years.This long period should keep members independent from the “fluctuat-
ing wishes of the electorate” and from political parties “committed to support[ing]
particular interests and particular programmes of actions” (ibid.). In contrast to
the Governmental Assembly, the Legislative Assembly is only elected by people of
the age of 45 once in their lifetime who then choose someone of their generation
whom they can “trust to uphold justice impartially” and to possess qualities such as
“probity, wisdom and judgment” (ibid.). This political body would revise and sanc-
tion all laws, including those concerning taxation and regulations for safety, health
and environmental matters. In other words, members would ultimately possess
the power to create an “adequate framework for a functioning competitive mar-
ket” (ibid.: 450). To ensure that these laws are compatible with the constitution,
Hayek also suggests that there should be a constitutional court that oversees the
work of these two assemblies.The judges of this court are, in turn, appointed by the
Legislative Assembly and would often include former members of this assembly.
As becomes clear, Hayek’s concept of a ‘democratic’ state is not very demo-
cratic. The problem of conflicting interests is solved by a council of the wise who
should be – in contrast to the other self-interested citizens – highly impartial.This
group supposedly possesses the insight into the true nature of a free market so-
ciety while simultaneously limiting citizens’ ability to democratically codetermine
its laws and social arrangements in ways that might interfere with the price mech-
anism, market competition and the resulting distribution of resources and wealth
In other words, while Hayek understands the open and competitive market as an
evolutionary process of discovery and adaptation dependent on the decentralized
decision-making of individual agents, its legal framework remains abstract and
immutable. While the interactions in the market should occur spontaneously, its
laws are enforced and protected in a rather unspontaneous and calculated man-
ner by supposedly wise and objective human beings. Simply put, it appears that
Hayek is defending a social order that is ruled by technocratic economic experts
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or platonic economist kings. According to this interpretation, I believe it to be ad-
equate to argue that Hayek’s concept of society based on an international, open
and competitive market comes close to what Hermann Heller called “authoritarian
liberalism” as early as 1933 (Heller 2015). Furthermore, this interpretation of Hayek
would allow us to agree with historian Philip Mirowsky, who argues that although
many economists and economic agents often argue for a minimalist state, they
are in fact not against the state but merely want to take over the driver’s seat in
government (Mirowski 2014).
It must be acknowledged, however, that such an anti-democratic political
model could easily be put off as the somewhat embarrassing blunder and obscure
thought experiment of an elderly economist. Furthermore, it can be expected that
most economists would reject such a political model, because it not only denies
fundamental political freedoms, but it is also highly improbable that such wise
and impartial people could be found. For this reason, it is often argued that open
and competitive markets must be coupled with the periodic open and competitive
election of government officials (North et al. 2009). Here, we appear to have
returned to Fukuyama’s notion of liberal democracy or democratic capitalism, in
which the underlying mechanism of the market – i.e. competition in the sphere of
economics – is applied to the democratic decision-making process in the political
sphere.
I would like to show, however, that even with the existence of periodic elections,
open and competitive markets nevertheless severely limit peoples’ rights and capa-
bilities to democratically alter their social arrangements. Wolfgang Streeck lucidly
describes this problem in his book Buying Time (2013). Here, he explains that demo-
cratic citizens (what he calls a Staatsvolk) are bound to a national territory and have
specific rights and obligations, including the equal right to vote and the ability to
express one’s opinion freely. In contrast, the people of the market (Marktvolk) are
generally understood as internationally mobile investors and creditors, who pos-
sess the right to demand profits. Importantly, while the first group is more or less
geographically bound, the second can move easily and more or less freely from
one country to the next. Because the well-being of economies, societies and states
are largely dependent on private investors, theMarktvolk becomes a second and, in
some cases, even more important constituency. Here, elections are supplemented
by continuous auctions, public opinion by the rate of return on investment, and
political loyalty by the “confidence” of investors in market stability (Streeck 2013:
117-132). When the Staatsvolk attempts to raise taxes or to implement environmen-
tal regulations, the Marktvolk, fearing a decline in profits, will often withdraw its
investments. In turn, these “investment strikes” (ibid.: 50, 118-119) lead to unem-
ployment and economic crises, thereby punishing the people for attempting to al-
ter their politico-economic institutions and, ultimately, constraining democratic
choices. In Streeck’s words,
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The limitation of national sovereignty by ‘market forces’ amounts to a limitation
of the freedom of the Staatsvolk to make democratic decisions and a correspond-
ing empowerment of the Marktvolk, which becomes increasingly essential for fi-
nancing government decisions. Democracy at national level presupposes nation-
state sovereignty, but this is less and less available to […] states because of their
dependence on financial markets. (Streeck 2013: 126)
Here, we are again reminded of the “countervailing power of private capital” (Held
1987: 160). Yet this time economic power is used not to limit the power of abso-
lute sovereigns and warring feudal lords, as was the case with Montesquieu and
Adam Smith, but instead to undermine the democratic powers of a nation state.
Joshua Cohen succinctly calls this the “structural constraints argument”. As Cohen
explains,
According to the structural constraints argument, the private control of invest-
ment importantly limits the democratic character of the state by subordinating
the decisions and actions of the democratic state to the investment decisions of
capitalists. Political decisions are structurally constrained because the fate of par-
ties and governments depends on the health of the economy, the health of the
economy on investment decisions by capitalists, and investment decisions by cap-
italists on their expectations of profits. While groups other than capitalists also
control strategic resources, and can use that control to constrain decision-mak-
ing, the structural constraints argument holds that the power of capitalists and
the fact that everyone's welfare depends on their decisions singles them out for
special attention. (J. Cohen 1989: 28)
This problem of structural constraints can, on the one hand, be understood as a
tension between national democracies and an international open market economy
(Streeck 1998; Rodrik 2012). On the other hand, it also must be understood as a fun-
damental tension between the realms of society that are considered to be private
and public. Within the classical Hobbesian state-market dichotomy, the mainte-
nance of one’s life and livelihood is largely considered to be a private affair that
occurs within the supposedly neutral framework of the state. Yet the framework of
the state or the public is never neutral and in this case subjugated to the arbitrary
decisions and powers of the Marktvolk.
For this reason, I would agree with the political scientist Charles E. Lindblom
who provocatively argues in his articleTheMarket as Prison from 1982 that the open
and competitive market can be interpreted as a type of political prison that does
not entirely stop, but substantially suppresses institutional change (Lindblom 1982:
326). As he explains,
Many kinds of market reform automatically trigger punishments in the form of
unemployment or a sluggish market economy. […] Punishment is not [however]
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dependent on conspiracy or intention to punish. If, anticipating new regulations,
a businessman decides not to go through with a planned output expansion, he
has in effect punished us without the intention of doing so. Simply minding one’s
own business is the formula for an extraordinary system for repressing change.
[…] That result, then, is why the market might be characterized as a prison. For a
broad category of political/economic affairs, it imprisons policy making, and im-
prisons our attempts to improve our institutions. It greatly cripples our attempts
to improve the social world […]. (ibid.: 325-329)
Yet even without Hayek’s impartial economic rulers, once the institutions of in-
dividual private property and the open and competitive market are in place, the
actual possibilities of people to democratically alter these central institutions re-
main severely limited. With Adam Smith, we can therefore say that this repression
of institutional change is merely another form of discipline that results from open
and competitive markets. In this sense, we might even say that Heller’s authoritar-
ian liberalism does not even require Hayek’s economist kings, but rather functions
through the economic institutions themselves. Here, it doesn’t matter who is in
the driver’s seat, because whoever it is must acquiesce to the demands of the mar-
ket. Thus, it can be concluded that both the supposedly neutral legal framework
of the state and the self-regulating, open and competitive market undermine our
previously developed concept of democracy, in which people possess the rights and
capabilities to codetermine their social conditions.
This being said, this rather negative portrayal of the market as a political prison
should not be taken as a denial of the positive aspects of capitalist markets. It can-
not be denied that open and competitive markets have expanded the realm of in-
dividual freedom and increased the number of goods that a large portion of the
world’s population can enjoy today. In this sense, we must agree with Fukuyama
that democratic capitalism is a good thing. Nonetheless, as I have shown, the insti-
tutions of the open and competitive market inherently limit the democratic free-
dom that people can realize. This might not be a problem if everyone was satisfied
with life within the framework of an open and competitive market. But as Adam
Smith and Hayek already acknowledged, this is not the case. Furthermore and as
we will soon see, social arrangements that prioritize individual freedom based on
the negative rights of private property bring about serious social, economic, and
ecological problems that often cannot be solved due to the structural constraints
of capitalist markets. For this reason, it is necessary to develop our understanding
of other social arrangements that are more compatible with our more demand-
ing understanding of democracy and thereby provide people with the capabilities
to institutionally adapt and collectively solve the problems that threaten them. As
already mentioned, one alternative to democratic capitalism that is increasingly
being discussed is that of the commons. For this reason, let us now turn to this
44 Democracy, Markets and the Commons
discourse on the commons and analyze whether it provides us with a normatively
sound and feasible alternative ‘beyond markets and states’.
3. Garrett Hardin’s tragedy
of the unregulated commons
Before we can examine the question of whether the commons provide us with a
reasonable alternative to the social institutions that underlie democratic capital-
ism, we must firstly analyze what is widely assumed to be the necessary failure of
commons, as expressed in Garrett Hardin’s influential 1968 articleThe Tragedy of the
Commons. Although the concept of the commons can be traced back much further,
Hardin’s article has greatly increased the contemporary interest in the topic and has
framed a heated debate that has lasted until today.1 In this short chapter I therefore
firstly analyze Hardin’s argument as to why commons are inadvertently overused.
In a second step, I discuss his suggestions of how to overcome this tragedy. In a
nutshell, I will demonstrate that Hardin’s theory is not a critique of the commons
per se, but rather of unregulated commons, which bring about open and competi-
tive social arrangements.
3.1 The tragedy: maximization strategies
and the double C–double P game
To begin with, it is worth mentioning that Garrett Hardin’s theory implicitly re-
peats the basic arguments of Malthus’ Essay on the Principle of Population from 1798.
Accordingly, Hardin opens his theory of “The Tragedy of the Commons” by assum-
ing two general yet conflicting principles. His first premise is based on the laws of
conservation and postulates that resources on earth are scarce. His second premise
is based on biologists’ observations that all living organisms have an inherent ten-
dency to perpetually increase their population in order to secure their survival
(Hardin 1968: 1243). Understood mathematically, this existential drive leads to the
1 According to Elinor Ostrom, “Hardin’s article is one of the most cited publications of re-
cent times as well as among the most influential for ecologists and environmental policy
researchers. Almost all textbooks on environmental policy cite Hardin's article and discuss
the problem that Hardin so graphically identified.” (Ostrom 2008b)
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exponential growth of populations. In nature, however, this tendency is kept in
check by limited resources and other scarcity-related mechanisms such as hunger,
disease, predators and, ultimately, death. In comparison to other animals, humans
are reflexive beings that must make choices between the forms of their consump-
tion, or rather between the amount of resources they utilize per person and their
population size. For this reason, Hardin dismisses the utilitarian principle of “the
greatest good for the greatest number” and declares that we must choose between
maximizing our offspring and maximizing goods – or that we find a middle way
between these extremes. With this reasoning, Hardin sets the stage for his cri-
tique of “laissez-faire” policies in reproduction and, more generally, of unregulated
commons.
Hardin explains this conflict between limited ecological resources and both
demographic and economic growth by envisaging a scenario involving a pastoral
commons. In Hardin’s scenario, a pasture is held in common and is “open to all”
(Hardin 1968: 1244), to be used by herders for the grazing of their privately-owned
cattle.Hardin borrows this “heuristic image” (Hardin 1977a: 68) fromWilliam Foster
Lloyd’s pamphlet Two Lectures on the Checks of Population that was first published in
1833 and utilizes it as a model to portray and understand the relationship between
humans and their environment. For us to comprehend the underlying problem,
Hardin’s two premises need to be reformulated. Firstly, the scarcity of resources
implies that the carrying capacity of a pasture is limited. Hardin therefore defines
the carrying capacity of a resource as “the maximum number of animals that can
be sustained by this food source year after year, without a diminution of the quality of
the pasture” (Hardin 1993: 207; original emphasis). The second premise, postulating
the supposedly natural exponential growth in the population size of every species
must be translated into the size of the herds that are bred and controlled by the
herders.While this second premise originally assumed an innate biological drive to
increase one’s own population size, we must now ask ourselves why herders desire
and choose to increase the number of their cattle.
Hardin answers this question within a general framework of methodological
individualism and in both biological and utilitarian terms. Although not explic-
itly formulated by Hardin, his biological reasoning provides us with a Social Dar-
winist and ‘existential’ understanding of the tragedy of the commons. In contrast
to other animals, in humans, an innate drive to survive can manifest itself either
in the increasing number of human offspring produced or in the amount of re-
sources accumulated for future production and consumption. When population
sizes and consumption levels are far below the carrying capacity of the available
resources, abundance prevails and the use of commons provides no serious prob-
lems. In Hardin’s words: “So long as there is a great sufficiency of pastureland,
commonized real estate is efficient: no fences need be maintained and there is lit-
tle call for human supervision.” (Hardin 1993: 216) This implies that although the
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carrying capacity creates a limitation to economic and demographic growth, if hu-
man existence remains largely below these boundaries, people should nevertheless
experience a certain sufficiency or even abundance. Yet, owing to the supposedly
natural urge to survive through the growth in population size or wealth accumula-
tion, resources become scarcer.This increase in scarcity, however, ironically leads to
a greater existential threat and an intensified attempt to secure one’s own survival
through increased growth and accumulation.
Although the foundation of Hardin’s argumentation is based on this ‘biologi-
cal’ reasoning, he resorts to utilitarian terms and rational choice theory to explain
the tragedy of the commons. Accordingly, Hardin declares that “as a rational be-
ing, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain” (Hardin 1968: 1244). Along this
line of thought, he assumes that each herder calculates the utility of increasing the
number of animals in their herd and that they realize that one additional animal
increases the individual’s utility (meat, milk etc.) by +1 while the negative effects
of overgrazing are distributed among all herders, creating a fraction of -1 utility
for themselves. In other words, the responsibilities for losses do not correlate with
the gains of one’s actions. For this reason, Hardin calls this situation the “dou-
ble C–double P game”, in which costs are communized and profits are privatized
(Hardin 1993: 237). By assuming that other humans are also rational beings and
that they will act accordingly, each herder realizes that resources will predictably
become scarce and that they must act in this manner so as not to be a ‘sucker’.
Hardin explains this dynamic and its problematic outcome in this key passage:
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes
that the only sensible course for him topursue is to addanother animal to his herd.
And another; and another…. But this is the conclusion reached by every each and
every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man
is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a
world that is limited. Ruin is the destination towardwhich allmen rush, each pursuing
his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. (ibid.: 1244; emphasis added)
The tragedy of the commons can thus be understood as a ‘race to the bottom’ in
which each herder attempts to gain as much as possible from the common pasture
before its resources are completely depleted. While individuals strive to survive
in the short term, the conditions necessary for the long term reproduction of the
group are undermined and destroyed. In other words, the tragedy of the commons
portrays a type of Hobbesian state of nature in which supposed subjective ratio-
nality ultimately leads to an objective, social and ecological irrationality. Due to the
assumed functioning of human nature in such a social setting,Hardin declares that
this destructive dynamic in the tragedy of the commons is “inevitable” (ibid.).
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3.2 Social institutions against tragedy: privatism or socialism
Yet in spite of this supposed inevitability, Hardin argues that the situation can be
changed. In this sense, Hardin sees the problem not necessarily in a supposedly
egotistical human nature or in a lack of individual morality but in the institutional
organization of society and of its resources (Hardin 1993: 218). As Hardin admit-
ted in an article published thirty years later, the actual problem of the commons
is not the commons per se, but rather that they are unmanaged and open to all
(Hardin 1998). Particularly, the problem of the tragedy of the commons is that the
use of its resources is institutionally structured in an open and highly competi-
tive manner. In this sense, the tragedy of a pastoral commons is not limited to an
agricultural society but can be understood as metaphor for the general problem of
open and competitive social arrangements in which profits can be privatized and
costs spread onto the rest of society (Hardin 1979). Interestingly, Hardin also sees
this problem in Adam Smith’s “laissez-faire” policies of unregulated free enterprise
and its adverse effects on pollution levels2 (ibid.; Hardin 1968: 1244; Hardin 1993:
223) and the supposedly Marxist principle of open-access: “to each according to his
needs” (Hardin 1977b). According to Hardin, both principles create social arrange-
ments in which rights and responsibilities fail to correlate and therefore ultimately
lead to over-use and destruction. However, I would add here that the negative ex-
ternalities of these open and competitive social arrangements also include social
inequalities and other related social problems such as unemployment, economic
crises and the like. The ability of all agents to appropriate an unlimited amount of
resources implies that certain (stronger) parties can inevitably accumulate more,
ultimately leading to the limitation of access to these resources for others. We will
discuss the social effects of this mechanism in more detail when analyzing what
I call the tragedy of the market. But for now, it is important to emphasize that
Hardin demonstrates that this lack of regulation opens the possibility for a small
minority to free ride and “bleed the jointly owned resource dry,” which, in turn,
forces others to “follow their lead” (Hardin 1979). According to Hardin, this prob-
lem cannot be resolved through a plea for more moral behavior because “a system
that depends only on conscience rewards the conscienceless” (Hardin 1972: 129). Or,
specifically, an open-access system penalizes the prudent and rewards the reckless
and more powerful.
Hardin’s answer to this problem is, at least at first glance, relatively simple:
“mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected”
2 In relation to the problem of externalities and pollution, Hardin writes that “we are locked
into a system of ‘fouling our nest,’ so long as we behave only as independent, rational, free-
enterprisers” (Hardin 1968:1245). For further thoughts on the problem of laissez-faire policies
and externalities, see also page 240 in Hardin’s Living within Limits (1993).
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(Hardin 1968: 1247). In order to break this tragic vicious circle, everyone must agree
to be forced to follow rules and regulations – without exception. Only through a
democratic social contract that regulates and limits everyone’s individual freedom
can the freedom of everyone be secured in the long run. Here, we are reminded
of Hobbes. But what is an institutional arrangement based on mutually agreed-
upon coercion supposed to look like? Hardin’s response to this question is, again,
quite straightforward: “privatism” or “socialism” must replace all forms of unman-
aged “commonism” (Hardin 1978: 315; Hardin 1979; Hardin 1993: 218-9). “Privatism”
occurs, according to Hardin, when both the land and animals are owned by the
same individual. Responsibilities and gains, resources and harvests correlate fully.
This property regime, however, becomes problematic when ownership is separated
from occupancy and operation, which can lead to new problems of over-use and
exploitation. While “socialism” is similar to “privatism” in that responsibilities and
gains correspond, it must be understood as a regulated common because it is col-
lectively owned, managed and harvested. However, this property regime is prob-
lematic because larger groups often require appointed managers who administer
and enforce rules. This delegation of power leads to the fundamental problem of
Quis custodiet ipsos custodies? Or in English:Whowill watch over the watchmen them-
selves?3 Due to the problems of both property regimes, Hardin argues that neither
form is clearly better than the other. It is important to Hardin that the tragedy of
unmanaged commons is avoided through either regime or – as is most often the
case – through a mixture of the two, depending on the different empirical condi-
tions.
Despite this openness towards both political systems and property regimes,
Hardin’s positionmust nevertheless be interpreted as Neo-Hobbesian (Ophuls 1977:
148). The reason for this is that in the case both of privatization and of socializa-
tion, Hardin argues that freedom must be limited by coercion implemented from
‘without’:
The persistent dream of freedom is the suicidal dream of a state in which indi-
vidual conscience is the only coercive force. But in truth, when we are dealing
with real human beings rather than paragons, if ruin is to be avoided in a crowded
world, peoplemust be responsive to a coercive force outside their individual psyches,
a ‘Leviathan,’ to useHobbes’ term. […] In a crowdedworld, this is the closest we can
get to freedom. (Hardin 1978, 314; emphasis added)
Hardin argues that because it cannot be assumed that all humans are virtuous,
human life and liberty can only be protected through coercive laws that precisely
limit this freedom. And these limiting rules must ultimately be implemented from
3 The literal translation refers to guards andnotwatchmen, but the problem remains the same:
the social control of those who must create and enforce rules.
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without, from outside the affected individual’s psyche and thus from outside the
affected group.
In summary, it can be claimed that Hardin’s approach leads to three rather sig-
nificant fallacies. Firstly, it is often mistakenly assumed that commons inherently
will be overused, while Hardin actually argues that the unmanaged commons leads
to tragedy. Here, I would agree with Hardin. Secondly, it is often mistakenly be-
lieved that the destruction of common resources can only be averted if privatized or
socialized. In this case, socialization is often interpreted as nationalization through
the state. It can generally be said that this dualism has reinforced the often held as-
sumption popular during and since the Cold War that the only options people have
to organize society are either according to the principles of individual private prop-
erty and the market or to those of a centralized nation-state. This is problematic,
however, because it simply brings us back to the market–state dichotomy that we
had hoped to escape in democratic capitalism. Lastly, Hardin assumes that while
people are theoretically able to democratically agree on laws to limit their freedom
and the destruction of the planet, the implementation of these lawsmust, however,
come from an external sovereign, a Leviathan. If these options are truly the only
possibilities available, three questions remain: Firstly, how are people able to enter
a contract that might be rational for society in the long run, while being harmful
or irrational for the individual in the short run? Secondly, are private property and
state ownership truly the only forms of resourcemanagement available to humans?
And thirdly, where will this virtuous, absolute Leviathan that can administer and
enforce laws “from the outside” come from? Considering these problems, which
remain unsolved in Hardin’s work, it appears necessary to explore Elinor and Vin-
cent Ostrom’s research on the commons, which provides us with theoretical and
empirical answers to these three questions – and opens the door to an alternative
to democratic capitalism.
4. Overcoming the tragedy with the Ostroms
Having analyzed the social structure and logic of the tragedy of the unmanaged
commons, I now turn to consider how to avert this supposedly inevitable catas-
trophe. An important characteristic of the approach I outline is that it aims to
provide us with a different conception of social arrangements that overcome or
dissolve the traditional market-state dichotomy of democratic capitalism, which
inherently limits democratic ways of shaping social institutions and solving so-
cial and ecological problems. In order to do this, we will turn to the work of Eli-
nor and Vincent Ostrom on the sustainable and democratic m of the commons.
The exploration of their work will be structured as follows. Firstly, I analyze what
Elinor Ostrom understands as “grim” social dilemmas that underlie not only the
tragedy of the commons but almost all forms of collective action. In a second step,
I consider the Ostrom’s arguments against a centralized and hierarchical state or
“monocentric order” as a possible answer to these social dilemmas. In a third step,
I critically examine several problems or tragedies that result from privatization and
the market. After having discussed the limitations of both monocentric orders and
markets, I then turn to the Ostroms’ work on how collective action can be culti-
vated and realized in order to overcome social dilemmas. A central feature of this
is the development of reciprocity, trust and reputation through the communication
of the affected agents. The stabilization of this collective action requires, in turn,
the democratic definition of rules for both the use of common pool resources and
their mutual monitoring. I will then discuss these ideas with reference to Elinor
Ostrom’s eight design principles for the sustainable self-governance of commons.
In a final step, I explore how these insights from microsituational settings can be
scaled up into what Elinor and Vincent Ostrom call a polycentric system of demo-
cratic governance. Last but not least, I critically examine the limits and blind spots
of their work.
Before delving into this investigation, I would like to briefly explain why I
largely focus on the work of Elinor Ostrom and only marginally on that of Vin-
cent Ostrom.The reason for this is rather simple: Elinor Ostrom’s extensive empir-
ical and theoretical work provides us with an amazing array of examples of com-
mon pool resources and public services, including fisheries, forests, pastures, ir-
52 Democracy, Markets and the Commons
rigation systems, water basins and police security. Throughout her life, Elinor Os-
trom searched to define the contingent conditions of possibility for overcoming
the tragedy of the commons – or put differently, the conditions of possibility for
human cooperation, democratic governance and ecological sustainability. And it
is for this work that she then received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009. In
contrast, while Vincent Ostrom also used the tragedy of the commons as a starting
point for the development of his ideas, his focus was less on commons and more
on the political theory of a polycentric or federal model of the state that was based
on many of Elinor Ostrom’s more empirical insights. For this reason, while I focus
on Elinor Ostrom’s work, I also integrate Vincent’s arguments and ideas in order
to complement those of Elinor.1
4.1 Collective action and “grim” social dilemmas
In Elinor and Vincent Ostrom’s theories, the notion of democracy is of central im-
portance as a means to overcome the tragedy of the commons. While much lit-
erature on democracy focuses on issues such as voting behavior, party politics,
parliamentary institutions and the state, Elinor Ostrom approached the problem
of democracy from a micro-situational perspective, drawing on game theory and
focusing on social dilemmas and collective action. In her Presidential Address of
the American Political Science Association in 1997, Ostrom explains the importance
of collective action theory for political science – and for almost all human interac-
tions:
The theory of collective action is the central subject of political science. It is the
core of the justification of the state. Collective action problems pervade interna-
tional relations, face legislators when devising public budgets, permeate public
bureaucracies, and are at the core of explanations of voting, interest group for-
mation, and citizen control of governments in a democracy. (E. Ostrom 1998: 1;
original emphasis)
According to Ostrom, collective action dilemmas are present in “all major eco-
nomic, political, and social projects requiring individuals to associate in alloca-
tion activities” (E. Ostrom 2003: 21). For this reason, it has been her lifelong aim
to develop intellectual tools to understand “the capabilities and limitations of self-
governing institutions for regulating many types of resources” (E. Ostrom 2008a:
2).
1 In order to deal with the rather awkward and cumbersome repetition of the names Elinor
Ostrom and Vincent Ostrom, I will sometimes also refer to the two authors simply as Vincent
and Elinor.
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In this sense, Ostrom understood the “tragedy of the commons” as a collective
action or social dilemma, which, in turn, can also be understood as a prisoner’s
dilemma involving two people (E. Ostrom 2008a: 2-5). According to Elinor, social
dilemmas arise in situations in which “individuals make independent choices in an
interdependent situation” (E. Ostrom 1998: 3; emphasis added). This is an important
point in my later, more in-depth discussion of an ecological understanding of the
commons. For now, it is important to note that such dilemmas occur “whenever
individuals in interdependent situations face choices in which the maximization
of short-term self-interest yields outcomes leaving all participants worse off than
feasible alternatives” (ibid.: 1). As we have already seen, these dilemmas should,
according to theoretical models such as the one proposed by Hardin, generate de-
fective strategies that ultimately lead to suboptimal outcomes (resource depletion,
inequalities etc.). In economic literature on game theory these outcomes are de-
fined as a Pareto-inferior Nash-equilibria; inmore colloquial terminology wemight
generalize fromHardin’s reference to a “tragedy of the commons” and speak simply
of ‘tragedy’. In general terms, Ostrom argues that such tragic situations boil down
to the “free rider problem”, which she defines in this way:
Whenever one person cannot be excluded from the benefits that others provide,
each person is motivated not to contribute to the joint effort, but to free-ride on
[i.e. take advantage of] the efforts of others. If all participants choose to free-ride,
the collective benefit will not be produced. (E. Ostrom 2008a: 6)
The reason for the general fascinationwith thesemodels is that their structures cre-
ate a situation in which the best individual strategies ironically lead to a suboptimal
joint outcome. For this reason, Elinor Ostrom writes, “The paradox that individu-
ally rational strategies lead to collectively irrational outcomes seems to challenge
a fundamental faith that rational human beings can achieve rational results.” (E.
Ostrom 1986: 4) It must be noted that this insight is quite striking because it contra-
dicts, first and foremost, the previously mentioned assumption in economics that
individual subjective interests lead to positive social outcomes, which is the basic
principle of the invisible hand that underlies belief in the self-regulation of themar-
ket.2 Furthermore, these dilemmas also suggest, more generally, that cooperation
2 It could be argued that the two models (the “invisible hand” and the “tragedy of the com-
mons”) cannot be compared because one model is based on private property regimes and
the other on common property regimes. In economic theory, the answer to the problem of
over-use and tragedy is therefore privatization. We will discuss the limits and problems of
privatization in more detail later. For the time being, however, it is important to note that
privatization cannot overcome the problem of tragedy because people are intersubjective
beings that share a common reality and therefore also share certain goods that cannot be
privatized. One example of this shared reality is, for example the shared legal structure of
the market itself. To illustrate the relationship between the market and the commons, we
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is impossible or, rather, irrational for supposedly rational agents within specific
social arrangements. Although Ostrom agrees with Hardin that “from within the
game, participants are trapped in an eternal struggle of tragic proportions” (ibid.:
6), she questions whether such a situation truly represents the full diversity of so-
cial interactions and institutions.
Thus, Elinor Ostrom not only criticizes the simple model based on this “grim
trap” but also the policy prescriptions whose equally “grim character” has resulted
from such models (E. Ostrom 2008a: 8). Her main criticism is aimed at the simple
dualism, both sides of which are frequently presented and discussed as alternatives
to the tragedy: centralized state authority versus privatization and the market. Be-
fore examining the Ostroms’ own alternative to the tragedy, I would like to ana-
lyze their interpretations and criticisms of the centralized state and the market in
more detail in order to clarify the limitations of these twomodels as answers to the
problem of the tragedy of the commons. Let us therefore begin with the centralized
state, which Vincent Ostrom calls the “monocentric order”.
4.2 The tragedy of monocentric orders
According to Vincent Ostrom, monocentric orders are realized according to a the-
ory of sovereignty that only envisages a single center of ultimate authority. This
is the Hobbesian model of the Leviathan that Hardin propagated. The assumption
underlying this idea is that to overcome perpetual war or the destructive compe-
tition between private, egotistical individuals, a single center of authority must
create a single system of law for all. In order to be able to do this, the center of
authority must be “the source of law, […] above the law, [and] cannot be held ac-
countable to law” (V. Ostrom 2011b: 352-3). Furthermore, this law is enforced by the
same source of authority (ibid.: 353-4). The conflicting violence between factions is
therefore resolved by creating a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in
the organization of a society” (ibid.: 353; emphasis omitted). The monopoly of the
use of force in society transforms all these quarreling individuals and groups into a
unified organization called the state. Abstractly speaking, oneness is to supersede,
contain and structure the many. The function of such a monocentric order is to
“dominate […] all patterns of organization that are subject to law” (ibid.) so as to
limit and enable individual freedom.
Drawing on MaxWeber, Vincent Ostrom further argues that a monocentric or-
der is not only characterized by a single center of supreme authority, but that it
could thus say that the commons provides the stage or background setting for the market.
While the self-regulation of the market might function on the stage, I argue that it leads to
the destruction of the stage.
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is closely associated with and dependent on hierarchical command structures that
are realized in a bureaucratic form of organization. In general terms, the com-
mand structure in monocentric, hierarchical organizations is justified based on an
increase in efficiency, rationality and objectivity. The hierarchical command struc-
ture and the monopoly of the use of force in society enables monocentric orders to
impose effective sanctions to prevent free riding and to collect levies for protecting
and developing both common-pool resources and public goods (V. Ostrom 1974: 58-
9). This ability to enforce rules and collect taxes provides an efficient answer to the
relatively high deliberation and transaction costs created when pooling resources
by creating contracts between all individuals. Furthermore, the management of
a resource through a single organization enables externalities to be internalized
(ibid.: 63).3 Thus, monocentric orders are assumed to increase the efficiency and
rationality in the organization of human affairs.
In relation to the efficient implementation of impartial and uniform laws, Eli-
nor Ostrom emphasizes, however, that uniform rules are problematic when deal-
ing with commons, because of the ways that common pool resources often differ
from one another. If uniform rules are applied across such different contexts, the
problem is that either false incentives are created or people do not take the rules
seriously and thus end up pursuing short-term maximization strategies neverthe-
less (E. Ostrom 2008a: 11). This problem is sometimes accentuated when resources
that were held in common by local communities are nationalized by the state. The
problem arises where the state, however, lacks the ability to monitor and enforce
the regulation of those resources, with the result that a common-property resource
is transformed into an unregulated open-access resource (ibid.: 23; E. Ostrom 1999:
495).
Vincent Ostrom’s rather fundamental critique of monocentric orders is not,
however, based on common-pool resources, but rather on the widespread and well-
known critique of bureaucratic systems in welfare states, made especially popular
by thework of Ludwig vonMises,Gordon Tullock and,more generally, public choice
theory. Here, it is argued that individuals working in large bureaucracies are – like
all human beings – self-interested, which ultimately leads to corruption and to the
organization’s executives losing control over it. Here, Elinor Ostrom also points
to the paradox that it is assumed that the Leviathan will be a wise and ecological
ruler while the individuals using the resources are short-sighted, ecologically ig-
norant egoists (E. Ostrom 1986: 8). Second, she argues that state bureaucracies are
3 It is important to note that this economic rationale of vertical integration drives both public
agencies andprivate firms to become centralized, hierarchical organizations, as Robert Coase
argued in his article The Nature of the Firm (Coase 1937: 390-1; V. Ostrom 1974: 59). This insight
radically contrasts the common interpretation of bureaucracy as a form of organization only
found in governments and public administration.
56 Democracy, Markets and the Commons
not exposed to competition and are therefore prone to being inefficient and unre-
sponsive to the diverse and changing demands of citizens and consumers. Contin-
uing this line of criticism, Vincent argues that monocentric, hierarchical bureau-
cracies enable a monopoly over the legal instruments of coercion and thus provide
“unique opportunities for a few to exploit the many” (V. Ostrom 1993: 59), opening
the door to oppression and tyranny. Vincent rounds out these criticisms of mono-
centric, bureaucratic orders by concluding – again with reference to Max Weber
– that such organizations can become self-perpetuating organizations that reduce
all individuals – rulers and ruled – to subservient cogs in an “iron cage” (Weber
2001: 123; V. Ostrom 2011b). This leads us to a supposed “paradox of bureaucracy”
in which collective attempts to enable individual positive freedom – through wel-
fare services, for example – will be undermined by an unresponsive and possibly
corrupt paternalism on the part of governmental officials (V. Ostrom 2011b: 355-
6).4 Furthermore, through its individualistic conception of rights, a monocentric,
bureaucratic (welfare) state supports the atomization of individuals and, thereby,
undercuts the desire and capacities of individuals to collectively care for common
goods (Allen/Ostrom 2008: 148). According to Vincent Ostrom, the monocentric or-
der thus appears to reproduce the tragedy of the commons through its monopoly
of the use of force and its corrupt and exploitive bureaucratic administration.
Before discussing the Ostroms’ answer to the problems of monocentric orders,
I wish to offer a few critical reflections on their depiction of monocentric orders,
which is admittedly somewhat simple and problematic. Firstly, it must be em-
phasized that the notion of a monopoly on coercion appears, at least to me, to
4 The assumption that a monocentric bureaucracy is a threat to individual positive freedom
is famously formulated in Tocqueville’s account of “democratic despotism” where he writes:
“That power is absolute, minute, regular, provident, andmild. […] The will of man is not shat-
tered, but softened, bent, and guided; men are seldom forced to act, but they are constantly
restrained from acting. Such a power does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does not
tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each na-
tion is reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the
government is the shepherd.” (Tocqueville 2004: 861-2) Although the state that Tocqueville
is describing is not the same as the one under which Vincent Ostrom lives, Vincent never-
theless repeats this argument throughout his work (e.g. V. Ostrom 1997: 278). In a different
form, Claus Offe also presents a similar argument in his essay Contradictions of the Welfare
State (1985) in which he explains that the socialist left also believes that the welfare state
undermines individual self-determination: “The welfare state can be looked upon as an ex-
change transaction in which material benefits for the needy are traded for their submissive
recognition of the ‘moral order’ of the society which generates such needs. One important
pre-condition for obtaining services of the welfare state is the ability of the individual to
comply with the routines and requirements of welfare bureaucracies and service organiza-
tions, an ability which, needless to say, often is inversely correlated to need itself.” (Offe 1985:
156)
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be an important means of overcoming conflicts. Monocentric orders provide ways
to define rules that limit free riding, enforce sanctions and redistribute scarce re-
sources. Ultimately, these are similar to the mechanisms that Elinor Ostrom de-
scribes in her eight design principles for sustainably self-governing commons.
Here, the monopoly of force can be understood as a pooling of coercive powers
in a certain institutional arrangement. However, the difference between the state
and the commons is simply that the state is a much larger institution with longer
chains of trust and accountability than the social arrangements that Elinor an-
alyzes. The mere fact that monocentric can be used as a means of tyranny and
oppression should not, however, imply that we must entirely reject the concept of
a monocentric order. This would be throwing the baby out with the bath water.
We have already confronted this problem in Hardin’s critique of commons, which
turned out be a critique of unregulated commons. Thus, the question is how the
monocentric power of the sovereign can be controlled and how the monopoly on
the use of force can be made legitimate and just. The question that is of central
importance here is whether the state’s rules and its authority are democratically
legitimate. Furthermore, the question arises of how bureaucratic administrations
should be designed to make them more responsive, effective and accountable. We
will return to these questions in more depth later while discussing polycentric or-
ders and the relation between the state and commons. Before that, however, let us
turn to the other of the two answers to the tragedy of the commons: privatization
and the market.
4.3 The tragedy of privatization and the market
Such criticisms of the state have been very influential, and it has often been said
that privatization is a better answer to the tragedy of the commons (e.g. Demsetz
1967). As we have already seen in our discussion of Garrett Hardin’s work, the main
arguments for privatization are the internalization of costs and thus the correla-
tion of costs and benefits. And as Adam Smith and other economists have argued,
competitive market arrangements, in turn, provide us with more responsive and
efficient social institutions.
Interestingly, Elinor and Vincent Ostrom do not discuss privatization or the
market very much. While Vincent is rather fierce in his critique of the monocen-
tric state, he remains somewhat silent on the problems of themarket. In fact, while
he speaks of a “moral economy”, he simultaneously defends the open and competi-
tive market using arguments similar to those that we have previously discussed (V.
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Ostrom 1991: 229-231; V. Ostrom 1997: 107; V. Ostrom 2011a: 191).5 In contrast, Elinor
does mention the problems of an open and competitive market, though she does so
sparingly. To be fair, we can generally assume that this has to do with the historical
context of the Cold War they lived and wrote in.6 Nevertheless, their empirical and
theoretical framework does provide us with some rare insights into the problem
of privatization and markets. The reason why I insist on a critique of privatiza-
tion and markets here is that we must understand why privatization and markets
are problematic in more detail in order to justify our defense and development of
commons. Conversely, if privatization and markets work well, there is no reason to
change their institutional arrangements. As Elinor Ostrom says herself, “If it ain’t
broke, don’t fix it” (Ostrom 2008a: 211).
Different Types of Goods (Part I)
Before turning to privatization and the market, it is important to note that Eli-
nor and Vincent Ostrom do not deal with these issues in detail because they often
simply assume that public choice theory has already developed a sufficiently clear
5 Here, it canbenoted thatVincentOstromdoesnot like touse thegeneral terms ‘markets’ and,
more importantly, ‘capitalism’. He explains in an interview: “Probably the best way to charac-
terize our approach would be to start with one of our most influential themes: the idea that
broad concepts such as ‘markets’ and ‘states,’ or ‘socialism’ and ‘capitalism,’ do not take us
very far in thinking about patterns of order in human society. For example, when some ‘mar-
ket’ economists speak of ‘capitalism,’ they fail to distinguish between an open, competitive
market economy and a state-dominated mercantile economy. In this, they follow Marx. He
argued that ‘capitalism’ has a competitive dynamic that leads tomarket domination by a few
largemonopoly ormonopoly-like enterprises. But whatMarx called ‘capitalism,’ Adam Smith
called ‘mercantilism.’ Similarly, many authors who write about ‘capitalism’ fail to recognize
the complexity of capitalist institutions. They overlook the rich structures of communal and
public enterprises in societies with open and highly competitive market economies. Instead,
we should expect to find some combination ofmarket and non-market structures in every so-
ciety, and we should recognize the complex configuration of institutions behind labels such
as ‘capitalism’.” (V. Ostrom in Aligica/Boettke 2009: 142) It is, however, quite a peculiar and
problematic fact about Vincent’s work that while he demands an exact and differentiated
analysis of the institutions of markets, he never – at least to my knowledge – provides such
a differentiated analysis himself. I do, in fact, hope to develop such a differentiated under-
standing of markets in this book.
6 In an interview, Elinor Ostrom was once asked “Do you take issue with those who call your
theories ‘implicitly socialistic’?”, Her answer to this question was: “Yes. I don’t think they are
supporting socialism as a top-down theory. A lot of socialist governments are very much top
down and I think my theory does challenge that any top-down government, whether on the
right or the left, is unlikely to be able to solvemany of the problems of resource sustainability
in the world.” (E. Ostrom in Klein et al. 2013: 541)
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categorization of goods, including private goods (Buchanan 1965). In distinguish-
ing between goods, they emphasize two essential characteristics: exclusion and
rivalry. In contrast to widespread theories on goods, Elinor and Vincent Ostrom,
however, replace rivalry with joint use (Ostrom/Ostrom 1999: 78). The divisibility
of goods creates the possibility of excluding others from their use, ultimately en-
abling a specific good or service to be privatized and traded as a commodity on the
market. Access to such a good is only allowed when the terms and conditions of the
vendor are met (ibid.: 76). In other words, access to these goods depends on a per-
son’s purchasing power or, in more plain language, on how much money a person
has. In the case of goods that cannot be divided up or where this is more difficult,
with things such as the air or peace, exclusion can generally not be realized. Here,
“anyone can derive benefits from the good so long as nature or the efforts of others
supply it” (ibid.). Joint use, on the other hand, implies that more than one person
can consume a good simultaneously. Typical examples of such a good are a movie
theater or a lighthouse. Goods that generally do not enable joint consumption are,
for example, an apple or a fish.These goods are, in contrast, considered to be rival.
If one person eats the fish, another person cannot eat it. Such goods are subtractive
and therefore considered to be scarce and thus rival. These distinguishing charac-
teristics of exclusion and joint use have led the Ostroms and other public choice
theorists to differentiate between individual private goods, collective private goods
or club goods, common pool resources and public goods. The following table sets
out the four types of goods:




Private Goods: Bread, shoes, au-
tomobiles, haircuts, books, etc.
Toll Goods: Theaters, night clubs,
telephone service, toll roads, cable




Water pumped from a ground-
water basin, fish taken from an
ocean, crude oil extracted from
an oil pool
Public Goods: Peace and security
of a community, national defense,
mosquito abatement, air pollution
control, fire protection, streets,
weather forecasts, public TV, etc.
Here, it is important to note that common pool resources are similar to public
goods because it is relatively difficult (i.e. costly) in both cases to exclude others
from their use. Yet, in contrast to public goods, common pool resources can pro-
vide individuals with goods that can be consumed individually (e.g. a fish from an
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ocean).7 In a similar manner, individual private goods can be distinguished from
collective private or toll goods in that both types of goods enable exclusion while
the former good is a rival good and the latter is – at least in principle – non-rival.
Although this schematic categorization of goods is helpful in differentiating
between types of goods, Vincent Ostrom emphasizes that there are a few respects
in which it is somewhat problematic. Firstly, few if any goods perfectly fit this
categorization except for a few trivial and ideal cases such as gravity (V. Ostrom
1975: 847). In a similar sense, the possibility of joint consumption depends on the
precise conditions of use. A public highway can, for example, become rival and a
public ‘bad’ when over-used. Additionally, the schematic representation of goods
fails to recognize that the differences between goods lie on a continuum. And lastly,
it neglects the relationships that exist between goods of various types (e.g. the rela-
tionship between automobiles and the public highway). Vincent therefore explains
that “within this continuum, the production or consumption of goods or services
may involve spillover effects or externalities” (V. Ostrom 2011a: 190; original emphasis).
In other words, the use of one type of good will most likely have positive or negative
effects on other goods owing to their interdependence (e.g. the positive effects of
education on a broader population and the negative effects of pollution on water
quality). The interrelatedness of different goods therefore demands different ac-
cess and utilization rules depending on the positive and negative effects of these
goods. Also, these access and utilization rules are not simply given; they are highly
contested.
Furthermore, it must be noted that this framework simply assumes that spe-
cific types of goods inherently or ‘naturally’ possess certain characteristics, which,
in turn, means that they are more adequately dealt with as private, club, common
or public goods. But as Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess argue, “Common pool
resources may be owned by national, regional, or local governments; by communal
groups; by private individuals or corporations; or used as open access resources by
whomever can gain access.” (E. Ostrom/Hess 2010: 58) Ostrom and Hess empha-
size, therefore, that “there is no automatic association of common-pool resources
with common property regimes – or, with any other particular type of property regime”
7 The concept of common pool resources is explained in a bit more detail in a longer passage
by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom: “In the case of a common-pool resource, exclusion may be
infeasible in the sense that many users cannot be denied access. But, use by any one user
precludes use of some fixed quantity of a good by other users. Each pumper in a groundwater
basin, for example, makes a use of water that is alternative to its use by each other pumper.
Each fish or ton of fish taken by any one fisherman prevents any other fisherman from taking
those same fish. Yet no basis exists for excluding fishermen from access to fish in an ocean.
Once appropriated fromanatural supply, water can be dealt with as a toll good to be supplied
to those who have access to a distribution system; similarly, once taken from the ocean, fish
can be dealt with as a private good.” (Ostrom/Ostrom 1999: 78)
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(ibid.; original emphasis). In other words, it can be assumed, at least theoretically,
that all goods could be privatized if purchasing power and the demand for a good
increased while new technologies were to reduce the costs of exclusion (Engel 2002:
52; Euler 2018). Just as a few centuries ago it might have seemed absurd to imagine
that watermight be bottled and become an object of mass consumption, it is just as
possible that fresh air will be bottled and sold one day. We can thus conclude with
Tyler Cowen that the “costliness of exclusion is not a function of the nature of the
good [itself]” (Cowen 1985: 61). Or, in more general terms, “nearly every good can
be classified as either public or private depending upon the institutional frame-
work surrounding the good and the conditions of the good’s production” (ibid.:
53). For this reason, it is necessary to investigate whether the Ostroms provide us
with arguments for or against organizing specific resources in private or common
property arrangements.
Market failure and privatization
It is important to emphasize that neither Elinor nor Vincent understands the
tragedy of the commons to be the result of a common pool resource itself or of a
common property regime. Rather, they understand the tragedy to be the conse-
quence of specific institutional arrangements that enable people to act in a specific
manner in relation to specific goods. In this sense, the unhindered individualistic
freedom that Hardin describes in his model is not to be understood as a type of
freedom in a state of nature, but rather as freedom that has been created through a
public good: the legal framework implicit in Hardin’s imagined scenario (V. Ostrom
1993: 62; V. Ostrom 1999: 62). More specifically, Hardin assumes a legal framework
that protects specific property and contract rights from arbitrary interference and
that allows the unimpeded and unlimited accumulation of resources. In Elinor’s
words, “The Hobbesian state of nature is logically equivalent to a situation in
which rules exist permitting anyone to take any and all desired actions, regardless
of the effects on others.” (E. Ostrom 2008a: 140) According to Vincent, this type of
individualistic freedom and choice is not simply a characteristic of open-access
common pool resources, but also a characteristic of the market (V. Ostrom 1974:
56). Furthermore, it is this individualistic choice that leads to the aforementioned
spillover effects and externality problems. As Vincent explains:
When individuals act with the legal independence characteristic of decisionmak-
ing in market structures in a situation dominated by externalities, common-pool
resources, or public goods, we can conclude that institutional weakness or institu-
tional failurewill occur. Themagnitude of theweakness or failurewill dependupon
the importance of the externality, or the degree of indivisibility occurring in the
common property or public good. (V. Ostrom 2011a: 193; original emphasis)
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Here, tragedy arises when individual freedom affects other goods and third par-
ties in the form of negative externalities, free riding or unlimited appropriation of
common resources or public goods. Vincent refers to this problem as a form of “in-
stitutional weakness or failure”. The failure he refers to can be interpreted as what
is generally called market failure. In turn, Elinor Ostrom defines market failure in
a similar yet slightly different manner:
Market failure means that the incentives facing individuals in a situation, where
the rules are those of a competitive market but the goods do not have the char-
acteristics of ‘private goods,’ are insufficient to motivate individuals to produce,
allocate, and consume these goods at an optimal level. (E. Ostrom 2005a: 23)
Although the acknowledgment of the problem of market failure is quite
widespread, it should not be interpreted as a critique of privatization and
markets per se but rather, as in Vincent’s argument on this point, as the “failure”
of certain goods to be divided up and privatized. As Elizabeth Anderson remarks,
correctly, “The theory of market failure is not a theory of what is wrong with
markets, but of what goes wrong when markets are not available: it is a theory
of what goes wrong when goods are not commodified.” (Anderson 1993: 192) The
point is that the problem of externalities is often understood as an institutional
weakness of common pool resources and public goods – and not as a problem of
private property and markets.
This is a very prevalent argument that is especially brought up in relation to
environmental problems such as pollution.8 For example, Arrow and Hahn argue
in their book General Competitive Analysis (Arrow/Hahn 1971: 186) that a “competitive
equilibrium” in allocation – and thus certainly no market failure – exists when lit-
erally everything is clearly defined and delineated as privatized commodities.9 This
assumption is far-reaching and would imply the comprehensive commodification
8 Here is merely one example: “There is good reason, however, to believe that a genuinely free
market economy would actually minimise negative externalities. A free market is not a free-
for-all, but a systemof private property rights enforced by law.Negative externalities without
the possibility of amelioration can only arise where private property rights do not (or cannot)
exist. […] While there may be some externalities that cannot be made good via the enforce-
ment of private property rights (principally because private property rights cannot be created
or enforced), the presence of negative externalities should properly lead to an investigation
to see how private property rights can be further extended, rather than an abandonment of
the free market system.” (Meadowcraft 2004)
9 Arrow and Hahn write: “The implications of these conclusions […] suggest that under appro-
priate hypotheses, especially convexity and the presence of all markets (absence of externali-
ties), competitive equilibrium is very sturdy. There is no strong incentive for subgroups to try
to coalesce and to achieve more than they could in the competitive equilibrium; for any such
attempt would be unstable. This is contrary to the view sometimes expressed that compet-
itive equilibrium has an inherent instability in that it would pay, for example, the owners of
4. Overcoming the tragedy with the Ostroms 63
of all things, including not only common-pool resources such as air, water, forests,
pastures and ecosystems, but also ‘things’ like a recipe, the enjoyment of a sunset,
every sexual act, every moment in which children are cared for and, theoretically,
also all streets, all laws, all form of police protection and the state itself.
To be clear, it would be completely wrong to argue that Elinor and Vincent
Ostrom defend this position. They worked throughout their lives to develop a bet-
ter understanding of how commons and common property arrangements can be
democratically governed. But the question arises whether the Ostroms provide
arguments against this (implicit) demand to privatize all of life. Generally, their
only arguments against privatization are the ones that result from their previously
mentioned categorization of goods. As in her 1990 book Governing the Commons Eli-
nor briefly discusses privatization. Here, she basically argues that privatization is
undesirable because it increases the costs of property protection, monitoring and
sanctioning (E. Ostrom 2008a: 12). She writes: “The setup costs for a new market
or a new insurance scheme would be substantial and will not be needed so long as
the herders share fodder and risk by jointly sharing a larger grazing area.” (ibid.:
13) According to Elinor, an increase in costs makes it unlikely that shared land will
be privatized. Furthermore, she argues that common pool resources such as pas-
tures are supposedly relatively difficult to (fairly) parcel up because of the highly
unequal structure of the landscape. According to Elinor, this wouldmake privatiza-
tion undesirable. In the case of fisheries, she also argues that the fishes’ migrations
make it “likely” that fisheries would “be owned in common rather than individu-
ally” (ibid.: 13). However, these arguments against privatization are simply based
on the functional description of goods and their monetary utility. As we can see,
we may search in vain for robust normative arguments against privatization in the
work of the Ostroms.
In this sense, a more fundamental question that arises now is not only if pri-
vatization is possible (i.e. costly), but whether it is normatively desirable. What is
neglected, here, is the simple insight that privatization and commodification fun-
damentally transform people’s relationships with each other and the world (e.g.
paid sex versus unpaid sex between people) and exclude people from resources
essential to their life and liberty (e.g. water, land, housing etc.). For example, by
enabling someone to appropriate and accumulate land without limit, other people
will be excluded from the chance to access land. I believe this to be the main, sim-
ple and general argument against privatization. The position that I defend in this
work and that I will elaborate on in more detail later is that people require access
to common resources as a prerequisite for life and liberty. While individual private
property might be necessary for the fulfillment of certain personal needs, an access
some one commodity to form a cartel and exploit their monopoly power.” (Arrow/Hahn 1971:
186; emphasis added)
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to democratically managed common property provides people with greater indi-
vidual freedom in joint activities while simultaneously minimizing their ecological
impact. Put somewhat differently, commons increase our autonomy, defined as the
ability to codetermine our social conditions, and simultaneously provide us with a
democratic means of creating abundance through the fairer distribution of goods
in a world of limited resources. In turn, I believe this to be the main argument for
a commons-based society.
Strikingly, Elinor and Vincent Ostrom’s work lacks such an explicit critique of
privatization and a clear normative defense of commons. As I have mentioned, it
would be false to argue that Elinor or Vincent Ostrom defend privatization; but
with the scant and somewhat misleading critique of market failure, the door is
left wide open to privatization.10 To be fair, we could say that as political scien-
tists, it was not their job to provide a normative defense of commons – they simply
provided examples to demonstrate that commons can be democratically and sus-
tainably managed. But before turning to their analysis of commons, let us push
this argument further and investigate the subsequent problems that result from
private property in competitive markets.
The tragedy of the market
Despite the lack of an explicit critique of privatization, Elinor Ostrom does in fact
provide another rather slender but insightful criticism of markets that will help
us in our general analysis of the relationships between markets, democracy and
commons.
InGoverning the Commons, Elinormentions that privatization transforms the re-
lationship that human beings have with nature. After privatization, she explains,
“each herder will be playing a game against nature in a smaller terrain, rather than
a game against another player in a larger terrain” (E. Ostrom 2008a: 12; original
emphasis). She then declares that the reason for this “game against nature” is a
“result of [the individual producer’s] own profit incentive” (ibid.: 13). Here, we are
confronted with a certain contradiction in property theory. On the one hand, it is
often assumed that privatization leads to a more responsible and sustainable man-
agement of a specific resource owing to the correlation between costs and benefits.
On the other hand, it is also assumed that people will use their resources more use-
fully or, rather, more productively and profitably. We will discuss this argument in
further detail when we discuss Locke’s justification of private property. For now,
however, it is interesting to note that Elinor appears to claim that sustainability
10 For a (neo)liberal market-oriented (re)interpretation of Elinor Ostrom’s work see, for exam-
ple, Mark Pennington’s article in Elinor Ostrom, common-pool resources and the classical liberal
tradition (2012).
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and profit contradict each other and that the problems of overuse and degradation
remain present even if the specific resource is privately owned.
On the one hand, we might think that this overuse occurs because people are
inherently greedy and short-sighted. This would support the thesis that if people
are able to pursue their egotistical interests, then they will seek profits and exploit
the resources that sustain their own existence. If this were the case, we could jus-
tify a power ‘from without’ that protects people from their own destructive drives.
But we will see that this is not the case that Elinor is defending. On the other
hand, it could just as easily be assumed that people will manage privately owned
resources sustainably in their own long-term self-interests. This could occur when
people are relatively informed about the effects of their actions. Yet why would
people then nevertheless overuse their privately-owned resources? The reason be-
comes more apparent when we perceive individuals in their broader social context.
In her article “Toward a Behavioral Theory Linking Trust, Reciprocity, and Repu-
tation” (2003), Elinor explains that when privatization is coupled with open and
competitive markets, the tragedy is simply repeated at a higher level. She explains:
“In highly structured and competitive environments such as an open market [...]
entrepreneurs have no alternative other than to seek profits. Those who do not pick
maximization strategies […] are eliminated by the selective forces of the market.” (E.
Ostrom 2003: 25: emphasis added) Much as in Hardin’s portrayal of the tragedy of
unregulated commons, Ostrom argues that the open-market arrangement trans-
forms individuals into “determinate, calculating machine[s]” (ibid.) that are caught
up in a single-exit or straitjacket situation (ibid.). In order to survive, private prop-
erty in open competitive markets thus force people to increasingly extract and ac-
cumulate resources – irrespective of whether these resources are owned privately
or collectively. Aside from these and other fleeting references to the problems of
“rent seeking” (E. Ostrom/Hess 2010: 55), “roving bandits” (E. Ostrom 2007: 12) or
even “robber barons” (V. Ostrom 2008: 244), I am not aware of any further critical
reflections on privatization and markets in the work of Elinor or Vincent Ostrom.
Before continuing, I think it is important to pause for a moment and reflect
on this insight of Elinor’s in order to develop my own more elaborate critique of
markets here. Aswe can now see, competitive andmaximizing arrangements as de-
scribed by Elinor are very similar to those described by Adam Smith in which mar-
kets discipline people to increase the “wealth of nations”. Firstly, it must be noted
that unregulated commons enable the unlimited appropriation and accumulation
of resources. Yet, in contrast to Adam Smith’s positive portrayal of wealth genera-
tion, we are reminded again that the discipline of open and competitive markets
greatly limits and undermines the individual and collective freedom to alter one’s
social arrangements. Furthermore, in discussing the tragedy of unregulated com-
mons, we have ironically discovered that open and competitive markets function
according to the same paradoxical logic as unregulated, open-access commons:
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One’s existence is secured through the necessity of appropriating more and more
material from a specific resource system, irrespective of whether the system is held
in common or treated as individual private property. Both arrangements function
according to the logic of ‘survival through accumulation’. While Smith describes
this process positively, as an increase in economic growth and monetary wealth,
the commons perspective conceptualizes the same social arrangement as a tragedy
that depletes and overuses people’s common resources. Put in this perspective, we
might even interpret the tragedy of the commons as the negative flip-side of the
perpetual increase in the wealth of nations.
Yet, in contrast to Elinor, I would argue that privatization does not simply re-
place the “game against another player” with a “game against nature” (E. Ostrom
2008a: 12). Instead, antagonistic and competitive relationships exist in both so-
cial arrangements. The reason for this is that both the unregulated commons and
the open market are structured according to the prisoner’s dilemma or what is
also known in economic terminology as the isolation paradox (Sen 1984: 123-4; El-
son 1988: 13-20). In both, there exists an institutional setting in which individuals
must act ex post without prior communication with the other person or knowledge
of their intentions and actions. This is what Frank Knight and other economists
call “uncertainty” in market situations (Knight 1921). The problem, however, goes
beyond the difficulty of merely dealing with unforeseen events such as rainfall or
the delivery of a package by post. As we know, the uncertainty of the prisoner’s
dilemma leads to maximization strategies and the depletion of resources – irre-
spective of whether these are held in common or owned privately. Hence, the pri-
vatization of all goods and resources is unable to overcome ecological problems,
because competitive markets force one to extract more and more resources from
one’s own individual private property, ultimately depleting these resources too. A
pertinent example of this is burnout,which can be interpreted as a type of depletion
of one’s resources in oneself in order to keep up with the other market participants
(Rosa 2010). As we see, survival through perpetual accumulation in a world of finite
resources is not only logically impossible, but also self-destructive.
Interestingly, this dynamic not only undermines the resources that are priva-
tized and transformed into profit but also destabilizes the market itself. Due to the
diversity of people’s capabilities and their unequal starting positions, accumulation
processes are also highly unequal. Simply put, people with better starting positions
can, in turn, accumulate more at a greater rate.This cumulative advantage is often
understood as the Matthew principle.11 This implies that the competitive dynamic
increases scarcity even more so for those who already have less, accentuating the
11 As Streeck quotes in his book Buying Time: “For to all those who have, more will be given, and
they will have in abundance; but from those who have nothing, even what they have will be
taken away.” (Matt. 25,29 in Streeck 2013: 94)
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divergence between the haves and have-nots. Those with little purchasing power
become increasingly limited in their ability to buy the products that are sold on the
market. This is, however, not only problematic for their own access to resources,
but also for those producing the goods, for if the products are not bought, profits
cannot be made, wages cannot be paid, and people lose jobs. The socio-economic
inequality that results from such a divergence thus leads to what is generally known
as an economic crisis due to a deficit in demand (Keynes) or over-accumulation
(Marx). According to this rather straightforward logic, open and competitive mar-
kets inherently lead to economic instability and the destruction of livelihoods. Put
somewhat differently, we could even say that the dynamic of the open and compet-
itive market undermines that commons we call the market economy.
Neither ecological devastation nor economic instability would necessarily be a
problem if people could solve the problems that result from the open and com-
petitive market. But as we already know, the open and competitive market creates
“structural constraints” (J. Cohen 1989: 28) or a “straitjacket situation” (E. Ostrom
2003: 25), which impedes people’s ability to alter their social institutions. We al-
ready have discussed this problem in relation to the tension between the Staatsvolk
and the Marktvolk. This problem is, however, exacerbated by the maximization dy-
namic of the competitive market. If one producer increases its rate of production,
all must follow suit in order to maintain their competitive edge. Thus, in order to
survive on the market, agents must increase not only the amount but also the rate
of appropriation and output. This is normally understood as producing efficiency
gains through rationalization processes and is one of the main justifications of a
competitive market economy. The sociologist Hartmut Rosa (2013) describes this
process as one of perpetual social acceleration, which might increase economic
output, yet does not necessarily increase people’s freedom and wellbeing. Impor-
tantly, this increased socio-economic acceleration also conflicts with the processes
of democratic deliberation and governance. As he explains:
The central specifically temporal difficulty of democratic politics proves to be the
fact that a participatory and deliberative will formation that includes a broad
democratic public is capable of being accelerated only to a very limited extent
and under specific social conditions. The aggregation and articulation of collec-
tive interests and their implementation in democratic decision making has been
and remains time intensive. For this reason, democratic politics is very much ex-
posed to the danger of desynchronization in the face of more acceleratable social
and economic developments. (ibid.: 254)
We can thus understand this desynchronization as a divergence of the high speed
socio-economic processes, on the one hand, and the time necessary for democratic
practices, on the other. This incongruence leads to political action lagging behind
economic developments. Importantly, it implies that “politics loses its role as an
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influential actor that shapes the playing field itself and takes on the status of a pre-
dominantly reactive fellow player of the game” (ibid.: 264; original emphasis). Here,
democratic politics is again dethroned, yet not by economist kings or a Marktvolk,
but rather by the maximization dynamics of the market itself. Similar to the previ-
ously discussed structural constraints, this necessity to perpetually accelerate can
thus also be perceived and understood as a function of natural or “objective forces”
(ibid: 269) that limit political deliberation and action. Again,we are confrontedwith
a mechanism of the open and competitive market that thwarts people’s collective
attempts to solve the problems that the socially constructed market institutions
themselves bring about.
As we see, the isolation paradox that underlies open and competitive markets
brings about numerous problems and mechanisms that limit democratic change
and institutional problem solving. As Amartya Sen explains: “The market mecha-
nism on its own confines its attention only to issues of congruence, leaving the
interest conflicts [and social problems] unaddressed.”12 (Sen 1984: 95) Along those
lines, I would argue that by neglecting or suppressing conflicts through individ-
ual private property, market exchange, competition and the belief in perpetual
accumulation and economic growth, conflicts and tragedies will inevitably erupt
elsewhere. As we have just discussed, these tragedies can involve economic degra-
dation, pollution and climate change, local and global social inequalities and eco-
nomic crises. Here, I would agree with James Tully who conceptualizes these in-
justices with the help of what he calls the Medea Hypothesis, “that is, like Medea
killing her own children, humanity’s current way of life is bringing about the de-
struction of the life conditions of future generations” (Tully 2013a: 3). On top of
this, the democratic deficit resulting from a state-market dichotomy hinders peo-
ple from institutionally dealing with these antagonistic interests and grave socio-
12 Hayek admits that markets do not actually deal with these conflicting values, but that they
instead merely provide a method for agreeing on the means of obtaining different and con-
flicting ends. Hayek writes: “Among themembers of a Great Society whomostly do not know
each other, there will exist no agreement on the relative importance of their respective ends. There
would exist not harmony but open conflict of interests if agreement were necessary as to which
particular interests should be given preference over others. What makes agreement and
peace in such a society possible is that the individuals are not required to agree on ends
but only on means which are capable of serving a great variety of purposes and which each
hopeswill assist him in the pursuit of his own purposes.” (Hayek 2013: 171-2; emphasis added)
Although it might appear that people do not agree on ends in an open, competitive market,
I would argue that the ultimate notion that people in capitalist societies must (tacitly) agree
on is perpetual and exponential economic growth as a means to deal with the fact that they
do not agree on other ultimate notions. Ignoring planetary boundaries, endless growth pro-
vides the hope that one day all people will be able to realize their desired ends. Instead of
dealing with conflicting values, people in an open and competitive market have thus agreed
on economic growth as a social end in itself.
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ecological problems. In turn, this is what Tully calls “the tragedy of privatization”
and what I would also understand as the tragedy of open and competitive markets
(Tully 2013b: 227; Tully 2014: 86).The underlying prisoner’s dilemma of both the un-
regulated commons and the open and competitivemarket underlines Charles Lind-
blom’s notion of the market as a prison that each person is “locked into” (Hardin
1968: 1244; Lindblom 1982). Thus, paraphrasing Hardin we may conclude that in an
open and competitive market, every individual is locked into a system that com-
pels them to increase their wealth without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is
the destination toward which everyone rushes, with everyone pursuing their own
best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the self-regulating market.
Unhindered individual freedom in an open and competitive market brings ruin to
all. Returning to Elinor Ostrom, we might therefore conclude that although she
recognizes the underlying straitjacket maximization logic of the open and com-
petitive market, it appears that she has not followed through with a reflection on
its consequences.
To avoid misunderstanding, I would again like to emphasize that my perhaps
rather severe-sounding critique of markets is of course not a critique of markets
per se, but rather of open or rather unregulated, competitivemarket arrangements.
Nevertheless, somemay say that this is a highly exaggerated and negative portrayal
of markets. To a certain extent, I would agree with that criticism. Fortunately, not
all markets function in this manner, as the regulations placed on labor markets
and subsidies for farming both go to show. It could even be said that the markets
in all goods and services are regulated in some form or another. In this sense, open
and competitive markets have been portrayed in an abstract and idealized manner.
Nevertheless, the mechanisms behind existing ‘imperfect’ markets still often func-
tion according to the dynamics I have just described. Furthermore, the problem
that many people – especially in northern Western countries and especially peo-
ple in upper social strata – are faced with is that the world does not appear to be
as bad as I have just described it to be. Under this assumption, we could begin a
discussion about whether the glass is half full or half empty. That, however, would
be missing the point. The problem is that many of the issues I have discussed are
not perceived directly but usually occur somewhere else, be that in poor neighbor-
hoods that one does not live in or in the global South that is hit harder than the
North by austerity policies and climate change. More to the point, the positive and
negative effects of these maximization strategies are distributed unevenly and un-
equally throughout a society and between societies. When the negative ones touch
us, we often fail to realize that they stem from institutional causes, but rather be-
lieve them to be individual problems or natural occurrences.13 Thus, while some of
13 This thought originally comes frommymanuscript editor, Marc Hiatt, who wrote it as a com-
ment when he was proof-reading this manuscript.
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us may not be aware of these problems in our day-to-day life, I would neverthe-
less affirm that the structural logic that lies behind these diverse socio-economic,
ecological and political problems is largely due to the institutional arrangements
based on privatization and open and competitive markets.
That being said, we can now return to the Ostroms and see what answers to the
tragedies of both hierarchical monocentric orders and privatization we can find in
their account of democratically governed commons.
4.4 Overcoming tragedy through collective action
In order to conceptualize alternative forms of societal organization, Elinor Ostrom
turns to the analysis and reflection of a central assumption of both Garrett Hardin’s
thesis and economic theory in general: that humans are rational, egotistical util-
ity maximizers. While she questions the universality of complete rationality and
rational choice theory, Ostrom insists that she does not present a new, alternative
model, but that she merely formulates a number of attributes of human behavior
that should be included in future efforts to formalize specific models of agency
(Ostrom 2003: 54, 62).
A behavioral theory of bounded rationality and norm-oriented agents
As mentioned above, the tragedy of the commons is based on the prisoner’s
dilemma, in which agents are conceptualized according to a utilitarian model of
complete rationality. The assumptions for such games are that (1) all participants
have knowledge of the structure and possible outcomes, (2) the strategies are
decided upon independently, and (3) there is no external authority to enforce
agreements (ibid.: 23). Elinor lists some reasons for the peculiarity of this model:
“no communication among the participants, no previous ties among them, no
anticipation of future actions, and no capacity to promise, threaten, cajole, or
retaliate” (E. Ostrom 1986: 10). Most importantly, the “only ‘choice’ available to
rational human beings [in this situation is] a ‘choice’ within the constraints of
an externally imposed structure” (ibid.: 11; original emphasis). Because people
can supposedly only choose within these specific institutional arrangements,
individuals are encouraged or forced to act as if they were ‘naturally’ egotistical
utility maximizers. It is in this sense that Elinor denaturalizes both unregulated,
open-access common property regimes and, in passing, the open competitive
market. In contrast, she understands both the models of the completely rational
agent and of the paradigm of the prisoner’s dilemma situation to merely be “one
model within a family of models […] [that exists] in highly structured physical and
institutional settings” (ibid.: 25).
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Given her extensive analysis of vast amounts of empirical research both in the
laboratory and in the field, Ostrom is in a position to relativize and reformulate
the currently dominant rational-choice theory.Without going into too much detail
about the laboratory experiments, it can generally be said that a lot of evidence
contradicts the theoretical predictions of dilemmas – and Garrett Hardin’s claim
that freedom in a commons inevitably lead to tragedy (E. Ostrom 2003: 24, 27-37).
The most important findings made in the laboratory are (1) the initially high yet
suboptimal levels of cooperation in most social dilemma games, (2) the positive
effect of communication on cooperation and (3) the willingness to invest in solving
second-order dilemmas or, rather, in changing the structure of the game itself in
order to improve joint benefits (ibid.). Despite these results, Ostrom remarks that
some contextual variables (such as length of game, communication and sanctioning
possibilities etc.) produce stark variations in levels of cooperation, which remains
as the “really big puzzle in the social sciences” (ibid.: 39). In this sense, it could be
said that these variances in laboratory settings and game outcomes has led Ostrom
to broaden the scope of classical methodological individualism by emphasizing the
importance of the social context for individual agency and collective action.14
It is this variety in the empirical results that has enabled Ostrom to attempt to
formulate a behavioral theory of bounded rationality that brings together the con-
straints of specific contexts and the cognitive limitations of agents. In comparison
to the “thin” theory of complete rationality in which humans are “self-interested,
short-term maximizers” (E. Ostrom 1998: 2), Ostrom develops a broader, “second-
generation” (ibid.: 9) model of bounded or incomplete rationality.
I assume that [humans] seek to improve values of importance to them (includ-
ing what happens to other individuals who are of concern to them); select actions
within interdependent situations inwhichwhat they do is affected by their expec-
tations of what others will do; use information about the situation and about the
characteristics of others to make decisions; and try to do as well as they can given
the constraints they face. In addition, I assume that in the course of their lifetimes
individuals learn heuristics, strategies, norms, rules, and how to craft rules. (E. Os-
trom 2003: 39-40)
Remaining within a general utilitarian framework, Elinor Ostrom appears to un-
derstand human rationality as a means to an end, as an instrument to attain cer-
14 Ostrom writes: “The models of social dilemmas used in laboratory experiments appear to be
quite robust. Researchers are able to create and replicate situations in which there is no co-
operation, very high levels of cooperation, or moderate levels of cooperation. The amount of
control that can be exercised indicates that the experimental models of dilemma situations
are quite good. The model of the individual actor used to explain outcomes appears to be the source
of the problem.” (E. Ostrom 2003: 39; emphasis added)
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tain preferences (E. Ostrom 1998, 9). Yet in contrast to a classical rationalist model,
however, Elinor does not assume the (short-term) maximization of interests but
hypothesizes that people merely desire to improve the things they value. This tele-
ological movement could be understood as a form of meliorism that is common in
pragmatist thought (Koopman 2006). Although Ostrom’s use of the term “value” is
under-defined here, if we consider her critique of a purely economic or monetary
understanding of value, it is plausible that her – and Vincent’s – understanding of
value is plural, conflicting and contingent (Dietz et al. 2003: 1909; V. Ostrom 1984).
It is important to note that this model of bounded rationality emphasizes that
the definition and pursuit of these values is embedded in and constrained through
the general material and social context. Having been influenced by Herbert Simon,
Elinor understands the rationality of an agent to be limited by available resources
(such as time and information) that enable people to attain specific ends (Wall 2014:
41-3). Furthermore, she argues that a number of empirical examples demonstrate
that humans learn and make use of various heuristics, norms and rules to sim-
plify this cognitive process of information analysis, evaluation and transmission.
According to Elinor, instrumental heuristics or “rules of thumb” are created and re-
fined by individuals in recurring situations in order to optimize outcomes. Norms,
however, are used as positive and negative “internal valuations […] that an individ-
ual attaches to a particular type of action” (E. Ostrom 2003: 40). Norms are gener-
ally learned through socialization and are affected by different situational variables
(ibid.: 49). Ostrom understands these internal values as a scale or “delta parameter”
(ibid.) that can weigh diverging and conflicting external ends against each other.
Although norms are often associated with positive values such as sharing and car-
ing, Ostrom conceptualizes the term more neutrally as encompassing individual
orientation systems or societal “focal points” (ibid.: 40) that are created through
past experiences and the expected actions of others. She explains,
After experiencing repeated benefits from other people’s cooperative actions, an
individual may resolve always to initiate cooperation in the future. Alternatively,
after many experiences of being the ‘sucker’ in such situations, an individual may
resolve never to initiate unilateral cooperation and to punish noncooperators
whenever feasible. (ibid.: 40-41)
As Elinor emphasizes, norms, preferences and values can be changed through-
out one’s life in response to specific experiences (E. Ostrom 1998: 9). By contrast
with unconscious heuristics and internalized tacit norms, rules tend to be self-
consciously developed “shared understandings that certain actions in particular
situations must, must not, or may be undertaken” (ibid.: 10). It is in this sense
that Ostrom understands rationality as being bound, where the choices of means
and ends that an agent makes are rarely based on complete knowledge and ab-
stract, absolute principles. Instead, they are constrained by the limited resources
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available and strongly influenced by implicit and explicit orientation systems cre-
ated through human interactions and experiences. By including both situational
constraints and societal norms and rules, Elinor Ostrom takes human agency, as
methodological individualism conceives of it, and fundamentally transforms it. Ac-
cording to Ostrom’s model, our agency is characterized by contingency15 because
it is embedded in the social reality Habermas calls “communicative action” (1981).
The importance of reciprocity, trust and reputations
Ostrom’s revision of the theory of human agency has important implications for
the overcoming of social dilemmas. To understand the possibilities of creating so-
cial conditions for overcoming social dilemmas, she turns to norms of cooperation
and reciprocity. According to Ostrom, “reciprocity is viewed by sociologists, social
psychologists, and philosophers as one of the basic norms taught in all societies” (E.
Ostrom 2003: 42). From an evolutionary perspective, cooperation and reciprocity
enhances one’s ‘fitness’ by promoting better outcomes. As a strategy for overcom-
ing social dilemmas, it was in use long before mutual obligations could be enforced
by external authorities (E. Ostrom 1998: 10). For this reason, it could even be said
that reciprocity has the tendency to be people’s dominant norm or default strategy.
This hypothesis is supported by numerous laboratory experiments in which people
use norms of reciprocity in one-shot, no-communication games and other short-
term experimental environments (E.Ostrom 2003: 47-9).16 Despite this general ten-
dency, Ostrom emphasizes that reciprocity is not biologically inherited. Instead,
individuals inherit a capacity to learn and value algorithms that enhance their ca-
pacity to increase their own long-term benefits when confrontingmultiple social-
dilemma situations with others who have learned and value similar norms, even
though each situation involves different people, payoffs, and levels of uncertainty.
(ibid.: 44)
15 The contingency of human agency basically implies that the actions of human beings are
neither completely predetermined – because chance, spontaneity and imagination open up
possibilities for change – nor completely free, because actions are always dependent on spe-
cific conditions.
16 A famous laboratory game that demonstrates this tendency to use reciprocity is the ultima-
tum game (E. Ostrom 2003: 47-9). In reference to other experiments, Ostrom writes: “The
evidence from experiments shows that a substantial proportion of the population drawn on
by social science experiments (primarily college students in major universities in the United
States, Europe, and Japan) – ranging from 50 to 60 percent – do have sufficient trust that
others are reciprocators to cooperate with them even in one-shot, no-communication exper-
iments.” (ibid.: 49)
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We will discuss the question of reciprocity and human nature in more detail later,
but for the time being, it is important to emphasize that because reciprocity is cul-
tivated through processes of socialization, individuals can develop different strate-
gies for dealing with different social dilemmas.While some people learn strategies
of reciprocity to overcome these problems in a variety of situations, others learn
norms of behavior that are less ‘nice’ (ibid.). This can include either individually
egotistical or collective parochial behavior. In this sense, reciprocity norms can also
have a dark side. In reference to this problematic finding, Ostrom argues:
Tight circles of individuals who trust one another [and cooperate] may discrimi-
nate against others of a different color, religion, or ethnicity to keep them from
access to productive opportunities. The focus on the return of favors for favors can
also be the foundation of corrupt practices whereby those in official positions do
favors for wealthy friends who then return the favors with various forms of finan-
cial enrichments. (ibid.: 45)
For this reason, reciprocity norms and practices that are inclusive and support
basic moral standards must be differentiated from those that are highly exclusive,
restrictive and repressive (ibid.).
According to Ostrom, central among the situation-internal or endogenous vari-
ables in human interactions that enable and strengthen reciprocity are those of
trust and reputation. She defines trust as “the [positive] expectation of one person
about the actions of others that affects the first person’s choice, when an action
must be taken before the actions of the others are known” (E. Ostrom 1998: 12).
Simply put, I will be nice to you, because I expect you to be nice to me.The existing
level of trust is therefore key to determining the first action in a social dilemma
because it “affects whether an individual is willing to initiate cooperation in the
expectation that it will be reciprocated” (ibid.). The existing levels of trust and the
first action sets the (normative) stage for future interactions. The hope or expecta-
tion that one’s cooperation will be returned is, however, not based on naïve altruism
but rather on one’s own previous experiences and the prevailing social norms, on
the one hand, and on the reputation of the other person, on the other. Reputations
are important for trust and reciprocity because they give information about an in-
dividual’s history of overcoming social dilemmas. Or, in other words, reputations
tell other people whether someone has been “keeping promises and performing ac-
tions with short-term costs but long-term benefits” (E. Ostrom 2003: 43). This, in
turn, enables people to “estimate of the risk of extending trust, given the structure
of the particular situation” (ibid.: 49). A good reputation makes a person trustwor-
thy, implying that one can expect that they will reciprocate cooperative behavior in
the future.
For this reason, Ostrom places the relationship between reciprocity, trust and
reputation at the center of her understanding of how bounded rational agents over-
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come social dilemmas: “At the core of a behavioral explanation are the links between
the trust that an individual has in others, the investment others make in trustwor-
thy reputations, and the probability of using reciprocity norms.” (E. Ostrom 2003:
49-50) If cultivated, trust, reputations and reciprocity are “valuable assets” (E. Os-
trom 1998: 12) that can create a “mutually reinforcing core” (E. Ostrom 2003: 50)
and transform Hardin’s negative vicious cycle of tragedy into a virtuous cycle of
improved joint outcomes, ultimately increasing one’s evolutionary fitness (ibid.; E.
Ostrom 1998: 12). As has hopefully become evident, these insights into the everyday
and microsituational mechanisms of reciprocity, trust and reputation to overcome
social dilemmas are fundamental to Ostrom’s theoretical development of an alter-
native to market or state policy prescriptions.
4.5 Self-governing commons with the aid of eight design principles
Despite these positive impacts on peoples’ capabilities to cooperate and trust one
another, it must be emphasized that Elinor Ostrom’s research also reveals the con-
tingency and fragility of these norms and behavioral patterns. This is made clear
with her reference to various common-pool situations that were not successful and
have failed (E. Ostrom 2008a). For this reason, she shifts her focus from inter-
nal and endogenous variables of an interaction situation to external or exogenous,
contextual variables in order to understand how social conditions can strengthen
these norms and enhance the likelihood that social dilemmas will be overcome. Os-
trom’s analysis of the effect of institutional structures on human interactions takes
first-order dilemmas of reciprocity, trust and reputation and transforms them into
second- and third-order public good dilemmas of institutional supply, credible
commitment andmutualmonitoring (E.Ostrom 2008a: 41-5). Similarly to her find-
ings on trust and reciprocity, while the classical theory of fully rational agents pre-
dicts that rule making will not occur because everyone will default to free riding,17
Ostrom’s meta-analysis of laboratory and field experiments reveals that people are
actually often willing to invest time and energy into changing rules and institutions
in order to secure cooperation and improve joint outcomes.
Before analyzing and discussing these exogenous factors in detail, it should be
mentioned that one specific variable can be considered fundamental for overcom-
ing social dilemmas at all levels of interaction: the possibility of communicating
17 On the problem of second-level dilemmas, Ostromwrites, “Spending time and effort design-
ing rules creates a public good for all involved and is thus a second-level dilemma no more
likely to be solved than the original dilemma. This is the foundation for the repeated recom-
mendation that rules must be imposed by external authorities who are also responsible for
monitoring and enforcing these rules.” (E. Ostrom 1999: 506)
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with one another. Although no single variable automatically produces reciprocity
norms, face-to-face communication is central for cultivating cooperation and cre-
ating institutions. In contrast to the situations of non-communication in Hardin’s
unregulated commons and the prisoners’ dilemma, Ostrom explains:
With a chance to see and talk with others repeatedly, a participant can assess
whether he or she trusts others sufficiently to try to reach a simple contingent
agreement regarding the level of joint effort and its allocation. Communication
thus allows individuals to increase (or decrease) their trust in the reliability of
others. (E. Ostrom 2003: 51)
But face-to-face communication not only enables people to access more informa-
tion about other participants, it also allows them tomake promises and agreements
in relation to future actions. Furthermore, communication can reinforce prior nor-
mative values and facilitate the development of a group identity, which also gener-
ally increases mutual trust (ibid.: 33). Thus, the possibility of face-to-face commu-
nication must be understood as a key variable in dealing with social dilemmas on
different but interrelated levels of action.
Despite this emphasis on the importance of communication for creating ro-
bust18 institutions, communication per se does not solve the problems of supply,
commitment and monitoring. In order to understand how these difficulties can
be dealt with through communication and rule creation, we must now turn to Os-
trom’s eight design principles for durable institutions.19 Beginning with the im-
portance of communication in dealing with multi-level social dilemmas, it makes
sense to begin with Ostrom’s seventh principle: “minimal recognition of rights to
organize” (E.Ostrom2008a: 90). According to Elinor, this entails “the rights of users
to devise their own institutions [that] are not challenged by external governmental
authorities” (E. Ostrom 2005a: 259). It is implicit in this principle that users have
“long-term tenure rights to the resource” (ibid.).20 These simple yet fundamental
18 The term robust is introduced here because it is a central term for the type of institutions
Ostrom intends to help develop. She explains what is normally meant by robust: “[Kenneth]
Shepsle considered a system to be robust if it was long-lasting and the operational rules
had been devised andmodified over time according to a set of collective-choice rules (which
themselves might be modified more slowly over time within a set of constitutional-choice
rules, which were modified, if at all, very unfrequently). The contemporary use of the term
robustness in regard to complex systems focuses on adaptability to disturbances: ‘the main-
tenance of some desired system characteristics despite fluctuations in the behaviour of its
component parts or its environment’ (Carlson and Doyle).” (E. Ostrom 2005a: 258)
19 I will not discuss the eight design principles in the order that Ostrom presents them in, but
rather in a sequence that suits the logic of my argumentation.
20 This aspect of the seventh design principle was not included in her 1990 book Governing the
Commons, but was added in her later book Understanding Institutional Diversity, published in
2005.
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principles provide people not only with rights of access and use with regard to a
given resource, but also with the right to define the institutional framework that
regulates it. This enables people to have a long-term interest in the maintenance
of the resource and allows communication and self-organizing to take place in the
first place.
Given the opportunity to communicate and self-organize, people are also able
to define clear boundaries for those with rights to access and utilize the resource
(design principle 1).21 This is an important step that transforms open, unregulated
commons threatened by overuse into closed and regulated commons (E. Ostrom
2008a: 90-1). The first set of rules to be defined can be located on the constitu-
tional-choice level. Choosing a constitution means determining “the specific rules
to be used in crafting the set of collective-choice rules that in turn affect the set of
operational rules” (ibid.: 52). At the next step, “collective-choice arrangements” and
the policy rules of “how a CPR [common pool resource] should be managed” (ibid.)
are defined (design principle 3). People are then able to create operational rules
that regulate the day-to-day use of the resource according to local conditions and
the different inputs and needs of the people involved (design principle 2). Accord-
ing to Ostrom, it is especially important here to note a “proportional equivalence
between benefits and costs” (E. Ostrom 2005a: 262). This supposedly implies that
“when the rules related to the distribution of benefits are made broadly consistent
with the distribution of costs, participants are more willing to pitch in to keep a re-
source well maintained and sustainable” (ibid.: 263). In simpler terms, fair rules are
important for maintaining trust and reciprocity, on the one hand, and to uphold
stable institutions and the sustainable use of resources, on the other.
Although the constitutional-, collective- and operational-choice levels of rules
and rule-making are analytically differentiated here, Ostrom notes that self-orga-
nizing and self-governing people in field settings “go back and forth across levels as
a key strategy for solving problems” (E. Ostrom 2008a: 54). In relation to all three
levels of rule-making, it can generally be said that when most of the individuals
who have an interest in a particular resource are able to continually configure and
modify their own rules, these rules are then more likely to better suit local en-
vironmental conditions and the interested individuals’ needs. Furthermore, such
participation not only limits elites’ ability to create institutions that only benefit
themselves, but it also empowers individuals to coproduce rules and public goods
21 The definition of clear boundaries of a common pool resource is necessary, according to Eli-
nor Ostrom, when the resource units consumed are rival or subtractive goods. In comparison
to non-rival or non-subtractible goods such as information that can be organized as open-
access regimes, the scarcity and subtractibility of goods makes it necessary to regulate the
appropriation and consumption thereof. According to Ostrom, this distinction between com-
monproperty and open-access regimes is crucial (E. Ostrom2008a: 91-2; E. Ostrom2010: 642,
644).
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that aremore likely to be considered fair, adhered to and fostered (E.Ostrom 2005a:
263).
Having discussed the general principles for the design of institutions, we must
now turn our attention to the problem of adherence to these rules. Although the
creation of fair and suitable institutions by those with an interest in the resource
strongly increases the likelihood that people will commit to adhering to the rules,
the fragility of reciprocity and trust implies that shared norms are not sufficient for
maintaining cooperation and improved joint outcomes. To strengthen one’s trust
that one is not being taken advantage of, rule infraction and free riding must addi-
tionally be controlled and limited through certain forms ofmonitoring, sanctioning
and other conflict-resolution mechanisms. While Hardin and many others believe
that only external coercion can solve the problem of rule violation, Ostrom be-
lieves this solution to be a sleight of hand because it does not address the costs and
motivations of the external enforcer (E. Ostrom 2008a: 44, 96). Although external
enforcers can, in certain cases, be useful and necessary, she argues that in order to
solve the commitment problem, interested individuals have to “motivate themselves
(or their agents) to monitor activities and be willing to impose sanctions” (ibid.:
44; emphasis added). The adherence problem thus boils down to a problem of the
willingness of interested individuals to adhere to collectively self-determined rules
– and to the assurance that others will also act accordingly. For this reason, the
adherence problem is inherently interwoven with the monitoring problem.
Monitoring generally implies that resource conditions and harvesting activi-
ties are visible and checked on. Ostrom’s research on durable resource regimes has
shown that monitoring works well if the monitors are appropriators themselves
or are elected by and accountable to appropriators (design principle 4) (E. Ostrom
2005a: 265). In some cases,mutual monitoring simply occurs as a “natural by-prod-
uct of using the commons” (E. Ostrom 2008a: 96). In cases where local monitors
are elected, these officials are, in turn, often also monitored by the appropriators
who are usually those who initially elected their officials. The redundancy in this
system of mutual monitoring is a central strategy to minimize the ‘quis custodiet
ipsos custodes?’ problem that Hardin formulates for what he understands as “social-
ism.” Furthermore, the attractiveness of formal and informalmutualmonitoring by
appropriators is increased – besides gains in status, prestige and other small mate-
rial rewards from sanctioning – by access to valuable information concerning the
resource and compliance rates for future strategic decisions (ibid.: 97). Although
mutual monitoring can easily be considered highly inefficient because of its re-
dundancy, research shows that it is actually an effective and low-cost mechanism
to strengthen mutual trust and maintain higher joint outcomes.
For monitoring to have any effect on trust and compliance, however, it must be
coupled with mechanisms for applying sanctions (E. Ostrom 2005a: 266-7). Sanc-
tions can be applied either by the appropriators themselves or by officials account-
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able to them – or by both (E. Ostrom 2008a: 90). Contrary to general assumptions
that trust and compliance are maintained through harsh punishments,22 Ostrom’s
research demonstrates that graduated sanctions are both less costly and more ef-
fective than initial major fines (design principle 5) (ibid.: 98). She writes that “in
many self-organized systems, the first sanction imposed by a local monitor is so
low as to have no impact on the expected benefit-cost ratio of breaking local rules
(given the substantial temptations frequently involved)” (E. Ostrom 2005a: 266;
original emphasis). In many cases, the initial sanction that is ‘imposed’ is when
the monitor merely informs both the person (and possibly the community) that
they were caught violating the rules (ibid.). These low-cost sanctions have an im-
pact because they are a subtle form of public shaming and damage the reputation
and trustworthiness of the individual. This threatens the individual’s social status
and evolutionary ‘fitness’ because other people may – in a “tit-for-tat” or “measured
reaction” (E. Ostrom 2003: 42, 52-3) – stop cooperating with this person, which, in
turn, produces an incentive to quickly return to a more cooperative strategy.23 Os-
trom explains, however, that the more serious problem of repeated rule infractions
is often dealt with by escalating sanctions because it “enables such a regime to warn
members that if they do not conform, they will have to pay ever higher sanctions
and may eventually be forced to leave the community” (E. Ostrom 2005a: 267).
With reference to Margaret Levi, Ostrom explains that monitoring and escalat-
ing punishment strategies create a regime of “quasi-voluntary compliance”. Here,
cooperation is initially voluntary because if non-cooperation arises, it will be sub-
ject to coercion (E. Ostrom 2008a: 94-5). More importantly, it must be noted that
these strategies generallymaintain or increase levels of quasi-voluntary compliance
and trust among appropriators so that – and contrary to Hardin’s assumption –
one-hundred-percent compliance is not necessary. In relation to endogenous fac-
tors, Ostrom writes:
22 In the literature on game theory, the most frequently discussed punishment is the grim trig-
ger. Here, “a participant, once he or she has detected any level of cheating, plays the Nash
equilibrium strategy forever” (E. Ostrom 2003: 52). The problem with the grim trigger, how-
ever, is that it “immediately could lead to the rapid unravelling of the agreement and the
loss of substantial benefits over time” (ibid.: 53). Although it is often assumed that the grim
trigger is normally used in social interactions as an ultimate threat to secure rule conformity,
research on game theory provides a different picture: “Few subjects use grim triggers, how-
ever, in experimental contexts.” (ibid.: 52)
23 Elinor explains that the most common – or most famous – reaction to non-cooperation is
the tit-for-tat reciprocal strategy. This mechanism can be defined as “reciprocate first, and
then do whatever the others did the last round” (E. Ostrom 2003: 42). It appears that this
tactic is also utilized in most field experiments to punish the rule violator for a specific nega-
tive action. Yet, in comparison to the unforgiving grim-trigger strategy, the offender receives
the chance to change their strategy and return to cooperation and improved joint outcomes
without further sanctions.
80 Democracy, Markets and the Commons
If only a small deviation occurs, the cooperation of most participants is already
generatingpositive returns. By keepingone’s own reaction close to the agreement,
one keeps up one’s own reputation for cooperation and makes it easier to restore
full conformance because cooperation levels are higher. (E. Ostrom 2003: 53)
For this reason, contingent self-commitment24 does not trigger a race to the bot-
tom or a relentless process of over-use and free riding when others break with the
agreement (E.Ostrom2008a: 97-8). In turn, the exogenous variables of localmutual
monitoring and graduated sanctioning can assure appropriators of the fact that the
conformance of others to the rules is being supervised. This can then increase lev-
els of trust and enables appropriators to “continue their own cooperation without
constant fear that others are taking advantage of them” (E. Ostrom 2005a: 265).
Furthermore, it must also be emphasized that, in comparison to external surveil-
lance and coercion, quasi-voluntary compliance through mutual monitoring and
graduated sanctioning can effectively increase trust, reciprocity and commitment
at extremely low costs.
Ostrom also mentions the importance of conflict-resolution mechanisms for
strengthening the reinforcing relationship between rule creation, contingent com-
mitment and mutual monitoring (design principle 6). Conflict-resolution mech-
anisms generally imply that “appropriators and their officials [should] have rapid
access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between
appropriators and officials” (E. Ostrom 2008a: 90). The reason why such mecha-
nisms are helpful is because – unlike physical constraints – “rules […] have to be un-
derstood in order to be effective” (E. Ostrom 2005a: 267). In other words, even when
appropriators have defined the rules themselves, the interpretation and adminis-
tration of social rules is always ambiguous and can therefore easily lead to conflicts
(E. Ostrom 2008a: 100). Due to this inherent ambiguity, there must be local are-
nas and simple mechanisms that enable people to discuss and resolve the precise
definitions of rule violation in different cases (ibid.). Although Ostrom emphasizes
the importance of local and sometimes quite informal techniques for dealing with
conflict, she also stresses the necessity of well-developed court mechanisms above
the level of the local resource. Having arenas for dispute resolution at higher insti-
tutional levels is, for example, especially important in reducing the problem of elite
capture. Even though such forums do not guarantee cooperation and the mainte-
nance of robust institutions, Ostrom considers it unlikely that robust institutions
24 Ostrom explains that contingent self-commitment implies the following type of pledge: “I
commit myself to follow the set of rules we have devised in all instances except dire emer-
gencies if the rest of those affected make a similar commitment and act accordingly.” (E. Os-
trom 2008a: 99-100) In this context, contingent means that the individual will adhere to the
rules as long as (most) others also do. This type of contingent self-commitment resembles
the tit-for-tat strategy of norm reciprocity.
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can exist over long periods of time without such institutional arrangements (ibid.:
101). Generally, it can be said that the ability to deliberate on and deal with conflicts
in a simple and uncostly manner can increase the levels of rule adherence and trust
within a specific community (E. Ostrom 2005a: 268).
Aside from these seven design principles, Ostrom adds a final eighth principle
to the list: nested enterprises. This principle is of importance for common pool
resources that are either relatively large or parts of larger resource systems. We
will now discuss this eighth design principle in relation to Ostrom’s more general
understanding of polycentric governance systems.
4.6 Institutional diversity and polycentricity
The design principles I have discussed are explications of the exogenous, institu-
tional variables that can strengthen the endogenous variables of reciprocity, trust
and reputation in order to overcome social dilemmas. It was shown that first-,
second- and third-order social dilemmas can be solved in a mutually reinforcing
manner (E. Ostrom 2005a: 267; E. Ostrom 2008a: 100). Now, we will turn to the
broader and more general implications of these results for the understanding of
institutional design, democratic theory and ecological sustainability.
Firstly, the results of Ostrom’s extensive meta-analysis of various common
property resources has shown that it is possible for individuals and communities
who are confronted with social dilemmas to change the very institutional structure
that they find themselves in and limit or even eliminate overuse and free riding.
This finding is extremely significant because it demonstrates that people can solve
“tragedies of the commons” without resorting to the classical – and sometimes
rather problematic – models of privatization or centralized state coercion. For-
mulated more fundamentally, the research on social dilemmas “demonstrates [...]
a world of possibility rather than one of necessity” (E. Ostrom 2003: 62). For this
reason, Ostrom explains that it is not commoners but rather academics who ap-
pear to be trapped in tragedy: “Instead of the users of a commons being inexorably
trapped in a tragedy, it is the scholars who have allowed their assumptions to trap
them into a presumption that short-run tendencies will necessarily prevail in the
long run.” (E. Ostrom 1986: 26) Despite this positive finding, her research also
shows that people do not always choose a better joint outcome whenever possible.
Asmany other examples of depleted common pool resources that Ostrom discusses
show that “establishing a possibility is not the same as establishing necessity” (E.
Ostrom 1986, 25; original emphasis). This generally implies that trust, reciprocity
and collective action are extremely delicate matters and require institutional
structures that are adapted to the relevant social and material conditions.
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Aside from formulating this new perspective for solving commons dilemmas,
Ostrom’s work has also challenged the classical dualistic concept of founding a so-
cial contract and subsequent institutional change. An important insight that Os-
trom provides with her empirical case studies is that there is no “state of nature”
entirely lacking in institutional structure (E. Ostrom 2008a: 140). This implies that
human interaction is always embedded in institutions25 and that no fundamental
difference exists between an “original” social contract and the change of institu-
tions26: “Once one assumes that all recurring situations are characterized by a set
of status quo rules, then it is possible to broaden the concept of institutional supply
to include both what can be called the ‘origin’ of new institutions and the changing
of existing institutions.” (ibid.: 140) Contrary to most contractarian philosophers
who categorically distinguish between a state of nature and civilized society, firstly,
this conceptualization of human interactions and institutions enables Ostrom, as
already mentioned, to understand the tendency for humans to act as egotistical
utility maximizers as a product of specific institutional arrangements. Simply put,
Ostrom denaturalizes the idea of the atomistic individual. Secondly, she formu-
lates a single theory of institutional origin and reform for operational-, collective-
and constitutional-choice levels of decision making, in which change is a continual
“sequential and incremental process” (ibid.: 141).
A third important implication of her work is that she places the micro-situ-
ational institutions governing smaller-scale common pool resources in a broader
context of nested and multi-leveled polycentric institutions. In relation to her un-
derstanding of institutional change on different levels of choice within institutions,
Ostrom explains that accumulated social and “institutional capital”27 can then be
25 Elinor defines institutions in the following manner: “‘Institutions’ can be defined as the sets
of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arena,
what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what proce-
dures must be followed, what information must or must not be provided, and what payoffs
will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions. All rules contain prescriptions
that forbid, permit, or require some action or outcome.” (E. Ostrom 2008a: 51)
26 Elinor defines institutional change as “a change in any rule affecting the set of participants,
the set of strategies available to participants, the control they have over outcomes, the infor-
mation they have, or the payoffs is an institutional change” (E. Ostrom 2008a: 140).
27 Although Elinor never precisely defines the term “institutional capital,” she uses it numer-
ous times in her writing. Generally, it appears to imply the functioning of institutions that
has evolved and developed through the adaptation of the system to solve certain problems
– whether biophysical or social. Institutional capital also implies the developed habits and
acquired knowledge of the people who build and maintain their own institutional systems.
Ostrom writes: “Current theories of collective action do not stress the process of accretion of
institutional capital. Thus, one problem in using them [traditional theories of collective ac-
tion] as foundations for policy analysis is that they do not focus on the incremental self-trans-
formations that frequently are involved in the process of supplying institutions. Learning is
an incremental, self-transforming process.” (E. Ostrom 2008a: 190) Elsewhere, she explains:
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utilized for governance on higher levels of scale: “Success in starting small-scale
initial institutions enables a group of individuals to build on the social capital [of
trust, reputation and reciprocity] thus created to solve larger problems with larger
and more complex institutional arrangements.” (ibid.: 190) In an article for the
United Nations Rio+20 summit that she wrote shortly before her death in 2012,
she explains the general importance of locally-governed institutions in a polycen-
tric system for environmental sustainability:
No one knows for sure what will work, so it is important to build a system that
can evolve and adapt rapidly. Decades of research demonstrate that a variety of
overlapping policies at city, subnational, national, and international levels ismore
likely to succeed than are single, overarching binding agreements. Such an evo-
lutionary approach to policy provides essential safety nets should one or more
policies fail. […] Sustainability at local and national levels must add up to global
sustainability. This ideamust form the bedrock of national economies and consti-
tute the fabric of our societies. The goal now must be to build sustainability into
the DNA of our globally interconnected society. (E. Ostrom 2012)
While we have previously mentioned that Elinor Ostrom emphasized that one sin-
gle model does not fit all situations, she clearly advocates a specific direction in
which political development should move: the strengthening of bottom-up initia-
tives and self-transformative processes to deal with global issues of sustainability.
Although some of the advantages of decentralized, participatory governance in
polycentric systems have already beenmentioned, I would like to briefly summarize
them. Firstly, local and disaggregated knowledge of both the existing social values
and norms and of the biophysical system and its changes can be used to create
rules that are better adapted to local conditions. Second, the creation of suitable,
legitimate rules that foster trust and reciprocity increases rates of conformity with
the rules and decreases the costs of monitoring and sanctioning. Finally, the exis-
tence of parallel autonomous systems reduces the probability of immense failure
spanning larger regions (E. Ostrom 2005a: 281-2). Even though it is often believed
that institutions which are “complex, redundant, and nested in many layers” (Dietz
et al. 2003: 1910) are inefficient, Ostrom’s research shows that such decentralized
and participatory forms of governance can, in fact, be quite effective in dealingwith
social dilemmas and tragedies – and therefore in realizing positive joint outcomes.
For these reasons, both Elinor andVincent Ostrom argue that commons-like in-
stitutions should be integrated in the management and provision of public goods.
“Applying models out of range can produce more harm than good. Public policies based on
the notion that all CPR appropriators are helpless andmust have rules imposed on them can
destroy institutional capital that has been accumulated during years of experience in partic-
ular locations, as illustrated by the Nova Scotia fishery cases.” (ibid.: 184)
84 Democracy, Markets and the Commons
This is what they call “coproduction” (E. Ostrom 1996; Parks et al. 1981), which Elinor
defines as “the process through which inputs used to produce a good or service are
contributed by individuals who are not ‘in’ the same organization” (E. Ostrom 1996:
1073). In comparison to the more widespread public choice theory, the Ostroms do
not, however, limit their understanding of coproduction to public-private partner-
ships in which public goods are outsourced to private corporations. Instead, they
argue that coproduction should “cross the great divide” (ibid.) between the state
and economy and integrate civil society. The aim of this is to create decision-mak-
ing arenas that unite the possibly conflicting interests of producers, consumers
and regulators. Although not explicitly stated, it can be assumed that participation
in the production and governance of such goods and services depends on one’s
degree of affectedness. While the importance of a clearly-defined demos is under-
stood as the first design principle of durable, self-governing institutions for com-
mon resources, the fundamental problem of how to measure this affectedness and
of who shall decide who is affected and can participate is, unfortunately, not dealt
with in their work. Nevertheless, by “unlocking public entrepreneurship and pub-
lic economies” (E. Ostrom 2005b), it is hoped that consumers will be transformed
into active citizens. Instead of separating the public from the private, the Ostroms
argue that bureaucratic state administration needs to be democratized (V. Ostrom
1974: 111).
However, because decentralized decision-making does have its own weak-
nesses, Elinor and Vincent Ostrom argue that these institutions must be located
within the larger institutional context of a complex polycentric system. The
importance of higher-scale institutions becomes apparent when the limits of
community governance are discussed. In short, these include: (1) the lack of
organization by some appropriators, (2) the failure of some self-organizing efforts,
(3) local tyrannies and elite capture, (4) stagnation or the lack of institutional
innovation, (5) illegitimate discrimination and exclusion, (6) communities’ limited
access to scientific information, (7) serious conflict among appropriators and
between common pool resource systems, and, most importantly, (8) the inability
of small-scale institutions to deal with larger-scale common pool resources (E.
Ostrom 2005a: 282).
Due to these limitations, Elinor emphasizes that local self-governed resources
must be built into – or nested in – a larger multileveled polycentric governance
system. She explains the concept of polycentricity in her book Understanding Insti-
tutional Diversity:
By polycentric I mean a system where citizens are able to organize not just one
but multiple governing authorities at different scales. Each unit exercises consid-
erable independence to make and enforce rules within a circumscribed domain
of authority for a specified geographical area. In a polycentric system, some units
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are general-purpose governments while others may be highly specialized. Self-
organized resource governance systems in such a systemmay be special districts,
private associations, or parts of the local government. These are nested in several
levels of general-purpose governments that also provide civil equity, as well as
criminal courts. (E. Ostrom 2005a: 283)
The advantage of such a polycentric system is that while users have the authority
to define some of the local rules, serious problems such as local tyrannies, cor-
ruption and inappropriate discrimination can, in turn, be addressed. According to
Elinor, polycentric systems make it possible to deal with such problems through
“larger general-purpose governmental units who are responsible for protecting the
rights of all citizens and for the oversight of appropriate exercises of authorities
within smaller units of government” (ibid.). Another advantage of such nested en-
terprises is that interaction and the exchange of information over what has worked
and what has not can also take place. Finally, and most importantly, a polycen-
tric system strengthens institutional robustness and evolutionary fitness in that if
small systems fail, larger systems can pitch in and help, and if larger systems are
unstable or break down, the smaller systems can possibly survive and support the
reconfiguration of the larger institutions (ibid.).
That being said, Elinor Ostrom acknowledges that polycentric systems are not
easy to deal with – neither for affected participants themselves nor for social sci-
entists. A central problem which she recognizes is the serious potential for con-
flict between different units “at multiple levels due to their interdependence” (ibid.:
286). Although not explicitly stated, this conflict can easily arise from competition
between the interdependent social units. While such competition and conflict can
lead to violence, according to Ostrom, the conflict can also generate more infor-
mation for participants to solve the specific problems that are being fought over.
For scholars, on the other hand, polycentric systems often look “terribly messy and
[are] hard to understand” (ibid.). For this reason, Elinor advises scientists to resist
their “love of tidiness” (ibid.) and to “develop better theories of complex adaptive
systems focused on overcoming social dilemmas” (ibid.). In relation to the numer-
ous difficulties in dealing with decentralized, participatory governance in polycen-
tric systems, Elinor Ostrom recognizes that “coping with potential tragedies of the
commons is never easy and never finished” (ibid.).
4.7 Interim conclusion
Without repeating the entire discussion of the Ostroms’ work, I now turn to a few
concluding reflections on Elinor and Vincent Ostrom’s work that will be important
for my discussion of the relationships between democracy, markets and commons.
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In general terms, the work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom has shown that the
tragedy of unregulated commons and what I have defined as the tragedy of open
and competitive commons can be overcome. As Elinor has demonstrated, these
problems may be overcome by cultivating communication, reciprocity and trust on
the one hand and by developing rules and regulations against overuse that are, in
turn, upheld through mutual monitoring and graduated sanctioning on the other.
It is important to note that their findings also emphasize that the people affected
by a specific resource system should be included in the codetermination of its rules
and regulations in order to provide an institutional framework that is adapted to fit
the specific cultural and ecological context. Such forms of democratic governance
are also understood as strategies in dealing with the limitations in the provision
of public goods by the state.The Ostroms call this type of democratic collaboration
with the government coproduction, which must be understood as an alternative
to the otherwise widespread notion of public-private partnerships. We might call
this alternative type of organization a public-civil society or possibly even a pub-
lic-commons partnership. Yet, owing to the weaknesses of small-scale democratic
governance of economic goods and activities, they argue that these units should
be embedded in a multi-layered and polycentric system of overlapping and demo-
cratically governed units.
Despite these improvements in our understanding of how to deal with the
problem of tragedy and the manner in which democratic forms of governance can
be developed, there are three respects in which the Ostroms’ work is nevertheless
somewhat limited. Firstly and as already discussed, their work lacks both a critique
of privatization and of open and competitive markets. For this reason, I would ar-
gue that while they disprove Hardin’s thesis for certain cases, it is important to
note that they almost entirely ignore the perpetually recurring tragedy of open and
competitive markets and the power asymmetries that result from them (Mattei
2013a: 20). Secondly, Elinor Ostrom’s rather positivistic description of successful
and unsuccessful commons importantly lacks explicit normative arguments as to
why societies should develop democratic common property arrangements (Levine
2011: 11-13). Elinor accentuates this problem when she emphasizes that there is no
single best social arrangement and that commons are no panacea (Korten/Ostrom
2010; E. Ostrom 2005a: 258).28 This is understandable considering the problems
of top-down blueprint thinking and policy implementations that the Ostroms dis-
cuss.Nevertheless, the lack of explicit normative arguments is problematic because
28 After she won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2009, Ostrom was asked,
in an interview by Fran Korten for Yes! Magazine, what her advice to someone with a pow-
erful influence on natural resources policy would be. Her answer was: “No panaceas!” (Ko-
rten/Ostrom 2010). In her book Understanding Institutional Diversity Ostrom writes, “As social
scientists, we have to use one of our favorite slogans […] – it depends!” (E. Ostrom 2005a: 258)
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it provides little counterweight to the widespread and rather well articulated argu-
ments for individual private property and open and competitive markets – despite
the existing negative effects that result from them. Thirdly, their rather narrow
focus on common pool resources rather than common property arrangements ac-
centuates this problem. This leads to the false impression that commons are spe-
cific things (pastures, forests etc.) and not social arrangements that can be utilized
for the organization of more or less all resources and goods. Due to this rather
limited definition of commons and their lack of explicit normative arguments for
commons arrangements, it can be expected that commons might simply remain
charming niches in the threatening stormy seas of the existing market society.
In order to deal with these problems, I believe it necessary to develop a norma-
tive justification of commons in the name of ecological sustainability and human
freedom. I will do this in relation to the institutions of property, the state and the
market. But before that, I firstly develop an ecological understanding of democracy
and the commons that prioritizes the shared, common reality of humans and the
non-human world and their co-creation of that reality. Let us therefore now turn
to a more ecological approach to the commons.

5. An ecological understanding of the commons
In this chapter, I would like to turn to a category that is of central importance to
our discussion of the commons, but is almost entirely neglected in the work of Eli-
nor Ostrom: nature. For Elinor, it appears as though nature tends to be reduced to
the role of a passive resource in the “drama of the commons” (Ostrom et al. 2002).
Nature is the stage on which the human drama takes place. Here, the relationship
between human beings and nature is implicitly instrumental. Although such an in-
terpretation of nature might appear to be sufficient for dealing with environmen-
tal problems and “planetary boundaries” (Steffen et al. 2015), I would argue that
its underlying society–nature dualism is both conceptually false and problematic.
The dualism is false, because human beings and human society are always a part of
nature: there is no outside of nature. The dualism is problematic, because the ex-
ternal environment is primarily understood as a limit to one’s individual freedom
– and not as an interdependent precondition of it. Furthermore, this instrumen-
tal and antagonistic relationship also leaves the door open for a hierarchical and
exploitative relationship of man over nature. It would be absolutely wrong to say
that Elinor Ostrom intended this, but I believe that her analysis critically ques-
tions neither prevailing understandings of nature nor the Malthusian-Hardinian
“stage” that she found herself on. Despite her insightful solutions to the tragedy of
the commons, the unregulated commons, as an ahistorical model of the place of
humans in nature, continues to dominate academic debates and the social imagi-
nary. In order to overcome this framework, it is therefore necessary to develop an
understanding of nature that is more conducive to a free and sustainable society.
Or in the words of Robyn Eckersley, I aim to shift our understanding of the envi-
ronmental problem from a “crisis of survival” to an “opportunity for emancipation”
(Eckersley 1992: 11-21).
In this chapter, I therefore proceed as follows. Firstly, I discuss the relationship
between nature, language and social arrangements and argue that humans’ social
practices and institutions are always interrelated with their conceptions of nature.
Secondly, I then attempt to develop a more timely understanding of nature that is
more conducive to the principles of freedom and ecological sustainability. Here, I
will develop a notion of nature based on new insights in diverse fields of thought, in
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which organisms self-organize and dynamically adapt to their changing environ-
ments. With reference to a number authors, I conceptualize nature as a web of life
that is constituted by interdependent organisms and ecosystems.Thirdly, I discuss
the importance of this ecological interdependence for human beings, which consti-
tutes a shared, common reality as the backbone of their individual freedom. Next,
I flesh out an ecological understanding of democracy with reference to a principle
of care and the civic tradition of democracy. Finally, with reference to the work
of Ugo Mattei and Fritjof Capra I develop an ecological concept of the commons,
which goes beyond common pool resources and emphasizes the civic practices of
commoning in, with and through nature.
5.1 Nature, language and social relations
Before I begin to elaborate my specific understanding of nature, I would like to ex-
plain why the way nature is understood is so crucially important for any discussion
of commons. A more sophisticated analysis of nature aims not only to determine
where the “safe operating space” within planetary boundaries may lie (Rockström
et al. 2009). Instead, I argue that a society’s understanding of its natural world is
central to the way humans interact with that world and with each other.
As just mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the fundamental premise
of my approach is that humans and society are always a part of nature. This ap-
parently naïve claim receives a little more depth if understood in the light of Marx
and Engels’s German Ideology, in which they write,
The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human
individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organization of
these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. […] All his-
torical writingmust set out from these natural bases and their modification in the
course of history through the action of men. (Marx/Engels 1998: 37)
While we must understand human existence as embedded in nature, we should
conversely also understand our ideas of nature as a specific result of our social
relations. Or again in the well-known words of Marx and Engels: “The ruling ideas
are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relations, the
dominantmaterial relations grasped as ideas.”1 (ibid.: 67)This classical “materialist”
notion of ideas implies that the prevalent ideas of society and nature are largely
historical results of contingent power relationships, which they legitimate. In this
manner, social institutions are naturalized and our conceptions of nature reflect
1 According to the rather well-known slogan, “it is not consciousness that determines life, but
life that determines consciousness” (Marx/Engels 1998: 42).
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the dominant form of social organization. In turn, the symbolic ordering of these
representations also constitutes and reproduces a specific organization of nature.
In contrast to a crude deterministic interpretation of Marx’s base-superstruc-
ture relationship between social relations and ideas, I contend that our ideas (of
nature) are not only a result of prevailing social relations but can also transform
them.Marx admits this himself in his discussion of the labor process, whichmakes
ideas real (Marx 1982a: 284).2 Elsewhere, he also claims that ideas can be used for
political collective action when they influence a wider population: “Theory, too, be-
comes a material force once it seizes the masses.” (Marx 1982b: 137) I do not want to
pursue a detailed discussion of Marx’s theory of historical materialism and social
practice here. Nevertheless, this very short discussion of Marx aims to underline
the embeddedness of language in both physical nature and its social arrangements.
Furthermore, it emphasizes that ideas can, in turn, be used to transform social ac-
tion and the organization of the material world. It is in this sense that language
and concepts are of utmost importance in the reproduction and transformation of
what we generally understand as ‘life’.
In a similar manner, Vincent Ostrom discusses the relationship between lan-
guage, reality and social relations in his bookTheMeaning of Democracy and the Vul-
nerabilities of Democracies (1997). There he writes:
The meaning associated with the triangulation of images [mental states], events
and relations [the objects and states of the world referred to] and words or sym-
bols [names assigned to events and relations] involves a shared community of un-
derstanding among language users. Tacit levels of understanding go beyond the
mere use of words and of definitions stated in a more profuse use of words, as
in dictionaries. In a sense, an ‘organic’ tie pervades intelligible communication by
reference to the tacit commonunderstandings that are fashioned by communities
of language users. […] The essential link is language. Language associates thoughts,
ideas, and knowledgeable articulations of skill in actions towhat gets done – ideas
to deeds. (V. Ostrom 1997: 130; emphasis added)
It could thus be said that, for Vincent Ostrom language constitutes the relation-
ship between ideas, things and social relations. In other words, it is not merely
social relations that determine one’s ideas and the distribution of power within so-
ciety, but it is also language that constitutes individual action and, in turn, these
2 InMarx’s words: “At the end of every labour process, a result emergeswhich had already been
conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not only effects
a change of form in the materials of nature; he also realizes [verwirklicht] his own purpose
in those materials. And this is a purpose he is conscious of, it determines the mode of his
activity with the rigidity of a law, and he must subordinate his will to it. This subordination
is no mere momentary act.” (Marx 1982a: 284)
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specific arrangements. Societies use language and ideas in specific ways that are,
however, not always fully transparent to the individuals using them.This tacit com-
mon understanding can be compared with Marx’s notion of a consciousness that is
organically and often unconsciously determined by social arrangements (Marx/En-
gels 1998: 42). These tacit “ruling ideas” (ibid.: 67) bring about specific patterns of
action and, in turn, what Ostrom calls with reference to Searle “institutional facts”
(V. Ostrom 1997: 128). For Vincent Ostrom, an institutional fact is the “social real-
ity that is itself an artifactual construction […] relying on norms and rule-ordered
relationships” (ibid.). He utilizes the term artifactual to connote that social reality
is constructed by humans and their (tacit) concepts of society.
For this reason, Elinor Ostrom also maintains in her book Governing the Com-
mons that wemust critically reflect on our “metaphorical use ofmodels” due to their
powerful influence on policy prescription and both individual and collective action
(E. Ostrom 2008a: 8).With Elinor Ostrom we could therefore say that the reformu-
lation of metaphors, concepts and ideas provides us with new “heuristics, strate-
gies, norms […] [and] rules of thumb” (E. Ostrom 2003: 40). These “focal points”
(ibid.: 41) help us (re-)orient ourselves in our interactions with one another and
with the world. Thus, reflecting on of our use of language and concepts, in turn,
opens up choices in the way we organize society and can “increasingly transform
the material conditions of [our] environment” (V. Ostrom 1997: 128). Within this
framework, language and ideas are thus understood as key determinants in the re-
production and transformation of social order and material reality. In line with the
thoughts of Cornelius Castoriadis (1987), Michel Foucault (2002) and Bruno Latour
(1993), we can therefore maintain that concepts not only provide us with abstract
ideas that help us understand an objectively given reality, but rather co-constitute
the symbolic-material order of things.
Along these lines, it can therefore be argued that our (tacit) common under-
standing of nature holds an important position in this process of reproduction and
transformation. The reason for this is that our knowledge and concepts of nature
are both a result of material conditions and social relations, on the one hand, and
a constituting force of the political organization of the environment, on the other.
As Jason W. Moore generally puts it in his book Capitalism in the Web of Life:
Modernity's structures of knowledge, its dominant relations of power, re/pro-
duction, and wealth, its patterns of environment-making: these form an organic
whole. Power, production, and perception entwine; they cannot be disentangled
because they are unified, albeit unevenly and in evolving fashion. (Moore 2015: 3)
AlthoughMoore speaks of modernity here, the point can be applied to all of human
history: “humansmake environments and environmentsmake humans” (ibid.). So-
ciety and nature or “human history” and “natural evolution” are intertwined and
coproduce each other both symbolically and materially. Jason Moore calls this the
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“double internality” of the society-nature relationship (ibid.: 5). The reason why
our knowledge and concepts of nature are of such great importance is therefore
because they provide the material or, rather, organic backdrop of reality that struc-
tures our possibilities of how to act and arrange society. In his article “The Nature
of Environment” (1993) David Harvey therefore argues,
If all socio-political projects are ecological projects and vice versa, then some con-
ception of ‘nature’ and of ‘environment’ is omnipresent in everything we say and
do. If, furthermore, concepts, discourses and theories can operate, when internal-
ized in socio-ecological practices and actions, as ‘material forces’ that shape his-
tory, then the present battles being waged over the concepts of 'nature' and of
‘environment’ are of immense importance. All critical examinations of the rela-
tion to nature are simultaneously critical examinations of society. (Harvey 1993:
39)
Due to the inherent interrelation of language, nature and social relations, I would
therefore contend that the different ecological, economic and political crises that
contemporary societies are facing today are also a result of specific conceptions of
nature. Following in the footsteps of John Dewey (1930) and Bruno Latour (2004,
2013), I believe that in order to deal with these problems, we therefore also have
to rethink our central concepts that constitute this relationship, such as the mind-
body, subject-object, individual-society and human-nature dichotomies. As I will
show, this shift should move us beyond a reductionist, mechanistic and determin-
istic to a more systemic, processual and adaptive understanding of nature and
society. Or more specifically, it is a shift from a dualistic and anthropocentric to
an interrelated and ecocentric model, in which humans are conceived as interde-
pendent, creative components of the natural world (Dewey 1929; Eckersley 1992;
Stengers 2010/2011).
Before continuing, it is of utmost importance to stress that this does not imply
that we can simply create another reality by describing it differently. That would
be solipsistic and naïve, especially considering the interests of those who are not
interested in such social change. Nevertheless, the aim is to develop a new “shared
common understanding” of nature that will influence people’s patterns of (inter)ac-
tion and possibly become a “material force” of social change towards a more demo-
cratic society. In order to see how this might be done, let us therefore now turn to
a few preliminary reflections on this new concept of nature.
5.2 Concepts of nature and social reality
In order to develop a different interpretation of nature that is conducive to com-
mons and commoning, I would like to focus on two pieces of writing:The Ecology of
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Law: Toward a Legal System in Tune with Nature and Community (2015) by Fritjof Capra
and Ugo Mattei and Enlivenment: Towards a fundamental shift in the concepts of nature,
culture and politics (2013) by Andreas Weber.3 As Capra and Mattei emphasize, their
critique revolves around the rise of a rationalist and mechanistic understanding
of the world through the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment constituted by
scholars like Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, Newton and Locke. For Weber, the prob-
lem lies not only in this reductionism, but also in deterministic interpretations of
competition and natural selection.These interpretations of reality, in turn, provide
us with a biological “metaphysics of our culture” (Weber 2013: 23) and with concep-
tual cornerstones of how human society can, and therefore should, be organized.
A key moment for these three authors in the development of contemporary
Western worldviews is Descartes’ differentiation between res cogitans and res extensa
through which the subjective human spirit is separated from – and placed above
– objective, material reality. While the realm of life and freedom is accessible only
to the spirit, the material world is understood as a mechanistic machine that is
determined by universal laws of nature. Despite advances in evolutionary theory,
Weber argues that, following Descartes, Malthusian and Social Darwinist “laws of
nature” created an understanding of the economy in which subjectivity and free-
dom were ultimately negated (Weber 2013: 23).4 The biologist Richard Dawkins, for
example, expresses this worldview most clearly in his book The Selfish Gene, as he
writes: “We are survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve
the selfish molecules known as genes.” (Dawkins 2006: xxi) Here, we are reminded
of Garrett Hardin’s assumption that the default position of people’s strategy of ac-
tion is to maximize one’s offspring and gains (Hardin 1968; Hardin 1993: 97). More
generally put, this biologically framed understanding of human action underlies
the widespread belief that humans are egotistical utility maximizers or homo oeco-
nomici. Due to the law-like nature of human action and, thus, social reality, Weber
therefore goes so far as to say that the “deep metaphysics of our age, is a science
of the non-living” (Weber 2013: 23). Or, as Alfred North Whitehead ironically points
out in his discussion of the notion “survival of the fittest”: “The art of persistence
[in comparison to the art of living] is to be dead. Only inorganic things persist for
great lengths of time.” (Whitehead 1958: 4)
3 Andreas Weber reformulated these thoughts in his more recent book Enlivenment: Toward a
Poetics for the Anthropocene published byMIT Press in 2019. However, I have chosen to focus on
the original essay published by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung in 2013, which was then later also
published in German under the title Enlivenment: Eine Kultur des Lebens – Versuch einer Poetik
für das Anthropozän by Matthes & Seitz in 2016.
4 Weber explains: “The [economic] process is subject-less and self-organized in the sense that
eternal, external laws (that of selection and that of economic survival) punish or reward the
behaviour of atomistic black boxes called ‘Homo economicus’ – economic man – or in amore
modern telling, the ‘selfish gene’.” (Weber 2013: 23)
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Although many intellectuals and scientists would not go so far as to deny the
freedom of the individual, it is important to note that the belief that people exist in
antagonistic and therefore competitive relationships is deeply rooted in Western
thought, including that of Hobbes, Kant and Freud (Hobbes 1985: 183-8; Kant 2001:
6:27; Freud 1962: 58). In simple terms, the antagonistic competition between atom-
istic individuals is often assumed to be a universal law of nature.5 This is what An-
dreas Weber and others understand as bio-economics: the biological foundations
of the open and competitive market (Arnhart 2015). Generally speaking, it can be
said that the universalization of the principles of machine-like mechanisms of an-
tagonistic competition has to some extent become a (tacit)metaphysical framework
within Western society, according to which its social and natural world has been
interpreted and organized. According to Capra and Mattei, this conception of laws
of nature was then adopted by legal scholars to create an objective legal framework
based on private ownership and state sovereignty, generally understood as “legal
absolutism” (Capra/Mattei 2015: 6). Additionally, and as we have already discussed,
it is this universalist institutional framework of the competitive market that has
largely brought about contemporary, interrelated ecological, socio-economic and
political crises.
This being said, Capra, Mattei and Weber maintain that in order to deal with
these crises a paradigm shift in our fundamental understanding of the world is
necessary. Andreas Weber, for example, propagates a paradigm shift from that of
the Enlightenment to one of “Enlivenment”. With reference to romantic and criti-
cal responses to the rationalism of the Enlightenment,Weber argues, however, that
rationality should not be abandoned, but should instead be linked with the subjec-
tivity and sentience that exist in all living beings. For this to occur, he explains,
it is necessary to explore a newnarrative forwhat life is, forwhat it is to be alive, for
what living systems do, and what their goals are. We need to explore how values
are created by the realization of the living, and howwe, as living beings in a living
biosphere, can adapt the production needed for livelihoods to that reality, the only
reality we have. (Weber 2013: 21)
With Alfred North Whitehead we could thus say that the individual or res cogitans
is not understood as a separate entity from material reality but as a creative force
within the process of the living world (Whitehead 1978). For Capra and Mattei, this
5 Here itmust be noted that although all three authors argue that people have a predisposition
to rivalry and aggression, they are not forever caught in this form of being. All three argue
that humans have the capacity to overcome these negative drives and this destructive state
of affairs through reason or, in the words of Freud, through the subjugation and sublimation
of the id by the super-ego. Nevertheless, while Hobbes and Freud assumed these negative
impulses to be innate and natural, Kant argues that they are “vices of culture” (Kant 2001:
6:27; original emphasis).
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implies a shift from thinking in terms of a “mechanism of law” toward an “ecology
of law” which, in turn, is inherently associated with the concept of the commons.
They explain,
In the strict scientific sense, ecology is the science of relationships between the
members of an ecological community and their environment. In this sense, then,
the ecology of law refers to a legal order that is consistent with and honors the
basic principles of ecology. The ecology of law implies a process of transforming legal
institutions from being machines of extraction, rooted in the mechanistic functioning of
private property and state authority, into institutions based on ecological communities.
The ecology of law seeks a quality of economic life aimed at nurturing and pre-
serving nature in the interest of future generations and overall human survival.
The law should mimic the natural strategies of long-term ecological survival, in-
cluding the reduction of waste and consumption. […] In other words, an ecologi-
cal vision of law does not reduce law to a professionalized, preexisting, objective
framework ‘out there,’ separate from the behavior it regulates and tries to deter-
mine. Instead, law is always a process of ‘commoning,’ a long-term collective action
in which communities, sharing a common purpose and culture, institutionalize
their collective will to maintain order and stability in the pursuit of social repro-
duction. Thus the commons – an open network of relationships – rather than the
individual, is the building block of the ecology of law and what we call an ecolog-
ical order. (Capra/Mattei 2015: 14-15; emphasis added)
In other words, the basic idea here is to overcome the dualism of laws. on the one
hand. and individuals. on the other, by contextualizing our understanding of law
historically, socially and ecologically. This would enable us to understand law as a
second-order commons that is created by humans and that should thus perpetually
be reformed and adapted by the communities affected by these laws. The general
point to be made here is that by widening our understanding of ‘nature’, we fur-
ther increase the number of ways in which we can organize social arrangements.
Again, this is not to say that we can then realize any form of social organization
whatsoever, irrespective of the existing conditions. Instead, it implies that we can
learn from our ‘first nature’ so we can attempt to bring social arrangements (i.e.
our ‘second nature’) into existence that are more or less well-adapted – and that
can continuously adapt – to existing ecological conditions. This type of learning is
what Capra and Mattei call eco-literacy and eco-design (Capra/Mattei 2015: 174-9).
Interpreted in a less dualistic and more poetic manner, according to Weber it does
not imply that we “copy nature’s objects, but rather follow [and participate in] its
[…] process of creative unfolding” (Weber 2015).
Before I continue, I would like to consider a criticism that might arise here.
I can assume that some people believe this general approach to be a naturalistic
fallacy. Here, it could be argued that I – and authors like Capra, Mattei and Weber
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– wish to transfer principles that we perceive in nature (‘facts’) into human society
and assume that the ‘is’ should determine the ‘ought’. It therefore might appear as
though I am simply repeating the same mistake that Social Darwinists have made,
yet the only difference is that I presuppose a different model of nature. This is also
the argument that I have used against limiting our understanding of democracy:
the mere fact that representative democracy is the most prevalent form of democ-
racy in the world does not imply that it is the best or most desirable. However, in
this case I argue that the analysis of nature precisely does not provide humans with
fixed forms and parameters of organization that must be transposed onto human
society. Instead, the conception of nature I am elaborating enables us to define a
process of human freedom in and with nature. In this sense, I would agree with
Andreas Weber when he says that
only if [an] organism is conceived of as a deterministic system are we trapped in
the danger of the naturalistic fallacy, imposing value from the outside on some-
thingwhich is [supposedly] neutral. Living beings, however, exist according to em-
bodied values. Their nature is to live according to values. The ontology proposed
here is non-deterministic because of biological reasons. (Weber 2016a: 39)
The point being made here is that this new interpretation of nature does not un-
derstand its functioning as something bound by strict, neutral laws. This would
be a naturalistic fallacy because we define how we should act and organize society
according to rules that supposedly exist externally and in independence of human
beings. In this model, human beings look onto life as if from the outside – and
the laws of nature are assumed to work inside of us, independently of our obser-
vation of them. But as Bruno Latour lucidly argues in his bookThe Politics of Nature
(2004), human beings are not only a part of nature, but co-create it. For this rea-
son, I would agree with Latour that we must “get out of the [platonic metaphor of
the] cave” (Latour 2004: 10), which divides reality into a realm of subjective, social
opinions (in the cave) and the “unchangeable nature of inhuman laws” (ibid.: 17).6
6 According to Bruno Latour, this dichotomy is highly problematic, as he explains: “By dividing
public life into two incommensurable houses, the old Constitution [i.e. the old interpretation
of nature] led only to paralysis, since it achieved only premature unity for nature and end-
less dispersion for cultures. The old Constitution thus finally resulted in the formation of two
equally illicit assemblies: the first [i.e. the existence of an independent, objective reality],
brought together under the auspices of Science, was illegal, because it defined the common
world without resource to due process; the second [i.e. subjective, social opinion] was illegit-
imate by birth, since it lacked the reality of the things that had been given over to the other
house and had to settle for ‘power relations,’ for a multiplicity of irreconcilable viewpoints,
forMachiavellian cleverness alone. Thefirst had reality but no politics [and thus no freedom];
the second had politics [and freedom] and mere ‘social construction.’” (Latour 2004: 53-4)
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According to Latour, we must in fact get rid of this reified notion of nature or, pos-
sibly, secularize our notion of nature, in order to understand the human-nature
relationship as one of a “common world” of “association” (ibid.: 25, 28, 37, 53). By
rejecting the simplistic dualism of realism and constructivism, Latour argues that
we can hopefully “move toward the multiplicity of nature […] something that might
be called the pluriverse” (ibid.: 40; emphasis omitted). Thus, by understanding hu-
man beings as an integral part of nature and nature as a plurality of realities that
are co-created with and by human beings, human nature is itself conceived as an
open and creative force. Here, we open up possibilities for human action in the
process of socio-ecological co-creation.
In order to understand this notion of interdependent co-creation a little bet-
ter, I would also like to briefly turn to Karen Barad’s book Meeting the Universe
Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (2007). Here,
Barad philosophically explores Niels Bohr’s quantum model of the atom and ar-
gues that Bohr actually “rejects the atomistic metaphysics that takes ‘things’ as on-
tologically basic entities” (Barad 2006: 138). Furthermore, Bohr ultimately “calls into
question the related Cartesian [and Newtonian] belief in the inherent distinction
between subject and object, and knower and known” (ibid.). With Bohr’s empiri-
cal findings Barad develops what she understands as a relational “agential realist
ontology” (ibid.). She explains,
In summary, the primary ontological units are not ‘things’ but phenomena – dy-
namic topological reconfigurings/entanglements/relationalities/(re)articulations
of the world. And the primary semantic units are not ‘words’ but material-discur-
sive practices throughwhich (ontic and semantic) boundaries are constituted. This
dynamism is agency. Agency is not an attribute but the ongoing reconfigurings of
the world. The universe is agential intra-activity in its becoming. (Barad 2007: 141)
Here, matter – and the universe or nature – is not a thing that has a substance,
but a perpetual process of development. And because no entity has an essence, it is
inherently co-constituted by its interaction in and with the world, with the other.
Barad therefore argues that matter – and the linguistic description of matter –
is “not a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency” (ibid.: 151). Here, the mate-
rial and the discursive are inherently intertwined in what she calls an “intra-active”
relationship, which ultimately results in the dynamic “co-constitution of subjects
along with objects” (ibid.: 145). For me, these reflections on Bohr’s quantum theory
are insightful because they support a notion of nature in which entities are not
subject to abstract and universal laws but ultimately co-create their reality in and
through their interdependent discursive-material relationships. Here, we might
even say that this very ontological openness and creative capacity lie implicitly at
the heart of the Ostroms’ theory of subjectivity and the commons, in which peo-
ple can learn and adapt their actions and institutions in socio-ecological systems.
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Such an interpretation would provide some depth to Elinor Ostrom’s proclaimed
shift from necessity to a world of possibilities (E. Ostrom 2003: 62). As we have
seen in our discussion of the competitive market, some institutions impede this
process of socio-ecological co-creation and adaptation. And as I will now show, the
notion of the commons supports adaptation because commons enable societies to
perpetually alter their institutions according to changing conditions, needs and
desires.
This preliminary discussion demonstrates, however, that ‘nature’ is a highly
contested concept and that no one true understanding of nature has ever existed
in human history.7 Although it is true that interpretations of nature have varied
throughout human history, I must nevertheless again emphasize that a purely dis-
cursive or constructivist interpretation of nature is flawed.This would lead us into
a solipsistic position in which we deny the existence (and resistance) of the other
and assume that humans can arbitrarily shape and form reality as they please.
I believe this position to be flawed because knowing and learning must itself be
understood as an embodied and interactive process in and with the world. Thus,
symbolic descriptions of the material world will never be grounded on one ulti-
mate truth but will change and adapt with new empirical insights and scientific
hypotheses. And with each (new) description of our natural world, we also implic-
itly bring a certain symbolic order of reality about.This is most obvious in reference
to our understanding of ‘human nature’ and the self-fulfilling prophecies of the
homo oeconomicus (Kapeller 2008: 34-40). Here, social arrangements are created on
the assumption that individuals are largely self-interested (e.g. individual private
property and open and competitive markets), which in turn confirm the belief that
people are egotistical. As empirical studies have shown, however, people already
act differently when similar social situations are simply named differently (Liber-
man et al. 2004).8 That being said, our symbolic interpretation of (human) nature
7 In reference to the contested question whether nature pursues a teleological purpose, An-
dreas Weber and Francisco Varela, for example, explain how the interpretation of this prob-
lem has changed throughout Western history: “The Greeks experienced nature as an ever-
present horizon, most clearly set in Aristotle’s dictum: the final cause is a necessary precon-
dition for themechanical cause. But in medieval times the idea of finality radically shifted to
divine will and design, the source of all meaning and purpose. The enlightenment opposed
to that the evenmore radical position of humanmind as themeasure of things, where nature
is only seen asmere object for the human subject. Recent times have shifted to post-modern
views on nature as a purely historical locus, contingent and relative.”(Weber/Varela 2002: 98)
8 Varda Liberman, StevenM. Samuels and LeeRoss, for example, discovered that people act dif-
ferently in similar social settings, depending on how these arrangements are named. They
performed two experiments, one with American college students and the other with Israeli
pilots and their instructors. Each group played either an N-move Prisoner’s Dilemma game
called “the Community Game” or “the Wallstreet Game”, each respectively connoting more
cooperative or more competitive norms. The rules of the two games were, however identical.
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is never simply a neutral representation of an objective fact, but always implicitly
conveys certain values of society and performatively brings a certain reality about.
In this sense, our question about nature turns into a more normative question:
What society do we want to live in and how can it be realized given the knowledge
of the conditions of our existence?This implies a shift from the merely empirical to
the normative, yet without completely disregarding the former. Or, more precisely,
it attempts to integrate the normative in the empirical because life itself – and
therefore science as well – is not a distinct and objective entity separated from the
symbolic, but also always a creative expression of the meaning we give ourselves
and the world. And I would argue that it is this understanding of nature that is
ultimately more conducive to commons and commoning.
5.3 Autopoiesis and the interdependent co-creation of reality
As previously mentioned, the understanding of the natural world as a machine was
developed during the Early Modern period by numerous thinkers, most notably
René Descartes (1596-1650) and Isaac Newton (1642-1726). Here, René Descartes’
dualism of mind and matter or res cogitans and res extensa is of central importance.
This Cartesian dualism assumes that the realm of freedom is limited to the mind
while the sphere of material reality remains unfree and determined (Des Chene
2001). With the aid of Isaac Newton’s mathematical understanding of the natural
laws that underlie all of material reality, the entire universe was ultimately con-
ceived as a clock-like machine, determined by its laws (Dolnick 2011). In this du-
alistic worldview, the mind receives the semi-divine position of a director who is
subject to yet stands above the laws of nature and can, or, rather, should control
the machine. For individuals, this implies mastery of the spirit over the desires of
the body; for society, it means the rule of those with insight into the underlying
Interestingly, the results of the experiment demonstrate that the levels of cooperation and
defection varied depending on the label of the game. Liberman et al. conclude, “When told
they were playing the Bursa [Wallstreet] Game, participants expected defection to be the
most likely response; when told they were playing the Kommuna [Community] Game, they
expected cooperation to be the most likely response. […] [T]he effect of expectations regard-
ing other’s choices on own choices depended on the name of the game, and thus on the way
the participants construed the game. The result of these tendencies over successive rounds,
in which defection begot defection and cooperation was sustained only when it was mutual,
was inevitable; that is, first-round responses tended to dictate later-round responses, and
as a consequence, overall rates of cooperation— especially mutual cooperation — were sig-
nificantly higher in the Community/Kommuna Game than in the Wall Street/Bursa Game.”
(Liberman et al. 2004: 1182)
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laws of nature and society over the ignorant and passionate masses; and for indi-
viduals’ relationship to nature, it implies the imperative to subdue (and exploit) the
natural world according to one’s supposedly higher needs and desires. The claim I
ammaking here is that in order to realize a democratic and sustainable society, we
need to overcome this problematic dualism.
For this reason, let us now turn to a new understanding of the natural world
that various philosophers and biologists have been developing at least since the
beginning of the 20th century. These intellectuals include, for example, the prag-
matists Charles Peirce (1839-1914) and George Herbert Mead (1863-1931), the neuro-
physiologist Warren S. McCulloch (1898-1969), the social scientist Gregory Bateson
(1904-1980), the chemist Ilya Prigogine (1917-2003) and the biosemioticists Thure
von Uexküll (1908-2004),Thomas Sebeok (1920-2001) and Jesper Hoffmeyer (1942*).
This new understanding of nature generally becamemore popular during the 1970s
through the work of the Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana (1928*) and Fran-
cisco Varela (1946-2001) and, since then, through the works of Fritjof Capra (1939*)
and Stuart Kauffman (1939*). The development of this new paradigm in biology is
often compared to the shift in physics fromNewtonianmechanics to quantumme-
chanics, Einstein’s general theory of relativity and thermodynamics in which the
subject and the object are no longer understood as independent entities (Weber
2014: 18; Capra/Mattei 2015: 42).
Following a similar line of thought, most of the authors just mentioned, and
most prominently Maturana and Varela, argue that our understanding of life must
also include an understanding of how human knowledge of life (cognition)arises
biologically (Maturana/Varela 1980, 1987). Although not stated in these terms, Mat-
urana and Varela initially take two simultaneous steps towards a resolution of this
problem. One, which is aligned with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology,
consists in acknowledging that the mind is an embodied part of the natural, mate-
rial world (Merleau-Ponty 2001); the other, which follows the semiotics of Charles
Peirce and other linguists, consists in acknowledging that all forms of knowledge
are elaborated and embodied in socially constructed signs that not only interpret
but also constitute or shape reality (Hoffmeyer 2008: 32). Here, knowledge of the
world is regarded neither as a form of representation or correspondence of signs
and their objects (signifier and signified), nor as a subjective, biological idealism
(Hampe 2007: 112) in which the subject merely projects their ideas and concepts
onto reality or the ‘thing-in-itself ’. Instead, the process of knowing is best un-
derstood as, in the terms preferred by Charles Peirce, a relational and interwo-
ven process of differentiation, interpretation and co-creation of the world through
signs. This implies that a ‘thing-in-itself ’ does not exist independently but is cre-
ated through its symbolic and material relations with other entities (Hoffmeyer
2008: 33). For Peirce, this process of interpretation consists of a dynamic, triadic
relationship between a sign, an object and an interpretant (Kilstrup 2015). This
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semiotic understanding thus emphasizes the two-sided character of the same re-
ality: the social constitution of the self and the material interconnectedness of the
subjective with its objective surroundings. Or, more precisely, humans are under-
stood as biological beings that socially conceive and construct themselves through
their symbolic self-referential differentiation from and interpretation of their en-
vironment. Therefore, the dualism that is often assumed in Western thought does
not exist ‘in reality’ but is created through a process of embodied cognition based
on symbols that delineate the separation between mind and matter, individual and
society and, finally, between culture and nature.
Peirce’s semiotics, in its generality, lays the foundations we need to broaden
the concept of embodied cognition to all living beings. Similarly to human beings,
all organisms actively constitute themselves as a differentiated unity, interpret the
information from their environment through chemical or, in Peirce’s terms, index-
ical and iconic signs and act accordingly in order to survive. Many philosophers
and biologists recognize this sensory cognition in all other forms of life (Bak 1997;
Kelso 1995; Goodwin 2001; Narby 2006). This process of sensory cognition is un-
derstood as the self-organization or dynamic self-reproduction of organisms or,
in the words of Maturana and Varela, as autopoiesis. Here, the process of self-or-
ganization must be understood as a material process of self-reproduction through
internal signaling. Weber and Varela explain in a co-authored article Life after Kant:
Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality (2002) that au-
topoiesis is
a circular process of self-production where the cellular metabolism and the sur-
face membrane it produces are the key terms. Thus an autopoietic system – the
minimal living organization – is one that continuously produces the components
that specify it, while at the same time realizing it (the system) as a concrete unity
in space and time, which makes the network of production of components possi-
ble. (Weber/Varela 2002: 115)
In general terms, autopoiesis or self-organizationmust therefore be understood as
a departure from a linear and mechanic conceptualization of life in which natural
laws and genes determine the actions of organisms. Instead, through signaling,
internal feedback loops provide a “nonlinear interconnectedness of the system’s
components” (Capra 1996: 85) which can be understood as a network. As Fritjof
Capra explains in his bookTheWeb of Life:
Since all components of an autopoietic network are produced by other compo-
nents in the network, the entire system is organizationally closed, even though
it is open with regard to the flow of energy and matter. This organizational clo-
sure implies that a living system is self-organizing in the sense that its order and
behavior are not imposed by the environment but are established by the system
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itself. In other words, living systems are autonomous. This does not mean that they
are isolated from their environment. On the contrary, they interact with the envi-
ronment through a continual exchange of energy and matter. But this interaction
does not determine their organization – they are self -organizing. (Capra 1996: 167-
8; emphasis added)
Both their partial independence from the environment and their internal feedback
loops enable organisms to create “new structures and newmodes of behavior in the
self-organizing process” (Capra 1996: 85).9 In the jargon of biosemiotics, this inter-
dependent autonomy is called semiotic freedom (Hoffmeyer 1993: 52-67) and, in the
Darwinian theory of evolution, can more generally be understood as adaptation.
Yet, while adaptation in non-human beings is normally understood as a random
and intergenerational phenomenon, the tradition on which I am drawing argues
that change can occur in a non-randommanner within the lifetime of an organism
(Strohman 1997: 195). Or, in simpler terms: “Creatures change their forms without
changing their genes.” (ibid.: 198)
In contrast to the widespread dichotomy in Western philosophy between ma-
terial reality as the realm of unfreedom and the human mind or spirit as the realm
of freedom, here, all living beings possess minimal intelligence, subjective agency
and autonomy.The theory of this subjective agency is grounded on the assumption
that all organisms strive to maintain themselves. The energy they direct towards
self-preservation implies that not only do all organisms have interests and values
(e.g. staying alive and reproducing the species) – they also have a minimal sense of
self (e.g. the maintenance of one’s own life) (Weber/Varela 2002: 116-119).This is not
to say that organisms are self-conscious, but rather that they are sentient beings
with a minimal, embodied sense of self. The foundation of an organism’s auton-
omy therefore does not lie in self-reflexive thought, but in sentience, which enables
9 In more technical language, this can be understood as a shift in biology from genetic de-
terminism to epigenetic open feedback networks. In the paradigm of genetic determinism,
evolution occurs through random reconfiguration of genetic information. In contrast to this,
Strohman argues in his 1997 article on the “coming Kuhnian revolution in biology” as fol-
lows: “Epigenetic networks have been described as cellular neural networks and, given their
great complexity and openness to environmental signals, most probably use a (nonlinear) logic
and set of rules quite different from the comparatively linear rules needed for completing
the genetic sequence of events. This comparison also emphasizes feedback from epigenetic
networks to the genome; feedback that includes changing the patterns of gene expression.
This change in pattern of gene expression is accomplished by enzymatic changes in chromo-
some structure and by ‘marking’ sections of DNA chemicallywithout changing the genetic code
in any way. What is changed is the accessibility of genes to expression pathways. But the decisions
to mark or not to mark are in the epigenetic [open feedback networks] and not the genetic pathway.
The details of epigenetic biology […] arewell knownand thoroughly covered in the literature.”
(Strohman 1997: 197; emphasis added)
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organisms to give meaning to the world through their embodied and intentional
interpretations of it (Weber 2016a; Narby 2006; Hoffmeyer 1993; Kauffman 1993).
For biosemioticist Jesper Hoffmeyer, this process of embodied cognition is inher-
ently linked to the capability of living beings to anticipate the future. To explain
this issue with some simple examples, I quote Hoffmeyer in full:
Quite generally, living systems have evolved a capacity for making anticipations:
they must decide when to grow and when to withhold growth, when to move,
when to hide, when to sing, and so on, and this way of adjusting the behaviour
depends on a capacity to predict the future at least to some limited extent. For
instance: is it likely the sun will shine or not, is it likely that little flies will pass
by if I make my web here, will the predator be fooled away from the nest if I pre-
tend to have a broken wing etc. Of course, in most cases it will be the instinctual
system of the animal rather than the [conscious] brain that makes this kind of
prediction, but the logic is the same: the animal profits from its ability (whether
acquired through phylogeny or through ontogeny) to identify trustworthy regu-
larities in the surroundings. And most – if not all – trustworthy regularities are
indeed relations. For instance, the relation between length of daylight and the
approaching springtime that tells the beech when to burst into leafs; or the play
of sun and shadows which tells the spider where to construct its web; or the rela-
tion between clumsy movements and an easy catch that tells the predator which
individual prey animal to select, and thus tells the bird how to fool the predator
away from its nest. (Hoffmeyer 2008: 34-5)
Considering these basic interpretative interactions of all living beings with their
environment, organisms should then not be understood as “genetic machines” but
as “materially embodied processes that bring themselves forth” (Weber 2013: 30).Or,
to put it somewhat tautologically: self-organization implies that living organisms
are alive.
The implications of this are twofold. Firstly, not all cognitive processes in living
beings are self-conscious but are, rather, based on a type of sensory and sentient
cognition. For humans, this is obvious when we consider that most of our actions
are not performed entirely consciously but rather through a tacit embodied knowl-
edge (e.g. habits). This was demonstrated most clearly by the famous Libet exper-
iment in 1979 in which a hand movement was initiated through a reaction of the
nervous system while the self-conscious decision to act in this manner followed
shortly afterwards (Libet 1999). While this experiment has often been interpreted
as proof for the non-existence of human free will – or the free will as a type of
ex post veto possibility –, this new interpretation of self-organization through sen-
sory cognition would, however, imply that autonomy does not merely lie in the self-
conscious determination of the movements of the body, but more fundamentally
in the body’s own embodied, sentient cognition (Libet 1985). In other words, hu-
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man beings’ relationship with the world is, in its most fundamental form, not one
based on knowledge and rationality, but is instead physical and emotional – or, in
the words of the sociologist Hartmut Rosa, a relationship of resonance (Rosa 2019).
Secondly, this conception of nature provides a more general, non-dualistic un-
derstanding of reality. Here, themind is not understood as a distinct thing in itself,
but as a process that arises out of interdependent relationships. By conceiving cog-
nition as sentient consciousness, ‘mind’ arises through a process of sensory inter-
actions of the organism’s components and in its interaction with the environment.
The mind – and all other ‘things’, for that matter – are therefore constituted as
separate and independent entities through their linguistic and symbolic catego-
rization in the interactive process of communication and reflection. In this sense,
it must also be noted that the environment or nature does not merely exist as a
thing in itself, but as relationships between different organisms that give each other
meaning and bring each other about. The pragmatist philosopher George Herbert
Mead expresses this idea in his book Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a
Social Behaviorist:
It is a difficult matter to state just what wemean by dividing up a certain situation
between the organism and its environment. Certain objects come to exist for us
because of the character of the organism. Take the case of food. If an animal that
can digest grass, such as an ox, comes into the world, then grass becomes food.
That object did not exist before, that is, grass as food. The advent of the ox brings
in a new object. In that sense, organisms are responsible for the appearance of
whole sets of objects that did not exist before. The distribution of meaning to the
organism and the environment has its expression in the organism as well as in
the thing, and that expression is not a matter of psychical or mental conditions.
There is an expression of the reaction of the organized response of the organism to
the environment, and that reaction is not simply a determination of the organism
by the environment, since the organism determines the environment as fully as
the environment determines the organs [i.e. the organism]. The organic reaction is
responsible for the appearance of awhole set of objectswhich did not exist before.
[…] The organism, then, is in a sense responsible for its environment. And since
organism and environment determine each other and are mutually dependent
for their existence, it follows that the life-process, to be adequately understood,
must be considered in terms of their interrelations. (Mead 1967: 129-30)10
10 It can be noted that while George Herbert Mead discusses the agency and meaning of ani-
mals, he nevertheless denies them a “self” which, however, is to be distinguished from our
notion of (self-conscious) subjectivity based on sentient cognition. Mead explains that “we
can distinguish very definitely between the self and the body. The body can be there and can
operate in a very intelligent fashionwithout there being a self involved in the experience. The
self has the characteristic that it is an object to itself, and that characteristic distinguishes it
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Here, individual entities such as the ox and the blades of grass are neither fully in-
dependent nor completely dependent on each other, but rather exist in interdepen-
dent relationships in which they enable each other to be brought forth.This insight
repeats the previously discussed notion that living creatures are not determined
by laws of nature and their environment. Instead, living beings are integrated in a
process of relational and interdependent co-creation of nature and meaning. This
is a basic insight of a systemic understanding of nature that can then be applied
to ‘higher’ or more complex forms of socio-ecological organization.
5.4 Ecosystems, abundance and natural commons
In order to apply the notions of autopoiesis and interdependent co-creation to hu-
mans, we need to scale up our understanding of these concepts from single organ-
isms to populations, entire ecosystems and the ‘web of life’ in general. Although
Maturana and Varela originally only developed the concept of autopoiesis as a func-
tion of cellular networks and other “minimal autopoietic systems”11 (Capra/Luisi
2014: 306), there have been attempts to transfer this understanding of life to more
complex organisms and living systems, including to the social domain. Here, it
might be helpful to elaborate on two basic concepts: that of the organism and that
of living systems. As Fritjof Capra and Pier Luigi Luisi explain in their book The
Systems View of Life:
All living systems are networks of smaller components, and the web of life as a
whole is a multilayered structure of living systems nesting within other living sys-
tems – networks within networks. Organisms are aggregates of autonomous but
closely coupled cells; populations are networks of autonomous organisms belong-
ing to a single species; and ecosystems are webs of organisms, both single-celled
andmulticellular, belonging tomanydifferent species. (Capra/Luisi 2014: 306; em-
phasis added)
In other words, we can differentiate between three types of multicellular living sys-
tems: Individual organisms, populations and societies and ecosystems. Because all
living systems are ultimately made up of cells, Capra and Luisi are right to say that
“all living systems, ultimately, are autopoietic” (Capra/Luisi 2014: 306). The under-
standing of populations as self-organizing basically revolves around the idea that
from other objects and from the body” (Mead 1967: 136). It is therefore self-reflexive con-
sciousness that creates the self as an object.
11 According to Capra and Luisi, minimal autopoietic systems include “simple cells, computer
simulations, and the autopoietic chemical structures, or ‘minimal cells’, created recently in
the laboratory” (Capra/Luisi 2014: 306).
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populations can reproduce themselves by continuously adjusting to and co-creat-
ing their eco-system.Here, individual organisms and specific populations are each
embedded within broader ecological settings, all taking part in the reproduction
of entire ecosystems. As we see, this systemic approach to understanding life pro-
vides us with a better understanding of interdependencies in nature and requires
us to revise many basic concepts that we have adopted from biology and applied to
economics and politics.More precisely, it becomes clear that this concept of ecosys-
tems underlies Elinor and Vincent Ostrom’s notion of commons as embedded in a
multileveled and nested polycentric system of governance.
To better understand this change of conceptual frame, let us begin with one of
the most fundamental assumptions in Malthusian and Neo-Darwinist interpreta-
tions of nature and economics: the competition of individuals over scarce resources
necessary for their survival. This assumption can be understood as one of the core
elements of “bioeconomic metaphysics” and lays the foundation for one of the core
functions of markets: the efficient allocation of scarce resources through market
competition (Robbins 1932).This basic concept of scarcity and the competition over
these resources has been popularized by the idiom “there is no such thing as a free
lunch”, cited by Robert Heinlein (1966), Milton Friedman (1975) and many others.12
As we have already seen in our discussion of the open and competitive free mar-
ket, according to this logic, one’s existence is secured through accumulation which,
ironically, increases scarcity through the depletion of resources needed by both the
one who accumulates and other beings. This antagonistic competition is not only
conceived of as a struggle between individuals but also as a struggle between en-
tire populations or nations – and against one’s environment. Not only do people
strive to accumulate more and more resources, populations also strive incessantly
to increase their own size in order to preserve their gene pool. As we have already
discussed, the underlying assumption here is that all living creatures are biolog-
ical consumption machines determined by their egotistical genes. Here, the only
strategy of survival is perpetual growth. It is interesting to note that not only is
freedom undermined by the biologically determined egotistical drive to perpetu-
ally grow, but also by the decrease in people’s chances of survival on account of the
destruction of their ecosystem. If growth were the only genetic program of life, it
can be assumed that living creatures would have wiped themselves out long ago
simply by devouring each other and their environments.
12 In the Library of Economics and Liberty (econlib.org), economistDavidR.Henderson explains,
for example, that he begins every class with the “Ten Pillars of Economic Wisdom”, the first
of which is “There ain’t no such thing as a free lunch” (TANSTAAFL). He then supposedly tells
students that “economic resources are scarce, and, therefore, if we getmore of one, there has
to be less of another. What are economic resources? It's a little circular: economic resources
are defined as scarce resources. […] There are a few non-scarce goods, which economists call
‘free goods’.” (Henderson 2014)
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However, while this notion might be biological, it is based on the logic of atom-
istic entities and therefore neglects the insights of an interrelated and systemic
understanding of biology that we have just discussed. The notion disregards the
interactive communication that occurs within an individual organism and the pro-
cesses of interdependent co-creation between organisms and their ecosystems. In
this sense, it neglects the capabilities of individuals and populations to adjust their
patterns of action not only to secure their own existence, but also to maintain the
metabolic reproduction of the entire ecosystem. This is not to say that individ-
ual organisms or populations must have knowledge of the entire ecosystem that
they exist in, but it is to be assumed that they can adjust their long-term con-
sumption and reproductive patterns in accordance with signals that they receive
from the ecosystem in order to secure their long-term existence. Obviously, this
can include destructive strategies of parasitic growth but theoretically it must also
include strategies of symbiogenesis and mutual symbiosis which are based on the
basic fact that the long-term existence of one being depends on the long-term ex-
istence of other beings. This is clearest considering the example of the bacteria in
my bowels that I provide food for and that, in turn, enable me to digest my food
(Gilbert et al. 2012; Morar/Bohannan 2019); or the trees that provide oxygen for an-
imals to breathe; or the rabbits that provide food for foxes. This is what George
Herbert Mead meant when he spoke of organisms’ reciprocal responsibility for the
conditions of each other’s existence.
To develop a better understanding of these other strategies of interdependent
survival in networked systems, we must integrate the other central premise of the
Neo-Darwinist narrative: scarcity. While I would agree that resources on planet
Earth are limited, this does not mean that resources must also be scarce. Limited
resources can nevertheless be experienced as abundant (Bennett 2001: 165). The
objective limit of resources is best understood with the law of conservation that
basically states that the total quantity of energy (including mass) remains constant
over time in a closed physical system. Energy can therefore not be created ex ni-
hilo but can only change its form (Hosch 2017). In contrast to this objective limit,
scarcity is a phenomenon based on social organization and perception. As Hardin
himself acknowledged, scarcity only occurs when the demand for some good ex-
ceeds the rate of its reproduction. According to Hardin, scarcity therefore increases
when populations grow and when it becomes possible to accumulate resources on
an ever-expanding scale. Ironically, however, by perceiving existing resources to be
scarce, individuals may pursue accumulation strategies by which they aim to se-
cure their own existence, but that deplete the resource and thus ultimately increase
scarcity for others – and, in the long term, also for themselves. Here, we can again
observe the creation of reality from the categories through which we perceive and
thus comprehend nature. We will discuss the creation of scarcity in more detail
later, but as we can see, the central question that we must answer is one of how to
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transform limited resources into relative abundance and freedom. As I will argue
later, that implies the transformation of our social arrangements from ones based
on negative rights, individual private property and open and competitive markets
to interdependent rights and commons property arrangements. In order to do this,
however, we must shift our understanding of planetary limits from one based on
scarcity to one based on sufficiency and abundance.
In order to do this, it would seem helpful to return to the work of Andreas
Weber who develops a notion of abundance in nature in relation to what he calls
“natural commons” or, more specifically, the process of “natural commoning”. In
Weber’s words:
Nature, understood as a creative process of interacting, embodied subjects, can
serve as a model for an economic concept of the commons. Basic structures and
principles of ‘natural commoning’ – self-organizing, dynamic, creative – have been
the basis of biospheric evolution. (Weber 2013: 37)
In contrast to the scarcity narrative, Andreas Weber argues that the concept of
commons is based on the assumption of a general and relative abundance in nature.
This is a central point that Weber emphasizes:
Resources in nature are not [inherently] scarce. Where they become so, they do
not lead to a creative diversification, but to an impoverishment of diversity and
freedom. The basic energetic resource of nature, sunlight, exists in abundance. A
second crucial resource – the number of ecological relationships and new niches
– has no upper limit. A high number of species and a variety of relations among
them do not lead to sharper competition and dominance of a ‘fitter’ species, but
rather to richer permutations of relationships among species and thus to an in-
crease in freedom, which is at the same time also an increase of mutual depen-
dencies. […] In old ecosystems where solar energy is constant, as in tropical rain-
forests and high oceans, this brings forth more niches and thus a greater overall
diversity. The result is an increase of symbioses and reduced competition. Scarcity
of resources, experienced as the temporal lack of specific nutrients, leads to less
diversity and the dominance of few species, as for example in temperate coastal
mudflats. (Weber 2013: 27)
In contrast to the scarcity narrative, the source of all of life originates from an
over-abundant resource that literally falls from heaven like manna: sunlight. As
is well-known, sunlight is the key source of energy for life on earth that enables
plants to synthesize carbon dioxide from the air and water and minerals from the
soil. As Campbell and Reece state in their textbook Biology, this process of photo-
synthesis, in turn, “nourishes almost all of the living world directly or indirectly”
(Campbell/Reece 2002: 176). In this sense, sunlight can be understood as a central
source of energy that is provided to all living beings as an abundant gift.
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Aside from sunlight,Weber alsomentions another resource that exists in abun-
dance in nature: “the openly available source code of genetic information” (Weber
2013: 39). Here, genetic code is not understood as an exclusive good that is pro-
tected and reproduced “privately” by competing individual species. Instead, it is a
good that is open to all and shared by many. In this sense, genetic data is concep-
tualized as an open-source commons. Similar ideas have been developed in Stuart
Kauffman’s concept of a biological “order for free” (Kauffman 1995: 71-92), on the
one hand, and Marcello Barbieri’s notions of “code biology” (2015) and “evolution
by genomic flux”13 (Barbieri 2003: 58), on the other. In Weber’s words:
DNA has been able to branch into somany species only because all sorts of organ-
isms could use its code, tinkerwith it and derive combinations thatweremeaning-
ful and useful to them. This is also the way Homo sapiens came about […]. Some
20 percent of our genome alone consists of former viral genes that have been cre-
atively recycled. (Weber 2013: 39)
According toWeber and other authors, it is therefore not the selfish gene that dom-
inates in nature, but the existential desire to share, copy and diversify genetic in-
formation – within and beyond one’s own species. In contrast to the dogma of
the survival of the fittest, Maturana and Varela understand this notion of evolu-
tion in The Tree of Life as “structural drift”, which merely appears a posteriori to the
observer as being “selected” by the environment (Maturana/Varela 1987: 102-3).14
13 Marcello Barbieri explains: “Other phenomena – such as unequal crossing-over, DNA slippage
and gene conversion – proved that the genome is actually a turbulent superstructure in which
genes are in a continuous state of flux. The Mendelian behaviour of genes is only a crude
approximation of the truth, good enough for many practical purposes but not for a real-life
understanding of the fluid genome. This brings us back to the possibility of a third exception to
theHardy–Weinberg theorem, i.e. to the possible existence of a thirdmechanismof evolution
based on non-Mendelian heredity. And since the newmechanism would be a direct result of
gene turbulence, a good name for it could be evolution by genomic flux.” (Barbieri 2003: 58;
original emphasis)
14 As Varela and Maturana write: “In fact, we have no unified picture of how the evolution of
living beings occurs in all its aspects. There are many schools of thought that seriously ques-
tion understanding evolution by natural selection; this view has prevailed in biology formore
than sixty years. Whatever new ideas have been bruited about in terms of evolutive mech-
anisms, however, those ideas cannot discount the phenomenon of evolution. But these will
free us form the popular view of evolution as a process in which there is an environmental
world to which living beings adapt progressively, optimizing their use of it. What we propose
here is that evolution occurs as a phenomenon of structural drift under ongoing phylogenic
selection. In that phenomenon there is no progress or optimization of the use of the environ-
ment, but only conservation of adaptation and autopoiesis. It is a process in which organism
and environment remain in a continuous structural coupling.” (Maturana/Varela 1987: 115) Or,
in more poetical and anthropomorphic terminology: “Evolution is somewhat like a sculptor
with wanderlust: he goes through the world collecting a thread here, a hunk of tin there, a
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Here, evolution should be understood not as a process of selection in which indi-
vidual genetic codes optimize and assert themselves against others, but rather as
a process of “free” exchange and recombination of genetic information. Survival
is thus not secured through protection and domination, but rather through the
(unconscious) collective participation in the adaptive diversity of life forms. In this
sense, aside from sunlight and the genetic code, as Weber emphasizes, diversity
itself must also be considered as another vital and abundant resource for life that
provides ever more possibilities for other beings to secure their interdependent
existence.
To understand this notion of diversity as a means for survival, we must turn to
another basic concept in Weber’s theory of biology and ecology: It is not competi-
tion, but rather ‘gift-giving’ and mutually interdependent ‘networking’ that under-
lies the life cycles of ecosystems. In this sense, Andreas Weber argues that nature’s
resources exist in relative abundance and that they are also provided to other living
beings as gifts.The most obvious examples of resources being provided as gifts are
those previously mentioned: sunlight, air, water, soil, genetic information and bio-
logical diversity. Here, it could be argued that the energy of these resources is given
to plants ‘for free’ or as a gift whose energy they conserve and transform through
photosynthesis and which can then be consumed by other beings in their turn. In
the words of Andreas Weber,
as there is no property in nature – there is nowaste. All waste products literally are
food for some othermember of the ecological community. At death every individ-
ual offers itself as a gift to be feasted upon by others, in the same way it received
the gift of sunlight to sustain its existence. There remains a largely unexplored
connection between giving and taking in ecosystems in which ‘loss’ is the precon-
dition for generativity. (Weber 2013: 39)
The fact that there is no property in nature is obvious because plants and animals do
not exist in symbolic legal arrangements.15 Nevertheless, this is not to say that there
should not be any property arrangements in society. Instead, the point that Weber
is making is that the transfer of energy from one organism to another depends
piece of wood here, and he combines them in a way that their structure and circumstances
allow, with no reason other than that he is able to combine them. And so, as he wanders
about, intricate forms are being produced; and they are composed of harmoniously intercon-
nected parts that are a product not of design but of natural drift. Thus, too, with no law other
than the conservation of an identity and the capacity to reproduce, we all have emerged. It
is what interconnected us to all things in what is fundamental to us: to the five-petal rose, to
the shrimp in the bay, or to the executive in New York city.” (ibid.:117)
15 In this sense – and in relation to the abundance and accessibility of resources such as sunlight
and genetic code –Weber writes, “nothing in nature can be exclusively owned or controlled;
everything is open source” (Weber 2013: 39).
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neither on trade nor on competition, but is simply passed on as a gift to other
living beings. Put in a larger ecological context, the concept of gift-giving can thus
be illustrated with the food cycle in which energy is passed on from one organism
to another in a more or less reciprocal manner. Fritjof Capra, for example, portrays
the food cycle in his bookTheWeb of Life in such a manner.
Figure 1: A cyclical portrayal of a food web (Capra 1996: 179)
This understanding should be contrasted with the linear and hierarchical un-
derstanding of food chains as it is often portrayed in schoolbooks such as, for ex-
ample, in the classical textbook Biology: A Global Approach (2015) by Neil Campbell
et al. As we see here, the food web is portrayed in a fairly hierarchical manner, in
which humans see themselves at the top of the relationship. Here, it is interesting
to note that Campbell et al. mention the decomposers that transform the energy
of carnivores and omnivores into energy for plants in the caption, but do not in-
clude them in the figure. For this reason, the food chain with humans at the top of
the hierarchy remains hierarchical and incomplete. Thus, it could be argued that
these two depictions of how energy is distributed in the ecosystem tacitly convey
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notions of how nature is structured: hierarchically and anthropocentrically versus
reciprocally and eco-centrically.
Figure 2: Hierarchical portrayal of a food web (Campbell et al. 2015: 1290)
While it might appear that this interpretation of nature portrays the relation-
ships between organisms as harmonious and benign, such an interpretation would
obviously be too idealistic. Yet nevertheless, Darwin himself acknowledged later
in life, in The Descent of Man from 1871, that most animals possess a “moral sense”
and “social instincts”, such as “mutual love” and an “instinctive sympathy” (Darwin
2004: 133, 119-151). And as the anarchist Pjotr Kropotkin also argued in 1902, biolog-
ical and social survival is not merely based on competition and warfare but also on
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reciprocity, cooperation and “mutual aid” (Kropotkin 1998). The main point of this
‘other’ interpretation of nature is that animals and populations are not conceived
in isolation from other organisms and their environment, but rather in mutual in-
terdependencies. This shifts our understanding of evolution from one focused on
competition to one based on communication in web-like networks and associa-
tions. The existence of a specific population is thus not conceptualized in a dual-
istic logic of ‘us versus them’ but as a dynamic, if sometimes stressful relationship
of interdependencies. It can therefore be argued that life only comes into being
through the existence of the other – through its dependency on the ecosystem that
it lives in.This implies a biological primacy of reciprocal “birth-giving”, understood
as a “natural gift economy” and a “natural commons” over the focus on struggle,
competition and “nature, red in tooth and claw”. According to Weber,
From the standpoint of enlivenment nature is a commons economy consisting of
subjects that are continuously mediating relationships among each other – rela-
tionships that have a material side, but also always embody meaning, a sense of
living and the notion of belonging to a place. (Weber 2013: 36)
Here, the natural common of the gift is not a specific property arrangement, but
should be understood as amode of existence and,more importantly, as the precon-
dition for one’s existence – including one’s ability to compete with other beings.
In this sense, the existence of ‘the other’ is the precondition of an organism’s own
existence. As Weber explains:
The biosphere consists of amaterial andmeaningful interrelation of selves. Embod-
ied selves come into being only through others: the biosphere critically depends
on cooperation and ‘interbeing’ – the idea that a self is not possible in isolation
and frenetic struggle of all against all, but is from the very beginning dependent
on the ‘other’ – in the form of food, shelter, mates and parents, communication
partners. Self is only self-through-other. In human development this is very clear, as
the infant must be seen and positively valued by its caretakers to be able to grow
a healthy self. (Weber 2013: 32; emphasis added)
Again, this interdependency of life does not imply that nature is one harmonious
symphony but that the dynamic processes of mutual adaptation and evolution
result from this interdependency. In this sense, Weber speaks of the biosphere
being “paradoxically cooperative” in that symbiotic relationships emerge out of
“antagonistic, incompatible processes: matter/form, genetic code/soma, individ-
ual ego/other” (Weber 2013: 32; emphasis omitted).16 Weber emphasizes that this
paradoxical unity forces entities to devise precarious and provisional responses to
16 The dynamic unity of these fundamental paradoxes of life can be compared to the wave-
particle paradox in quantum physics.
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challenges to their way of life. Here, existence comes into being through “transitory
negotiations of several incompatible layers of life” (Weber 2013: 32).
This implies that nature does not exist in a stable equilibrium but rather in a
dynamic process of balancing diverse desires and needs between different organ-
isms within an ecosystem. It does not imply that all organisms exist in a struggle
of ‘all against all’ in which one species or population will ‘win’. Instead, the im-
plication is that ecosystems have functional “dissipative structures” (Capra 1996:
168-9) or “balancing levels” according to which a change in one factor of the ecosys-
tem will bring about other changes in the same system (Weber 2013: 38-9). Here,
the dynamic balance that an ecosystem maintains can be interpreted as an inher-
ent principle of networked or associative self-organization. Using the concepts of
relative abundance and mutual interdependence in ecosystems, Weber then also
reminds us that an ecosystem never grows in a material sense. Thus, he concludes
that “nature is running a steady-state economy – that is, an economy where all rel-
evant factors remain constant in relation with one another” (Weber 2013: 27). This
notion of the metabolic reproduction of the ecosystem in a dynamic yet steady
state economy will be relevant for our later discussion of a commons-based econ-
omy. For now, however, let us turn to the implications of these insights for human
freedom and democracy based on the ecological and systemic understanding of
reality I have been discussing.
5.5 Empathy, cooperation and a common(s) reality
In the context of a discussion of self-organizing organisms, populations and
ecosystems, it is important to note that the degree of autonomy of organisms and
networks varies greatly depending on the complexity of the specific multicellular
living system. Here, the main difference between human and non-human living
systems is that humans and their social systems possess the ability not merely
of interpreting their environment through indexical and iconic signs, but also
of interpreting through symbols.17 This capability not only enables humans to
give things “names”, but also makes possible a form of self-reflection in which
the “process of naming is itself nameable” (Bateson 1979: 185). In turn, these self-
reflective capabilities allow human beings to exercise a greater degree of “semiotic
freedom” (Hoffmeyer). George Herbert Mead discusses this increased freedom
through self-reflection with reference to what is normally understood as one’s
mind:
17 Despite this very general and far-reaching statement, there are experiments that demon-
strate that non-human animals also use basic abstract concepts. One such experiment shows
how ducklings can differentiate between “same or different” (Martinho III/Kacelnik 2016).
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Mind arises in the social process only when that process as a whole enters into, or
is present in, the experience of any one of the given individuals involved in that
process. When this occurs the individual becomes self-conscious and has a mind;
he becomes aware of his relations to that process as a whole, and to the other
individuals participating in it with him. […] It is by means of reflexiveness – the
turning-back of the experience of the individual upon himself – that the whole
social process is thus brought into the experience of the individuals involved in it;
it is by such means, which enable the individual to take the attitude of the other
toward himself, that the individual is able consciously to adjust himself to that process,
and to modify the resultant of that process in any given social act in terms of his adjust-
ment to it. (Mead 1967: 134; emphasis added)
As Mead emphasizes, the ability to reflect on the process of thought and action is
not something divine or transcendental, but emerges from the processes of the cen-
tral nervous system. Importantly, this self-reflexive ability provides humans with a
greater range of freedom than other living beings. For Mead, the seemingly simple
ability to stop and reflect on one’s cognitive processes (i.e. thinking) opens a space
in one’s mind for altering the interrelations between symbolic signs and intended
action. Or, inMead’s ownwords, “when he stops,mind, we say, is freed” (ibid.: 122).
Nevertheless, Mead never tires of emphasizing that this process of reflection is
not merely an individual activity, but also an inherently social one. In other words,
language and, therefore, mind only occur through the interaction both with one’s
environment and with other human beings. Self-consciousness and the self are
therefore not atomistic and independent, but created through the material and
social world that it is embedded in. Mead explains,
What goes tomake up the organized self is the organization of the attitudeswhich
are common to the group. A person is a personality because he belongs to a com-
munity, because he takes over the institutions of that community into his own
conduct. He takes its language as a medium by which he gets his personality, and
then through a process of taking the different roles that all the others furnish he
comes to get the attitude of the members of the community. Such, in a certain
sense, is the structure of a man’s personality. […] The structure, then, on which the
self is built is this response which is common to all, for one has to be a member of a com-
munity to be a self. (ibid.: 162; emphasis added)
Biologically, this primordial cooperative sociability is explained by the development
of mirror neurons.18 In a general sense, mirror neurons enable the mind to grasp
18 Mirror neuronswerediscovered in the early 1990s inParma, Italy, by a teamof scientists ledby
Giacomo Rizzalotti who were analyzing the brains of macaque monkeys and their cognitive
abilities to plan movements. They discovered neurons in the F5 region of the frontal cortex
that not only fired before themonkey had grabbed a peanut, but also when a researcher took
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another mind “as if” the emotions, thoughts and behavior of the other were one’s
own (Damasio 2003: 115). According to Rizzalotti and Sinigaglia, however, this pro-
cess should not be understood as reflexive but instead as immediate and empa-
thetic:
The instantaneous understanding of the emotions of others, rendered possible
by the emotional mirror neuron system, is a necessary condition for the empathy
which lies at the root of most of our more complex inter-individual relationships
(Rizzolatti/Sinigaglia 2008: 190-1).
Mirroring the other in a direct, first person and pre-reflexive manner enables peo-
ple to empathize with other humans – and other living, sentient beings.This basic
insight that humans are not simply reflexive and rational but also inherently social
and empathetic beings is reflected inmuch recent research in other scientific fields
(Waal 1996, 2009; Fehr/Schmidt 2006; Kolm/Ythier 2006; Tomasello 2009; Rifkin
2009; Bowles/Gintis 2011; Baron-Cohen 2011; Batson 2011; Jensen et al. 2014; Breg-
man 2020).19 The important point here, however, is that mirror neurons enable a
pre-reflexive and primary sociality that promotes the development of self-reflexive
individuality in and with others. In this sense, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia write,
The clarification of the nature and reach of the mirror neuron systems then pro-
vided us with a base from which to investigate the cerebral processes responsible
for the vast range of behaviour that characterizes our daily existence, and from
which we weave the web of our social and interindividual relations. (Rizzolatti/Sini-
gaglia 2008: 192-3; emphasis added)
some peanuts. Soon afterwards, they studied human brains and found a similar reaction:
neuronal activitywasdetected in an individualwhen they sawother humans act, even though
theywere not acting themselves (Rifkin 2009: 82). This discovery triggered aburst of research
that would go on to support an embodied and social theory of mind in which not reason, but
emotions – and, more specifically, empathy and cooperation – stand at the center of human
existence.
19 Randall Collins, for example, confirms this insight in his book Violence: A Micro-sociological
Theory (2008): “Humans have evolved to have particularly high sensitivities to the micro-in-
teractional signals given off by other humans. Humans are hard-wired to get caught in a
mutual focus of intersubjective attention, and to resonate emotions from one body to an-
other in common rhythms. This is an evolved biological propensity; humans get situationally
caught up in the momentary nuances of each other’s nervous and endocrinological systems
in a way that makes them prone to create interaction rituals and thus to keep up face-to-
face solidarity. I ammaking more than the banal point that humans have evolved with large
brains and a capacity for learning culture.We have evolved to be hyper-attuned to each other
emotionally, and hence to be especially susceptible to the dynamics of interactional situa-
tions. The evolution of human egotism, then, is far from primary; it emerges only in special
circumstances, for the most part rather late in human history.” (Collins 2008: 26-7)
118 Democracy, Markets and the Commons
This understanding of mind emphasizes the ecological principle of interdepen-
dence and co-originality of the self and the other, which, in this case, must also be
interpreted as the individual and society.
In a general sense, we could therefore say that mirror neurons bridge minds
and weave them into a network of “common mind[s]” (Pettit 1993). In other words,
mirror neurons provide humans with an elementary and underlying shared expe-
rience and a shared reality. Here, we are reminded of Elinor Ostrom’s “interdepen-
dent situations” (E. Ostrom 1998: 1) that constitute most of people’s existence and
consciousness. As Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia explain:
Themirror neuron system and the selectivity of the responses of the neurons that
compose it, produce a shared space of action, within which each act and chain of
acts, whether ours or 'theirs', are immediately registered and understood without
the need of any explicit or deliberate ‘cognitive operation.’ (Rizzolatti/Sinigaglia
2008: 131; original emphasis)
Mirror neurons generally enable individuals to develop a shared language, shared
thoughts and shared, collective actions through the imitation of the other. Michael
Bratman echoes this insight in his notion of shared intentions, which “consists in
a public, interlocking web of appropriate intentions of the individuals” (Bratman
1999: 9). Or, as Mead explains, “the beginnings of the process of communication
[are found] in the co-operative process, whether of reproduction, caring for the
young, or fighting” (Mead 1967: 234). It can thus be said that cooperation lies at the
beginning of all individual development and is most clearly symbolized by parents
caring for their children. Nevertheless, it must also be noted that this coopera-
tion can be conflictual or competitive. Or, conversely, the basis of a competitive or
conflictual relationship implies that two parties share a common reality – of which
they are also a result. For if a reality was not primarily interdependent and shared,
conflict would not even arise.
In another sense, we could possibly say that one’s mind does not exist ‘in one’s
head’, but rather ‘out there’ in one’s interactions with society and in the world.
In the words of Mead, it is the “generalized other” that is incorporated and repro-
duced throughmirror neurons and role-playing games (Mead 1967: 152-64). For this
reason, we could not only argue that language, but also mind, thoughts and “real-
ity” should be understood as an “irreducibly social good” (Taylor 1995) that people
co-create and inherently share. However, this shared mind-language-reality is not
merely limited to the social sphere but includes material reality as well. In this
sense, Mead argues that “consciousness as stuff, as experience, from the stand-
point of behavioristic or dynamic psychology, is simply the environment of the hu-
man individual or social group” (Mead 1967: 111; emphasis added). Subjective mind
is therefore always objectified in its existing social and natural conditions.
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What was previously understood as nature as a commons now flows over into
a type of social commons that lays the foundation of both our social realities and
our individualities. In his article Reality as Commons, Weber explains,
The commons of reality is a matrix of relationships through which aliveness is
unfolding in ecosystems and history. It conveys the aliveness of biological and
human communities from a perspective of metabolic dependency, exchanges of
gifts, and the entanglement of actors within their vectors of activity. Living par-
ticipants bring each other into being by establishing relationships (metabolism,
predator/prey relationships, social ties), thus producing not only their environ-
ments but their very identities. Thus, the commons describes an ontology of rela-
tions that is at the same time existential, economic and ecological. It emphasizes
a process of transformation and identity formation that arises out of a mutuality
that is not only material, but also experienced [and symbolic]. (Weber 2015)
From this perspective, all our interactions constitute our shared, common reality.
The fabric of our very existence could thus be understood as a commons – all of
reality as a commons. Or in the words of Jean-Luc Nancy, all beings exist in rela-
tionships of “being-in-common”, which is not to be thought of as oneness or unity
of a common substance, but is rather constituted by the singularities of diverse be-
ings (Nancy 1993: 30, 69). This being-in-common or reality-as-a-commons would
therefore obviously include acts of sharing, but also border walls, conflicts and
war. Although these latter examples might be attempts to exclude, subdue or even
eliminate the other, they nevertheless bring about the common reality that people
inherently co-inhabit, co-create and, thus, share. In this sense, it could even be
said that reality as a commons is the bedrock and horizon of the interdependent
existence of humans and the non-human world.
While this concept of reality as a commons might appear to be overly abstract
and vague, it is clear that we must not confuse it with Elinor Ostrom’s notion of
common pool resources or common property arrangements. Instead, this under-
standing of commons goes beyond them and should, rather, be understood as a
“way of entering into relationships with the world, both materially and conceptu-
ally” (Weber 2015). Moreover, as I shall later argue in more detail, this understand-
ing provides us with the adequate concepts to demand that people should have the
right and the opportunity to codetermine their shared common reality.
5.6 Ecological freedom, democracy and care
As might be evident by now, this notion of a shared reality-as-commons based
on interdependent self-organization in ecosystems requires us to reformulate the
understanding of autonomy and democratic freedom I developed above with refer-
120 Democracy, Markets and the Commons
ence to David Held and others. Recall that Held’s principle of autonomy was based
on the individual’s capability and right to change the conditions under which it
lives. Although this represents an advance in relation other notions of freedom in
that it conceptualizes democracy as a form of living, I would agree with James Tully
that it nevertheless conceives of autonomy as “the supreme value and [in turn] de-
rives universal environmental rights, duties and institutions from it” (Tully 2008a:
74). On the basis of our discussion of nature, however, we can now see that it is
important to invert this relationship and embed the principle of autonomy in ba-
sic principles of ecology. Fritjof Capra, for example, has identified the principles
of “interdependence, recycling, partnership, flexibility, diversity, and, as a conse-
quence of all of those, sustainability” as characteristic of ecological reality (Capra
1996: 304). Thus, in its most simple sense, an ecological reinterpretation of Held’s
autonomy principle can ultimately provide us with a concept of democratic free-
dom based on the sustainable self-organization of diverse organisms within an
ecological network of interdependencies. In this section, I would therefore like to
flesh this idea of ecological freedom out. I argue that the principle of interdepen-
dence that lies at the heart of this concept brings us to an ethic of care that should
ultimately guide and constitute human freedom.
Let me begin this discussion of ecological freedom by returning to Andreas
Weber’s essay Enlivenment. In this essay,Weber presents a notion of autonomy that
is not only biologically embodied but also interrelational. He calls this “freedom-
in-and-through-relation” (Weber 2013: 40) and explains this notion of freedomwith
reference to interdependent ecological networks or “natural commons”:
Amultitude of different individuals and diverse species stand in various relation-
ships to one another – competition and cooperation, partnership and predatory
hostility, productivity and destruction. All those relations, however, follow one
higher principle: only behaviour that allows for the productivity of the whole
ecosystem over the long term and that does not interrupt its capacities of self-
production, will survive and expand. (ibid.: 37)
If we follow Weber here, we can say that the relations of the individual in and with
the entire ecosystem become central to our understanding of ecological freedom.
For an organism can only flourish sustainably if its ecological conditions are intact
over longer periods of time. The important point is therefore not simply the maxi-
mization of individuals’ autonomy, but rather the reproduction and codetermina-
tion of the systemic socio-ecological conditions that enable individual freedom.
That being said, one might try to conceive of individual freedom – in accor-
dance with a particular organic metaphor – as the subjugation of the individual to
the whole. But this would be a mistake. There exists a familiar critique that says
that holistic and organicist conceptions of life inherently lead to totalitarianism,
as was the case with National Socialism (Harrington 1996). The understanding of
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ecological relationships defended here, however, is fundamentally at odds with this
totalitarian and hierarchical interpretation of society as an organism. Totalitarian
metaphors of an organic society have often been based on notions of Social Dar-
winism which, in turn, is used to legitimate a hierarchical interpretation of nature
and a society divided into charismatic leaders and sheep-like followers. Only by
suppressing one’s individuality can the existence of the whole be secured. Contrary
to this interpretation, the notion of interdependent ecological systems I have been
developing implies that self-organizing organisms and biological diversity are nec-
essary for the functioning of the whole ecological network. Or, in Weber’s words
once more, “the individual can only exist if the whole exists and the whole can only
exist if individuals are allowed to exist” (Weber 2013: 32). Although this definition
goes in the right direction, I consider the notion of being “allowed to exist” to be
somewhat problematic. Individual existence may be reduced to life in prison. The
fundamental point in this ecological and systemic notion of freedom is, however,
that the thriving of individuals depends on a ‘healthy’ society and the flourishing of
society depends on a healthy individual.We cannot have one without the other: the
whole and its parts are interdependent and co-create each other. In order for this to
happen, it is necessary to see both “the forest and the trees” (Moran/Ostrom 2005)
in their interwoven relationships with one another. For it is this interdependent
and systemic understanding that must complement and transform Held’s notion
of individual autonomy and democracy in order to make it more ecologically sound
and open to a more far-reaching notion of commons.
First and foremost, this implies that the networked structures of living systems
are not hierarchical. In simple terms, all organisms – including all people – are
assumed to possess the ability to self-organize and it is assumed that all parts con-
tribute to the interdependent co-creation of the whole. The biological and physical
realm of human reproduction and production is thus no longer conceptualized as
the realm of necessity and unfreedom. Nevertheless, while human beings possess
the capability to reflect, reason and self-organize, they are dependent on the self-
organization and well-being of other organisms, populations and their ecosystem
at large.They should therefore be understood as merely one component in a larger,
complex ecosystem. According toWeber, this concept of ecological freedom is what
underlies the commons:
The basic idea of the commons is therefore grounded on an intricate understand-
ing of freedom and its relationship to the whole: the individual enjoys many op-
tions of self-realisation but the only viable ones depend upon the flourishing of
the life/social systems to which she belongs. To organize a community between
humans and/or non-human agents according to the principles of the commons
means to increase individual freedom by enlarging the community’s freedom.
Both expand together – and mutually through one another. (Weber 2013: 40)
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Again, this is not to say that the relationship between the individual parts and
the whole are always harmonious. That would be a naïve and all-too optimistic
interpretation of mutual interdependence. Freedom should rather be thought of
as a process of continual communication and negotiation both over the necessities
of material existence and between the individual parts and the whole. Thus, we
could conclude that individual freedom is not only an in-and-through-relation,
but, more precisely, must be understood as a form of being with, through and
against the other.
In order to understand what this means, let us go through each term: freedom
with, through and against. ‘Freedom with’ signifies people’s inherently common
reality, which they share and therefore codetermine – irrespective of whether they
have the political or legal right to codetermination. It emphasizes the co-origina-
tion of self and other and one’s dependence on the other. Importantly, this de-
pendence is positively connoted here because it is only with the other that one can
realize common ends and satisfy common needs.Moreover, this relation highlights
the intrinsic value of social interactions, collective action and convivial modes of
being. In this sense, the principle underlying ‘freedom with’ can be understood
as the Kantian categorical imperative that all (rational) beings must each be con-
sidered as an end in themselves (Kant 2002: 45; 4:429), whereby we would replace
the term rational with the term sentient, extending its sphere of relevance to all
living beings and thereby possibly also ecosystems in general. In contrast, ‘free-
dom through’ denotes the utilitarian and instrumental character of relationships,
in which people can use one another and their environment. We use people and
things to realize certain ends that are either held in common or not. Both freedom
‘with’ and ‘through’ resemble a collective notion of positive freedom, understood as
the ability to act collectively, and social freedom, understood as the ability to code-
termine one’s conditions of existence. Finally, ‘freedom against’ emphasizes that
people have conflicting values and ends and therefore need to negotiate how these
differences can co-exist without negating one another. While ‘freedom against’ ap-
pears similar to negative freedom or ‘freedom from’, the latter is, in fact, a means
of solving the conflicts that arise in relation to differences by excluding or negat-
ing the other. Instead, ‘freedom against’ implies that conflicting interests and ends
must be dealt with not through exclusion but, rather, through negotiation. This
is not to say that all conflicting ends have a right to be realized, but rather that
it must be negotiated which means and ends more adequately fulfill the flourish-
ing of its parts and the reproduction of the whole. In this sense, ‘with, through
and against the other’ are the fundamental criteria of freedom based on ecological
interdependence.
Lastly, it should be noted that the three aspects of ecological freedom must al-
ways be acknowledged simultaneously. While it is possible that one aspect will be
emphasized in certain relationships, other aspects will be accentuated in other re-
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lationships. None of these aspects can entirely be subtracted from the definition
of ecological freedom. As we can see, the negation of ‘with’ would imply a purely
instrumental and conflictual relationship with others. This comes close to the no-
tion of negative freedom in which one’s atomistic and supposedly independent
subjective rationality is defined as the cornerstone of society. The denial of either
‘through’ or ‘against’ would, in turn, lead to the subjugation of one’s individuality
to the whole and thus negate one’s individual freedom. As we see, this notion of
freedom aims at maintaining a dynamic tension between the parts and the whole
while not falling into the traps of focusing onmerely one aspect of its tripartite def-
inition. In this sense, I would say that ecological freedom emphasizes individuality
without being either totalitarian or atomistic and solipsist.
As we see, ecological freedom thus emphasizes the importance of other liv-
ing beings as a precondition for one’s own material existence and actual freedom.
Hence, ecological freedom is always both embedded and embodied freedom. As
Weber elaborates,
the enlivened idea of freedom does not do away with the classical-humanistic
[and liberal-negative] account[s] of autonomy (as strictly biologistic accounts do),
but rather it limits its absoluteness to an ‘embodied relativity’. There is no such
thing as individual freedom detached from the living world, and any attempt to
claim it inevitably will violate the necessities of embodied life, of an organic be-
ing’s living needs. So from an Enlivenment viewpoint freedom (as enframed in
constraint) is a natural process. (Weber 2013: 40)
Here, freedomwith, through and against is simply interpreted as a process of com-
munication with one’s ecosystem and not merely with one’s fellow human beings.
This generally implies that people recognize that other organisms have an intrinsic
right to exist and are the basis for human existence and the reproduction of the en-
tire ecosystems which they co-inhabit (the aspect of ‘freedom with’). Importantly,
this would imply that humans provide organisms, other animals and wider ecosys-
tems with legal rights that recognize their rights to life and liberty. This notion of
ecological freedom would, however, also imply that humans can use these organ-
isms and ecosystems to satisfy our needs (‘freedom through’), while not negating
the needs of the other (again, ‘freedom with’). Finally, this notion can suggest that
humans must somehow negotiate over conflicting ends and see to what extent
these conflicting ends support the reproduction of the whole and the flourishing
of each individual part.
But how can this negotiation process between human and non-human organ-
isms take place? On the one hand, the notion of ecological freedom should provide
people with a point of normative orientation in their everyday interactions with
the non-human world. On the other hand, it should also provide people with the
ability to file a suit in the name of the non-human world when the rights of cer-
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tain organisms or ecosystems are violated. While this idea might sound somewhat
peculiar, the discussion on the rights of nature is not new (Stone 1972, 2010) and
legal systems that take the rights of the non-human world into account already ex-
ist (La Follette/Maser 2017). If we take the rights of sentient non-human organisms
seriously it would, however, ultimately demand that the non-human world would
not only be increasingly integrated into the legal framework as an object, but also
as participants in the democratic processes of law and policy making. Considering
the increasing sphere of democratic integration from white male adults who own
property, to white male workers, to people of color and to women, this would be a
logical conclusion of this historical development (Hilpert 1999).
Although an in-depth analysis of this important topic cannot be adequately
dealt with here, I nevertheless would like to briefly sketch how we might be able
to integrate the non-human world into democratic processes. Let me begin my
sketch with Bruno Latour, who argues for nothing less than a new constitution
that would realize a “Parliament of Things” (Latour 2004). In order to understand
this somewhat fantastical notion, we need to return to Latour’s previously men-
tioned critique of the subject-object and human-nature dualisms that underlie our
conceptions of reality and politics. Here, the nonhuman world is conceptualized
as inanimate and mute (Latour 2004: 62), which denies its ability to voice its in-
terests and opinions and, thus, inherently excludes it from the realm of politics
(ibid.: 62). Yet Latour argues that “speech is no longer a specifically human prop-
erty, or at least humans are no longer its solemasters” (ibid.: 65).The reason for this
is that “facts” do not “speak for themselves” (ibid.: 67), but are always interpreted
and voiced by scientists. As Latour explains in his bookWeHave Never Been Modern,
“these facts indeed represent nature as it is. [But] [t]he facts are produced and rep-
resented in the laboratory, in scientific writings; they are recognized and vouched
for by the nascent community of witnesses” (Latour 1993: 28). And as in the case
of the “ecological crisis”, he emphasizes in Politics of Nature that “far from suspend-
ing discussion over matters of fact, every piece of scientific news, on the contrary,
throws oil on the fire of public passions” (Latour 2004: 65). Simply put, supposed
empirical facts and their interpretation are highly contested and, therefore, highly
political. For this reason, Latour argues that “each [scientific] discipline can define
itself as a complex mechanism for giving worlds the capacity to write or to speak, as a
general way of making mute entities literate” (ibid.: 66; original emphasis). Thus,
Latour contends that parliaments need not include elephants, trees and stones in
their rooms and debates, but rather scientists, who will then be the “spokesper-
sons of the nonhumans” (ibid.: 64). Ultimately, these scientists shall complement
the “subjective” opinions of politicians, intertwining the supposed subjective and
objective perspectives of reality into a unified “association of humans and nonhu-
mans” (ibid.: 70-77) and in a process of co-creation. While I would agree with the
basic analysis and aim of Latour’s argument, I find it problematic to assume that
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only scientists in lab coats can interpret nature and provide nature with a voice.
While Latour appears to defend a widening of democratic participation to include
nonhuman beings, by simply opening parliament’s doors to scientists, democratic
rule can lopsidedly become a rule of experts. According to this interpretation of
Latour’s work, such a “Parliament of Things” would thus not only disempower the
people who work in and with ecosystems on a daily basis (e.g. farmers, fishers, for-
est rangers etc.), but also factory workers and urban office workers, who support
ecological issues and want to make their neighborhoods ‘greener’.
For this reason, I would argue that nature is neither mute nor can its voice
only be represented by scientists. Instead, because all humans are always in in-
teraction in and with their ecosystems, ‘nature’ perpetually ‘speaks’ with us and
is constantly being interpreted by humans. John Dryzek gives a rather simple ex-
ample of this communication between humans and the non-human world, “If the
topsoil on which my crops depend is shrinking, then clearly nature is ‘telling’ me
something” (Dryzek 1987: 207).This example can be extended to the home-owner in
a suburb, who interprets the shriveled leaves as a sign to water her tomato plants,
or to the urban dweller, who wants to have more bike paths and parks in order to
improve the air quality, climate and living conditions in the city. As Christopher
Stone once put it in his influential paper “Should Trees Have Standing?” from 1972,
I am sure I can judge with more certainty andmeaningfulness whether and when
my lawn wants (needs) water, than the Attorney General can judge whether and
when theUnited Stateswants (needs) to take anappeal fromanadverse judgment
by a lower court. The lawn tells me that it wants water by a certain dryness of the
blades and soil – immediately obvious to the touch – the appearance of bald spots,
yellowing, and a lack of springiness after being walked on; [but] how does ‘the
United States’ communicate to the Attorney General? (Stone 2010: 11)
In this sense, the communication between humans and ‘nature’ can possibly be
more concrete and straightforward than the communication between social in-
stitutions such as ‘the national government’ and ‘the law’ or ‘the market’. And in
contrast to Bruno Latour’s limitation to scientists as the sole spokespersons of a
supposedly mute nature, we must therefore concede that all people equally and
perpetually partake in conscious or unconscious communication processes with
the ecosystems they inhabit.
Putting human-nature relations in this perspective, I find Robert E. Goodin’s
argument in his article “Enfranchising the Earth and its Alternatives” (1996) to be
a rather convincing strategy to integrate nature into politics. Like Latour, Goodin
argues that as it is impossible to integrate future generations (i.e. the as yet unborn)
into politics, so it is also impossible to integrate “birds and bees and boulders”
into democratic processes (Goodin 1996: 841). According to Goodin, this practical
difficulty does not, however, negate the desirability and necessity of enfranchising
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nature. Because of this apparent paradox, Goodin argues that we must not hold on
to the “view of democracy as necessarily entailing ‘one person, one vote’, with each
person representing his or her own interests” (ibid.: 844). Instead, he contends that
it might be empirically more realistic, as well as being morally and politically
preferable, to think instead of democracy as a process in which we all come to
internalize the interests of each other and indeed of the larger world around us.
[…] The best we can hope for is that nature’s interests will come to be internalized
by a sufficient number of people with sufficient leverage in the political system
for nature’s interests to secure the protection that they deserve. (ibid.)
Thus, nature’s interests should not simply be represented by scientists, but more
widely by “people qua voters” (ibid.). Yet this only occurs if “people come to take
interest in nature’s interest” (ibid.; original emphasis). According to Goodin, this
leads to a twofold goal in democratic theory: firstly, the interests of nature should be
internalized by more and more people and, secondly, the political system must be
“maximally responsive to those expressions of interest” (ibid.). Considering these
two goals – and proceeding along a line of thought similar to the Ostrom’s –
Goodin defends a “direct, grass-roots, participatory democracy” (ibid.: 849), be-
cause it breaks down concentrations of power and opens up political discourse to
a wider group of people. As Goodin explains:
Participatory democracymakes the political systemmore responsive to green val-
ues because the more others [i.e. other people] there are who have to be given an
explanation, the more likely it is that there will be someone among themwho in-
ternalizes the interests of nature. The larger and more diverse the electorate, the
more likely is there to be some nature-lover who is going to ask, ‘What about the
effects of all this on nature?’ (ibid.: 845)
Yet in contrast to Elinor Ostrom, Goodin bases this argument not on “empirical
sociology”, but rather on the “analytics of participatory government and the law of
large numbers”, which assume that “every proposal has to be justified to everyone”
and that “at least among very large electorates, virtually every point of view is likely
to be represented” (ibid.). This leads to an important consequence on an individ-
ual level, which is that “having to defend our positions publicly makes us suppress
narrowly self-interested reasons for action and highlight public-spirited reasons
in their place” (ibid.: 846). Simply put, if more people participate in political ne-
gotiations and decision-making procedures, the more likely public interests and
the interests of nature will be represented and considered. But as Goodin notes,
even if a constituencymight not include ecologically minded people, assuming that
these concerns might be expressed in discursive arenas can also lead to the “antic-
ipatory internalization” of the interests of the non-human world (ibid.: 846-7). In
sum, although the non-human world does not speak for itself, wider participation
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in democratic deliberation increases the likelihood that nature will be integrated
into and represented in politics and the voices of the non-human world ultimately
become internalized into one’s own consciousness.The ecological other becomes an
increasingly integral part of the self and of society’s organization. Here, it must be
emphasized that the notion of wider participation does not simply imply a broad-
ening of the constituency on higher political levels, such as that of the nation-
state, but rather also a ‘deepening’ of democracy, in which political participation
is increased and intensified on all political levels and in various social realms.20 As
we see, this ecological and normatively instrumental justification of participatory
democracy complements Elinor Ostrom’s theory of democratic governance, which
is largely based on empirical evidence, yet also advocates a decentralized and par-
ticipatory democracy in a polycentric political system.
This shift in understanding from an individualistic and entirely anthropocen-
tric understanding of freedom to a social and ecological notion forces us to rethink
our basic ethical relation to other human beings and to the non-human world.
In the most general terms, the relationship to other humans and the non-human
world should be interpreted as a resonant relationship of communication and ne-
gotiation. Furthermore, by recognizing the inherent interdependence of living sys-
tems, ecological freedom is neither based on the negative notion of non-interfer-
ence nor on a utilitarian ethic of the maximization of utility for the greatest num-
ber. I would also argue that ecological freedom goes beyond Honneth’s previously
discussed concept of social freedom based on (the struggle for) mutual recogni-
tion between humans. Instead, I would argue that ecological freedom is based on
a care ethic – towards one’s fellow human beings and the non-humanworld. In this
sense, I would appeal to the definition of care by Joan Tronto and Berenice Fisher
and explored in Tronto’s 1993 book Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic
of Care:
On themost general level,we suggest that caringbe viewedas a species [i.e. social]
activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our
‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies,
our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex,
life-sustaining web. (Fisher/Tronto in Tronto 1993: 103; original emphasis)
Although care is often associated with the relationship between parents or, more
specifically, mothers and their children, I would agree with Tronto that care is a
more general concept that, firstly, refers to a processual activity, and, secondly,
is able to describe an individual or collective relationship with social institutions,
non-human beings or an inert object. Here, it is important to emphasize that the
20 See for example Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participa-
tory Governance (2003) edited by Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright.
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care ethic implied here is not hierarchical and paternalistic; instead it is based on
the recognition of others’ equal capabilities and rights to self-organize. Ecological
freedom based on a care ethic thus emphasizes the equal rights of all living be-
ings to individual and interdependent action and the responsibility to support the
freedom and flourishing of all other living beings. In the words of Karen Barad,
Intra-acting responsibly as part of the world means taking account of the entan-
gled phenomena that are intrinsic to the world's vitality and being responsive to
the possibilities that might help us and it flourish. Meeting each moment, being
alive to the possibilities of becoming, is an ethical call, an invitation that is writ-
ten into the very matter of all being and becoming.We need tomeet the universe
halfway, to take responsibility for the role that we play in the world's differential
becoming. (Barad 2007: 396)
Interpreting this ethical call as a call to an ethics of care, we must, however, em-
phasize that caring does not imply an altruism that negates self-interest in the
name of the other. Instead, it includes a fundamental notion of self-care that is
balanced with the care for others and the interdependent processes of becoming
(Tronto 2013: 32). In other words, self-interest need not be in conflict with the in-
terests of others. Nevertheless, care does not realize a harmonic unity, whether
through self-negation or the invisible hand of the market; rather, it is a form of
“differential becoming”. Conflict can arise precisely from diverging values of care.
Hence, practices of care require the negotiation of diverging interests and values,
accompanied by a basic recognition of and interest taken in the other. Grounding
our notion of freedom on an ethic of care therefore implies that we break with the
tacit ‘ethic’ of atomistic self-interest that the notion of negative freedom assumes.
We would therefore shift our focus from the right of non-interference and the un-
limited accumulation of wealth to the care for reproduction and flourishing of the
constituent parts of the whole. By placing a care ethic at the foundation of our no-
tion of freedom, I believe that we would ultimately be bringing life and freedom
into alignment.
Here, someone might ask if we truly need a specific ethos for a specific legal
framework. My short and simple answer to this is yes. The reason for this is that
social institutions can only be maintained if they are also morally justified and
upheld. A moral justification implies not only the approval of the existence of cer-
tain institutions, but also patterns of both individual and collective practices that
uphold and reproduce these institutions (Jaeggi 2018a, 2018b). Following Hegel,
I would argue that social institutions are not merely created through reason and
contracts, but are brought about through unconscious, incorporated and habitual
patterns of action which are, in turn, structured according to normative values of
right and wrong. This is what Hegel generally refers to as “Sittlichkeit”. We may
found new institutions, but if we do not uphold them through ethical conviction
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and repeated actions, they will most likely disappear again. In this sense, we could
also say that (democratic) institutions of society are no better than the people (and
their actions) in that specific society. From this perspective, it is our norms, our
ethics and our corresponding actions that must bring about the social institutions
we want.
By placing care at the center of our relationship to ourselves, other humans
and the non-human world, we not only change our notion of freedom, but also
transform our understanding of politics and the legal framework that structures
society – and the distribution of care work. In general terms, this shifts our under-
standing of politics from a relationship that is primarily struggle and conflict to a
one of mutual, reciprocal care. Furthermore, the emphasis on care complements
a focus on individual rights with one’s responsibilities towards others. While the
right to self-organize is a necessary pre-requisite of the right to care and flourish,
Tronto emphasizes the importance of responsibilities in what she calls a “caring
democracy”:
Most importantly, rather than being a set of principles from which one deduces
proper action, a feminist democratic ethic of care begins by envisioning a series
of caring practices, nested within one another. The broadest of these nested prac-
tices are those that pertain to society as a whole […]. The goal of such practices
is to ensure that all of the members of the society can live as well as possible by
making the society as democratic as possible. This is the essence of ‘caring with.’
While living in a democratic manner is not the only goal of care, or of human life,
in a democratic society it is the goal of democratic caring practices. Thus, demo-
cratic politics should center upon assigning responsibilities for care, and for ensuring that
democratic citizens are as capable as possible of participating in this assignment of respon-
sibilities. The task of a democratic politics is to affix responsibility, and as we come
to recognize the centrality of care for living a decent human life, then the task of
democratic politics needs to be much more fully focused upon care responsibili-
ties: their nature, their allocation, and their fulfillment. (Tronto 2013: 30; original
emphasis)
By interpreting freedom and democracy in this manner, we could say that democ-
racies that clearly separate the private from the public and that are coupled with
self-regulating markets limit the possibilities for individuals to care for the socio-
ecological problems that determine their common reality. As we have already seen,
the self-limitation of politics to the realm of the state has created a democratic
deficit that can also be interpreted as a structural caring deficit in contemporary
societies.These legal institutions stop people from taking responsibility and caring
for social and ecological problems because the root of these problems is ultimately
situated in the private realmwhich is largely shielded fromdemocratic interference
– be that by the state, civil society or communities.
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Furthermore, the existing politics of care imply that the responsibilities of care
are unequally distributed; while some people are overburdened with classical ‘pri-
vate’ and often unpaid care work (e.g. childrearing, caring for the sick and elderly,
housework), few people have the resources to care for common affairs (e.g. politi-
cians, philanthropists, environmentalists) and others are largely freed from both
these kinds of care work (e.g. people pursuing accumulative ‘economic’ activities).
So while some people have a “free pass” to extract and accumulate wealth – in
the name of caring for themselves and society –, the rest of society must do the
care work that repairs the socio-ecological organism(s) and keeps it (or them) alive.
Thus, legal arrangements define and distribute care work and the corresponding
responsibilities within society (Tronto 2013: 32-3). In this sense, it is not simply of
central importance to define and demand rights for humans and the non-human
world (e.g. the right to clean water, to education etc.), but also to demand a fair
distribution of caring possibilities and obligations that enables the maintenance
and reproduction of these freedoms for all beings (Held 1995: 203).
That being said, I would like to further develop an understanding of democ-
racy that is based on the notion of ecological freedom I have elaborated so far. In
order to do this, I now turn to Fritjof and Capra’s notion of eco-law, developing it
with reference to James Tully’s work on the “civic tradition” of democracy, which
provides us with an important stepping-stone for an ecological democratic theory
of the commons.
5.7 The civic tradition of ecological democracy and commoning
In his book OnGlobal Citizenship (2014), James Tully distinguishes between civil and
civic traditions of democracy. Similarly to Fritjof Capra and Ugo Mattei, he recog-
nizes that the civil tradition is problematic because it limits people in their capa-
bilities to change their legal frameworks to adequately deal with and care for social
and ecological problems. To understand the civic tradition of democracy fully, it
may, therefore, be helpful to briefly discuss what Tully understands by the civil
tradition of democracy.
The civil tradition of democracy
According to James Tully, the civil tradition is based on a dualistic conception of
society that differentiates between individuals and their representatives, on the
one hand, and citizens (demos) and their legal framework – understood as the con-
stitutional rule of law (nomos) – on the other (Tully 2014: 11). This conception is
similar to the conceptions outlined above of both protective, legal (minimal) and
formal, positive (medium-range) democracy. Here, the “constitutional rule of law
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is the first condition of citizenship”, which is “defined as a status (state or condi-
tion)” (ibid.). Rights and obligations are granted to the individual by the hierarchical
authority of the state. Society is divided into the state-individual, state-market or
state-civil society dichotomies that are found in the writings of Hobbes, Locke and
Kant. Tully lists four tiers of citizenship rights and duties within this civil tradition:
(1) civil liberties, understood as private autonomy or, with reference to Benjamin
Constant, the liberty of the moderns; (2) representative government and the liberty
of the ancients, understood as the opportunity to participate in public autonomy;
(3) social and economic rights, understood as substantive yet rather weak rights to
education, housing and health; and finally, (4) modern minority rights (ibid.: 12-
17). As Tully emphasizes, the “modern liberty to participate in the private economic
sphere and not to be interfered within it; the right to own property and enter into
contracts” (ibid.: 13) lies at the center of the first tier civil liberties. In this sense, the
state exists primarily to pacify our supposedly antagonistic and conflicting, ego-
tistical interests. Again, we confront the state-individual dichotomy which must
also be interpreted as a dichotomy of subjective, egotistical or, in Christian termi-
nology, ‘fallen’ individuals and objective, robust and ‘universal’ laws. Or, in Kantian
terms, it is a rational and universal legal order that can be realized even by a “na-
tion of devils” (Kant 2006: 90).21 As becomes clear, this concept of civil liberty turns
the social and ecological ontology I develop in this chapter on its head by assuming
independent and conflicting individuals as primary, the interference of others as
21 In the words of Immanuel Kant: “Establishing a state, as difficult as it may sound, is a prob-
lem that can be solved even for a nation of devils (if only they possess understanding). The
problem is as follows: ‘To form a group of rational beings, which, as a group, require univer-
sal laws for their preservation, of which each member is, however, secretly inclined to make
an exception of himself, and to organize them and arrange a constitution for them in such a
way that, although they strive against each other in their private intentions, the latter check
each other in such a way that the result in their public conduct is just as if they had no such
evil intentions.’ It must be possible to solve such a problem. For it is not precisely how to at-
tain the moral improvement of the human being that we must know, but rather only how to
use the mechanism of nature on human beings in order to direct the conflict between their
hostile intentions in a people in such a way that they compel each other to submit them-
selves to coercive laws and thereby bring about the condition of peace in which laws are in
force. In the case of actually existing, however imperfectly organized states one can also ob-
serve this, in that in their external conduct they already closely approximate what the idea
of right prescribes, although an inner morality is certainly not the cause of this conduct (and
it should not be expected that a good state constitution would arise from an inner morality,
but rather conversely that the good moral education of a people would follow the former).
Hence reason can use the mechanism of nature, in the form of selfish inclinations, which by
their nature oppose one another even externally, as a means to make room for reason’s own
end, legal regulation, and to thereby promote and secure, insofar as it is within the power
of the state to do so, both internal and external peace.—This is the essence of the matter:
Nature wills irresistibly that right ultimately attains supreme authority.” (Kant 2006: 90-91)
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cumbersome and participation in social activities and common affairs as optional
Here, democracy and processes of democratization are “equated with tier-one civil
liberties (neoliberal marketization) and a short list of democratic rights (primary
elections)” (Tully 2014: 29). In this dualistic model, self-organization is not under-
stood as an activity of self-governance but rather as a “spontaneous” function of
the self-regulating market as described by Hayek. As we have previously discussed
in reference to the self-regulation of the market, the primacy of individual negative
freedom and market competition lays heavy constraints on democratic freedom.
The problem is that the civil tradition does not recognize the ecological, democratic
freedom that would enable all people to participate in this process of multilayered,
institutional self-organization and adaptation. Tully discusses this problem:
The civil traditionmakes a fundamental distinction between the institutional rule
of law and the citizen activities that take place within the boundaries of these in-
stitutional settings. The institutionalized rule of law exhibits a systemic or func-
tional quality of formality and independence from the agents who are subject to
it and act within its boundaries. This picture is encapsulated in themantra, ‘rule of
lawnot ofmen’. The features of institutionalization and rationalization that estab-
lish the independence of the rule of law from the rule ofmenandwomen consist in
the definite rules, procedures and training of the institutional offices, the hierar-
chical, command–obedience relationships among the members, the specialized
division of labour, the separation of knowledge fromuse, reflexivemonitoring and
the systematic application of coercion to align behaviour with rules. That is, it is
the non-democratic and procedural character of the relationships within an insti-
tution that give it its formality and independence from the informal rule of men.
The language of governance is replaced by that of administration, management,
control, discipline, procedure, direction and monitoring. […] The roles of humans
seem to disappear. (Tully 2014: 55; emphasis added)
Here, we are reminded of Vincent Ostrom’s critique of the monocentric order. Yet,
in contrast to Ostrom, Tully sees similar problems in representative democracies
based on the civil tradition that uphold an abstract, formal and independent rule of
law. Aside from the hierarchical and technocratic character of these social arrange-
ments, it is important to note Tully’s conclusion that “humans seem to disappear”
within such a framework. I find this point to be central because it is precisely in the
name of individual negative freedom that the civil tradition is often so fiercely de-
fended. Yet, from Tully’s perspective, the universal and abstract rules of property
that are supposed to defend individual freedom simultaneously suggest its dis-
appearance. How can this be? Much as in Hayek’s understanding of a dethroned
democracy, political issues are delegated to experts who uphold the rule of law and
implement adequate policies to maintain the functioning of the social body. As
Capra and Mattei note, “since its foundation by Hugo Grotius, international law
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has remained based on individualized Cartesian building blocks – legal persons
in competition with each other within a mechanistic, depoliticized vision of law”
(Capra/Mattei 2015: 117-118). As in Hermann Heller’s notion of authoritarian liber-
alism, Capra and Mattei describe this institutional arrangement as a type of legal
absolutism. The individual is subjugated to the forces of the self-regulating open
and competitive market and is unable to participate in the democratic self-organi-
zation of its common, institutional political-economic reality. Active and conscious
participation in and care for the self-organization of society is thus constrained.
Due to this democratic deficit, we can interpret the civil tradition to be politically
disempowering – and antihumanistic. Furthermore, the apathy that results from
it can turn into both hatred of established elites and hope for strong (authoritar-
ian) leaders who will ‘set things straight’. The tragic irony, however, is that these
new charismatic leaders are themselves subject to the structural constraints of the
market and must often adhere to the ‘objective’ market forces under a new political
banner.
The civic tradition of democracy
In contrast to this civil model of democracy, Tully develops an alternative under-
standing of citizenship that overcomes these dualistic problems and that can be
interpreted as a democratic theory of our ecological concept of freedom. Tully calls
this form of citizenship “civic”, in which the liberty of the ancients is prioritized
over the liberty of the moderns. According to Tully, a fundamental difference be-
tween these two traditions is that while civil citizenship defines “a status within
an institutional framework backed up by world-historical processes and universal
norms, the [civic] tradition looks on citizenship as negotiated practices, as praxis –
as actors and activities in contexts” (Tully 2014: 35). As we see, the civic tradition of
democracy is very similar to Axel Honneth’s notion of social freedom and is based
on the recognition that institutions must be upheld and reproduced by social prac-
tices. Similarly to our social and ecological interpretation of the individual, Tully
also assumes an embodied subject that brings about institutions through its inter-
active relationships with others:
The [civic] tradition reverses this modernist, institutional orientation and takes
the orientation of citizens in civic activities in the habitats they are enacted and
carried on. Institutionalization is seen and analyzed as coming into being in un-
predictable and open-ended ways out of, and in interaction with, the praxis of
citizens – sometimes furthering, strengthening and formalizing these activities
while at other times dispossessing, channeling, dominating, cancelling, downsiz-
ing, constraining and limiting. (Tully 2014: 35-6)
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Here, citizenship is not granted and guaranteed by states but, instead, brought
about through collective action and social freedom. In contrast to first and second-
tier freedoms in the civil tradition,
the crucial kind of freedom is thus neither the freedom from relationships of in-
terdependency (negative freedom) nor the freedom of acting in conformity with
allegedly ideal and universal legal relationships that ‘we’ impose on ourselves
(positive freedom). It is the proto-civic and civic freedom of negotiating and de-
mocratizing in/over the always less-than-ideal relationships in which we live and
breathe and become who we are. The only guarantee of freedom and democracy
is, not surprisingly, the daily cooperative practices of democratic freedom in webs
of relationships and on the fields of possibilities they disclose. (Tully 2014: 52-3)
As we see, civic freedom is thus neither merely understood as negative or positive
freedom but as action in, with and against others. Furthermore, political partici-
pation is not simply a right and possibility, but rather an act and a perpetual praxis
of being free. As Tully explains:
The civic citizen manifests the freedom of participation. The free citizen is free in
engaging in civic activities and, eo ipso, making these activities free. Civic freedom
is not an opportunity but a manifestation; neither freedom from nor freedom to
(which are often absent or suppressed), but freedoms of and in participation, and
with fellow citizens. The civic citizen is not the citizen of an institution (a nation
state or international law) but the free citizen of the ‘free city’: that is, any kind of
civic world or democratic ‘sphere’ that comes into being and is reciprocally held
aloft by the civic freedom of its citizens, from the smallest deme or commune to
glocal federations. (Tully 2014: 39; original emphasis)
Translated back into our terminology, civic activities are a manifestation of ecolog-
ical freedom with, through and against the other. In this sense, Tully’s civic theory
of democracy must obviously be understood as inherently participatory. We must,
however, be precise in defining participation. Firstly, participation is neither to be
limited to the realm of the state nor to be understood as something extraordinary,
as if political engagement occurs after work and in our free time. Instead, partic-
ipation must be understood as basic and constitutive of our interactions with the
other. All activities are manifestations of participation in life, and it thus depends
on everyday patterns of action that bring about different relationships and institu-
tions. Or in other words: we cannot not participate in life and politics; the apolitical
citizen is also inherently political. Political participation in everyday life can thus be
more or less free. And by consciously acting in a self-organized manner, we make
ourselves even freer.
Second, and as previously mentioned, participation is not something granted,
but rather something realized through (collective) action and thus literally ‘en-
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acted’. Participation is thus not to be limited to actions within existing institutions
(e.g. voting). Here, Tully defines four general types of civic activities, depending on
the precise field of action one finds oneself in: (1) the range of activities available
in and recognized by an existing government; (2) a certain range or “Spielraum” of
“playing the civic game differently”; (3) the negotiation of governance relationships
themselves; and (4) confrontation with the unjustified structural limits of the spe-
cific field (Tully 2014: 48-9). In this sense, Tully understands the processes of civic
action as the participation in and transformation of existing relationships and in-
stitutions. As Tully explains:
The civic tradition simply does not have this disenfranchising disjuncture prob-
lem. By starting from the premise that any community subject to and affected by
a relationship of governance that harms a public good is for that very reason a
citizenry with the civic right to hold the responsible party accountable through
civic negotiations, it links democratic organization, networkization and civicized
institutionalization directly to the specific power relationship at issue and at the
most effective sites. (Tully 2014: 82)
The right to participate in the democratic codetermination of one’s common re-
ality is therefore not something that is provided for by institutions, but instead
something that is acted upon when people feel negatively affected by existing cir-
cumstances. Through this collective action, they – hopefully or ideally – alter and
codetermine the social arrangements in which they live. In this sense, Tully con-
cludes that “to civicize governance relationships is – eo ipso – to ‘democratize’ them”
(Tully 2014: 49; emphasis added).
With this differentiation of the fields of action, we can ask ourselves to what
extent this civic tradition of democracy is to be equated with direct democracy.
Firstly, it must be clarified that this model of democratic law-making is not to be
confused with a Marxist model of direct democracy in which there is no separation
of powers (Held 1987: 116). Although the separation of powers is rarely discussed in
Tully’s civic model of democracy, he does emphasize that the existence of institu-
tionalized procedures is of fundamental importance for the existence, stability and
reproduction of democracies. Tully clarifies,
This is not to deny the importance of institutionalized procedures. It is rather to
observe that the way a person ‘grasps’ a procedural rule is not itself a procedure
but a negotiated practice. […] Both our understanding of the rule and the actual
rule itself are immanent in […] negotiated practices that cannot be circumscribed.
The living rule of law is the pattern of interplay and interaction of the negotiated prac-
tices. This is the immanent or manifestation thesis of the civic rule of law. The
unfolding of the rule of law, no matter how institutionalized and rationalized, is
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internally related to the indeterminate negotiated practices of the law. In a word,
civic citizens are ‘constructivists’. (Tully 2014: 56-7; emphasis added)
Thepoint Tully is making here is that the separation of powers and the enforcement
of procedures is not something that societies can simply rely on, because they,
too, are created through practice and subject to conflicting interpretations and
negotiations.
According to this interpretation, I would argue that Tully’s understanding of
an institution is very similar to the one George Herbert Mead defines, in his so-
cial behaviorist terminology, as “developments within, or particular and formalized
manifestations of, the social life-process at its human evolutionary level” (Mead
1967: 262). This interpretation of social arrangements supports the idea that the
cultivation of a specific ethic manifests itself in specific social patterns of action
(e.g. utility maximization or an ecological care ethic). In turn, the negotiated con-
flict over patterns of action and social arrangements can support or impede the
realization of certain norms and values that are consolidated in existing institu-
tions. As we can see, this notion clearly contradicts the aforementioned Kantian
notion of legal institutions which should be constructed for a “nation of devils”.
Let me illustrate this with a few examples. If, for example, a large majority of
people believes slavery to be legitimate, it is difficult if not impossible to legally
abolish slavery. If people desire to eat large amounts of cheap meat, it is probably
very difficult to prohibit intensive factory farming. If a large percentage of a people
demands unlimited freedom to accumulate wealth, then it will be impossible to
limit accumulation. If a society believes that competition brings out the best in us,
it is highly improbable that one will be able to create a legal structure that fosters
cooperation. It is irrelevant here, however, whether the majority of society actually
owns slaves or has the ability to accumulate large amounts of wealth. It might be
the case that only a small minority actually participates in such practices. Yet if
the belief that these practices are morally legitimate, ethically commendable and
socially valuable, they will most likely be broadly accepted and difficult – if not
impossible – to alter.
Conversely, however, this does not imply that an altruistic morality of all indi-
viduals is necessary to create just and democratic institutions. Rules are created
precisely in order to place limits on those actions of individuals that limit the free-
dom of others, on the one hand, and on conflict with socially accepted values, on
the other. If everyone acted altruistically, rules would not be necessary. At the same
time, if no one abided to the law, specific laws could not be enforced and would
most likely not exist in the first place. Civic activity thus creates institutions,which,
in turn, determine the structure of social patterns of action and the possibilities for
future civic activity. As we can see, this concept of civic action echoes the principles
of co-creation previously discussed in our non-dualistic, ecological understanding
5. An ecological understanding of the commons 137
of the relationship between human beings and nature. Here, human beings are re-
sponsible for the co-creation of their material and social reality. Or, in the words
of Harry Boyte, Elinor Ostrom et al.: “a citizen is the co-creator of the worlds to
which she or he belongs” (Boyte et al. 2014: 207). This is what Tully means by the
inherent constructivism of the civic rule of law (Tully 2014: 57).
Eco-law, commons and commoning
Interestingly, Tully’s notion of the civic activity of law-making is very close to what
Fritjof Capra and Ugo Mattei describe as an ecological paradigm of law that is
manifested in the commons. For them, a shift to an ecological understanding of
law can only be realized through a “culture and genuine civic engagement” that
“overcome both hierarchy and competition as ‘correct’ narratives of the legal or-
der” (Capra/Mattei 2015: 134).This implies, on the one hand, that we must critically
reflect and alter the normative values and mental frameworks that guide our ev-
eryday practices and constitute our institutional arrangements. On the other hand,
an ecological conception of law also has the task of overcoming the state-market
or state-individual dualisms and basing itself on a different conception of nature:
the networked system. Much as in Tully’s conception of civic democratic rule as a
“network of relationships of negotiated practices” (Tully 2014: 56), Capra and Mat-
tei argue that an ecological understanding of law “seeks to capture the complex
relationships among the parts and the whole – between individual entitlements,
duties, rights, power, and the law – by using the metaphor of the network and of
the open community sharing a purpose” (Capra/Mattei 2015: 134). All three authors
argue that law is not to be understood as a neutral and objective science that is
merely constructed and implemented by experts and specialists, but should, in-
stead, be understood as a craft or practical art (Tully 2014: 56) amounting to a “non-
professional exercise in the sharing of collective meaning” (Capra/Mattei 2015: 135;
emphasis added). The interpretation of law as a nonprofessional practice implies
that everyone has the opportunity and the capabilities to partake in the definition
– and possibly implementation – of the law. Thus, the nonprofessional character
of law-making makes it democratic. That being said, Capra and Mattei go so far
as to argue that in an ecological order, “the community [or network], not the in-
dividual or the state, is sovereign” (ibid.: 140). According to them, however, this
does not imply that the state should wither away, but, instead, that local and global
communities and networks should have the power to perpetually change and adapt
their legal structures according to changing circumstances and needs. In this sense,
Capra and Mattei argue that
the new ecolegal order must allow collective agency to emerge […], reclaiming
the law as a collective tool of political transformation. Such participatory decision
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making, both political and economic, is a crucial aspect of the need to put the
legal system at the center of, not the individual physical or legal person, but the
‘whole’ – communities, networks, qualitative dimensions of relationships, with
direct access to and stewardship of knowledge, law, and resources. (ibid.: 164)
The state and its monopoly of power to enforce laws does not disappear, therefore,
but is ‘reclaimed’ and democratized through civic activities.
While Capra and Mattei place the term “community” at the center of their the-
ory, the concept is not to be read as referring only to local geographical units. Due
to this misunderstanding, Elinor Ostrom’s cases have often been criticized for re-
quiring too much homogeneity and for therefore being very limited in scale. In
contrast to a close-knit notion of community, the concept of community devel-
oped here should rather be understood as networks of people pursuing common
(or conflicting) interests on local, regional or global levels. Nevertheless, it must be
emphasized that all communities are situated in local contexts – and in natural
ones (ibid.: 164). The concept of a networked community thus rejects the nature-
culture divide and always understands itself as a form of collective action within
specific socially co-constructed landscapes and environments. This contextualiza-
tion, however, does not prevent people connecting with others on the other side of
the world. The main point is the negotiation of needs and desires, the pursuit of
similar yet conflicting goals and the exchange of information and resources, be that
local farmers developing an international seed bank or the international effort to
protect local water resources from privatization. For this reason, James Tully calls
this local-global networking “‘glocalization’ and the networkers ‘glocal citizens’ be-
cause they are grounded in and hyperextend the civic features of local citizenship”
(Tully 2014: 73). The “glocal” community is thus not simply to be understood as a
‘higher’ cosmopolitan order but as a network of people that are engaged in concrete
practices and conflicts that take place on the ground of and within specific social
systems – even if they are dispersed across geographical locations (Tully 2008b:
84). These networks would then be the arenas of negotiation and would provide
the “foundations for an international legal order based on independent, legally or-
ganized commons” (Capra/Mattei 2015: 144).22
That being said, Capra andMattei acknowledge that communities can either be
“giving, hospitable, and open to guests” or can be “selfish, closed and bigoted” (ibid.:
164).23 However, the recognition of the interdependence of living beings underlying
22 For a more detailed discussion of how such a legal framework for commons would look like,
seeWeston and Bollier’s Green Governance: Ecological Survival, Human Rights, and the Law of the
Commons (2013).
23 Jeremy Waldron, for example, argues similarly in his article “Community and Property – For
Those Who Have Neither” (2009): “Although ‘community’ can sound like a warm, inclusive
word, real-world communities (be they nations, municipalities, neighborhoods, or clusters
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this ecological legal paradigm should – at least theoretically – provide a basis for
a care ethic which cultivate inclusive values. For this reason, Capra and Mattei ar-
gue that such ecological communities are “never closed” (ibid.: 164). With reference
to the self-organizing principles of organisms, they also state that communities
“depend on energy and nutrients from their environment, and on occasional dis-
turbances for their evolution” (ibid.: 164). The question whether such communities
and commons are inherently open or closed is a complex and often ethically del-
icate issue. Immaterial goods such as genetic code and information can be open-
access, whether in a regulated or unregulated manner. The community of farmers
that share their seeds is not threatened if someone else participates in their ex-
change practices. On the contrary, the community can benefit from this external
influence. Such a community might, however, regulate this open-access commons
by excluding people and corporations who wish to privatize the genetic-code of
seeds, which would diminish the quality of their seed commons. With reference
to Elinor Ostrom I would also argue that complete openness is also problematic
in the case of limited, material goods such as land, if people aim to effectively
deal with free riding and the overuse of resources. Here, I would maintain that
material, common goods should remain closed to people pursuing maximization
strategies that lead to the depletion of these resources. This could, for example,
place the rights of indigenous people to use resources over those of corporations
(Weis 2015). Conversely and in line with Elinor Ostrom’s third design principle,24
I would, however, also argue that the inclusion of ‘others’ is based on the general
right of affected people to access vital resources and to codetermine the institu-
tions that govern those resources. In reference to access and participation rights,
this should theoretically also include, for example, refugees, immigrants or home-
less people who are in need of resources for their survival (Waldron 2009).25
While the principle of affectedness is one way to determine inclusion in a spe-
cific networked community, another – and possibly more straightforward –means
of condominiums) characteristically define themselves by reference to an array of excluded
‘others’ and erect fences and patrol borders to keep these others out.” (Waldron 2009: 189)
Although I would agree with Waldron that real-world communities are often exclusionary,
I would deny the claim that they always are or that the principle of exclusion is inherent in
communities as such. The arrangement of a community depends on a shared ethic, whether
inclusionary or exclusionary, and, in more formal cases, on a specific constitution that struc-
tures its openness and closedness.
24 Elinor Ostromdefines the third design principle in her bookGoverning the Commons in the fol-
lowing manner: “Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modi-
fying the operational rules.” (Ostrom 2008a: 90)
25 This is, for example, in contrast to ‘expats’, who are not in such a destitute situation. Obvi-
ously, ‘affectedness’, ‘vital resources’ and thus ‘inclusion’ are highly contested concepts and
can therefore not be determined in abstraction or in advance, but are defined in the practices
of civic collective action and negotiation.
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of community formation is the pursuit of common interests and realization of com-
mon goods. For Tully, this provides a people with both a common purpose for their
civic activities and an ethos of caring. In his words:
A civic activity also has another important aspect, the telos or good towards which
the activity is oriented and which the activity upholds and manifests. It gives the
activity its civic character or ethos. A civic telos is thus a ‘civic good’. Modern citi-
zenship is ‘egocentric’, oriented towards the protection of the liberty of individuals
to be free from interference and to be free to exercise their autonomy in the pri-
vate sphere (tier-one rights) or in the official public sphere (tier-two rights). In
contrast, diverse citizenship in both citizen and governance/citizen relationships
is ecocentric andhuman-centric (or relationship-centric in both cases). Civic activi-
ties are oriented towards caring for the public or ‘civic goods’ of the correlative ‘city’:
namely, the community and its members bound together by citizen/governance
and citizen relationships in interdependency relationships with nonhuman ani-
mals and the environment they bear as inhabitants of the natural habitat. (Tully
2014: 64; original emphasis)
While Tully speaks of civic common goods, Capra and Mattei explicitly speak of
commons. Nevertheless, by placing common purposes and commons at the center
of their theories of civic democracy and eco-law, the authors break with the tra-
dition of “deontological liberalism” (Sandel 1986) as propagated by Immanuel Kant
and John Rawls (1988). According to Michael Sandel, deontological liberalism as-
sumes a plurality of conflicting individual conceptions of the good and therefore
places the right (the law) over the good (a specific notion of the good life).26 While
Kant argues that the right should be attained through the use of one’s transcen-
dental reasoning and finally through contract, Rawls maintains that the right can
be defined by means of a thought experiment envisaging a veil of ignorance and by
means of an overlapping consensus. In the civic tradition and eco-legal paradigm,
by contrast, the civic good is understood as an inherent part of all institutions,
communities – and a constitutive part of the ontological fabric of a common real-
ity. Norms and justice are brought about not merely through reason and contract,
but, first and foremost, through pre-contractual social practices.
According to Tully, these common goods are “multiplex” and “subject to ongoing
democratic negotiation” (Tully 2014: 64). For him, they include diverse democratic
26 As Sandel explains, “society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own
aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by princi-
ples that do not themselves presuppose any particular conception of the good; what justifies
these regulative principles above all is not that theymaximize the social welfare or otherwise
promote the good, but rather that they conform to the concept of right, a moral category
given prior to the good and independent of it” (Sandel 1986: 1).
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goods such as “civicizing” relationships, character development and conviviality
and more substantive goods such as “caring for the environment, economic self-
reliance, mutual aid, fair trade, equality among citizens and so on” (ibid.). While
Tully’s list of these goods remains somewhat general and vague, Capra and Mattei
step back and claim that law itself must be understood as a commons that results
from collective action or “commoning” (Capra/Mattei 2015: 14, 160). They explain
that “law is always a process of ‘commoning,’ a long-term collective action in which
communities, sharing a common purpose and culture, institutionalize their col-
lective will to maintain order and stability in the pursuit of social reproduction”
(ibid.: 14; original emphasis). Here, the civizicing activities that Tully describes can
be equated with what Capra andMattei refer to as commoning. According to Capra
and Mattei, the “fundamental organizational principle of commoning everywhere
is that of caring, duty, reciprocity, and participation” (ibid.: 156). Commoning thus
implies the process of collectively using and bringing about common goods in a
manner that ensures the future reproduction of the good. This is ensured when
people who are affected by the resource are included in both the definition and
adaptation of its institutional framework and the fair use and enjoyment of its
benefits.
So, what precisely are commons, if we base our thinking on the notion of civic
collective action? It should be clear that this dynamic and process-oriented inter-
pretation of commons goes beyond the definition presented by the Ostroms and
other political economists. Recall that according the classical, politico-economic
definition commons are limited to common-pool resources, meaning goods that
are rival and where the exclusion of others is difficult (i.e. costly). As we have al-
ready argued, these resources could, however, be organized as national, private or
common property – each with their corresponding institutional arrangements. An
important insight we derived from that discussion was that whether something
should be held in common cannot be derived from the objective descriptive char-
acteristics of that something. The question whether something should be held in
common or not is not merely a question of an entity’s phenomenological char-
acteristics but largely depends on whether people want to hold a specific good in
common –and the relevant social institutions that realize this.Whether something
is considered to be a commons, thus, depends on the desires, values and norms of
a community. In this sense, commons can be understood as a triadic relationship
between resources, communities and norms/rules (Helfrich et al. 2010: 10). Never-
theless, this shift from the objective description of a good to social relationships
and institutions remains somewhat dualistic and neglects the dynamic process of
co-creation of reality through commoning. The existence of a common is thus not
merely a descriptive or normative question, but, more importantly, a question of
social practice. Capra and Mattei therefore emphasize that common resources and
goods can therefore not be separated from the activity of making them common
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(Capra/Mattei 2015: 153). Or, as historian Peter Linebaugh explains in this often-
quoted passage:
To speak of the commons as if it were a [pre-existing] natural resource is mislead-
ing at best and dangerous at worst – the commons is an activity and, if anything,
it expresses relationships in society that are inseparable from relations to nature.
It might be better to keep the word as a verb, an activity, rather than as a noun, a
substantive. (Linebaugh 2008: 255)
We must thus conclude that our previous question is somewhat misleading. We
cannot simply say what commons are.That would assume that commons are objec-
tive things that exist independently from people. Such an understanding of com-
mons would substantivize the concept and neglect both the normative and per-
formative characters of commoning as a “vital determinant” of commons (Euler
2018). In this sense, commons scholar and activist Silke Helfrich states that “com-
mon goods don’t simply exist – they are created” (Helfrich 2012a). Hence, commons
cannot be limited to what is traditionally known as common pool resources, but
must be understood as a civic activity of self-organizing or ‘commoning’ that both
brings common goods about and democratizes their institutional frameworks.Giv-
ing attention to practices of commoning enables us to recognize our shared reality
as a commons. It also enables people to care for their own well-being and the well-
being of others according to the ecological principles of freedom.
6. Towards a commons theory of property
After having laid the foundations for an ecological understanding of freedom and
some preliminary remarks on a more profound notion of commons, I believe it is
necessary to turn to a central question that I have not yet discussed in this book: the
question of what a commons theory of property could look like. Generally put, this
is of central importance because it would enable us to develop an understanding
of property rights that is not based on exclusion, dominion and scarcity, but rather
on access, democratic guardianship and relative, convivial abundance.
In order to develop such a theory, I proceed as follows. Firstly, I critically ex-
amine the normative language of goods with reference to the categorization of
goods in the work of the Ostroms. In a second step, I present a general argument
for common property arrangements, based on the acknowledgement of common
needs and the interdependent yet conflictual satisfaction of these needs in shared
resources. After these two introductory sections, I turn to John Locke’s famous labor
theory of individual private property and critically reinterpret it from a commons
perspective. Here, I argue that we must shift our justification of property in three
respects: firstly, we must replace property arrangements based on (self-)ownership
with those structured according to guardianship. Secondly, I argue that the nega-
tive rights of non-interference must be replaced by the notion of non-domination.
Lastly, I demonstrate that a commons theory of property must be based not on
the special rights granted to individual laborers but more importantly on general
rights that arise from the needs of interdependent beings.With this groundwork in
place, I then turn to John Rawls’ influential theory of a property-owning democracy.
Here, I will argue that Rawls’ notion of predistribution provides us with a good un-
derstanding of positive access rights to resources, but that we must shift the focus
from productive capital to the care we need to bestow on material resources held
in common. In a final step, I shift my focus from so-called productive resources
to consumption goods and maintain that certain consumptive goods should also
be organized in the form of common property. Here, I will show that shared con-
sumptive goods both decrease detrimental ecological impacts and simultaneously
make it possible to provide more people access to goods than are able to have un-
der non-commons arrangements.With this critical reworking of Locke’s and Rawl’s
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theories, I hope to sketch a commons theory of property that increases individual
freedom, relative abundance and democratic, convivial ways of life.
6.1 The normative language of goods
In order to explore and develop a commons theory of property, I would like to take
the previous argument on commoning a step further by focusing on the civic activ-
ity of self-organization from a linguistic perspective. As we have already discussed
in relation to our understanding of nature, the way we describe and categorize
things constitutes or co-creates reality. In this sense, language is never neutral
and should therefore also be understood as a political act. This implies that the
praxeological turn that consists in understanding commons as commoning must
also be understood as a linguistic turn, whereby speaking constitutes merely one
form of social praxis (Austin 2009; Searle 2005). With reference to our discussion
of commons, this implies that the way we describe goods also frames their consti-
tution and normative desirability in the symbolic order of things.The etymological
roots and equivocal meaning of the word ‘good’ are an obvious demonstration of
the normative structure of words and language: here, goods (i.e. certain things) are
generally perceived as something good (i.e. valuable and desirable) (Milgate 2008).
The question that arises is, however, whether commons are also perceived in this
light – and how this might be changed. In my analysis of the Ostroms’ work, I
noted that common-pool resources are defined according to their rival quality and
their relatively high costs of exclusion. Yet my discussion of nature and ecological
freedom led us to the conclusion that commons are never simply given, but are
always created through civic activities of self-organization or commoning. In line
with this questioning of the assumed facticity of commons, I would now also like
to critically examine the normative categorization of goods according to the terms
‘exclusion’ and ‘rivalry’.
Generally put, it can be said that the mainstream political and economic dis-
course on goods and property revolves around the categories of exclusion, rivalry
and, to a certain extent, subtractivity (Buchanan 1965; Corners/Sanders 1999; E.
Ostrom 2002). As already mentioned, Elinor and Vincent Ostrom did use the term
“exclusion”, yet replaced the word “rivalry” with “joint use” and “non-rivalry” with
“alternative use” (Ostrom/Ostom 1999). rom 1977, 1999).The reason for this lies most
likely in the normative way that the classical terminology is framed; what the words
do with us and the world. If we consider the mainstream terminology, it must be
recognized that all three terms have a certain negative connotation that assume
and emphasize the conflictual aspects of goods, implying that one person’s enjoy-
ment of a good is often interrupted or threatened by other people. This negative
connotation, in turn, provides a more general normative and political framework
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for thinking about and dealing with goods: where exclusion ‘unfortunately’ is not
possible, people must either arduously organize these goods in complex common
property arrangements, or – even worse – let the centralized state manage them.
Thus, implicit in this categorization is the assumption that wewould actually prefer
to possess these goods privately and enjoy them without being bothered by other
people. Or put somewhat more radically, the underlying principle of this catego-
rization is – in the words of Sartre – that “hell is other people” (Sartre 1989: 45).
This is not to say that everyone with private property hates his or her neigh-
bors, but rather that a deep fear of other people is an axiomatic basis of individual
private property and our understanding of goods in general. As we see, by fram-
ing goods in this manner, people are assumed to be related to one another in in-
herently antagonistic ways. Yet in this case, the fact that humans are each other’s
enemies lies not merely in people’s ‘nature’ but is also reproduced in the way we
perceive and organize goods. By framing goods in this manner, the antagonistic
relation between people is naturalized – and the supposedly best answer to this
problem is, apparently, the exclusion of others through negative rights and indi-
vidual private property. By shutting the other out (and oneself in), the individual
is supposedly freed from unwanted interferences, burdensome responsibilities and
conflict. Only from this ‘original position’ of negative freedom based on a supposed
material independence can positive social freedom then be attained by entering
into voluntary relationships according to the needs and desires that spring en-
tirely from the independent self. As we can see, this deeply rooted understanding
of independent antagonistic individuals and highly contested goods goes against
the understanding of ecological freedom that I have outlined, which is based on
the mutual interdependence of self-organizing living beings that inherently share
a common reality.Thus, in order to create a system of democratic eco-law based on
commons, we must also reformulate our categorization of goods, which, in turn,
should transform our normative framework of social arrangements.
For this reason, I would argue that we must shift our focus when discussing
goods from exclusion to inclusion, from subtraction to sustainability or addition
and, finally, from rivalry to (negotiated) cooperation. If we revise the categoriza-
tion of goods in this manner, the normative question that implicitly underlies the
social organization of goods is then no longer how to limit the consumption of
goods through exclusion. Instead, the normative question regarding a good would
be: which goods produce better joint outcomes when shared, and which can be sus-
tainably reproduced or, if possible, increased in number through (negotiated) co-
operation? It can be assumed that such a recategorization would flip the supposed
tragedy of the commons on its head by defining not the (unregulated) commons
but privatization as the main problem we face. In turn, this might provide us with
a normative linguistic framework that would value inclusive, sustainable and addi-
tive social arrangements over those based on unlimited individual appropriation.
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We need to ask ourselves, however, if this replacement of categories is merely
a sleight of hand that ignores the ‘intrinsic’ characteristics of goods. In order to
answer this question, let me provide some examples that illustrate what I am trying
to get at. As I have already discussed, the question of exclusion is not necessarily
dependent on the ontological characteristics of a good, but rather on the economic,
technological and institutional context that makes exclusion possible or not. Thus,
the ability to exclude people from a good is not inscribed in the good itself, but
is determined by social conditions and norms. With subtraction and rivalry, the
issue appears a little less straightforward. The standard argument assumes that a
good is rival or non-rival depending on whether its future use is decreased, i.e.
subtracted, when utilized or consumed. The classical examples here are food and
information. If I eat an apple, the other person cannot eat the same apple because
it is gone. If I use a piece of information (e.g. a recipe, a book from a library or
an article from a newspaper or on the Internet), the quality of the good is not
diminished and thus can be used by another person. In more abstract terms, while
food is normally understood as subtractive and thus rival and scarce, information
is generally understood as non-subtractive and therefore non-rival. Due to this
categorization, food is then classified as a private good and information as a public
good, or it is assumed, at least, that these goods should be classified in this manner
(e.g. Stiglitz 1999).
As was the case with excludability in relation to common-pool resources,we can
also think of other ways of perceiving and organizing the goods that have been clas-
sified as rival and non-rival. With respect to information, several examples quickly
come to mind where information is not always structured as an open-access public
good. For example, scientific information arising from research that was, at least
in many cases, funded out of the public purse is often stored in expensive, privately
owned academic journals. We will discuss this problem in relation to the educa-
tion commons in the next chapter. Printed newspaper articles can also often only
be accessed if the newspaper is paid for and therefore privately appropriated. By
socially organizing this information as private goods, it is made scarce and rival,
despite its supposedly inherently non-rival character.
However, the case with apples is a little more complicated. Obviously, it is true
that my consumption of an apple would prevent another person from consuming
it. In this sense it could be argued that apples are subtractive and rival goods. But
to then assume, as John Locke did (2008: II, §26), that the apple must be a private
good is not necessarily given.Wewill return to Locke later, but the focus on subtrac-
tion merely emphasizes one way of using a specific good. There are, for instance,
other ways of using an apple that enable or even increase its usefulness to others:
this is the case, for example, if I merely take a photo of it (neutral use) or share
it with someone else (inclusive, non-additive use) or use its seeds to plant other
apple trees (inclusive, sustainable/additive use) (Euler 2020).The last two examples
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show how a group of people can have their shared cake or, rather, apples and eat
them too. In other words, all three uses demonstrate how an apple can be used
in non-exclusive and non-subtractive ways that support relationships of inclusion
and conjoint flourishing. Furthermore, by focusing on the individual subtraction
of an apple through consumption, two central questions are ignored: (a) whether
other people have access to other apples and (b) how the apples came into existence
in the first place. If, for example, there are piles of fresh and juicy apples for a group
of people to eat, the fact that I consume one or even a few apples does not make
apples per se scarce and rival. Alternatively, if apple trees were cultivated by a group
of people who then divided them up fairly1 between themselves year after year, the
quantity of apples might be limited, but not necessarily rival and scarce. In this
case, we might even consider a relative abundance of apples to exist because the
group is satisfied with the number of apples available to it and the consumption of
apples by one person does not threaten another’s access to apples, since everyone
acknowledges a limitation on individual appropriation. Philosopher Jeff Noonan
discusses this notion of relative abundance in relation to the conflict of use and
appropriation rights between Native and white fishers in New Brunswick, Canada:
Conflict [over the lobster fishery] is only likely to be resolved if both sides to
the dispute interpret ‘abundance’ in such a way that they can agree that there is
enough of the resource to share without any group feeling deprived. This conclu-
sion cannot be reached if either side looks at the logic of resource appropriation
as governed by the value of profit maximization, since by definition the growth of
profit has no ‘natural’ limit and anyone driven by that value will see any restriction
upon that logic as a personal or group deprivation. (Noonan 2004: 191-2)
Here, we are reminded of Elinor Ostrom’s work on the democratic management
of commons, where Ostrom says that the limitation of appropriation can enable
the sustainable use and reproduction of resources over long periods of time. Yet as
Noonan makes clear, such a regime also requires, in turn, a normative shift from
unlimited wants and the desire for endless profits to a mindset based on basic
needs satisfaction and sufficiency. With Erich Fromm, we might be able to think
of this as a shift from having to being (Fromm 1997). Considered in this manner,
relative abundance and non-rivalry would theoretically be possible for subtractive
goods under the condition of a materially limited reality (Sahlins 1972: 1-39; G. A.
Cohen 1995: 128). In this sense, we can agree with Hardin that scarcity and rivalry
are not given, but arise through an unregulated, unlimited and, ultimately, unfair
increase of use or appropriation of a certain good. Consequently, scarcity is not an
1 The fair distribution of these goods needs not imply that they are distributed equally; they
could fairly be distributed, for example, according to effort, need or whatever other values
people define as important.
148 Democracy, Markets and the Commons
intrinsic condition of nature and rivalry is not an inherent characteristic of subtrac-
tive goods, but rather depends on the way we perceive and thereby institutionally
organize their use.
In coming to appreciate this important insight, we can avoid confusion if we
differentiate between goods, their production and their institutional arrange-
ments. In the case of the apple, we have the apple, the apple tree and many other
factors that are necessary for the growth of the apple, such as a plot of land,
air and water, to name just a few. With Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, we
can therefore differentiate between the flow of resources (e.g. apples) and the
resource unit (e.g. the apple tree, the orchard and the ecosystem) (Ostrom/Hess
2007: 10). Along those same lines, we can also differentiate between goods used
for production (e.g. the apple tree, a fishery, machines, capital) and goods used for
consumption (the apple, fish, pasta, clothes or wages) (Held 1995: 263). In general,
we could therefore say that while the consumption of a good (e.g. chewing and
digesting an apple) is often individual (i.e. private), neither the (re)production,
the appropriation nor the allocation of that good must necessarily be organized
privately. The following question then arises: which type of social organization
of which goods is more conducive to the values of inclusion, sustainability and
addition? Since it can be assumed that a fair distribution of goods will create a sus-
tainable, relative abundance of limited goods, it is of the utmost importance that
the individuals dependent on specific resources have the opportunity to negotiate
and codetermine the social arrangements for dealing with them (Knight/Johnson
2007). In line with the insights gained from the Ostroms’ work, we may thus con-
clude that democratic negotiated cooperation and self-organization are the key
counterparts to scarcity, rivalry and, ultimately, tragedy. And because the ability to
codetermine the institutional framework would imply rights to access, inclusion
and democratic participation, it can be argued that a property regime based on
commons, understood as a variety of forms of common property arrangements,
may well fulfill this purpose best.
6.2 Common needs, common resources and common property
Similarly, Capra and Mattei argue in favor of a shift in our legal framework from
extractive to more sustainable and “generative” property rights based on commons
and commoning (Capra/Mattei 2015: 145-6; Kelly 2012). In a nutshell, they contend
that for most of human history resources were held in common, while only dur-
ing the recent history of humankind has a legal system based on universal, indi-
vidual private property rights emerged that enables the unlimited accumulation
of wealth. Although this legal transformation has provided a part of the world’s
population with increased living standards and technological advances, it has also
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brought with it numerous grave ecological, social and political problems. For this
reason, Capra and Mattei write that “harmonizing human laws with the princi-
ples of ecology requires, at a minimum, the development of a healthy and legally
protected commons sector and associated institutions” (Capra/Mattei 2015: 152).
In order to do this, they argue that it is necessary to transform existing forms of
property structured around the individual into forms structured around interde-
pendent situations and the shared reality of the community. In their words:
A radical revision of property and of its relationship with state sovereignty is thus
necessary if we wish to transform capital back into commons and build an ecolog-
ical order. Such an alternative begins with the understanding that a community
lives and unfolds in a common space where the actions of one member affect the
well-being of all others. Such a space is the venue of life and death for a commu-
nity and it must serve the interest of every one of its members, regenerating life
in it. (ibid.: 139)
This shared, common reality thus provides the backdrop for the understanding that
humans – and most, if not all, living beings – possess common needs and desires,
such as the desire to be loved and respected, the need to eat, the desire to live well
and the desire to develop one’s capabilities and to codetermine (i.e. self-organize)
one’s reality. Obviously, this is not an exhaustive list of human needs, but it does
assume that certain needs and desires are common to all sentient beings. This is
not to say, however, that the specific form of need satisfaction is the same for all
beings; these vary according to species, culture and technological development.
Nevertheless, instead of assuming conflicting interests and goals as the axiomatic
foundation of social arrangements, the ecological commons approach to property
emphasizes interdependencies and the similarity of fundamental needs and de-
sires. From this perspective, it is the similar needs that come first and ultimately
lead to conflicts of interest. Jeff Noonan aptly expresses this idea:
Beneath differences in the content of cultures, there is, I will argue, a shared – in-
deed universal – human need for a ‘social habitat,’ that is, a resource base through
the use of which goods are produced that in turn sustain the practical and sym-
bolic particularities of the culture. […] The uniqueness of a culture is a content that
is produced by universal forms of human activity. The evidence for the position is
provided precisely by the struggles between different [individuals and] cultures for
the same resources. If [individuals and] cultureswere radically distinct anddiscrete
wholes they would never come into conflict because there would be no common
needs between them, and there would therefore be nothing to struggle about.
(Noonan 2004: 186; original emphasis)
As we can see, beneath the conflicts between people lie not completely diverging
interests, but rather common needs that are, in turn, codependent on the use of
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these resources. However, because all living beings exist in webs of interdepen-
dent relationships, the satisfaction of one person’s needs is significantly affected
by the manner in which other people satisfy their needs. Due to these existential
interdependencies, it is crucial to hold those resources for the satisfaction of such
common needs in common.
Conversely, behind this reasoning lies the assumption that, if individuals can
privately appropriate these limited vital resources, then the ability of others to sat-
isfy their basic needs will also be limited. To put it briefly, the abilities of the have-
nots to survive, self-organize and flourish will be undermined. Here, it is worth
pointing out that the word ‘private’ etymologically comes from the Latin word pri-
vare, to deprive, bereave or rob (Onions 1966: 711; Glare 2012: 1607-8). This root
meaning of the word private thus supports the interpretation that private indi-
vidual property is something that is taken from the shared reality-as-commons.
The individual appropriation of vital resources thus implies that possible uses of
these resources by other people are blocked – and, simultaneously, the relationship
of responsibility and obligation between the one who appropriates and other be-
ings is dissolved.2 Private property turns the relationship of duties on its head: the
responsibility no longer lies with the owner towards the community, but rather in
the duty of those excluded from the resource to respect the rights of the owner. In
the words of Jeremy Waldron:
Material resources are crucial to our survival and elementary aspects of our well-
being. In the circumstances of moderate scarcity that we must assume, it is per-
2 Although somemight argue that private property is entails duties owed by proprietors to the
rest of society (e.g. I cannot drive my car on the sidewalk or faster than 120 km/h on the high-
way), I agree with JeremyWaldron that we must understand these restrictions not as duties
but rather as “general background constraints”. He writes: “The rule that knives are not to be
usedmurderously nor cars driven at a certain speed are not to be seen as property rules. They
are part of the general background constraints on action which place limits on what anyone
can do with any object whether it is his property – or something he has some sort of entitle-
ment to use – or not. Once we have settled what the background rules of action are, we can
then turn to the property rules. If a particular action, say, riding bicycles, is permitted by law,
it does not follow that the law permits me to ride any bicycle I please. The specific function
of property rules is to determine, once we have established that bicycles may be ridden, who
is entitled to ride which bicycle and when.” (Waldron 1988: 32-33) Aside from these back-
ground constraints, the institution of private property requires that individuals fulfill one
central duty regarding others: to respect their private property and, in turn, to fulfil contrac-
tual obligations. This reciprocity might be understood as a form of mutual obligation and,
thus, care. Yet due to the central principle of exclusion from and non-interference in private
property, the duty to respect private property ultimately and, at least in principle, liberates
the individual from further obligations in relation to the need, satisfaction and wellbeing of
other beings. I believe this to be one of Robert Nozick’s central arguments in Anarchy, State,
and Utopia (1999).
6. Towards a commons theory of property 151
fectly possible that the uses that are blocked by the duties correlative to property
rights are uses that relate tohumanneed, not just covetous desire. (Waldron 2009:
165)
Despite the existence of common needs in a shared reality, private property in ma-
terial resources enables people to exclude others from its use, ultimately placing
the burden of duty on the community to respect the ownership rights of the in-
dividual – and not on the individual to care for the wellbeing of the community.
With this inversion, the notion of care and responsibility, as I elaborated earlier,
is individualized, implying that each individual is responsible for the satisfaction
of his or her own needs. Although we cannot deny the importance of individual
responsibility for one’s own wellbeing, this entirely individualized notion of care
based on private property brings about an atomistic and competitive arrangement
that reminds us of Hardin’s tragedy of the unmanaged commons. Tragedy results
because no one feels responsible for the sustainable satisfaction of the needs of the
community as a whole and, as an individual, no one is institutionally capable of
caring for shared, common resources.
A widespread argument against this rather critical interpretation of individual
private property is that ownership is not a unified concept, but rather consists of a
“bundle of rights” (Grey 1980; Glackin 2014). This bundles-theory interpretation of
propertymust be understood as a critique of the standard interpretation ofWilliam
Blackstone’s (1723-1780) famous definition according to which private property is
“that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the ex-
ternal things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in
the universe” (Blackstone 2016: 1).3 Contrary to this Blackstonian notion of private
property as “individualistic, exclusive and absolute dominion” (Schorr 2009: 104),
the bundles of rights theories, as, for example, presented by Wesley N. Hohfeld
(1913) and A.M. Honoré (2015), define ownership rights as a diverse collection of
independent rights (Penner 1996; Glackin 2014: 3). Importantly, and as Shane N.
Glackin states, “the bundle theory regards these individual and separable rights, or
‘sticks,’ as having no substantive, essential connection to each other” (2014: 4). In
this sense, the notion of private property is not constituted by any intrinsic char-
acteristics of the relationship between individuals and things, but rather through
contingent ways of bringing rights together into combinations that are ultimately
assigned to people.This basically implies that prevalent notions of private property
are not based on transcendental or natural laws, but that they are historical prod-
ucts of existing societies. At this point it must be admitted that a deconstruction
of individual private property into its diverse components is remarkably helpful in
3 As recent work has shown, however, even Blackstone himself did not support this rather
monolithic notion of individual private property (Schorr 2009).
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“demystify[ing]” (ibid.: 3) widespread notions of property and understanding the
complex relationships of access, management, use, exclusion and alienation of re-
sources. Elinor Ostrom and Edella Schlager, for example, use the bundle-of-rights
theory in order to analyze various arrangements for dealing with “common-prop-
erty resources” (Schlager/Ostrom 1992). This strategy can open the field to a less
ideologically charged debate over the pros and cons of different property arrange-
ments, whether individual, common or public.
Nevertheless, with Henry E. Smith I would argue that the bundle theory is
problematic because it can cover up normative questions of property arrangements
by focusing on the how instead of on the why (Smith 2011: 281). That is, on how in-
dividual property is structured, rather than on why certain resources are allowed
to be owned privately. Furthermore, the analytic ‘realism’ of the bundle-of-rights
theories conceals the fact that individual private property does have a dominant,
central meaning in modernWestern societies that is employed either as a cognitive
shortcut in order to simplify complex legal relationships or, and more importantly,
as a normative justification of existing social arrangements. As I have alreadymen-
tioned, following the arguments of Henry Smith, JeremyWaldron and Richard Ep-
stein, a central function of individual private property is defined as exclusion or
non-interference.4 Although Jeremy Waldron also defines exclusion as the “key to
private property” (Waldron 2009: 164), he elaborates “in Hohfeldian terms” on a few
other important aspects of private ownership:
To justify private property is to justify conferring, recognizing, and enforcing cer-
tain individual rights over material resources. An individual X’s rights of owner-
ship in relation to some land, Lx, usually are comprised of such elements as (R1)
the right to use Lx, (R2) the right to exclude others from the use of Lx, and (R3) the
power to transfer some or all of these rights to others by way of gift, sale, lease or
bequest. (ibid.)
Here, we see two additional key aspects of individual private property that result
from exclusion: the right to use and to alienate (i.e. trade) resources. Implicit in
this definition is also the right to accumulate, underuse or destroy resources. The
exclusion of the other provides the owner with the freedom to do what they please
4 Henry Smith writes, for example: “The architecture of property emerges from solving the
problem of serving use-interests in a roughly cost-effective way. […] At the core of this ar-
chitecture is exclusion because it is a default, a convenient starting point.” (Smith 2011: 282)
In Richard Epstein’s book Design for Liberty, he writes: “The choice of a sound property ‘base-
line’ in the original position is not random. […] The central proposition is this: the only set of
substantive rules that achieves that goal is one that requires all persons to forbear from in-
terfering with the property rights of any other person, where ‘interfering’ is narrowly defined
to involve taking, using, handling, or breaking the property of another.” (Epstein 2011a: 74)
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with a good within certain “general background constraints” (Waldron 1988: 32).5
Along these lines, in his book The Right to Private Property (1988), Jeremy Waldron
further defines ownership as
the abstract idea of an object being correlated with the name of some individual,
in relation to a rule which says that society will uphold that individual's decision
as final when there is any dispute about how the object should be used. The owner
of an object is the person who has been put in that privileged position. (ibid.: 47)
As we see, individual private property implies the right to exclude others from the
determination of how resources will be used and allocated. Here, the individual
owner has the right to determine the access and use of material resources for the
satisfaction of their shared individual needs. Thus, a central aspect of individual
private property over goods is to place the owner’s decision-making power and the
satisfaction of their needs over that of other members of the community.
As I have already mentioned with reference to the tragedy of privatization, the
emphasis on exclusion and non-interference in individual private property rights
makes it difficult to alter property arrangements in order to align them with the
shared yet conflicting needs of other human and non-human beings. Thus, I agree
with Capra and Mattei that only by holding these vital resources in common is it
possible to negotiate the terms of their use and, hopefully, to satisfy the needs of
everybody. Put in these terms, the central justification of commons must be un-
derstood as an ecological (re)interpretation of the basic right to life and liberty or,
in my terminology, to an interdependent, sustainable, self-organized and flourish-
ing existence (Alexander/Penalver 2009). According to Capra and Mattei, it is this
ecological reasoning that has brought commons into existence throughout human
history:
Ancient institutions of the commons that provide communities with water, wood,
agricultural products, education, and housing construction are still alive in eco-
logical niches in Europe and are still very important in much of Africa, South Asia,
and Latin America. […] Even today, when a common need emerges, people tend to
organize in common to run recuperated spaces, factories, theaters, gardens, farm-
ers markets, or institutions such as Time Banks. […] These emerging alternatives,
based on the recognition of common needs, material or spiritual, make us under-
stand that the resources necessary to satisfy a need must themselves be understood as
a common and governed according to the principles of solidarity necessary for all to sat-
isfy their needs and for the community to prosper. (Capra/Mattei 2015: 142-4; emphasis
added).
5 For an elaboration on the notion of these “general background constraints”, see footnote 2
above.
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Simply put, if we recognize that humans share both a common reality and common
needs, we should also recognize that the resources that enable everyone to satisfy
these needs should also be held in common. In the words of Capra and Mattei,
a legal order that is based on generative ownership “serves the needs of life by
having the tendencies to be socially just and ecologically sustainable built into the
very fabric of its organizational structures” (Capra/Mattei 2015: 146).
The ideal type of commons can thus generally be defined as goods created,
reproduced and held in common by a group of people, a network or a community
that is affected by and dependent on a specific material or immaterial resource. As
we see, this definition closely resembles the notion of common property as defined
by Jeremy Waldron:
In a system of common property, rules governing access to and control of material
resources are organized on the basis that each resource is in principle available for
the use of every member alike. In principle, the needs and wants of every person
are considered, and when allocation decisions are made they are made on a basis
that is in some sense fair to all. (Waldron 1988: 41)
In contrast to individual private property, which defines exclusion as its structur-
ing principle, common property arrangements emphasize access and inclusion.
Although commons often have – or even require – boundaries, they can neverthe-
less be considered inclusive because they enable those in need and those affected to
define and adapt their institutional framework. In this sense, commons are based
on networked democratic governance systems that ensure the inclusion and par-
ticipation of the affected people. Simultaneously, commons demand that the users
of a resource are responsible for its sustainable reproduction. Commons are thus
structured according to the individual satisfaction of common yet conflicting needs
and desires through the sustainable and interdependent co(re)production of these
goods. It is again important to underline here that commons must not necessar-
ily assume an extremely high level of harmony or unity, but instead provide people
with the ability to collectively solve conflicts and shared practical problems through
democratically negotiated cooperation. This aspect of common property arrange-
ments emphasizes the ‘freedom-against’ characteristic of ecological freedom. In
this sense, common property arrangements support and enable democratic prob-
lem solving in all spheres of life. Last but not least, the (re)production and mainte-
nance of commons is not merely a means to an end (freedom through, i.e. individ-
ual needs satisfaction), but must itself be understood as an end in itself (freedom
with).This is best understood through the concept of conviviality, in which people’s
satisfaction of needs occurs not in isolation, but in acting with others.
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6.3 Reinterpreting John Locke’s theory of property
from a commons perspective
In order to fully understand this central argument for holding resources needed
for the satisfaction of individual needs in common, it might be helpful if we com-
pare the argument to John Locke’s (1632-1704) justification of the private appro-
priation of resources in his Second Treatise of Government (1689). The reason why I
choose to reinterpret Locke’s labor theory of property is that its importance for our
contemporary understanding of individual private property and our existing so-
cial arrangements cannot be underestimated. It lies at the heart of the concept of a
self-regulating market, Robert Nozick’s libertarianism and, also, Garrett Hardin’s
tragedy of the commons. I will thus present a short sketch of Locke’s argument
and then revise his theory according to the conception of ecological freedom and
the commons I have already outlined. This will revolve around three conceptual
and normative shifts: from (self-)ownership to guardianship, form non-interfer-
ence to non-domination and, finally, from access through individual labor to the
interdependent satisfaction of needs.
Locke’s justification of individual private property
Framed in the Christian theology of his time, Locke believed that “God has given
us all things richly” (Locke 2008: II, §31; emphasis omitted). More precisely, God
“has given the Earth to the Children of Men, given to Mankind in common” (ibid.:
II, §25; emphasis omitted). According to these notions, the abundant resources of
nature originally belonged to everyone and thus to no one. This is what Simmons
and Waldron call a “negative community” (Simmons 1992: 238; Waldron 1988: 153).
Locke understands this type of social arrangement as a commons (Locke 2008: II,
§28), which reminds us of Garrett Hardin’s notion of an unregulated open-access
commons. Furthermore, in this fictional state of nature, all humans are “equal and
independent” (ibid.: II, §6) and each has the right to or, rather, the freedom to
preserve themselves (ibid.: II, §17, 19). Yet, in order to survive, human beings are
required to labor, be this through hunting and gathering or, as God supposedly pre-
ferred, through “subduing or cultivating the Earth, and having Dominion” (ibid.:
II, §35). According to Locke, this, however, puts humans in a problematic situation:
how can they appropriate and consume goods that belong to everyone? (ibid.: II,
§25-6) In order to solve this problem, Locke argues that one’s self, including one’s
body and the labor of one’s body, must originally be understood as one’s individ-
ual private property (ibid.: II, §27). From this premise of self-ownership, he argues
that individuals then have the right to transform the resources originally held in
common into private property through the “mixing” of their labor with the com-
mon resources (ibid.), be it through picking an apple, killing a deer or cultivating
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wheat. In Locke’s words: “So that God, by commanding to [labor and] subdue, gave
Authority so far to appropriate. And the Condition of Human Life, which requires
Labour and Materials to work on, necessarily introduces private Possessions” (ibid.:
II, §35; original emphasis). According to Locke, only the private appropriation of
goods through labor can secure the survival and liberty of human beings (ibid.: II,
§26). Although Locke understands property as a means to life and liberty, he then
collapses the three values under the term of property (ibid.: II, §123), ultimately
defining the protection of property as the “chief end” of society and government
(ibid.: II, §124).
It must be noted, however, that in his labor theory of property Locke does not
clearly differentiate between the right to the fruits of one’s labor (e.g. the apple, the
deer or the wheat) and the resources that brought this fruit forth (e.g. the apple
tree, the land on which the wheat is grown and, possibly, the territory where the
deer live). In Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess’s terminology, this implies the right
not only over the resource unit, but also over the resource system itself. This is
important, because it ultimately legitimates the exclusion of others not only from
the fruit of one’s labor, but also from the means of subsistence (e.g. water, land
etc.) and themeans of production (e.g.machines, factories, capital).This ambiguity
implies that the labor theory of property can easily support the right not only to the
outcome of the labor process, but also to the resource systems involved in the labor
process itself. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that Locke originally limits
the right to appropriate these common resources by two provisos: (a) the resources
should not be left to spoil (ibid.: II, §31) and (b) there must remain “enough and as
good” for others (ibid.: II, §33). While the “spoilage limitation” (Macpherson 2011:
204-11) aims at limiting the under-use of goods and ensuring respect for God’s
gifts to humankind, the “sufficiency limitation” (ibid.: 211-14) is apparently meant
to ensure that all human beings retain access to sufficient natural resources in
order to be able to secure their existence.
Nevertheless, Locke goes on to describe how these original limitations on one’s
appropriation rights were annulled with the “invention” of money (Locke 2008: II,
§36). Because it is possible to hoard money without it spoiling, Locke contends that
the first proviso is no longer applicable and people may accumulate money without
limit (ibid.: II, §50).The fact thatmoney can buy large amounts of natural resources
is, according to Locke, no longer a problem because the owner will not leave the
land to spoil, but will use this land productively in order to increase profits (ibid.:
II, §48, 50). As Adam Smith argued almost 100 years later, the use of resources for
profit is, thus, not interpreted as extraction and depletion, but rather as an increase
in the wealth of mankind and the conveniences of life (ibid.: II, §37). In contrast
to Hardin’s tragedy of the open access commons, according to Locke, the private
appropriation of common resources supposedly greatly increases the value of the
resources involved (ibid.: II, §40, 43, 45).
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Interestingly, the second sufficiency limitation also becomes invalid with the
introduction ofmoney.Here, Locke provides two reasons for the annihilation of the
right to access resources in order to secure one’s existence. Firstly, the introduction
of money is based on a “tacit and voluntary consent” (ibid.: II, §50), which then
legitimates the inequality that results through the private accumulation of wealth.
And secondly, although Locke admits that the accumulation of wealth in the hands
of a few creates scarcity for those without property (ibid.: II, §45), he nevertheless
believes this to occur “without injury to any one” (ibid.: II, §50). On the one hand,
this is due to the increases in productivity that result from the unbound right to
accumulate. These increases in productivity supposedly create an abundance of
conveniences for the wider population and therefore compensate for the scarcity
that was brought about through privatization (ibid.: II, §41). On the other hand,
it is implicitly assumed that those individuals without direct access to the means
of subsistence in the form of natural resources still possess their own bodies and
can therefore sell their labor power in exchange for a wage (ibid.: II, §28). Now
it is no longer direct access to natural resources that secures one’s existence, but
rather access to money through wage labor, which in turn enables the laborer to
survive by buying food and a place to live on the market. As becomes apparent, the
original, equal right to self-preservation and liberty through access to resources
held in common has been transformed into the protection of the existing, unequal
distribution of property, on the one hand, and the necessity that the propertyless
enter into wage labor relationships in order to secure their life, on the other hand.
This is the basic argument of John Locke’s labor theory of private property.
Although this storymay initially appear rather straightforward and convincing,
there are numerous premises in Locke’s theory of property that are highly problem-
atic. To name just a few: the existence of the independent individual in a state of
nature; the open-access commons (res/terra nullius) as a state of nature; the con-
cept of self-ownership; the suspension of the provisos through the introduction of
money; and the necessity to declare something as one’s own private property in
order to use or consume it. I hope to deal with each of these issues by arguing that
a commons theory of property requires a shift from (self-)ownership to guardian-
ship, from non-interference to non-domination and, finally, from labor to needs.
From (self-)ownership to guardianship
As our discussion of nature has demonstrated, all living organisms, including hu-
mans, are autonomous or self-organizing yet always exist in webs of interdepen-
dent relationships. For this reason, it can be assumed that the more appropriate
original state of nature is not to be understood as one where individuals roamed
around alone, but where people – as they still do today – lived and worked together
in groups – in, with and against other humans and the non-human world. As most
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historical and ethnological research shows, resources were never conceived as res
nullius, but were always subject to various informal and formal rules concerning
rights and obligations. Often enough, so-called ‘primitive’ economies were based
on communalistic economies with central resources held in common (Weston/Bol-
lier 2013: 133-5; Diamond 2007: 131-3; Scott 2017).6 As was the case with Thomas
Hobbes, the concept of the independent individual and the common world as res
nullius is thus a historical and legal construct of Locke’s day projected back into the
past and onto nature.
This raises several questions. Would the concept of interdependent living
beings shed a different light on the notion of (self-)ownership? If ownership is
founded on ‘labor’ can I truly be considered to be my own property? Would I not,
in fact, be the property of the people who raised me and the environment that
provided me with sunlight, air and things to eat? As we can readily appreciate,
although human beings have a sense of self and the power to self-organize, this
does not mean that one’s existence has been brought forth merely through oneself
and through one’s own labor. With reference to Andreas Weber’s concept of the
gift economy of the open-source “natural commons”, I would therefore argue
that the self should also be understood as a gift – not necessarily from God, but
from the infinitely complex processes of co-creation that result from the mutually
interdependent relationships in the web of life. Or, phrased somewhat differently,
the individual should be conceived of as a product of nature and society – and, in
relation to each of these, as an active and semi-autonomous agent. Here, the focus
shifts from the supposedly independent ‘Man’ who forms the world, to the world
that brings each individual being about. The individual does not independently
determine, but takes part in this process of interdependent co-creation. Such an
understanding of the self-world relationship may sound somewhat peculiar in the
6 The anthropologist Stanley Diamond, for example, explains: “Primitive societies rest on a
communalistic economic base. This is not to say that everything in such societies is owned
in common, which is clearly not the case, but rather that those material means essential
to the survival of the individual or the group are either actively held in common or, what
is equivalent, constitute readily accessible economic goods. […] Exceptions to this commu-
nal condition dissolve under close scrutiny. For example, it is claimed that members of Hot-
tentot joint families ‘own’ particular cows in the family heard, but we find that they cannot
privately dispose of them. It is similarly assumed that individuals ‘own’ particular watering
places, but we discover that access is never denied to other people in need of it. On the other
hand, true private property does exist among primitives, in the form of tools made by the in-
dividual, breechclouts, back scratchers and similar ‘extensions of the personality.’ However,
private property of this type does not constitute primitive capitalism; this does not exist, at
least among primitives. The private property that can be identified is either not essential for
group survival, is readily duplicated by any individual in the society and therefore need not
be owned communally, or is of so personal a nature that it cannot be owned communally.”
(Diamond 2007: 131)
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ears of people brought up and trained in the Western mode of thinking based on
methodological individualism. Despite the danger of ethno-romanticism (Latour
2004: 42-49), I believe that it can be argued that such a notion is more prevalent in
the Buddhist notion of dependent co-arising (Macy 1979; Garfield 1994; Loy 1997)
and in a number of indigenous traditions (Santos 2008, 2016). A famous portrayal
of this notion has been expressed in the phrase attributed to Chief Seattle, in which
he apparently said that “the earth does not belong to man, man belongs to the
earth.”7 This understanding is also echoed in Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic, in which
he writes: “In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror
of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his
fellow-members, and also respect for the [socio-ecological] community as such.”
(Leopold 1987: 204)
A central implication of this understanding of the self as a member in a net-
work of reciprocal gift giving is that it ultimately transforms a central category of
property rights: ownership becomes guardianship. The resources that one uses, be
it the land, the water or one’s own body, are not something that one owns, but
rather a gift of nature and of society. Although the notion of the gift and guardian-
ship is often associated with “archaic” societies (Mauss 2002), it is also marginally
discussed in contemporary debates on property arrangements. Karl Marx, for ex-
ample, refers to the concept of stewardship in this rather well-known passage in
volume three of Capital:
From the standpoint of a higher socioeconomic formation, the private property of
particular individuals in the earthwill appear just as absurd as theprivate property
of one man in other men. Even an entire society, a nation, or all simultaneously
existing societies taken together, are not the owners of the earth. They are sim-
ply its possessors, its beneficiaries, and have to bequeath it in an improved state
to succeeding generations, as boni patres familias [good heads of the household].
(Marx 1991: 911)
Although Marx equates ownership and property here, his critique tends in a simi-
lar direction to the argument I have been developing: that humans are not owners
of the earth, but have received this earth and their selves from others and therefore
have a duty to care for their own well-being and that of their society and ecosystem
7 As is generally well known, the authenticity of this phrase and of Chief Seattle’s speech is
contested. Although the speech was supposedly held in 1854 or 1855, it was only published
by Dr. Henry A. Smith in the Seattle Sunday Star on October 29, 1887. Since then, numerous
versions of the speech have been published (Low 1995; Krupat 2011; Rothenberg 1999). Impor-
tantly, the cited famous phrase is actually not part of the original speech published in 1887,
but only appears in later versions. Despite this historical inaccuracy, I nevertheless believe it
justified to refer to this quotation, because it reflects the notion of another type relationship
with world – irrespective whether it was expressed by Chief Seattle or someone else.
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for the benefit of future generations. Yet in contrast to Marx, I would argue that
it is not property per se but property arrangements based specifically on the no-
tion of exclusive, individual private ownership that are problematic. In this sense,
a commons can or, rather, should be understood as an institutional property ar-
rangement in which not only is exclusion replaced by inclusion, but ownership is
also replaced by guardianship.
While this change in labels may appear to be a rather simple task, effecting
it would in fact require us to revise not only our conception of ownership over
things, but also our deeply rooted notion of self-ownership. According to Locke, it
is the notion of self-ownership that provides individuals with the right to exclusive
ownership of the world. Here I agree with G. A. Cohen and Michael Sandel that
the concept of self-ownership is in itself highly problematic because it lays the
foundation for an individualistic and absolute understanding of property rights.
With reference to Nozick’s interpretation of Locke’s concept of self-ownership, G.
A. Cohen gets at the crux of the problem when he explains that the “polemically
crucial right of self-ownership is the right not to (be forced to) supply product
or service to anyone” (G. A. Cohen 1995: 215). Similar to the abstract and absolute
right of ownership over things, the right to self-ownership implies that each person
has “no non-contractual enforceable obligations to anyone else with respect to the
use of your powers” (ibid.: 240). In turn, the premise of self-ownership enables
the rejection of any claims the community might make on the fruits of the other
person’s labor. For this reason, Cohen understands self-ownership to be a central
pillar for open and competitive markets in which each individual is free to own,
exchange and accumulate goods in the absence of either limitations or obligations
to other individuals. Along these lines, I would also argue that the affirmation of
self-ownership and the right to the fruits of one’s labor ultimately denies other
people and society in general the right to a share of these fruits – let alone the right
to access and share the underlying resource systems. Along with Cohen, I would
conclude that the answer to this grave problem is the “rejection of the thesis of self-
ownership” itself (ibid.: 230). However, while Cohen then vaguely propagates the
“affirmation of non-contractual obligations to serve other people” (ibid.), I would
argue that we must develop the previously discussed care ethic into more robust
property arrangements that enable the codetermination of socio-ecological rights
and duties.
For this reason, I turn to Michael Sandel who, to my knowledge, is one of the
few contemporary Western philosophers who has not only criticized the notion of
self-ownership but has also developed an alternative notion of property based on
guardianship. In his book Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1986), Sandel discusses
Rawls’Theory of Justice (1971) and the general notion of self-ownership. Here, Sandel
agrees with Rawls that we should understand the self as made up of a purely con-
tingent and arbitrary distribution or, in our terminology, gift of our natural endow-
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ments. For this reason, Sandel argues that we should not interpret our relationship
to these gifts as something that we own. Instead, he argues,
To be sure, the various natural assets with which I am born may be said to ‘be-
long’ tome in the weak, contingent sense that they reside accidentally withinme,
but this sense of ownership or possession cannot establish that I have any spe-
cial rights with respect to these assets or any privileged claim to the fruits of their
exercise. In this attenuated sense of possession, I am not really the owner but
merely the guardian or repository of the assorted assets and attributes located
‘here’. (Sandel 1986: 82)
The fact that a person is born with – or without – certain arbitrary qualities and
capabilities implies that this person then has no justification to consider its self
and the fruits of its labor as entirely its own. But how, then, are we to conceptual-
ize the relationship to our bodies and the world? In order to answer this question,
Sandel differentiates the concepts of the owner, the guardian and the repository.
According to Sandel, ownership, in its strongest version, implies “that I have ab-
solute, unqualified, exclusive rights with respect to my endowments” (ibid.: 96). In
its more moderate version, this implies that “I have certain privileged claims with
respect to them, a bundle of rights, while not unlimited, at least more extensive
with respect to my assets than any bundle of rights anyone else may have with re-
spect to them” (ibid.). In contrast, the repository of assets assumes the complete
arbitrariness of the relationship between the self and one’s natural endowments
and provides little basis for the recognition of the subject. The notion of guardian-
ship, however, assumes a relationship between one’s self and its endowments and
assets, yet embeds it in an intersubjective, communitarian framework:
To say that I am the guardian of the endowments I bear is to imply that they are
owned by some other subject, on whose behalf, or in whose name, or by whose
grace I cultivate and exercise them. This is a notion of possession reminiscent
of the early Christian notion of property, in which man had what he had as the
guardian of assets belonging truly to God, and it is a notion that fits with various
communitarian notions of property as well. (ibid.: 97)
The basic reason why Sandel defends such a notion of property rights is that it
enables us to understand property as a social phenomenon that has been created
not only for the satisfaction of one’s individual needs and desires, but also for the
needs and desires of the wider community. For this reason, I would agree with
Sandel that the notion of guardianship enables us to conceptualize a form of prop-
erty that breaks with the classical concept of independence and absolute dominion.
Yet, instead of falling back into hierarchical dependencies characteristic of the feu-
dal system, a democratic notion of guardianship embeds resources in a contextual
framework of property based on interdependencies, mutual care and codetermi-
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nation. And in contrast to both the Christian and communitarian interpretation of
guardianship, I would understand the stewardship not toward God and not only
toward one’s fellow human beings, but equally to all living and non-living beings –
as a type of socio-ecological stewardship.Thus, by defining an individual’s relation-
ship to its self and to theworld as a form of guardianshipwithin this ecological web,
I would argue that we have laid the cornerstone of the “structural [eco-]communal-
ity of the commons” (Meretz 2012), for property arrangements that include those
without a voice: the wider community, humankind ‘in general’, nature and, possi-
bly also, future generations. In view of these inclusory advantages of guardianship
over ownership, scientists Will Steffen et al. (2011) propagate stewardship as a cru-
cial means to solve the serious threats that humanity faces in the epoch of the
Anthropocene.
From non-interference to non-domination
Although this argument might sound reasonable, it may be feared that the shift
from ownership to guardianship will open the door to the arbitrary oppression of
the individual by the community. In order to deal with this legitimate criticism
and potential danger, I argue in the following section that not guardianship, but
rather non-interference leads to new forms of domination and, thus, paradoxically
enough, to arbitrary interference. This insight brings us to the conclusion that a
revision of Locke’s theory of property from a commons perspective also requires a
shift in focus from non-interference to non-domination.
Put in a historical perspective, John Locke’s concept of natural property rights
was developed as a critique of the existing feudal social order and the absolute
powers of the monarchy over property rights. With the rise of the bourgeoisie, this
feudal property regime was problematized, not only because it limited the indi-
vidual appropriation of property but also because the absolute monarch ultimately
had the power to arbitrarily confiscate the property of his subjects. Locke’s theory
of property was thus a means of dealing with both of these problems. On the one
hand, it justified an original appropriation of property through labor and unlimited
accumulation through money; on the other hand, it protected individual private
property from the arbitrary powers of the state. By grounding these basic property
rights in God, nature and reason – all of which were understood to be one and
the same (Laslett 2008: 94-6) –, Locke provided a new theological interpretation
of the divine property arrangements that lies prior to existing social institutions.
This is what is generally understood as natural law. Thus, individual private own-
ership became a means to prevent arbitrary political powers from interfering with
a person’s freedom to act. For this reason, the non-interference engrained in indi-
vidual private property has become a fundamental cornerstone for all other forms
of freedom and a liberal society in general.
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Considering the power asymmetries of the feudal social order, the right to non-
interference is in itself an important and legitimate claim. However, since Locke’s
times, the freedom of individual ownership has expanded to such an extent that
it has shifted the balance of power from the absolute monarch to wealthy individ-
uals and large multinational corporations whose existence often lies beyond the
grasp of nation states and social control. In this sense, the relationship between
sovereignty and private power has been reversed (Bailey/Mattei 2013: 973-4). And
while state sovereignty has partially been democratized since Locke’s times, prop-
erty arrangements have remained – often in the name of individual negative free-
dom and constitutional democracy (e.g. Epstein 2011b) – largely immune to the
processes of democratization.8 With James Tully we can say that this is a result
of the prioritization of individual negative rights over democratic rights of code-
termination. It therefore appears as though Locke’s property rights, which were
originally developed as a critique of the power of the monarchy have, in turn, en-
abled new power asymmetries to develop.9
In his Second Treatise on Government, Locke already recognized that private prop-
erty and the introduction of money lead to inequalities. According to Locke, how-
ever, peoplemust accept these asymmetries on account of their “tacit and voluntary
consent” to this social arrangement and the supposed fact that monetary wealth
“may be hoarded upwithout injury to any one” (Locke 2008: II, §50; emphasis added).
As we see, the accumulation of wealth by some individuals has, according to Locke,
no negative effects on or ‘externalities’ affecting those with less property or no di-
rect access to the means of subsistence. As has already been mentioned, Locke’s
answer to this problem of scarcity-through-privatization is the ability to ‘freely’
exchange one’s labor for wages and the increases in productivity that result from
private ownership. The person without direct access to the means of subsistence
can sell his or her labor power to someone who owns productive resources. Fur-
thermore and as Adam Smith later argued, the unfettered profit motive, market
competition and the increased productivity that results fromprivatizationwill sup-
posedly benefit propertyless individuals in providing them not only with jobs but
also cheaper and more luxurious goods. In this sense, Locke and Smith assume
8 It must be noted here, however, that nationalization cannot be equated with democratiza-
tion. Awell-known (failed) example of the democratization of private property is theMeidner
Plan in Sweden (Blackburn 2007; Pontusson 1992). This is not to say that a number of small-
scale cases do not exist in which resources have been socialized and democratized, such as
reclaiming water rights in Cochobamba, Bolivia, and Italy (Assies 2003; Mattei 2013b) and
the recuperation of companies by workers in Latin America and Europe (Azzellini 2016).
9 Saki Bailey and Ugo Mattei describe this as a “return to a sort of neo-medievalism, where
state sovereignty is weak and constitutional law is reduced to a Leviathan that uses an iron
fist with the weak – the people – and the velvet glove with the strong – corporate powers”
(Bailey/Mattei 2013: 973).
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that scarcity-induced conflicts can be solved through increased productivity. To-
day, this is generally understood as economic growth and the ‘trickle down’ effect –
and is still a frequently invoked justification of socio-economic inequalities (Pinker
2018: 97-120). That being said, it is important to note that this dualistic depiction
of reality as divided between the haves and the have-nots may appear to some
as highly simplified, especially considering the development of the middle-class
and other positive effects of economic growth over history. But while there have
been great increases in the absolute amount of wealth since the times of Locke and
Smith (Maddison 2007; Acemoglu/Robinson 2012; Pinker 2018), the asymmetrical
relation between those with and those without productive property (e.g. capital)
still remains relevant (Piketty 2014; Oxfam 2017).
But do the inequalities and power asymmetries resulting from the private ap-
propriation of the original commons truly have no negative effects on the prop-
ertyless? And are all people still equally free if no one is interfered with by the
arbitrary power of the state? The important point to make here is that, in contrast
to Locke’s assumption, the unlimited accumulation of resources by some individ-
uals may well expand their sphere of non-interference, but this accumulation also
limits and therefore interferes with the freedom of others. Jeremy Waldron lucidly
explains this problem in his bookThe Right to Private Property:
If private property serves negative liberty, it does so because owning something
just is a matter of being free to use it and of its being the case that one is not to
be opposed in that use by the interference of others. But then the distribution of
property has a direct impact on the distribution of negative liberty. A person who
owns nothing in a society (where everything is privately owned) is not at liberty,
in a negative sense, tomake use of anything – indeed for everything that hemight
use, someone else has a right that he should refrain from using it, and it is a right
which they are entitled to enforce. If it is true that all (or most) human actions
require a material component over and above the use of one's own body – a lo-
cation, for example, or an implement – then the unfreedom in a negative sense
of the propertyless man is more or less comprehensive. There is literally nothing
or next to nothing that he is free to do. This point is mitigated by the existence
of some common property even in the most comprehensively capitalist societies:
tramps have the streets to walk on and the bridges to sleep under. But that is all
they have and all they can do, without falling foul of the prohibitions enforced by
the property systemof the society inwhich they have tomake a life for themselves.
(Waldron 1988: 410-11; original emphasis)
As we can see, the unlimited appropriation of resources by some individuals makes
these resources scarce and ultimately undermines the freedom of others, thereby
substantially interfering with the freedom of others.While it is often assumed that
the point of negative freedom is to free the individual from undesired interference
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and involuntary obligations, as I have mentioned already it nevertheless “gener-
ates a duty […] on everyone to refrain from using [the thing or resource] without
my permission” (ibid.: 109). People without property are thus placed under the duty
to recognize the property rights of the other – even if they themselves are property-
less and need these resources to survive. Similarly, G. A. Cohen vividly illustrates
this relationship between one’s duty to respect the property of others and the in-
terference with the freedom of those without property:
The banal truth is that, if the state prevents me from doing something that I want
to do, then it places a restriction on my freedom. Suppose, then, that I want to
perform an action which involves a legally prohibited use of your property. I want,
let us say, to pitch a tent in your large back garden, perhaps just in order to annoy
you, or perhaps for themore substantial reason that I have nowhere to live and no
land ofmy own, but I have got hold of a tent, legitimately or otherwise. If I now try
to do this thing that I want to do, the chances are that the state will intervene on
your behalf. If it does, I shall suffer a constraint onmy freedom. The same goes, of
course, for all unpermitted uses of a piece of private property by those who do not
own it, and there are always those who do not own it, since ‘private ownership by
one person presupposes non-ownership on the part of other persons’ (Marx 1991:
948). (G. A. Cohen 1995: 55-6)
The general point that Waldron and Cohen are making is that, given the interde-
pendence of individuals on resources that people need for their life and liberty, no
neutral or positive sum property arrangements exist. The accumulation of some
resources inherently leads to scarcity for others. While the concept of non-inter-
ference might have made sense in its historical setting against the powers of an
absolute monarch, the un-interfered-with and thus unlimited appropriation of re-
sources can substantially undermine the life and freedom of others. As becomes
clear, the interdependence of living beings implies that the existence and freedom
of one being is inherently intertwined with the existence and freedom of another
being and therefore always ‘interferes’ with others – whether we like it or not.
As previously mentioned, Locke’s answer to the problem of exclusion from di-
rect access to resources is wage labor. But is there not a fundamental difference
between direct access to resources and engaging in wage labor? On the one hand,
it could be argued that there is no difference between working on the original com-
mons and wage labor because both are a means to secure one’s existence through
labor. Whether I cultivate my vegetables or earn a wage to buy vegetables makes
no significant difference. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the two
are significantly different. The difference between the two is rather simple: when
people do not have direct access to the means of subsistence or production, they
have no other choice than to enter wage labor relationships. They either go hungry
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or perform work for another – that is, if they can find a job.10 In this sense, we
may speak of a socially determined existential necessity that forces people with-
out access to the means of subsistence to enter wage labor relationships. Although
the coercion is not exerted by individuals but through society’s property arrange-
ments, it is neither less real than personally exercised coercion, nor is it natural,
nor entirely accidental.11 We can therefore say that property arrangements that do
not provide people with direct access to the means of subsistence and production
deny those people the right to life and liberty.
Because this structural coercion is non-accidental, the inability to directly ac-
cess the means of subsistence also means that an individual’s ability to survive and
freedom to choose how they will survive is interfered with in an arbitrary manner.
While Philipp Pettit presents us with a less profound critique of wage labor rela-
tionships (Pettit 2006),12 I would nevertheless like to draw on his notion of domina-
10 Starting one’s own business is rather unlikely for most people without property, under-
stood either asmeans of subsistence (land),means of production (machines) or accumulated
wealth (capital), because in order to start a business, resources are required. The ability to
borrow money (credit) to start a business might possibly be an option, but also requires an
‘accumulation’ of either social or symbolic capital (e.g. knowing the right people, having the
right education, a good reputation or social status) that is not always given. This is not to say
that starting a business for people without property is entirely impossible, but it is neverthe-
less less likely – or simply less successful – than for people with more more capital.
11 While people like Townsend and Malthus aimed at naturalizing social arrangements that
cause scarcity and poverty (Polanyi 2001: 116-21), Friedrich von Hayek argues that such oc-
currences cannot be considered unjust because they arise accidentally from the unintended
interaction of individual agents. Hayek writes: “Though we are in this case [of injustice] less
ready to admit it, our complaints about the outcome of themarket [a property regime based
on individual private property] as unjust do not really assert that somebody has been unjust;
and there is no answer to the question ofwhohas been unjust. Society has simply become the
new deity to which we complain and clamour for redress if it does not fulfil the expectations
it has created. […] For in such a system in which each is allowed to use his knowledge for his
own purposes the concept of ‘social justice’ is necessarily empty and meaningless, because
in it nobody’s will can determine the relative incomes of the different people, or prevent that
they be partly dependent on accident. ‘Social justice’ can be given a meaning only in a di-
rected or ‘command’ economy (such as an army) in which the individuals are ordered what to
do; and any particular conception of ‘social justice’ could be realized only in such a centrally
directed system.” (Hayek 2013: 233) In contrast to this view, I argue that social arrangements
can be considered unjust because they are always created by individuals with a specific pur-
pose. The history of individual private property shows that it has always aimed at excluding
other people from its use – and forcing people into wage-labor relationships (Neeson 1996:
27-34; Castel 2003). This coercion was therefore, in the eyes of some, not unintended. Yet
even if this structural coercion was not intended, this should in no way deny people the right
to criticize and counteract the negative effects that result from it.
12 In Freedom in the market (2006), Pettit argues with reference to Adam Smith that wage labor
can – in an ideal or well-functioning labor market – provide people with the ability to escape
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tion as arbitrary interference in order to make sense of its various problems. With
Pettit, we can say that arbitrary interference occurs when one person can arbitrar-
ily interfere with the choices and plans of another person. Here, the action of one
person is “chosen or rejected without reference to the interests, or the opinions,
of those affected” (Pettit 1997: 55). In this sense, one person’s exclusion from the
means of subsistence or production makes them dependent on the arbitrary will
of the proprietor and his or her desire to employ them. As Waldron explains:
Appropriation […] wreaks a drastic change in the position of non-appropriators.
From being tenants-in-common of God's largesse, they are now placed in the po-
sition of moral [and economic] dependence, for everything but bare survival, on
the say-so of individual property-owners. (Waldron 1988: 175-6)
Put in a historical perspective, this is what Karl Marx calls “so-called primitive ac-
cumulation” and what is more generally understood as the enclosure or privatiza-
domination. Most importantly, this occurs through the possibility of exiting relationships of
domination (Smith refers here tomaster-servant relationships characteristic of the feudal ap-
prenticeship system) (Smith 1994: 117, 136-42) and enteringmore favorable ones (Pettit 2006:
142-4). In Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1997), Pettit discusses, however,
the problemof domination inwhat socialists have otherwise called “wage slavery” during the
rise of capitalism and argues that his theory of non-domination supports this critique ofwage
slavery (Pettit 1997: 141-2). In this sense, Pettit criticizes property arrangements that lead to
asymmetrical power relations and domination, which in turn legitimize state regulation and
a fairer distribution of property: “The distribution of property may tend toward inegalitar-
ian extremes, and it may be necessary to regulate against the effects of those extremes on
people’s overall enjoyment of freedom as non-domination.” (Pettit 2006: 147) Despite this
conclusion, he argues that the domination or, rather, arbitrary interferencemust be “more or
less intentional in character” (Pettit 1997: 52). For this reason, he limits the notion of domina-
tion in property arrangements to particular relationships and intentional actions. In Freedom
in the market he writes: “The property regime can have the aspect of an environment akin to
the natural environment. Like the natural environment, it will certainly affect the range or
the ease with which people enjoy their status as undominated agents, and it may warrant
complaint on that account, but it will not itself be a source of domination. It will not be a source
of domination so far as it is the cumulative, unintended effect of people’s mutual adjustments,
where that history of adjustmentmay ormay not have begun in government initiatives.” (Pet-
tit 2006: 139; emphasis added) As we can see, this is a similar argument to the one presented
by Hayek (see footnote 11 above) because Pettit brackets out the “unintended” domination
that arises from the social structure or property arrangements themselves. As I already ar-
gued a propos Hayek, it is extremely questionable whether the domination that arises out of
such property arrangements is entirely unintended, because the legal framework has been
intentionally implemented andmaintained (Gourevitch 2013: 606). And even if these effects
of a specific property regime were unintended, I would agree with Alex Gourevitch that a re-
publican theory of non-dominationmust include not only intentional domination in a partic-
ular employer-employee relationship, but also the structural domination that arises in wage
labor relationships out of asymmetrical property arrangements (ibid.: 598-601).
168 Democracy, Markets and the Commons
tion commons, and the dispossession of those who have depended on commons,
that began in the 12th century, if not earlier, and has continued until today (Marx
1982a: 873-940; Neeson 1996; Zückert 2003; Boyle 2003; Harvey 2004; Linebaugh
2008; Federici 2009). Although this process of enclosure might have freed peasants
from the feudal relationships of serfdom, it also ‘freed’ peasants from their means
of subsistence – ultimately making them vulnerable to the arbitrary interference
of proprietors.
In contrast to the notion of socio-ecological interdependence I developed above,
economic dependence on wage labor is therefore problematic because of the asym-
metrical power relationship between the employer and the employee.This relation-
ship places the one without property in a situation of vulnerability and powerless-
ness vis-à-vis the proprietor/employer. In turn, this relationship leaves the door
open to domination.Here, we can also refer to Pettit’s notion of domination, which
he defines as follows:
Both [the employee and the employer] will share an awareness that the power-
less can do nothing except by the leave of the powerful: that the powerless are at
the mercy of the powerful and not on equal terms. The master-slave scenario will
materialize, and the asymmetry between the two sides will be a communicative
as well as an objective reality. (Pettit 1997: 61)
The fact that wage labor relationships have been entered into by contract does not,
however, alter the existence of this power asymmetry (ibid.: 62). Although the abil-
ity to exit wage labor relationships slightly increases one’s freedom, it does not
protect or immunize the propertyless against future relationships of domination.
In turn, within the hierarchical wage relationship, domination is often experienced
as the necessity of carrying out certain tasks that are determined by the employer,
thereby denying the employee his or her freedom to self-organize and codetermine
their activities with others. As a result, we find two potential types of domination in
wage labor: one in the asymmetrical distribution of access to productive resources
and the other in hierarchical employee-employer relationships (Gourevitch 2013:
598).
This is not to say that all wage relationships are experienced as hierarchical and
oppressive. Contemporary forms of wage labor relationships in a modern knowl-
edge-based economy, for example, often support individual creativity, self-man-
agement and team collaboration. Yet despite these gains in the individual freedom
for employees, the range of freedom is often limited by the employer’s demands
that employees increase productivity and outputs (Boltanski/Chiapello 2007). Fur-
thermore, the relationship of domination remains, because it is not necessary that
the person in power (e.g. the employer) actively interfere with the freedom of the
propertyless (e.g. the employee). Instead, we can argue with Pettit that “what con-
stitutes domination is the fact that in some respect the power-bearer has the ca-
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pacity to interfere arbitrarily, even if they are never going to do so” (Pettit 1997: 63;
emphasis added). The mere capacity of property owners and employers to deny an
individual their wage labor and thus a means to survival, on the one hand, and the
mere capacity to subjugate the employee to the will of the employer within a wage
labor relationship, on the other, provides the basis for domination, even if it is not
actively exercised. In this sense, we can argue with Pettit that the propertyless “are
in a position where fear [of unemployment] and deference [to the employer] will be
the normal order of the day, not the frankness that goes with intersubjective equal-
ity” (ibid.: 64; emphasis added). By creating asymmetrical positions of power and
domination, property arrangements that enable the unlimited private accumula-
tion of resources can therefore arbitrarily interfere with and undermine the equal
right of all people to life and liberty. Ironically, the arbitrary interference caused by
asymmetrical property relationships as described above reminds us of the domina-
tion of the sovereign, which Locke originally aimed to limit and avert.The arbitrary
interference and domination that arises from negative freedom rights ultimately
undermine not only the equal negative freedom rights of the propertyless, but also
the principle of self-organization that underliesmy notion of ecological democracy.
In order to grasp and deal with the problem of negative freedom, I argue with Pet-
tit that we must shift our focus from non-interference to non-domination, thereby
providing each member of a community with protection from arbitrary interfer-
ence and, in turn, the possibility of participating in the codetermination of their
activities.
Following this line of thought, one answer to the problem of domination is
limiting the accumulation of resources by individuals and corporations. If we link
this to the concept of guardianship, we can see that a limitation on accumulation
should not merely be framed as a cap on wealth, but rather as basic responsibil-
ities towards other individuals, affected communities and the environment that
are inscribed in property relations themselves. To put it briefly, the limiting of ac-
cumulation reciprocally enables the freedom of others. John Rawls’Theory of Justice
provided this with a now-classical definition in the form of the maximin princi-
ple: socio-economic inequalities must be limited in order to maximally benefit the
least advantaged (Rawls 1999). With a more socio-ecological focus, Capra and Mat-
tei briefly discuss the implications of such a limitation of accumulation in their
discussion of ecolaw. In relation to corporations they suggest:
Ecolaw will not consider corporations, which are the current face of accumulated
capital, as people, because unlike every other creature they are immortal. In the
United States, for example, the idea that economic interests can be incorporated
nomatter what their purpose is quite recent and dates back to the late nineteenth
century. Before then the legal benefits of incorporation were granted only for spe-
cific purposes and were limited in time. Once the purpose of a corporation had
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been achieved, such as when the Charles River Bridge was completed, the cor-
poration would dissolve, as naturally as individuals die. In ecolaw, the benefits
of incorporations are restricted, with conditions to care for the environment and
respect communities. (Capra/Mattei 2015: 185-6)
In this sense, the purpose, activities and existence of corporations will always be
bound to theirmeaning and value for the affected people and environment. In turn,
this socio-ecological embedding should limit corporations’ ability to dominate oth-
ers. This can theoretically imply either the limitation of resource extraction from
socio-ecological systems or the redistribution of wealth back to those affected by
an economic enterprise.
Despite the importance of limiting accumulation and, thus, limiting power
asymmetries, the notion of non-domination also requires people to be protected
from potential domination. According to what I have argued, this would require
people not to be forced into asymmetrical wage labor relationships by existential
necessity. Within the republican tradition, this has often been understood as free-
dom from economic dependence.Thinkers such as James Harrington, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau and Thomas Jefferson argued that freedom and democracy can only be
realized through the widespread distribution of property in resources and, more
specifically, in land (Jackson 2012: 34-5). Generally put, all three propagated an
agrarian republicanism that was assumed to secure the independence of individu-
als through a broad distribution of land and, thus, the direct access to their means
of subsistence. Such a property arrangement would protect individuals from eco-
nomic dependence and, in turn, produce independent, responsible, diligent and
austere citizens. With the rise of the open access market and commercial society
the focus slowly shifted from land to the access to public goods such as universal
education, health care and old age pensions.This age-old argument that property in
resources is a necessary precondition for life and liberty has more recently taken on
different forms, as for example: John Rawls’ concept of a property-owning democ-
racy (Rawls 2001), Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott’s notion ofThe Stakeholder So-
ciety (Ackerman/Alstott 1999), the idea of the unconditional basic income, which
is, for example, advocated for by Philippe Van Parijs (Van Parijs 2003; Widerquist
2013; Pettit 2007). At the center of all these schemes is the basic idea that property
is a necessary precondition for life and independence, generally understood as the
freedom from arbitrary interference and domination.
I will discuss Rawls’ notion of property-owning democracy shortly, but for the
time being, it is crucial to note the importance of commons for freedom from arbi-
trary interference and domination. Similar to the just-mentioned schemes, com-
mons have historically provided people with direct access to their means of subsis-
tence and therefore “offered some independence of wages and markets” (Neeson
1996: 12). Similarly, Stuart White argues,
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In the same way that the historic enclosure of the commons helped to create a
proletariat, reliant onwage-labour, the emergence of the commons today can con-
ceivably help limit this reliance. To the extent that capital- and commons-based
predistribution reduce reliance onwage-labour, they thereby also help reduce the
risk of domination from this source. They will tend to make workers less desper-
ate to find jobs and so help protect them against situations where, because of the
urgent need for a job, they are vulnerable to domination by employers. (White,
unpublished: 10)
The direct access to resources in the form of commons can therefore limit the ar-
bitrary interference that arises through asymmetrical distribution of individual
private property and the dependence on hierarchical wage labor. Furthermore, by
defining non-domination as a central pillar of property arrangements, “no single
individual can arbitrarily make the decisions affecting” all the others (Gourevitch
2013: 609). In turn, this enables Pettit’s “intersubjective equality” (Pettit 1997: 64)
to come about, in which people can organize economic activities, including wage
labor relationships, in a more democratic manner. The important point, however,
is that the notion of commons developed here emphasizes non-dominated socio-
ecological interdependence and not economic independence. Put in this light, the
advantage of commons over more individualistic property arrangements, such as
Rawls’ property-owning democracy or a basic income, is that interdependence is
inscribed in the property arrangements themselves. While criticizing the depen-
dence from asymmetrical power relations, a commons theory of property would
not fall into the illusions of individual independence, as many republican theories
do, but would instead critically reflect how interdependence can be organized in a
manner that hinders arbitrary interference and domination on the one hand, and
enables the negotiated self-organization of economic activities on the other. The
fundamental question is not, therefore, whether interference takes place or not,
but rather how commons arrangements can be organized in order to distribute
freedoms and duties in a manner that supports the interdependent and sustain-
able self-organization of all living beings.
From individual labor to interdependent needs
Up until now, I have reinterpreted John Locke’s theory of property by replacing
ownership and non-interference, as constituents of our understanding of property
with guardianship and non-domination.The justification of these shifts was largely
based on the socio-ecological interdependence of living beings and the problems
of arbitrary interference and domination that arose out of a purely negative defi-
nition of freedom.The connection between interdependence and non-domination
ledme, in turn, to the justification of a commons property arrangement.Now, how-
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ever, a central question relevant to the reinterpretation of Locke’s theory of property
arises: how should we understand the legitimacy of appropriating from commons?
According to Locke, the ability to individually appropriate resources held in com-
mon is based onwhat is often referred to as the labor theory of property. Byworking
on the resource, I have a right to declare it as mine. In turn, Locke also declares
that a thingmust be one’s individual private property in order to use or consume it.
In order to critically reinterpret these frequently invoked justifications of individ-
ual private property, let us begin with Locke’s labor theory of property and, more
precisely, Carol Gould’s critique of that theory in her book Rethinking Democracy:
Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society (1990).
Much like my own defense of an ecological and interdependent interpretation
of reality, Gould argues that in order overcome the problems of domination and ex-
ploitation we must base our property arrangements not on an individualistic, but
on a social ontology. As a critique of Locke’s individual labor theory of property,
she argues that most forms of production occur not individually but through so-
cial cooperation and collaboration. Conceptualizing labor activities in this manner,
she maintains that the labor theory of property “gives rise to a different concep-
tion of property right, namely, social property” (Gould 1990: 177). Yet, in order to
protect a minimal realm of negative freedom and non-interference for the individ-
ual, Gould distinguishes between personal and social property. In this postulate,
Gould differentiates between personal property that is “required for the individual’s
own subsistence and self-development” and social property, which is “required by
individuals in common in order to realize their joint purposes” (ibid.: 180). Fur-
thermore, she develops arguments for two fundamental rights to social property.
Firstly, she explains the “right of all of those engaged in a common activity to con-
trol the products of that activity, or to enjoy in common the benefits of their labor”,
which provides the “condition for the development of the sociality of individuals
as individuals-in-relations” (ibid.: 183). Secondly, she argues in favor of the “equal
right to control the conditions of social activity” (ibid.), which sounds very simi-
lar to my definition of democratic freedom. But Gould says that this implies not
only the “right to participate in decisions concerning the uses of the conditions or
means of social production in which one is engaged” but also “the right to partici-
pate in decisions concerning the purposes and plans of the activity” (ibid.: 183-4).
Simply put, the right to codetermination is based on one’s participation in a joint,
social activity. I agree with Gould that such a social right to democratic codeter-
mination and the individual right to the fruits of one’s social activities provides an
important cornerstone for a more social and democratic interpretation of Locke’s
labor theory of property. It provides a radical shift from the right of the individual
proprietor to exclude others to the right of others to be included in the common
use and benefits of the specific resources. Furthermore, her understanding of la-
bor is broad enough to include not only people in wage-labor relationships, but
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also people who participate in unpaid social activities. Finally, her notion of social
property is not conceptualized as state property but rather as “the property of the
associated individuals engaged in a given common activity, whether in an industry
or a social organization” (ibid.: 189).
In a similar way, this principle is expressed by legal scholar Burns H. Weston
and commons intellectual David Bollier in their book Green Governance: Ecological
Survival, Human Rights, and the Law of the Commons (2013). In relation to the “prin-
ciples of internal [commons] governance” they write that “commoners shall have
collective control over the surplus value they create through the collective manage-
ment of their shared wealth and resources” (Weston/Bollier 2013: 275, 277). While
Gould emphasizes the recognition of the individual equal right to positive freedom
in relation to others, I would interpret this from my commons perspective as the
equal right to individual and interdependent self-organization. Despite the gains
that come with a social and democratic reinterpretation of Locke, I would never-
theless argue that a labor theory of property is not adequate for a commons theory
of property because, firstly, it remains rather exclusive and, secondly, it falsely pri-
oritizes labor activities over the general right to existence through a right to the
satisfaction of primal needs.
In order to understand these limitations, let us begin with the basic argument
for a (social) labor theory of property. Since we have already discussed the problems
of a labor theory of property in relation to the notion of ownership, we will now
focus on the more general problem of grounding a theory of property on labor. Put
in more general terms, it must be admitted that a labor theory of property does
have an intuitive appeal. If I (or we) change an object that is not owned by anyone,
it seems that I (or we) should have the right to declare that thing as mine (or ours).
With Gould, we could say that if a group of people kills a mammoth, then the group
would have the right to the mammoth meat. Or, with a more contemporary exam-
ple, if a group of people build cars in a factory then they have a right to codetermine
how the activities are organized and how the profits of the company are distributed
between the employees. Although Gould argues that her concept of social property
refers to the broad notion of “social activity” (Gould 1990: 183) and is thus not limited
to wage-labor relationships, the principle of a labor theory of property inherently
limits the questions of codetermination to those performing the specific labor ac-
tivities. Other people who are not engaged in these activities but are nevertheless
significantly affected by them are thus excluded from the rights to codetermina-
tion. Thus, by focusing on labor activities, people outside of the hunting, farming
or industrial activities (in both cases often women and the wider community) are
excluded from the decisions concerning how activities are to be organized and,
more importantly, what is to be done with their fruits. According to the principle
of non-interference, it would be assumed that people outside of these activities
should have no say in the codetermination of these affairs. Considering, however,
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the division of labor in society and the interdependent self-organization of living
beings (i.e. the dependence of the person engaging in wage-labor on the person
at home taking care of the children and the household and on the city as it takes
care of education, pollution, unemployment, etc.), it becomes less clear why peo-
ple at home or in the community should be completely excluded from the important
decisions that are made in businesses that significantly affect and determine their
lives.
In order to understand this problem better, let us turn to an example that lies
closer to home: the ability to democratically participate in political affairs. In con-
trast to the fundamental right to democratic codetermination of one’s life condi-
tions, the argument for political participation based on negative liberty and indi-
vidual private property, as presented by Locke and others, is grounded on the right
to non-interference as against the state authority. People are allowed to vote in
matters concerning the state because they are subjugated to the state monopoly on
the use of force. Furthermore, people (are obliged to) pay taxes so that the state will
be able to provide certain public goods such as law and order, roads or education.
For this reason, because of the coercive force that stands behind the obligation to
be a member of this specific association and the requirement to pool private re-
sources through taxation, people should ultimately also have a say in how the state
is organized or, as is most often the case, they should be able to elect who shall rule
and determine the organization of the state and its activities. So the main justifi-
cation of the democratic right to participate in public affairs of the state is the fact
that citizens are involuntarily and significantly affected by the state’s overarching
authority. Political participation is therefore ameans to limit arbitrary interference
of the state (i.e. domination) and to collectively define its legitimate forms of in-
terference (e.g. taxation). In more general terms, participation is a means to legit-
imize the basic rules governing our common reality. Here, the more fundamental
right to democratic self-organization shines through the negative right to non-in-
terference. According to the classical argument from negative freedom, however,
one would have no right to codetermine either the organization of the firm one
works in or the use of the surplus value that it appropriates, because one has the
free choice to exit this wage labor relationship and work elsewhere (where one will
most likely not have the right to democratic participation either). Finally, if a per-
son is not happy with the undemocratic company they work for, they theoretically
have the right to start a democratic enterprise together with others. According to
this logic, the exit option provides people with the ability to escape involuntary
domination in “private” associations, but does not provide them with the right to
codetermine either the activities that they perform with others or those by which
they are otherwise affected.
On the one hand, I agree that we must distinguish between different types
of associations in which people are involved (e.g. the state versus private firms).
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On the other hand, if we understand freedom as non-dominated freedom with,
through and against the other in the codetermination of the socio-ecosystems that
one inhabits, the strict separation between the in- and out-group becomes less
clear. Put rather simply, although I do have a choice between different partners,
products or jobs, owing to the existential necessity to engage in wage-labor (even
in its non-dominated and democratic form) the people of a community are signifi-
cantly affected by and interfered with by the way that firms conduct their business.
In this sense, how low (or high) wages are in a given society, for example, or what
type of products it produces and sells (e.g. chemical or organic fertilizers), or what
type of technology its firms used (e.g. whether very little labor or more craft and
skill is necessary) – these things make a big difference to the people who live in that
society. Even though these issues are often understood as private matters concern-
ing, first and foremost, the official owners of the firm (e.g. the shareholders), they
do have large effects not only on the workers of the firm, but also on the surround-
ing community and the wider public because they share a common reality and are
dependent on this reality for their life and liberty. Parallel to the dependence of an
individual’s life and liberty on wage labor relationships, we must admit that com-
munities are also deeply affected by, dependent on and, thus, potentially dominated
by the economic activities of ‘private’ associations.While Gould’s social labor theory
of property aims to widen this range of codetermination to those performing col-
lective activities, other affected communities nevertheless remain excluded from
the process of democratically negotiated self-organization.Thus as we can see, the
social interpretation of a labor theory of property is limited owing to its focus on
the performance of labor, which then excludes those human and non-human be-
ings who are significantly affected by the activities yet not actively participating in
them. For this reason, I argue that it is necessary to include not only shareholders
and those performing specific labor activities, but also significantly affected stake-
holders in the democratic codetermination of enterprises, ultimately transforming
an economic enterprise and association into a type of commons (Tortia 2011). Put
slightly differently, the arbitrary interference in and potential domination of en-
terprises in one’s private life plans legitimizes the non-arbitrary ‘interference’ in or,
rather, the codetermination of social activities of (re)production in economic or-
ganizations that effect one’s interdependent common reality. We will discuss the
notion of economic commons associations in greater detail later, but let us now
turn to the second fundamental problem in the labor theory of property: the pri-
ority of labor over life.
The question that arises from our previous discussion of economic activities,
the division of labor and affected communities is therefore whether labor itself is
truly the ideal justification for the appropriation of resources and the appointment
of authority to determine the allocation and use of resources. I will not discuss the
intricate details of the difficulties in the labor theory of property (Waldron 1988:
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137-252). Instead, I would like to begin with Hume and Kant’s general critique of
Locke’s labor theory of property, according to which a minimal form of possession
of external resourcesmust precede any form of labor. According toHume and Kant,
this prior possession does not arise from labor, but instead from simple occupa-
tion (ibid.: 173-4).13 It is the prior occupation of land and space that, in turn, enables
people to access, labor on and use these resources. Or, more simply put, property
in the world is a precondition of labor – and therefore also for life and liberty. Only
if I can access resources (whether directly or through contract) can I then work on
them in order to survive and, hopefully, live freely. This insight figuratively turns
Locke’s labor theory of value on its head – or, as will become clear, restores its orig-
inal meaning. Although I would not necessarily agree with the manner in which
Hume and Kant frame the problem as a warlike state of nature in which each indi-
vidualmust protect his or her goods from the threatening dispossession by others,
I nevertheless agree with their general insight. Yet, in a somewhat less individual-
istic and belligerent rhetoric, we could also say that the original appropriation of
external resources does not occur through labor, but through people simply being
in the world.
If this argument is correct, it would also require us to reinterpret the notion
of the “right to property”. To do this, it may be helpful to use Jeremy Waldron’s
distinction between a special-right-based and a general-right-based argument for
property.14 Waldron defines the concept of “rights” and the different arguments in
the following way:
A right-based argument for private property is, as we have said, an argument
which takes an individual interest to be sufficiently important in itself to justify
holding others (especially the government) to be under duties to create, secure,
maintain, or respect an institution of private property. A special-right-based argu-
ment (or SR-based argument, for short) is an argument which takes an interest to
have this importance not in itself but on account of the occurrence of some contin-
gent event or transaction. A general-right-based argument (or GR-based argument,
for short) is one which does not take the importance of such an interest to depend
on the occurrence of some contingent event or transaction, but attributes that im-
portance to the interest itself, in virtue of its qualitative character. (Waldron 1988:
115-6)
13 In the words of JeremyWaldron: “Before a man can cultivate a piece of ground, he must take
it into his possession and exclude others from its use; otherwise their exercise of common
rights might make his cultivation impossible.” (Waldron 1988: 173)
14 It should be noted, however, that Jeremy Waldron adopted this distinction form H.L.A. Hart
(Waldron 1988: 106).
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This distinction enables us to pinpoint a central problem in the labor theory of
property. Put in general terms, Locke transforms the primary and original general
right to access resources in the original state of nature into a special and contingent
right to appropriate resources through labor. Furthermore, Locke’s justification of
private property was based not only on the right to the fruits of one’s labor, but also
on the increased productivity that was brought about through labor and private
ownership. Simply put, those who produced more possessed the ultimate right to
resources. For example, it was the increase of “comforts” and “conveniences” (Locke
2008: II, §41) through productivity gains in farming that, according to Locke, jus-
tified the taking of the “wild woods and uncultivated waste of America” from the
“needy and wretched inhabitants” of the NewWorld (ibid.: II, §37). Although Locke
did not actually argue for the privatization of common lands in England (ibid.:
II, §35), the reasons that justified the violent expropriation and enclosure of com-
mons were based on similar arguments (Neeson 1996). As Locke explains, “God gave
the world to men in Common; but since he gave it them for their benefit, and the
greatest Conveniencies of Life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed
he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated” (Locke 2008: II, §34; em-
phasis added). This special-right-based argument for individual private property
has major implications: on the one hand, Locke assumes that productivity and re-
sources held in common are mutually exclusive; on the other hand, it implies that
an increase in productivity provides people with the right to own resources over
those who are less productive (i.e. farming over hunting and gathering, industrial
production over craft work etc.). Both of these assumptions and arguments are
still widespread today (Demsetz 2002). Moreover, the priority of productivity leads
to a linear, growth-oriented justification of property arrangements and economic
activities instead of, for example, arrangements based on care for the sustainable
reproduction of resources. That being said, we may conclude that Locke’s special-
right-based argument of resource appropriation through productive labor does not
secure the general right to life, liberty and property for all, but instead leads to the
privilege of those with greater strength and skill to extract more common resources
from nature and society.
It must be admitted that Gould’s labor theory of social property attempts to
mitigate this problem by arguing that everyone participating in a specific activity
should likewise control the means of subsistence and production and have a share
in the fruits of labor. Nevertheless, a very large asymmetry between those who can
produce more and those who cannot or do not produce much has often been the
result of this asymmetry. This is precisely the problem that Karl Marx describes in
his Critique of the Gotha Programme, in which he criticizes the principle of the equal
right to the fruits of one’s (social) labor:
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The right of the producers is proportional to the labor they supply; the equality
consists in the fact that measurement is made with an equal standard, labor. But
one man is superior to another physically, or mentally, and supplies more labor
in the same time, or can labor for a longer time; and labor, to serve as a measure,
must be defined by its duration or intensity, otherwise it ceases to be a standard of
measurement. This equal right is an unequal right for unequal labor. It recognizes
no class differences, because everyone is only a worker like everyone else; but it
tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment, and thus productive capacity,
as a natural privilege. (Marx 2009: 9-10; original emphasis)
As Marx emphasizes, while the focus on labor may be correct according to cer-
tain standards of justice and equality, it nevertheless remains an abstraction that
negates the differences between individuals’ productive capabilities and activities,
ultimately creating and legitimizing material inequality between people. In turn,
this inequality can lead to power asymmetries and relationships of domination
between people. In Waldron’s terminology, we could say that even a social labor
theory of property is a special right and thus remains contingent and somewhat
arbitrary. According to Marx, this is due to the focus on the distribution of goods
in the ‘sphere of circulation’ after the goods have been produced – instead of the
distribution of the means of subsistence and production themselves.
With Waldron, I therefore argue that in order to deal with this problem we
must shift our reconstruction of the legitimacy of property from a specific-right-
based to a general-right-based argument. In Lockean terms, this implies a shift
from the labor theory of property “back” to the primary general right of all people
to access resources that originally belonged to all of humanity. But then what would
the justification of the right to use and appropriate goods be based on, if not labor?
The answer to this question is quite simple and has already beenmentioned: needs.
As Waldron explains,
A GR-based argument for private property is not satisfied by the assignment of
one or two trivial or useless resources to each individual; it requires the assign-
ment to individuals of resources that they take seriously as the basis of their in-
dividual economic well-being. Thus the universal distribution of private property,
required by a GR-based argument is likely, as a matter of fact, to satisfy the de-
mands of the principle of need, for in seeing to it that everyone has private property,
the proponents of that argument will also in effect be seeing to it that everyone has
the wherewithal to satisfy his basic needs. (Waldron 1988: 440; emphasis added).
According to Waldron, the shift from a special-right-based labor theory of prop-
erty to a general-rights-based needs theory of property places the principle of oc-
cupation or rather being, life and self-preservation at the heart of our property
arrangements. It can therefore be said that a labor theory of property reverses the
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fundamental relationship with the world from one based on embodied being in re-
lationships with the world to one based on the unequal opportunity to pursue pro-
ductive activities. One’s relationship to the socio-ecosystem is therefore dependent
on one’s arbitrary natural endowments and one’s ability to work and accumulate.
The labor theory of property assumes that humans should first work and then eat
and have shelter, even though they require shelter, food andmost likely many more
resources (e.g. education) before they can work. Simply put, basic needs must be
fulfilled before work can be performed. Anyone who has brought up children knows
this to be a general fact. For this reason, a more just theory of property must place
needs satisfaction over labor. In Lockean terminology, we must therefore conclude
that a property regime that fulfills these criteria of life, liberty and property for all
is not one based on labor, but on the more general right to existence through the
access to resources that enables one to satisfy one’s needs. Yet, to be precise we
must admit that Waldron is not arguing for a general right to common property
or commons. However, although he focuses on individual private property, the ar-
gument also holds true for common property. And as we have already argued, the
justification for the access to commons instead of individual private property is the
fact that commons provide people with amore adequate institutional arrangement
for dealing with conflict in the satisfaction of people’s common and interdependent
needs.
In conclusion, it can therefore be said that the development of a commons the-
ory of property demands that we critically revise Locke’s well-known labor theory
of property. As I have demonstrated, this demands a threefold shift in our under-
standing of property: firstly, the shift from (self-)ownership to (self-)guardianship
integrates the wider socio-ecological web of life in institutional property arrange-
ments. Secondly, the shift from non-interference to non-domination requires that
people have direct access to resources held in common in order to avert arbitrary
interference and, in turn, enable the codetermination of their activities and life
conditions. Lastly, my critique of a (social) labor theory of property has demon-
strated the necessity of prioritizing the more basic and general right to resources
according to interdependent needs satisfaction (i.e. ‘being’, life or self-preserva-
tion) over the special right to resources through labor appropriation.
After having worked through these elements of a theory of property, the ques-
tion arises how such a right to property should be spelled out. To gain an idea of
what such a property arrangement might look like, let us now to turn to the work
of John Rawls, who also argues for the direct access to resources or, in his termi-
nology, an ex ante or predistribution of property in the name of individual freedom
and democracy. Parallel to my revision of Locke’s theory of property, I now crit-
ically examine Rawls’ notion of predistribution and property-owning democracy
and reinterpret it from a commons perspective.
180 Democracy, Markets and the Commons
6.4 Predistribution: commons in a property-owning democracy
It can generally be said that John Rawls is one of the most important political
philosophers of the 20th century.Hismagnus opus ATheory of Justice (1999)15 remains
a central reference for the conceptualization and defense of a free and just society.
In this work, and somewhat more explicitly in his later book Justice as Fairness: A
Restatement (2001), Rawls discusses the property arrangements of such a society.
Rawls develops and defends the notion of predistribution, in which property in re-
sources is understood as a precondition of a person’s life and liberty. The principle
of predistribution allows him to develop a model of property-owning democracy,
which I analyze here. The question that arises is whether this notion of predistri-
bution and property-owning democracy can aid in the development of a commons
theory of property and if not, how we must reinterpret Rawls’ model. In order to
answer this question I firstly sketch Rawls’ theory of justice and his concept of
a property-owning democracy. Next, I discuss the relation between the individ-
ual and society and critically analyze the role of the competitive market in Rawls’
model. Finally, I argue that an ecologically sound predistribution schememust shift
its focus from productive assets and productivity to shared resources and their
care. Thus, I claim that common property arrangements would provide a better
background structure for a sustainable property-owning democracy.
John Rawls’ property-owning democracy
In order to grasp Rawl’s understanding of predistribution and a property-owning
democracy, I first summarize and discuss his theory of justice, largely with refer-
ence to his book Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001). Rawls formulates the fun-
damental idea of justice as “a fair system of social cooperation over time from one
generation to the next” (JF: 5). He breaks this concept down into his two principles
of justice:
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of
equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liber-
ties for all; and
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are
to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equal-
ity of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged members of society (the difference principle). (JF: 42-3)
15 In my discussion of Rawls’ theory of justice, I will refer to the second edition of the book A
Theory of Justice published in 1999 with the abbreviation “TJ”. The book Justice as Fairness will
be mentioned as “JF”.
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The first principle should enable the “fair equality of opportunity,” which is more
generally understood as “liberal equality” (JF: 44). The second principle, on the one
hand, refers to the “fair value of political liberties,” which should ensure the “equal
chance of influencing the government’s policy and of attaining positions of au-
thority irrespective of their economic and social class” (JF: 46). On the other hand,
the second principle also includes Rawls’ famous “difference principle” which rad-
ically binds or limits the individual accumulation of wealth to the benefit of those
least well-off in society.Within the ecological understanding of social reality I have
elaborated, the difference principle could be understood as a means of express-
ing the principle of social interdependence and the requirement that a society can
only flourish when all individuals can also flourish. As mentioned previously, this
principle provides a way to limit arbitrary interference and domination.
Rawls understood his theory of justice to lay the foundations for the “basic
structure” of a just and free society. According to Rawls, the basic structure of a
society16 is the “primary subject of political justice” (JF: 10) and should secure just
“background institutions” that “remain fair over time, from one generation to the
next” (JF: 51). The reason these institutions are in the “background” is because they
are supposedly founded on a general overlapping consensus of the members of a
society and should thus not be put into question or attacked anew in each period
of legislation.These institutions should make justice and freedom socially sustain-
able.
For a long time after his first formulation of a just basic structure, Rawls’ theory
of justice was believed to amount to a legitimation and defense of welfare-state
capitalism. He corrected this common misunderstanding briefly in the preface to
the second edition of ATheory of Justice in 1999 (TJ: xiv-xvi) and thenmore extensively
in his later book Justice as Fairness in 2001. Since this reformulation, there has been
a growing interest in the interpretation and further implications of his theory of
justice (O’Neill/Williamson 2012; Cheneval/Laszlo 2013).
In his discussion of the specific institutions of a just basic structure, Rawls dis-
tinguishes five different regime types: state socialism with a command economy,
laissez-faire capitalism, welfare-state capitalism, property-owning democracy and
liberal (democratic) socialism. Not very surprisingly, Rawls rejects state socialism
because it is controlled by a single political party and “violates the equal basic rights
and liberties, not tomention the fair value of these liberties” (JF: 138). In this regime
16 Rawls elaborates on the concept of this basic structure: “The basic structure of a society is
the way in which the main political and social institutions of society fit together into one
systemof social cooperation, and theway they assign basic rights and duties and regulate the
division of advantages that arises from social cooperation over time. […] The basic structure is
the background social framework within which the activities of associations and individuals
take place. A just basic structure secures what we may call background justice.” (JF: 10)
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type, the economy is structured according to a general plan that negates both demo-
cratic participation and free markets. Yet, Rawls also criticizes laissez-faire capi-
talism, which he calls “the system of natural liberty” (JF: 137) because it “secures
only formal equality” and rejects both principles of justice (JF: 137).17 To the sur-
prise of some, however, Rawls also argues that welfare-state capitalism (WSC) fails
to live up to the standards of his theory of justice. Although WSC does express
“some concern for equality of opportunity, the policies necessary to achieve that
are not followed” (JF: 138). Furthermore, WSC also rejects the second principle of
justice, the fair value of political liberties. Owing to these underlying values, WSC
“permits very large inequalities in the ownership of real property (productive assets
and natural resources) so that the control of the economy and much of political life
rests in a few hands” (JF: 138). While WSC generally provides those in need with a
social minimum, the inequalities that bring such needs forth are themselves not
regulated, limited or eradicated.
The only answer to the failings of state socialism, laissez-faire capitalism and
welfare-state capitalism is what Rawls calls property-owning democracy (POD) or
liberal (democratic) socialism. While he only briefly discusses liberal socialism,
Rawls develops the differences between WSC and POD in more detail. Liberal so-
cialism consists, according to Rawls, of a regime in which the means of production
are owned “by society” (JF: 138). Yet, in comparison to state socialism, a plurality of
parties competes and is therefore forced to share political power. Furthermore, eco-
nomic power is not centralized but “dispersed among [democratically organized]
firms” (JF: 138). And, just as importantly, economic activities are structured not by a
centralized plan but through “a system of free and workably competitive markets”
(JF: 138). Despite the paucity of Rawls’ comments on liberal socialism, it appears
safe to say that this regime is what many other intellectuals understand as mar-
ket socialism: an economy organized by worker-owned firms and a ‘free’ market
economy (Miller 1990).
17 In a letter to Philippe Van Parijs, Rawls elaborates on his critique of laissez-faire capitalism.
Here, Rawls argues that the “large open market including all of Europe is aim of the large
banks and the capitalist business class whose main goal is simply larger profit” (Rawls/Van
Parijs 2003). This economic class justifies their interests with the “idea of economic growth,
onwards and upwards, with no specific end in sight” (ibid.). He goes on to say that in laissez-
faire capitalism distribution is almost exclusively referred to “in terms of trickle down” (ibid.)
and without any mention of welfare-state redistribution. The problem with such an unreg-
ulated market economy is that the “long–term result of this […] is a civil society awash in a
meaningless consumerism of some kind” (ibid.). With reference to this trenchant critique,
it can be said that Rawls rejects large, open markets in general because they are often used
by economic (and political) elites to accumulate capital without having to redistribute their
gains to other members of society. Furthermore, such a market economy creates individu-
als that are merely consumers and not understood – or do not understand themselves – as
political citizens.
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According to Rawls, the only other social arrangement that realizes his prin-
ciples of justice is what he calls property-owning democracy (POD).18 Like liberal
socialism, PODmust, he thinks, be understood as “an alternative to capitalism” (JF:
135-6). However, while liberal socialism is like laissez-faire capitalism and WSC in
that it emphasizes social ownership, POD allows for individual private property
in productive assets. The major difference between WSC and POD is, nonetheless,
that while WSC allows “a small class to have a near monopoly of the means of pro-
duction,” POD ensures a “wide and far more equal dispersion of real property and
productive assets” (JF: 161). Importantly, this also includes human capital, “that is,
education and trained skills” (JF: 139). Rawls is, however, rather vague in defining
what these primary goods could be. Besides education and training, the focus is of-
ten on what Rawls calls “productive assets”, which are interpreted by most of those
developing his notion of POD as “productive capital” (O’Neill 2012: 80; Hsieh 2012:
156; Freeman 2013: 23; Thomas 2017: 307). Furthermore, in a POD the distribution
of capital and wealth occurs not at the “end of each period” (ibid.) after the process
of production and the distribution of assets through market exchange have taken
their course but rather “at the beginning of each period” (JF: 139). The shift from
WSC to POD is thus a shift from ex post to ex ante distribution. The shift in per-
spective is important because it intends “not simply to assist those who lose out
through accident or misfortune (although that must be done), but rather to put all
citizens in a position to manage their own affairs on a footing of a suitable degree
of social and economic equality” (JF: 139).
Put somewhat differently, POD attempts to realize the substantive equality in
which the right to life, liberty and property is not merely understood negatively as
the protection of already existing property relations but also positively as a general
right to access the means of production. This shift from redistribution to predis-
tribution should transform individuals dependent on welfare into independent indi-
viduals capable of equally and freely participating in social cooperation. While in-
equalities and dependencies often lead to class antagonisms and political apathy,
material independence should, in turn, provide recognition and self-confidence to
all members of society, ultimately empowering them to participate in democratic
politics (JF: 140).
Rawls’ notion of the individual and society
Having now laid out Rawls’ general understanding of his theory of justice and a
property-owning democracy, the question arises why he focused on a wide dis-
18 The concept of POD was adopted from the English economist James E. Meade (1907-1995),
who explicitly discussed the term in his book Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of Property
(1964).
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persion of individual private property. Generally, Rawls grounds the priority of in-
dividual freedom and, therefore, individual private property on the “reasonable
pluralism” of individual conceptions of the good. Due to the plurality of ends in-
dividuals pursue, Rawls argues for the priority of the right over the good, which
ought, he thinks, to be the result we arrive at if we think through the “original
position” thought experiment and the concept of an overlapping consensus.
To delineate Rawls’ position more clearly, it may be helpful here to briefly com-
pare Rawls’ concept of justice with Elinor and Vincent Ostrom’s concept of the com-
mons. On the most general level, there appears to exist quite an overlap in the con-
ceptualization of Rawls’ well-ordered, just and democratic society and the Ostroms’
design principles for the sustainable and democraticmanagement of resources and
institutions held in common. Both the Ostroms and Rawls emphasize the impor-
tance of a shared understanding of justice, the significance of shared knowledge
of the constitution of society’s basic structure and the necessity of effective self-
organization. That being said, while the Ostroms develop their under-theorized
concepts of justice and sustainability from empirical examples of pre-contractual
social cooperation and democratic participation, Rawls grounds his normative po-
sition in the thought experiment of the “veil of ignorance” and the “original posi-
tion” and in the contractual agreement of an “overlapping consensus”.
According to Rawls, the veil of ignorance and the original position enable people
to “be removed from and not distorted by the particular features and circumstances
of the existing basic structure” (JF: 15). This thought experiment enables people to
grasp the equality of persons despite opposing interests and unequal bargaining
advantages (JF: 16). The aim of the hypothetical and ahistorical original position
(JF: 16-7) is to provide a just procedure in order to arrive at an “overlapping consen-
sus” or social agreement on the “fair terms of social cooperation between citizens
regarded as such” (JF: 16). While the Ostroms define symmetrical (or more or less
equal) relationships as a central prerequisite for fair and sustainable democratic
government, Rawls formulates a just procedure that makes it possible to conceive
of a hypothetical symmetry of each party despite the actual lack of symmetry. In
relation to the tragedy of the commons, it could be said that Rawls’ original posi-
tion enables human beings to overcome tragedy by creating just and stable social
arrangements through contractual agreements based on insights arrived at by step-
ping behind the veil of ignorance. The tragedy is overcome when all participants
recognize both the equality of all and the mutual advantage resulting from social
cooperation.
That being said, the contrast between the Ostroms and Rawls should not be
overemphasized, becausemore overlap exists than is apparent at first glance.Here,
I do not wish to focus on the communitarianism-liberalism debate in this short
discussion of Rawls. As Sibyl Schwarzenbach persuasively argues in her article
“Rawls, Hegel, and Communitarianism”, this debate is a “red herring” (Schwarzen-
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bach 1991: 564), because Rawls himself does not advocate the “abstract”, “denuded”
and “asocial” individualism that many communitarians such as Michael Sandel
(1986), Charles Taylor (1994) andMichaelWalzer (1989: 185) see in his writing.On the
contrary, in the third part of A Theory of Justice Rawls strongly emphasizes the im-
portance of complementary cooperation for the “social union” and the realization
of a “well-ordered society”.19 For example, Rawls explains that
the social nature of mankind is best seen by contrast with the conception of private
society. Thus human beings have in fact shared final ends and they value their
common institutions and activities as good in themselves. We need one another
as partners in ways of life that are engaged in for their own sake, and the successes
and enjoyments of others are necessary for and complimentary to our own good. […] Thus
wemay say followingHumboldt that it is through social union founded upon the needs
and potentialities of its members that each person can participate in the total sum of the
realized natural assets of the others. We are led to the notion of the community of
humankind the members of which enjoy one another’s excellences and individu-
ality elicited by free institutions, and they recognize the good of each as an element
in the complete activity the whole scheme of which is consented to and gives pleasure to
all. (TJ: 458-9; emphasis added)
As we see, Rawls’ concept of a just society reaffirms our insight of the interde-
pendent self-organization and convivial flourishing of the individual for the whole
and the whole for the individual.The provision of access to property enables people
to satisfy their needs in a self-organizing manner that is in accordance with their
natural endowments and capabilities – and those of others. Furthermore, this pro-
vision does not simply occur ‘magically’ through the public institutions of the state,
but trough the “collective activity of justice [which] is the preeminent form of hu-
man flourishing” (ibid.: 463). This concept of justice as the basic structure could
thus be understood as the shared norms and values of a community brought about
by and reproduced through civic social actions, interactions and institutions.
The competitive market and the problem of endless growth
So the problem in Rawls’ concept of justice does not lie in the discrepancy between
the individual and society, despite what parties to the communitarianism-liberal-
ism debate have often assumed. Instead, I would argue that the problem lies in two
tensions: on the one hand, in a tension between the ‘private’ economic reproduc-
tion of society and the ‘public’ reproduction of a society’s basic structure; and on
the other, in a tension between the reality of justice and its ideal concept. In other
words, the problem in Rawls’ theory of justice is not the individual-society-state
19 See especially chapter 79 “The Idea of the Social Union” in Rawls’ A Theory of Social Justice.
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relationship, but rather the market-state dichotomy. Since I discuss the concept of
non-ideal theory in more depth later, let me turn briefly to Rawls’ understanding
of the market.
Interestingly, in both property-owning democracy and liberal socialism, Rawls
defends a wide distribution of property against the backdrop of a competitive mar-
ket economy.The combination of a wide distribution of productive assets and a sys-
tem of “(workably) competitivemarkets” (TJ: xiv) is meant to “prevent a small part of
society from controlling the economy and indirectly political life itself” (ibid.: xiv-
xv). The assumption is that competitive markets “properly regulated secure free
choice of occupation and lead to an efficient use of resources and allocation of
commodities to households” (TJ: 244). In their ideal form, regulated competitive
markets – coupled with a widespread distribution of productive assets – should
ensure not merely freedom of association, but also an efficient use of society’s re-
sources. Finally, it must also be noted that Rawls’ just and well-ordered society does
not necessarily require perpetual economic growth; ex ante distribution in line with
the two principles of justice should also, theoretically, be realizable in a stationary
state (JF: 63-4).20
Although this might be assumed, I question whether a wide dispersal of indi-
vidually owned productive assets combined with highly competitive markets can
actually be realized and maintained over generations. Here, I would argue that
the economic ‘virtues’ (pursuit of self-interest, competitiveness etc.) that are cul-
tivated through individual private property and open and competitive market ar-
rangements would undermine the social cooperation necessary for the stable or
sustainable reproduction of a just basic structure of society “over time from one
generation to the next” (JF: 5). This is a common criticism of Rawls’ theory of jus-
tice and property-owning democracy (Krouse/McPherson 1988: 102-3; Wesche 2013:
106-9; Hussain 2009; Roemer 2013). Aside from this ethical argument, highly com-
petitive markets inherently lead to the accumulation and overuse of socio-ecolog-
ical resources, as we have already discussed. This is what we understood as the
tragedy of privatization and open and competitive markets. In this sense, I would
agree with Sibyl Schwarzenbach that the provision of “productive capital” is highly
conducive to “exclusive and acquisitive” ownership (Schwarzenbach 1987: 144) and
ultimately to an economy geared towards perpetual monetary growth.
20 In Justice as Fairness, Rawls writes, “A further feature of the difference principle is that it does
not require continual economic growth over generations to maximize upward indefinitely the
expectations of the least advantaged (assessed in terms of income and wealth). That would
not be a reasonable conception of justice. We should not rule out Mill's idea of a society
in a just stationary state where (real) capital accumulation may cease. A well-ordered society is
specified so as to allow for this possibility.” (JF: 63-4; emphasis added)
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The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, for capital to be productive, it needs
to be invested in a specific enterprise at a rate of interest. This implies that the
firm has to produce and sell goods, which, in turn, enables it to earn a profit and
pay the interest back. But the augmented capital is then lent again with the aim
of receiving interest. In turn, more goods are produced and consumers (hopefully)
buy more things. It is important to note that each time capital is lent its amount
must be increased, for that is the reason why it was lent in the first place. If the
expected rate of interest cannot be paid back, capital is withheld and the economy
slumps or breaks down. This is what Streeck refers to as an “investment strike” on
the part of capital (Streeck 2013: 50). In this sense, the inherent logic of an economy
based on interest and productive capital is one of perpetual and exponential growth
(Binswanger 2013; Hardin 1993: 61-68). Given this dynamic, the amount of produc-
tive assets made available to each citizen at every round of ex ante predistribution
must, in turn, also be increased. Secondly, the reproduction and predistribution of
capital separates the monetary mediation of needs satisfaction from the socio-eco-
logical basis of wealth production. This separation often enables people to ignore
and forget where monetary wealth originates and allows them to believe that ma-
terial wealth can increase without limits – despite the limits to economic growth
in a world of finite resources. In other words, the predistribution of productive
capital not only neglects the question of how capital is produced and reproduced,
but also transforms themeans of satisfying one’s needs (throughmoney) into an end
in itself (wealth accumulation and the potential to satisfy ever more, and ever in-
creasing needs). Yet, as I just mentioned, it is not only capital’s “veil of ignorance”
that allows us to forget the socio-ecological foundation of wealth and to develop
unlimited material needs and desires, but it is rather a central and inherent func-
tion of productive capital to perpetually and exponentially grow. In this sense, the
supposed stability that results from an economy based on productive capital and
competitive markets is, from a socio-ecological point of view, highly unsustainable
(Schweickart 2012: 213).
Although Rawls does argue that we could have a steady-state economy, for the
reasons mentioned I believe that the predistribution of “productive capital” would
nevertheless result in an ecologically unstable growth-oriented economic system
– even if the ex ante distribution of these assets were extremely fair and just. The
usual answer to this problem would be that robust laws and a “just background
structure” could protect socio-ecological resources from overuse. However, if un-
limited growth is a central feature of the economy, then both the people demanding
their return on investment and those required to repay interest will always attempt
to undermine and challenge the rules. Put more generally, and as I have already ob-
served in relation to the state-market dichotomy, the separation of individual and
‘private’ economic interests from general, ‘public’ interests ultimately leads to the
limitation of political regulation and democratic organization of socio-ecological
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systems. Consequently, a property arrangement based on exclusive and acquisitive
ownership of productive capital will ultimately be unable to sustainably reproduce
the socio-ecological just basic structure of society.
From productivity to care
For this reason, I would defendRawls’ argument for predistribution and a property-
owning democracy, but I would argue that an ex ante distribution must be based
on something other than productive capital if domination is to be overcome and
the self-organized satisfaction of needs enabled. As might be expected, my answer
to this problem lies in access to commons and the practice of commoning in the
form of democratic negotiation over the use of economic resources that are held in
common. Yet, because it is also possible that democratically organized activities be
directed towards perpetual growth, I would argue that it is also necessary to shift
the core normative value underlying economic activities from productivity to care.
To do this, I would like to take a step back and analyze the concept of productivity
and ecological limits in relation to the work of Locke and Adam Smith. Although
this jump back in time might appear somewhat anachronistic, I would argue that
Rawls’ notion of productive assets echoes Locke and Smith’s focus on productivity
as a central feature of a legitimate socio-economic arrangement. After examining
their arguments, I then relate them back to Rawls’ notion of productive assets in a
property-owning democracy.
As I have already discussed, for Locke it is not only labor, but, more specifically,
productive labor that lays the foundations for the right to appropriate resources.
For example, the cultivation of land is, he thinks, more productive than hunting
and gathering because it produces greater yields per unit of labor and land (Locke
2008: II, §41-3). In this respect, Locke understands labor activities that increase the
number of material goods in the world as productive. Adam Smith also adopts this
normative notion of productive labor and clearly distinguishes unproductive from
productive labor. Unproductive labor includes, for example, services performed by
“churchmen, lawyers, physicians,men of letters of all kinds; players, buffoons,mu-
sicians, opera-singers, opera-dancers” (Smith 1994: 361) – and, presumably, also the
activities of people who care for children, the sick and the elderly.The notion of pro-
ductivity is therefore limited only to very specific activities, which, in turn, provide
supposedly ‘unproductive’ people with food, clothes, homes, computers and cars.
In contrast to Locke, however, Smith argues that it is not merely an increase in
material goods (use value) that should be described as productive, but also the in-
crease in profits that result from the sales of these goods on the market (exchange
value). The emphasis on productivity is understandable considering the socio-eco-
nomic realities prior to the industrial revolution. The focus on productivity has
brought about an immense increase in the output of material goods and monetary
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wealth over the last two hundred years (Pinker 2018: 81). The main reasons given
for these developments are, firstly, individual private property, which enables the
individual to use a resource in a way that will increase its yields and then sell the
goods for profit. Secondly, the competition between individual producers that re-
sults from openmarkets drivesmarket participants to perpetually increase levels of
productivity in order to produce more goods for a cheaper price and thus maintain
a competitive advantage. We have already discussed this issue in detail. Accord-
ing to Smith, however, another main reason for increases in productivity is the
division of labor which can more generally be understood as the rationalization of
production processes. This is the opening argument ofTheWealth of Nations.
So that we can better understand where the increase in productivity in modern
economies comes from, I would like to analyze Smith’s argument for the division
of labor in more detail and, more specifically, his famous example of the pin maker
(Smith 1994: 4-5). Smith argues that the output of pin production could increase
greatly if it were not one personwho performed all the tasks involved in producing a
pin, but if, instead, the process of pin-making were divided into numerous steps,
each of which was then executed by a different person. By dividing up the labor
between a number of people, each laborer becomes a specialist for a particular
activity, increasing the efficiency of the work process for making a single pin and
ultimately increasing the number of pins that can be produced in the same amount
of labor time (e.g. one day). Lastly, Smith notes that further efficiency gains can
then also be achieved through the use of machines. This is the usual story that is
told when discussing increases in productivity through rationalization processes
and specialization. What is noteworthy is that the story being told is linear and
progressive: there is a beginning and an end, and the in the end we have more
than in the beginning. So where does this ‘more’ come from?
To understand productivity from a socio-ecological perspective, we must shift
our focus from the linear process of production to the reproduction of life in ecosys-
tems. Here, we must also note that the amount of matter and energy on earth re-
mainsmore or less constant over time. From this perspective, the creation of wealth
merely implies the reconfiguration of existing matter and energy into goods that
we then, in turn, define as wealth. For example, the amount of metal in the world
before and after the production process has remained the same. The increase in
the production of pins simply means that more metal has been extracted from the
earth and transformed into pins within a shorter period of time. Let us call this
the “nature side” of the equation. In this equation, however, we must also include
the wood or coal that is burnt in order to change the form of the metal. It can gen-
erally be assumed that the increase in pin production would require an increase
in the use of wood or coal. Today, the source of energy would be oil, gas, nuclear
energy, solar energy or wind energy. On a side note, all these energy sources have
a material base and effect the environment in specific ways, such as, for example,
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the materials used to build solar panels and wind turbines. But for the moment let
us leave the question of new ‘green’ sources of energy out of the picture. In Smith’s
case, the accumulated energy in the wood or coal is released into the air in the form
of carbon dioxide, which is then transformed back into oxygen by plants through
the process of photosynthesis. While trees can grow back, the cycle of coal (or oil)
formation occurs over hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of years. The point
I wish to make here is that what is often understood as increases in productivity
is not only the transformation of specific resources into use or exchange values,
but also the release of accumulated energy into the atmosphere. More specifically,
the increases in productivity are not only based on the rationalization of labor pro-
cesses, but also dependent on the ability to release stored energy from coal and oil
(Wrigley 2004: 68-86). Expressed in somewhat different terms, it is not only labor,
but also the exploitation of large amounts of the gifts of ancient “buried sunshine”
(Mitchell 2011: 12) that allows human beings to increase their productivity andmake
the economy ‘grow’.
There is also, however, the ‘social side’ of the equation. In a first step, this re-
quires us to look at the type of labor that is involved in this production process. Be-
cause Adam Smith is discussing a market economy, we may generally assume that
he is talking about wage labor. From a Marxist perspective, the important point
here is that the wage laborer had to sell his or her labor at a price lower than the
amount of money that is realized through the sale of the goods produced. One cen-
tral reason for low wages is the competition between the large numbers of people
dependent on wage labor for their survival. This forces wage-dependent people to
accept incomes that (barely) cover their costs of living, even though the labor power
that the employee exerts exceeds this value. The difference between the exchange
value of the laborer’s wages and the exchange value realized through the sale of the
goods produced during, for example, one day of labor by the employee is, generally
speaking, what Marx understands as surplus value (Marx 1982a: 293-306). Accord-
ing to Marx, this surplus value explains where the “more” is derived from at the
end of the production cycle, which he symbolizes as M–C–M’ (money–commod-
ity–more money) (ibid.: 247-256). From this perspective, it is not necessarily the
division of labor, but more precisely the wage contract that enables the employer
to legally appropriate and accumulate the surplus value of productive wage labor.
It can therefore be said that the rate of rationalization will be intensely pursued,
not by the laborers, but rather by the employers, who will then profit (at least ini-
tially) from the increases in productivity.21 Interestingly, much later in his workThe
21 I say ‘initially’ because the gains only occurwhen a producer rationalizes his or her production
process before the competitors follow suit. In that time, it can generally be assumed that
consumers will buy the cheaper products from this more efficient producer. Marx calls this
“extra profit” (Marx 1991: 142) and compares it to the average surplus value generated through
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Wealth of Nations, Smith admits that there are negative social consequences which
result from too much specialization, in which “the [specialized] laborer becomes
as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become” (Smith
1994: 840). Understood within our socio-ecological framework, this implies that
productivity gains should be conceived of as the time and energy that are extracted
from the employee by the employer andmake the employee exhausted and “stupid”.
Hence, aside from the extraction from nature, it is also the exploitation of people
that enables labor activities to be more productive and, ultimately, transforms this
increase in productivity into increases in accumulated wealth.
It might be argued, however, that in a property-owning democracy this prob-
lem would not occur, because people have access to resources in the form of pro-
ductive assets. Here, it can be argued that this fact would free individuals from
entering wage labor relationships involuntarily. Thus, we could say that in such an
arrangement asymmetrical wage labor relationships would not exist. Furthermore,
it could also be contended that because the individual possesses productive assets,
she could become a co-owner of the enterprise. This would provide the individual
with rights to the surplus value that otherwise would have been appropriated by
the employer. It is often assumed that such a democratic enterprise would hinder
or even eliminate exploitation. Although this is partially true, if the enterprise sells
onto a competitive market the necessity to perpetually increase productivity will
remain, since the enterprise will be forced to keep up with changes in “socially nec-
essary labor time” (G. A. Cohen 1979). Thus, the necessity to perpetually rationalize
one’s labor processes through new technology and increased specialization would
also persist. If this is not achieved, it can be assumed that the enterprise would not
be able survive on the competitive market. This would then imply that the workers
would be obliged to exploit themselves. We can understand self-exploitation here
as the exertion of more energy than is required for the regeneration of the mind
and body. The problem of specialization can be interpreted here as the self-in-
flicted one-sided development of one’s capacities, which demands the suppression
of other activities and the degeneration of the capacities they involve. We already
touched on these problems in our discussion of the tragedy of the market in rela-
tion to burnout. To be fair, a recurring and just predistribution of property would
slow down the pace of this process, but it would nevertheless still occur. The only
difference would be that there is no employer to blame. Instead, the exploitation
would be self-inflicted and enforced throughmarket dynamics that induce acceler-
ating productivity gains.Here, we are reminded of Smith’s discipliningmechanism
of the open and competitive market.
society’s average rate of productivity, otherwise also defined as the socially necessary labor
time that is required to maintain in order to survive on the competitive market.
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Another aspect of this ‘social side’ of the productivity equation is the specializa-
tion of people towards performing reproductive care work outside of wage labor
relationships, be this in the household, the community (e.g. care for the unem-
ployed) or for the environment (e.g. against pollution). Although we have already
discussed this, it is important to note again that the ‘free pass’ given to ‘productive
people’ puts more care work obligations on the people who perform supposedly
‘unproductive’ activities. The amazing gains in efficiency through the division of
labor have therefore also divided the social world into those who are rational and
productive and those who are emotional (or, from a purely economic perspective
‘irrational’) and caring. From the linear perspective of output gains, the former is
obviously the more valuable; from the systemic perspective of reproduction, the
latter is essential for survival. But the point is not to say which of the two is ‘better’
– both are valuable in their own way and satisfy different needs and desires that
individuals, communities and ecosystems have. The point, however, is to empha-
size that gains in productivity always have social and ecological costs that, in turn,
need to be tended to and taken care of. Or, put somewhat more critically, gains
in productivity do not merely result from the activity of productive individuals,
but rather from the extraction of matter and energy from entire socio-ecological
systems, which then crystallizes in the form of individual private property while
it increases in output. Here, we are reminded again of Garrett Hardin’s “double
C–double P game”, in which costs are communalized and profits are privatized
(Hardin 1993: 237-8). What some people interpret as productive increases in the
“wealth of nations”, others experience as the depletion of their energy reserves.
That being said, the point is not to get rid of the division of labor or all forms
of growth. I merely present these few examples in order to demonstrate that all
increases in productivity have a specific ‘material’ base (matter, energy, time) that
cannot be eliminated from the equation. Increases in productivity ex nihilo do not
exist (ibid.: 70-76). This is not to say that all increases in productivity are based on
exploitation. Nor should this insight imply in any way that Rawls (implicitly) sup-
ports exploitation. That would obviously be false. But his emphasis on productive
assets and capital leaves the question of where productivity gains are supposed to
come from unanswered (Schweickart 2012; Alperovitz 2012; Williamson 2012: 303).
I believe this to be a serious problem in Rawls’ theory of property-owning democ-
racy that must be dealt with. This short discussion of the origins of productivity
gains has merely attempted to make the point that productivity cannot perpetu-
ally rise without having serious (negative) effects on society and the environment.
In relation to our discussion of labor and productivity, this implies that we must
shift our understanding of economic activities and property arrangements from
one based on productivity to one revolving around cultivation and care.
This emphasis on care in economic activities might initially appear problem-
atic, because care is often interpreted as an unproductive activity. But this does not
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imply that labor would then be unproductive, but rather that productive activities
would not be based solely on a linear logic of the maximization of material wealth.
Instead, its central normative characteristic would be concern for the sustainable
creation and reproduction of goods for the satisfaction of common needs. Along
these lines, Sibyl Schwarzenbach also argues in her discussion of Rawls that we
should reinterpret labor and ownership according to the concept of care. She ex-
plains that “by care ismeant that specifically intelligent activity which appropriately
responds to the concrete legitimate needs of others with the end of encouraging
their autonomous capacities” (Schwarzenbach 1987: 157). Here, the shift is not only
from the linear increase in production outputs to cyclical reproduction, but also to
the concern and responsibility for the satisfaction of the concrete needs of others
– be they other humans, other living beings more generally, or entire ecosystems.
Lastly, concern for others is not abstract –mediated throughmonetary values such
as ‘capital’ – but becomes visible through the concrete activities of caring for the
satisfaction of concrete needs in the form of food, housing, education, health, cul-
ture or a clean environment. Conversely, it could be said that needs decoupled from
the activities of care fall into the illusion of unlimitedmaterial growth,which inher-
ently leads to tragedy. In this sense, caring is not an individual and private activity,
as it is often understood to be, but rather a social and ecological activity of cul-
tivation, maintenance, reproduction and regulation that dissolves the boundaries
between the private, the economic and the political, on the one hand, and those
between culture and nature, on the other.
As can be expected, placing care at the heart of economic activities implies a
transformation of property arrangements. Here, I would argue with Schwarzen-
bach that care requires a shift from “exclusive and acquisitive” ownership to what
she calls shared “joint guardianship”, which is what we have defined as the com-
mons (ibid.: 147, 156-7). As I have already said in relation to guardianship, such a
commons property arrangement would integrate those who are significantly af-
fected into the management of the economic activities of the specific resource sys-
tem. This integration would provide individuals with opportunities to voice their
concrete needs and collectively negotiate if and how such needs can be satisfied in
relation to the needs of others. As is to be expected, such systems for managing
resources will often be criticized as inefficient and unproductive. This is the very
widespread assumption that was already voiced by Locke when he spoke of “com-
mon and uncultivated” resources. The fear that an economy based on democratic
care would be inefficient and unproductive is, however, partially true. In contrast
to Locke, the problem we face today – at least in the north-western hemisphere –
is not a lack of productivity but a productivity that is not compatible with the so-
cio-ecological reality. Or, in other words, an economic system based on perpetual
material growth is utopian in a world of limited resources. For this reason, it is
necessary to develop some reasonable alternative to such a highly problematic and
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self-destructive property arrangement geared toward perpetual increases in pro-
ductivity. By placing democratically organized caring activities at the center of our
background structure, the short-term efficiency in quantitative output productivity
would decrease. That, however, is precisely the point of such a property arrange-
ment. Moreover, such a system could increase the quality of the resource system,
the labor activities themselves and the goods being consumed.The shift from pro-
ductivity to care would therefore connote a shift from quantitative to qualitative
growth – a shift from owning more things to leading a more self-determined and
fulfilling life. In this respect, the creation of the qualitative good life will become
more efficient in a commons arrangement. A central reason for this is that people
will have the opportunity to codetermine the (re)production process ex ante through
democratic negotiation instead of through an ex post consumer choice that occurs
after the products have been produced and put on the shelf. Democratic negotia-
tion in commons property arrangements thereby also replaces the expensive adver-
tising industry that attempts to convince people that they should buy the specific
goods that are being produced. In this sense, we must interpret my critique of pro-
ductivity and growth not as a renunciation of either productivity or growth per se,
but rather as the opening up of the possibility for people to democratically code-
termine the criteria, organization and direction of the sustainable reproduction of
their resources and social activities. Simply put, we should put institutions that
support democratic deliberation and care at the heart of ‘productive’ economic ac-
tivities. This, I believe, would be an adequate socio-ecological reinterpretation of
Rawls’ property-owning democracy. Accordingly, the most just basic structure of
society is a commons-creating democracy.
6.5. Consumption goods: individual or common property?
Up until now, I have argued that the right to access to resources is a precondi-
tion for life and liberty. More precisely, I have argued that a commons theory of
property is justified due to the necessity of satisfying needs through access to the
resources on which people co depend. A common property arrangement provides
people with the institutional framework to solve conflicts over these shared vital
resources and collectively care for the reproduction of the specific socio-ecological
resource systems. This then leads to a central question that we have not properly
dealt with yet: would all goods be considered to be common property in such a
property arrangement? And if not, where would the line be drawn between private
and common property? In order to answer these rather broad questions, I begin
by discussing the differences between individual and social activities and produc-
tive and consumption goods. With reference to the negative ecological effects of
consumption patterns, I then argue that we must also conceptualize consumption
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goods as commons.Thirdly, I demonstrate that collaborative forms of consumption
can enable relative material abundance in a world of limited resources.
Different types of goods (part II)
The question of which goods and resources should ultimately be held, governed
and reproduced in common is both a simple and a difficult question. One simple
answer could be that I, as a philosopher, do not have the right to determine such
things, but rather that people themselves have to decide which goods they want to
organize as commons. I do, in fact, believe this to be true because commons are not
something that can simply be implemented by philosopher kings or technocrats but
require the civic activity of commoning to bring them forth. However, this would
be an easy way out of dealing with the problem. Another rather simple approach to
the problem would be to declare that all resources necessary for people’s existence
should be held as commons. But would this include not only the field of wheat, but
also the bread that I eat? As we can see, this generalization is very vague and not
very helpful because, theoretically, everything could be declared as necessary for
someone’s existence. Thus, the argument I provide below is not to be understood
as a list of things that should be held privately or in common, but rather as an
attempt to deal with the issue in a somewhat more dynamic and differentiated
manner.
To begin, let us recall Carol Gould’s differentiation between personal and social
property. According to Gould, personal property is that which is “required for the
individual’s own subsistence and self-development” (Gould 1990: 180). In contrast,
social property is supposedly that which is “required by individuals in common in
order to realize their joint purposes” (ibid.). This appears to be somewhat helpful,
but one central problem here lies in the fact that subsistence activities (i.e. farm-
ing, food processing, cooking) are often not performed individually, but rather in
groups. In such cases, subsistence resources should actually be understood as so-
cial or, rather, common property. Yet, when these activities do occur individually,
as they do, for example, in the case of cultivating a small garden lot, it is obvi-
ously adequate to understand this resource as an individual one. For this reason,
we should not only focus on the differentiation between individual and social ac-
tivities, but also, as David Held suggests, on the distinction between consumptive
and productive property (Held 1995: 263).22 As I have already mentioned, and along
the same line of thought, Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess distinguish between
the flow of resource units and the resource systems themselves (E. Ostrom/Hess
22 David Held also mentions financial property (i.e. capital) as a third type of property. In order
to simplify the argument, I focus on the distinction between consumptive and productive
goods and define financial property as a unit of productive property.
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2010: 58-9). Consumptive property and the flow of resource units could be, for ex-
ample, toothbrushes, apples, bread, underpants, bicycles, coal, personal comput-
ers or cash. Production goods and resource systems, on the other hand, would be
things such as apple trees or orchards, coal mines, bakeries, factories for tooth-
brushes, underpants or computers, central processor units or capital. However,
here we must also examine whether the specific entity is being used individually
or together with others in order to determine whether it should be conceptualized
as personal or social property. I could, for example, use my bicycle or my computer
as a source of income and thus transform a consumption good into one utilized for
production (e.g. as a bike messenger or a computer programmer). But this would
not transform it into social property, because the activity is performed individu-
ally. In this sense, things are not productive per se, but become productive through
their specific use. According to my argumentation, the social coordination of these
individual activities in an organization (e.g. the delivery or programming services)
should, however, be organized in a social and democratic manner, for example as
a cooperative, enabling the participants in this specific organization to fairly dis-
tribute their individually and collectively generated wealth and to democratically
codetermine the organization of their labor.
Nevertheless, another problem exists in the juxtaposition of individual con-
sumption and social production. A good that is individually consumed can also be –
and, in some cases, should be – organized as common property. According to Locke,
individual private property enables people to use and enjoy a specific good without
the arbitrary interference of others. This enables them to exclude others from the
use of that property. In cases of individual consumptive and productive property,
this often makes sense. I would, for example, prefer not to share my toothbrush,
my underpants, and my shoes with other people. I would also prefer to cultivatemy
small garden lot by myself, ridemy bicycle and usemy computer. By declaring these
goods as individual private property the negative freedom of the individual is se-
cured and the freedom of other people is not necessarily threatened, assuming the
goods are not used in bothersome or harmful ways (i.e. riding over old people on
the street with my bike or planning terrorist bombings with my computer). These
are the usual examples that are often brought up in arguments against common
property arrangements. The general point here is that individuals don’t want to
have to ask the community if they can brush their teeth with the communal tooth-
brush twice or three times a day or if they can put on a pair of communal shoes
every morning in order to go and get the communal newspaper. The problem with
this argument is, however, that it leads to the assumption that everything would be
held in common because, theoretically, everything has an effect on someone else
(i.e. the color of someone’s T-shirt might not match the color of my pants, for ex-
ample). Obviously, these examples are absurd. No one would want such property
arrangements. And, yes, such property arrangements would be highly inefficient
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in dealing with our everyday lives. But no one in favor of commons is per se against
individual private property in such personal consumption goods. When we focus
on these issues, we get distracted from a more fundamental one that is at stake:
the problems of exclusion from or overuse of resources that are central for one’s life
and liberty. From this perspective, there are strong ecological or functionalist and
normative arguments for the sharing of certain consumption goods. Let us now
turn to these arguments.
Maximizing consumption and the population myth
Up until this point, I have generally argued that resources that affect the larger
community and that are necessary for the satisfaction of common needs should
be held in common. As previously mentioned, this basically implies that (re)pro-
ductive activities in resource systems should be organized as commons while the
flow of consumption units should be organized as individual private property. Yet
let me introduce an example that reveals problems for this dichotomy. Let us as-
sume that a person has acquired a relative amount of wealth (for the sake of the
argument, we could say within the limits of Rawls’ difference principle).The person
wants to use this money for consumption goods because the reinvestment of the
money would transform it into productive property (capital). This would, in turn,
require that the broader community also have a voice in the use of this capital. But
because the person does not want the community telling them what to do with this
money, they decide to spend most of their money on consumption goods such as,
for example, numerous large houses, expensive cars, yachts, private jets and so on.
And, to be fair, let us also assume that this person is not attempting to (accord-
ing to our commons property arrangement) ‘illegally’ use these goods as objects of
speculation and thus as ‘productive goods’. According to the distinction between
individual consumptive and social productive property, this would be legitimate
and no one would have the right to interfere with this person’s freedom.
Nevertheless, I would argue that problems arise here. Firstly, the logic of this
conception of negative freedom implies that individual freedom is increased if the
scope of one’s non-interfered-with reach over the material world is increased.This
basically implies that the more private consumption goods one has, the better. Al-
though we have shifted from productive to consumptive goods, our focus on the
increases in material goods and quantitative growth remains. But this leads us to
the question whether such a notion of maximization is compatible with the limits
of the earth system not only in the sphere of production but also in the sphere of
individual consumption. If there was only one such privileged person in the entire
world, we could say that it might not necessarily matter, because the environment
would not be too badly affected. The reality is, however, different: more and more
people strive to acquire more and more goods because they interpret the increase
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in consumptive goods as an increase in freedom and well-being (Rosa 2016: 45).
It can thus be assumed that this widespread aspiration has very serious negative
effects on the environment.
If we remember Garrett Hardin’s argument in the Tragedy of the Commons, this
ecological problem lies not necessarily in the number of goods people accumulate
and consume, but rather in the number of people in the world. As he explains in his
book LivingWithin Limits (1993), if we limited population growth, the smaller num-
ber of people in the world would then be able to enjoymore goods.QuotingMalthus
this would include, for example, a “daily […] glass of wine and a piece of beef for
[one’s] dinner” (Hardin 1993: 213, 306). Or, formulated more technically: “at a sus-
tainable size of population, the quality of life and the quantity of it are inversely
related” (ibid.: 213; emphasis omitted).This is the main thesis of Hardin’s Tragedy of
the Commons, and it is expressed by numerous other ecologists such as Paul Ehrlich
in his book The Population Bomb (1968) and more recently by the earth systems sci-
entist James Lovelock, who is a patron of the Optimum Population Trust. Lovelock
has said, for example, that
those who fail to see that population growth and climate change are two sides
of the same coin are either ignorant or hiding from the truth. These two huge
environmental problems are inseparable and to discuss one while ignoring the
other is irrational. (Lovelock quoted in populationmatters.org 2009)
This conclusion can easily be drawn by looking at the correlation between popu-
lation growth and the increase in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions over the last
200 hundred years (Steffen et al. 2011: 742, 745). Here, the total amount of GHG
emissions is mathematically distributed over the whole of the world’s population.
According to this calculation, the countries with the largest (increases in their) pop-
ulations are responsible for the overuse of the carrying capacity of their resource
systems. Hardin portrays this in his lifeboat ethics metaphor:
Metaphorically, each rich nation amounts to a lifeboat full of comparatively rich
people. The poor of the world are in other, much more crowded lifeboats. Contin-
uously, so to speak, the poor fall out of their lifeboats and swim for a while in the
water outside, hoping to be admitted to a rich lifeboat, or in some other way to
benefit from the ‘goodies’ on board. (Hardin 1974: 561)
The rather simple moral of this story is that the “rapidly-breeding poor” (ibid.: 565)
are the cause of the overuse of ecological resources and climate change. In order to
save planet earth, we must therefore exclude the poor from the wealth that north-
ern countries possess, let poor people die and, thereby, hopefully limit their ability
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to reproduce (ibid.: 565).23 According to this argumentation, sharing goods with
those who have less simply pours more oil into the fire of population growth and
ecological destruction.
I do not want to say that population sizes have no effects at all on socio-ecolog-
ical systems. It can generally be assumed that correlations between the two exist.
Nevertheless, the problem with the emphasis on the correlation between popula-
tion size and GHG emissions is that it neglects and conceals the distribution of the
specific ‘goods’ (wealth) and ‘bads’ (depletion and pollution) within a specific group
and between groups of people. By looking at the precise distribution of GHG emis-
sions, we encounter, however, a rather different picture. Viewed in this manner,
increases in GHG emissions do not necessarily correlate with population growth,
but rather with the increase in wealth and, thus, in consumption goods available
to individuals. For this reason, environmental scientist David Satterthwaite argues
that we should stop using the often-used equation “total impact equals population
times affluence times technology” (I = PAT). Instead, he argues that we must use
the correct equation “impact equals consumers times affluence times technology”
(I = CAT). As Satterthwaite explains:
It is not correct to suggest that it is the increase in population that drives the
growth in GHG emissions, when the lifetime contribution to GHG emissions of
a person added to the world’s population varies by a factor of more than 1,000 de-
pending on the circumstances into which they are born and their life possibilities
and choices. So it is not the growth in the number of people, but rather the growth in the
number of consumers and the GHG implications of their consumption patterns that are
the issue. In theory (leaving aside the difficulties in measurement), responsibility
for GHG emissions should be with individuals and households and based on the
GHG implications of their consumption, and not with nations (or cities) based on
GHG inventories from the production perspective. From the consumption perspec-
tive, globally, the 20 per cent of the population with the highest consumption levels is
likely to account for more than 80 per cent of all human-induced GHG emissions and an
even higher proportion of historical contributions. In considering how to reduce emis-
sions globally, far more attention should be directed to reducing this group’s GHG
emissions. And as responsibilities for addressing this are allocated to national and
local governments (with city governments having particularly important roles),
consider how this 20 per cent of the world’s population is distributed between
23 In Hardin’s own words: “Every life saved this year in a poor country diminishes the quality of
life for subsequent generations.” (Hardin 1974: 565; emphasis omitted) He therefore argues
that we must “admit no more to the boat and preserve the small safety factor. Survival of
the people in the lifeboat is then possible (though we shall have to be on our guard against
boarding parties).” (ibid.: 562)
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nations (obviously most, but certainly not all, are in high-income nations). (Sat-
terthwaite 2009: 564; emphasis added)
As the journalist George Monbiot puts it, “While there’s a weak correlation between
global warming and population growth, there’s a strong correlation between global
warming and wealth.” (Monbiot 2016: 104-5) As we see, the problem is not necessar-
ily large populations, but the great increase of wealth belonging to a small group of
people.Their ability to accumulate without limit enables them to consume most of
the world’s resources and to consequently produce most of the existing greenhouse
gases. For this reason, the political scientists Ulrich Brand and Markus Wissen call
this an “imperial mode of living” (2018) of the wealthy Northern countries, which
the sociologist Stephan Lessenich interprets as an “externalizing society” (2019).
To translate these insights back into Hardin’s “lifeboat ethics” metaphor: the rea-
son why the boats are sinking does not, first and foremost, lie in population sizes.
Instead, the boats of the affluent are sinking due to the heavy load of consump-
tion goods that they have collected. In turn, the boats of the poor are also sinking
because of the weight of the bads (pollution, deforestation, rising water levels, oil
spills etc.) that the wealthy have externalized. Yet, while the affluent can build bet-
ter and larger boats to carry the load, the others are left to sink.
If this is correct, it should have rather important implications for our discussion
of property arrangements for enabling life and liberty for all living beings. Firstly,
we cannot simply separate production goods from consumption goods. Simply or-
ganizing productive resource units as commons and leaving the sphere of con-
sumption intact as a sphere of individual negative freedom does not solve the eco-
logical problems societies are currently trying to deal with. Such a strategy might
protect the environment from a supply-side perspective, but it does not answer the
problem from a demand-side perspective that results from ecologically destructive
patterns of individual consumption. If people continuously demand more goods
for the satisfaction of their needs and desires, it is not clear that the production of
these goods will also change.
Secondly, although I have said that it should not necessarily be a problem if
only a few individuals own and use large amounts of resources, we have just seen
that only a small portion of the world’s population (20 percent) produces a large
portion of the world’s GHG emissions (80 percent). It is to be expected that if we
delved deeper into the statistics, we could find that an even smaller group of people
is proportionally consuming evenmore resources than the rest of the world’s popu-
lation (Monbiot 2016: 105-6; Oxfam 2017). From this perspective, it would therefore
be false to say that the individual ownership of a bicycle by each person in the world
is just as problematic as the private ownership of jeeps, yachts, jets and numerous
houses by a few. In this sense, we can say that the unlimited consumption of specific
6. Towards a commons theory of property 201
goods is not simply a ‘private’ matter, but has far-reaching and serious effects on
other people and the non-human world.
Third, it is also important to note that not only does a small portion of the
world’s population produce most of the world’s GHG emissions, but also that the
very poor people of the world produce very small amounts of GHG emissions (Sat-
terthwaite 2009: 547). This might sound like good news for Mother Nature – and,
to a certain extent, also for the wealthy inhabitants of the earth, because they can
simply reduce their consumption levels to a slight degree in order to get ‘in tune
with nature’, while simultaneously hoping that the poor will remain poor. But this
cynical answer is not only unjust towards those in need, but also largely unfeasi-
ble because those in poverty obviously want to improve their living standards and
increase their freedom. It can generally be assumed that they also want to real-
ize their rights to life and liberty just as Western societies have done. So how is
this fundamental contradiction between consumption patterns based on ever-in-
creasing needs and desires and the limitation of the ecosystems’ resources to be
solved?24
Collaborative consumption and relative abundance
Since this is a rather grand question, it might be helpful to return to our previous
discussion of individual private property in consumption goods in order to an-
swer it. As I mentioned then, the underlying principle is that individuals should be
free to enjoy their consumption goods without interference. Personal consumption
goods should remain as the last bastion of negative freedom.This negative freedom
is often understood as one of the fundamental types of individual freedom that lie
at the heart of a liberal society.
Within this understanding of freedom, it is then often assumed that the larger
the sphere of one’s negative freedom in consumption goods, the more opportuni-
ties one has to satisfy different needs and desires. Although this might be true,
we must also, however, recognize that different goods produce different effects on
24 In this short discussion of levels of consumption, GHG emissions and ecological degradation,
I have neglected one important aspect of the complex situation: the ability of ecosystems
to absorb GHG emissions. If, for example, we had enough trees on earth, our consumption
levels could theoretically remain at a certain level or even increase because the plants would
absorb the emitted gases. I would, however, argue that it can generally be assumed that high
levels of individual consumption are dependent on the deterioration of ecological systems
and their ability to reabsorb GHG emissions. Themost straightforward example of this is the
production of meat with soya feed in large areas where rainforest used to exist. Here, again,
we are confrontedwith the fundamental contradiction between an endless increase in needs
and desires and the limits of ecological resources.
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the environment. Importantly, different patterns of individual consumption in re-
lation to different goods produce different ecological effects. The increase in my
collection of jogging shoes in order to go running more often is, for example, com-
pletely different than the increase in the number of flights I take in order to attend
more academic conferences. Yet despite these differences, the maximization pat-
tern nevertheless assumes that the more goods, the better. It is important to note
here that it does not matter if these goods are bought with money that I earned
through wage-labor on the market or if I have received the means to buy these
goods from a state-orchestrated predistribution scheme available to all citizens.
Depending on the type of good and the pattern of consumption, the ecological ef-
fects are the same. As we see, it appears as though we have come across a certain
ecological paradox in the relationship between life, liberty and property – irrespec-
tive of whether we side with Locke or Rawls. On the one hand, we can enhance
material wealth and individual freedom in the form of consumption goods at the
cost of the environment. On the other hand, we could maintain life on earth at the
cost of poverty and lack of freedom. Within this framework, it appears as though
the needs and desires of humans oppose and contradict the needs of nature.
Where then is the way out of this dilemma? Is humanity simply going to fall
into a Hobbesian war of ‘all against all’? Or will a global state and the managers
of production resource systems rigorously limit and equally distribute the con-
sumption goods that each individual is allowed to have in the name of a just eco-
dictatorship? Or is each individual required to achieve mastery over their endless
needs and desires in the form of self-imposed sacrifice and asceticism? As we see,
all these options appear not only unattractive, but also highly unrealistic – except
for the possibility of war, that is. What other options do we have then? In order to
answer this question, let us return to the basic question of what property rights
are actually for. Informal or formal property arrangements intend to regulate the
use of resources so that people can live in relative peace and liberty.These arrange-
ments are meant to provide people with enough security so that they do not have
to be afraid that their dearly held goods will be taken from them. This enables in-
dividuals to plan their daily affairs, reproduce their existence and, possibly, lead a
good life. As we see, property arrangements are ameans to an end, such as security,
peace, realizing life-plans and, hopefully, a good life. Furthermore, the freedom in-
volved in this definition is also not an end in itself. Freedom is valuable because it
provides people with choices and capabilities; it is a means for people to be able to
define and realize their own conception of the good life.
Locke’s interpretation of this was to define these property rights individually
and exclusively: only if an object is individual private property can the individual
consume it. This is the same logic reproduced in the economic categorization of
goods I discussed in relation to Elinor and Vincent Ostrom: private goods are sub-
tractive and rival and can exclude the use and consumption of others. As we already
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mentioned above, almost all goods could fall into this category. As the term con-
notes, rival goods imply that the other person is a threat to one’s freedom and lib-
erty. But as we have seen, this logic would imply that the increase in life and liberty
for all people would then necessitate that everyone had individual private property
over an immense amount of goods and resources. Each piece of individual private
property provides people with a larger range of freedom to satisfy their needs and
desires and to realize the good life. The question remains, however, whether the
effort of producing and accumulating these goods in the end provides people with
enough time and peace of mind to enjoy a good life.
But we might base an alternative interpretation of the right to life, liberty and
property in consumption goods not on individual and exclusive rights, but instead
on collectively shared access rights to consumption goods that are held in common.
As I have already suggested in relation to the classification of goods, an alterna-
tive to the categorization of goods as exclusion, subtraction and rivalry could be
inclusion, addition and cooperation. Here, ‘rival’ goods are used and consumed
individually but nevertheless held in common, thereby transforming their subtrac-
tive characteristic into an additive feature of the good. G. A. Cohen discusses this
principle in reference to an often-used example of tools:
A homespun example shows how communal property offers a differently shaped
liberty, in no different sense of that term, and, in certain circumstances, more lib-
erty than the private property alternative. Neighbors A and B own sets of house-
hold tools. Each has some tools which the other lacks. If A needs a tool of a kind
which only B has, then, private property being what it is, he is not free to take B’s
one for a while, even if B does not need it during that while. Now imagine that
the following rule is imposed, bringing the tools into partly common ownership:
eachmay take and use a tool belonging to the other without permission provided
that the other is not using it and that he returns it when he no longer needs it, or
when the other needs it, whichever comes first. Things beingwhat they are (a sub-
stantive qualification: we are talking, as oftenwe should, about the real world, not
about remote possibilities) the communizing rule would, I contend, increase tool-
using freedom, on any reasonable view. To be sure, some freedoms are removed
by the new rule. Neither neighbor is as assured of the same easy access as before
to the tools that were wholly his. Sometimes he has to go next door to retrieve
one of them. Nor can either now charge the other for use of a tool he himself does
not then require. But these restrictions probably count for less than the increase
in the range of tools available. No one is as sovereign as before over any tool, so
the privateness of the property is reduced. But freedom is probably expanded. (G.
A. Cohen 2011: 155)
204 Democracy, Markets and the Commons
Although there might be a decrease in freedom for certain individuals from one
perspective, the principle of a tool commons or tool library would clearly increase
the freedom of those without the wealth to own all the tools. Cohen continues,
It is true that each would have more freedom still if he were the sovereign owner
of all the tools. But that is not the relevant comparison. I do not deny that full own-
ership of a thing gives greater freedom than shared ownership of that thing. But
no one did own all the tools before themodestmeasure of communismwas intro-
duced. The kind of comparison we need to make is between, for example, sharing owner-
shipwith ninety-nine others in a hundred things and fully owning just one of them. I sub-
mit that which arrangement nets more freedom is a matter of cases. There is lit-
tle sense in one hundred people sharing control over one hundred toothbrushes.
There is [however] an overwhelming case, from the point of view of freedom, in
favor of our actual practice of public ownership of street pavements. Denationaliz-
ing the pavements in favor of private ownership of each piece by the residents ad-
jacent to it would be bad for freedom ofmovement. (ibid.:155-6; emphasis added)
As we see, the question of which goods should be held in common cannot be
answered in advance, but must be decided through weighing different pros and
cons and, most importantly, through practical experiments that deal with differ-
ent goods. And, as Cohen mentioned, we are not talking about the collectivization
of a person’s toothbrush. Nevertheless, the principle can be applied to the use of
bicycles, cars, computers, musical instruments, games, gardens, holiday houses,
or even one’s own living space. The point is that in a world in which not everyone
can have everything, sharing goods in the form of commons provides the greatest
freedom for the greatest number of people. Here we can see that the normative ar-
gument for an increase in access to more shared goods is closely intertwined with
the ecological or functionalist argument for the stability of commons-based socio-
ecosystems. By sharing access to these goods, people can increase their freedom
without necessarily having to increase the number of goods that exist. Common
property in consumption goods thus provides people with a key strategy that en-
ables them to increase relative material abundance in a world of limited resources.
But is this the answer to the destruction of the environment: public sidewalks
and a library for tools? No, these are obviously simply some examples of how con-
sumption goods can be held in common. Nevertheless, the basic principle remains
rather simple and significant: by sharing goods with others, people can increase
their freedom to access and use various goods while decreasing the overall quan-
tity of goods being produced and consumed. The point, however, is not merely
to pool preexisting goods, but also to actively create these common goods with
others through the civic activity of commoning. Thus, by pooling these resources,
people not only access more goods, but they can also overcome the consumption-
production divide by using these goods, in turn, to satisfy their own specific needs
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and desires. This is what is propagated with repair workshops, 3-D printers and
the notion of open hardware (Rifkin 2015; Baier et al. 2016; Siefkes 2008). It is a
transformation of individual consumers into coproducers or peer-to-peer produc-
ers (Benkler/Nissenbaum 2006) through the equal access to pooled goods, which
not only frees people from the need to satisfy their needs via the market, but also
provides people with numerous opportunities to engage in collective productive or
‘commoning’ activities.
6.6 Interim conclusion
After this rather long investigation of a commons theory of property, let me briefly
summarize my findings. In this chapter, I have generally argued that in contrast
to exclusory private property, a commons theory of property is based on access
and democratic control. Instead of dominion, non-interference and labor, com-
mon property arrangements uphold the principles of guardianship, non-domina-
tion and needs-satisfaction. Common property arrangements can thus increase
people’s individual freedom, by both expanding their access to resources and giving
them the ability to democratically codetermine their institutional arrangements.
They provide people with the institutions to deal with conflicts over shared re-
sources that are necessary for the interdependent satisfaction of people’s common
needs. This can be interpreted as an institutional means of caring for the sustain-
able maintenance, reproduction and flourishing of socio-ecological systems.
Put differently, common property arrangements provide people with a way of
organizing life in a world of limited resources without resorting to domination and
without suffering from either scarcity or the tragedies of the unregulated commons
or the market. Instead, they enable people to create a relative abundance through
a convivial mode of interdependent existence. Relative abundance is, however, not
merely created through contracts that pool the limited quantity of goods being con-
sumed, but rather through the qualitative transformation of the relationships in the
web of life. In economic terminology we might say that commons create surplus
social value, instead of merely a monetary surplus. Thus, the other is not primarily
constituted as an existential threat, but rather as a peer withwhom to jointly realize
better outcomes through an ongoing process of negotiation and co-creation.
We can expect that some will find that a society based on common property
arrangements imposes too specific and narrow a concept of the good life. Accord-
ingly, it is often argued that in a liberal society political institutions should be neu-
tral and impartial in relation to notions of the good life (Dworkin 1991: 127; Gaus
2003; North et al. 2009: 114; Hayek 2013: 169-196). This is often understood as the
prioritization of the right over the good (Rawls 1988). As Rawls himself acknowl-
edges, however, no political arrangements are completely neutral in relation to di-
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verging concepts of the good life (ibid.: 251). As he explains in ATheory of Justice, “the
basic structure of society is bound to encourage and support certain kinds of plans
more than others by rewarding its members for contributing to the common good
in ways consistent with justice” (TJ: 373; emphasis added). As we have seen, indi-
vidual negative rights in private property provide people with the formal freedom
to pursue their economic interests without arbitrary interference.The antagonistic
structure of these property arrangements, however, inherently leads to maximiza-
tion strategies and its associated tragedies. In turn, individual positive rights at-
tempt to secure life and liberty by providing equal access to “productive assets”. Yet
as we have seen, these arrangements also induce similar maximization strategies.
Thus, we can say that the notion of the good life that unintentionally arises in both
of these property arrangements is caught in the “straitjacket” (E. Ostrom 2003: 25)
of maximization strategies and perpetual economic growth.
That being said, the problem we face, especially in relation to the problems of
scarcity, domination and tragedy, is not necessarily one of absolute neutrality, but
rather the question of the compatibility of different concepts of the good life. In
this sense, the concept of interdependent freedom in common property arrange-
ments obviously limits the scope of all possible life plans that can be pursued. Its
underlying principles of inclusion, negotiated cooperation and care therefore in-
herently limit life plans that aim to realize exclusion, competition and domination.
This much I must concede. But I also argue that these principles of common prop-
erty are the foundations of a just, free and sustainable social order. Despite these
supposed limitations of the range of choices within such a property regime, the
specific plans and choices within the arrangement are not predetermined. On the
contrary, common property arrangements increase individual freedom both by ex-
panding access to resources and by bringing themunder democratic control. In this
sense, it must be emphasized that in contrast to other property regimes, the free-
dom to alter and codetermine one’s social conditions is not merely limited to the
public sphere and affairs of the state. Instead, it is extended to the ‘private’ realms
of production, consumption and social reproduction. Furthermore, the cultivation
of democratic freedom in these everyday civic activities should hopefully open up
a “world of possibility” (E. Ostrom 2003: 62) and enable people to collectively orga-
nize their lives according to their own conceptions of the good life. For it is these
everyday civic practices in common property arrangements that are the seeds for
a flourishing democratic society and the sustainable reproduction of a just basic
structure.
7. The role of the state in a commons-
creating society
After having developed a commons theory of property, it is now necessary to turn
to the question of the relationship between commons and the state, on the one
hand, and the market, on the other. These questions are of great importance be-
cause the notion of commons is often interpreted as a form of social organization
“beyondmarkets and states” (Ostrom 2010; Bollier et al. 2012). As I will demonstrate
in the next two chapters, I believe this interpretation to be rather misleading. To
my mind, commons are not so much a radical alternative to the market and the
state, but rather as a strategy for democratizing these two social arrangements. In
general, the aim of my analysis is therefore to shift our framework of societal or-
ganization from one based on the state-market dichotomy to one conceptualized
as a commons-creating society. In order to flesh out this idea, I will sketch how
the state and the market can be transformed through commons institutions and
civic practices of commoning. Let us begin this analysis with the state-commons
relationship.
My examination of the state-commons relationship begins with some general,
preliminary reflections on this relationship. In a second step, I discuss the spe-
cific role commons can play in relation to various forms of the state, including the
monocentric, the minimal and welfare state. I then develop a better understand-
ing of the notion of the state in a commons creating society with reference to the
public goods housing, health care and education. In a final step, I discuss the role
of the state in developing commons in a non-ideal world. Here, I touch on a num-
ber of issues: the ‘urgency’ of climate change, the role of commons in ‘developing’
countries, the threat of state oppression and opportunities to reclaim and cultivate
commons both within and against the state.
7.1 Preliminary reflections on the state-commons relationship
In order to clarify my intentions here, I would like to begin my discussion of the
state-commons relationship with some preliminary remarks on the subject. While
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it might be argued that commons exist as a form of social organization ‘beyond’
and thus independent of the state, I would, contrarily, argue that the state is a cen-
tral institution for the realization and maintenance of commons.This claim might
appear surprising and fundamentally wrong by those who interpret and experience
the state as a hierarchical and oppressive institution and, in contrast, commons as
a form of self-governance. Here, the notion of self -governance appears to contra-
dict the necessity of an external authority manifested in the state. Yet, the problem
with such an antithetical presentation of the state and commons is that it remains
caught up in the dualistic Hobbesian model of the state: the monopoly on the use
of coercion can only be held by a Leviathan that rules autocratically over society.
Here, we must distinguish between the monopoly on the use of coercion, on the
one hand, and the form of organization that exercises this power, on the other.
As I have argued above, the self-governance of a commons provides us with an al-
ternative means to overcome the Hobbesian belligerent state of nature. From this
perspective, a monopoly on the use of force is created through trust, reciprocity
and the democratically determined rules and regulations of the commoners. In
the words of Anna Stilz: “The democratic state is a joint practice in which we act
together to secure a common end, and its unity can be explained on lines similar to
the unity of other practices in which we commonly act together.” (Stilz 2009: 192)
Here, the state’s monopoly on power needs to be understood as a form of recipro-
cal and public coercion. Only through this democratically legitimized monopoly on
power can affected people limit appropriation and free riding and, in turn, real-
ize fair and sustainable social arrangements. While the enforcement of laws by the
state can limit the harm afflicted on others and the overuse of resources, the state’s
ability to collect taxes is also a central means of alleviating power asymmetries and
opportunities for unequal appropriation. We might therefore say that, in its ideal
form, a democratic state can be interpreted as a self-governed commons.
In turn, this notion of the state provides us with a point of reference for think-
ing about how the state can provide access to resources in the form of a commons
predistribution. This is indeed a very difficult question because it is sometimes
assumed that state provision and commons are opposed to one another. In this
case, state provision is normally conceived as a ‘top-down’ activity, while commons
are understood as goods that are created, reproduced and managed ‘bottom-up’
by those affected. Furthermore, the notion of state provision of common property
is closely associated with the communism of the Soviet Union and its practices of
dispossession, coercion and uniformity. For this reason, the legal scholar Richard
Epstein, for example, firmly criticizes the provision of common property by the
state:
Any insistence, however, on mandatory common ownership is a recipe for disaster: co-
owners are not chosen but imposed, so the level of mutual distrust is likely to
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be high. Disagreement over the common plan of development, or over the divi-
sion of benefits and burdens, is virtually certain to producemassive forms of paralysis
from which there is no escape. A division of the property is ruled out by the inflex-
ible requirement of common ownership; and a sale of the property, or of any interest
therein, is not likely to succeed if a sustainable purchaser cannot be found – and
who wants to buy into a lawsuit or a family dispute? Boundary disputes are the
price paid in order to avoid the governance problems that arise from forced associ-
ations. (Epstein 1994: 36-7; emphasis added)
Although this portrayal of commons is obviously crude, Epstein’s criticism never-
theless remains partly valid: the forced, top-down implementation of a commons
regime would most likely be problematic. The necessary state coercion involved in
such a transformation of social order would contradict the notion of free associ-
ation and democratic self-governance inherent in the idea of a commons based
society. Therefore, the question arises how the state can provide common goods
without ‘forcing’ people to collectivize their property.
Furthermore, the general assumption that a commons provided by the state
would be uniform must also be considered. This is, in general terms, a widespread
critique of the satisfaction of individual needs through the paternalistic state pro-
vision ofmaterial equality: people are different and do not want to be providedwith
the same goods – irrespective if these goods are individually owned (e.g. clothes, a
home etc.) or collectively (e.g. education, public swimming pools etc.). The diver-
sity that exists between people requires that they be allowed to choose how they will
satisfy their needs. Therefore, while economic liberals defend negative liberty and
the freedom to choose products on the market, political liberals argue that non-
dominated positive liberty and the predistribution of productive assets can over-
come these problems of coercion and uniformity. Both, however, fall into a dualistic
understanding of the state and the individual that is typical of the civil tradition
in democratic thought: on the one side, there is the state and its background insti-
tutions; on the other side, we find the individuals who act within this preexisting
framework. What both camps fail to consider, however, is a different and more
democratic understanding of the state and public services, which can include the
creation of commons through collective action.That will be the focus of the second
section of this chapter. In order to reinterpret public goods as commons, however,
let us now review the relationships between commons and the different forms of
the state that I have already touched upon in order to then develop a notion of a
state-commons.
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7.1. Varieties of the state and the role of the commons
Commons in a hierarchical and monocentric state
As we have seen, a central figure in thinking about notions of the state is the mono-
centric and hierarchical Leviathan that rules over society. In this model, we will
begin with the thought experiment of a Hobbesian, warlike state of nature which
can be interpreted as the tragedy of an unregulated commons. Hardin’s response
to this problem was a social contract of “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon”
(Hardin 1968: 1247) and, more precisely, a Hobbesian Leviathan. Yet, while Hobbes’
Leviathan was created to protect individual property rights, Hardin revived the
Leviathan in order to regulate the use of common resources. This form of govern-
ment is what Vincent Ostrom called the “monocentric order”. We can conceive of
this model either in a negative light, as a form of eco-dictatorship or, more posi-
tively, as a type of enlightened despotism that rules in the name of the good of the
people. AlthoughHardin does not endorse a Leviathan that supports any formof re-
distribution, we can nevertheless imagine how such a political order could provide
commons in the form of public goods.Here, the supposedly neutral and benevolent
bureaucracy of the state provides commons in a top-down manner. Examples of
such commons could range from education to transport, television, clothing, food
and housing. To decrease the costs and increase the efficiency of the provision of
these goods, they would, at least theoretically, be created in a uniformmanner and
administered according to uniform rules. These goods would be defined accord-
ing to the average statistical values of all individuals combined with the ecological
conditions that limit these values. Individual needs and desires could bemarginally
considered (e.g. in the case of having a mental or physical handicap), but would be
largely ignored (e.g. in the case of preferring a freestanding home with a garden
instead of an apartment).
I do not need to discuss the problems of such a political regime in detail once
more. Nevertheless, let me summarize them in five points. Firstly, as I observed in
relation to the Ostroms, without anymeans of democratic control and accountabil-
ity, government functionaries are no less prone to corruption than any other human
beings. Secondly, regarding the regulation of common pool resources, under the
scenario I have envisaged unitary rules would be defined that do not always fit di-
verse contexts. Thirdly, the monitoring and enforcement of the regulations would
entail relatively high costs, making their implementation rather fragmented and
weak and ultimately turning them back into quasi-open-access resources. Fourthly,
the uniformity of goods cannot take individual needs and desires into account.
Equality is understood here as material equality which tends towards material uni-
formity. And finally, the provision occurs in a paternalistic and technocratic man-
ner, disempowering citizens by transforming them into consumers. Although such
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state provision might be experienced as comfortable because it frees the individual
frommany existential problems, it remains questionable how stable such a regime
would be if based on this undemocratic and hierarchical relationship. To be clear,
this critique is not to be misunderstood as a critique of the state, its monopoly on
the power of coercion and public goods per se, but rather as a critique of the highly
undemocratic manner in which such goods would be produced and provided. The
general implication of these criticisms is that people are not truly free if they are
simply materially provided for.
Commons in a minimal, market-based state
These problems of the state regulation and provision of commons have been
strongly emphasized by economic (neo-)liberals and libertarians (Friedman/Fried-
man 1980; Nozick 1999). For this reason, they often argue that the state should be
minimized and the provision of the goods I have mentioned occur through the
market. Let us therefore now turn to the relations between commons and the state
in a market-based society. In order to understand this issue, I will focus on the
work of Adam Smith and John Locke and attempt to shed some further light on
their work. Given the importance of the market in their models, it is not surprising
that it takes a while for the state to appear on the stage.
If we begin with the classical understanding of the commons, we must note
that Locke was not confronted with Hardin’s problem of the overuse, but rather
with the problem of the underuse of resources held in common. Although Locke
perceived there to be an abundance of unowned, common resources in the world
(especially, for example, land in North America), he nevertheless believed that the
goods necessary for a comfortable, convenient and good life were rather scarce
because they were rare and not very widespread. Furthermore, Locke understood
the total surface area of land on earth to be limited and, due to the increase in
people and the use of money, able to become scarce. Nevertheless, it appears that
the limitation of surface area could be compensated by ‘depth’. In this sense, I would
argue that Locke understood natural resources as a well that could be drawn from
without limit.The ability to drawmore fromnaturewould have depended, however,
on access to land and on the amount of labor exerted.Hardin, in contrast, explicitly
– and, in my opinion, correctly – describes all natural resources to be limited.
The reasons for this shift in perspective are rather simple: while Locke lived in a
preindustrial era, Hardin lived in a world that had experienced around 150 to 200
years of high levels of unprecedented industrial productivity.
As we have seen, for Locke, each person is originally allowed to appropriate
from the unregulated commons as much as he or she can use as long as resources
are not allowed to go to waste and there are enough resources left over for others.
As Locke argues, however, with the introduction of money, individuals can appro-
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priate and accumulate larger amounts of resources and use these “productively”
by selling the surplus products for profit on the market. For others, direct access
to the commons has become scarce if not entirely annulled. In turn, productivity
gains are provided as a compensation for the loss of access to existential resources
through private appropriation. However, because these others no longer have di-
rect access to the means of subsistence, they are required to enter wage-labor re-
lationships in order to earn money to then buy the goods on the market needed to
secure their existence. If, in turn, we add Adam Smith’s concept of the open mar-
ket to this narrative, the allocation of goods and services would then, according to
the story, occur in a self-regulating manner in which supply and demand would,
over time, exist in a balanced equilibrium. Even if an absolute scarcity of resources
should arise, market exchange and the prices of goods would theoretically provide
the best mechanism for their efficient distribution in society, given the market’s
abilities to self-regulate and to reduce highly complex information (e.g. the lim-
ited availability of goods and resources) into simple, comprehensible data (prices).1
Thus, in a minimal, market-based state it can generally be said that the commons
have been privatized while direct access to resources has been replaced by market
mechanisms.
According to this general description – and much as in Hobbes’s work (though
not Hardin) – the state was originally created through a (hypothetical) social con-
tract in order to protect individual property rights. Here, the state can be inter-
preted as a type of second order legal commons generated through the pooling
of people’s individual coercive power. Yet in this story, in contrast to Hardin, the
authority of the state is not supposed to limit the appropriation of the first order
commons, but rather simply to ensure the protection of individual private property.
Along these lines, Locke, Smith and many others have argued that the state should
not interfere in the private accumulation of wealth or the self-regulation of the
market.The protection or provision of commons is thus limited to a minimum, in-
cluding the protection of private property rights and the enforcement of contracts
by the police, or the protection of peace and national security by the military. For
some, such as Adam Smith, the provision of basic common services is extended to
those goods where “market failure” occurs. So aside from the commons of law and
security, basic common services often include goods such as education or roads.
Both the state and these goods are financed through pooled resources (taxes) that
are collected by the state. The responsiveness of the state to the demands of the
people is supposedly maintained through two central means: through the freedom
to move property (i.e. capital) freely, on the one hand, and, on the other, through
1 To be precise, the reduction of complex information through the price mechanism is not,
to my knowledge, an argument advanced by Adam Smith, but one especially emphasized
around 200 years later by Friedrich August von Hayek.
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the ability of the enfranchised population to periodically elect representatives from
competing parties. In general terms, this is a minimalist, legalist notion of democ-
racy based on the state-individual or public-private dichotomy of the civil tradition.
As I said in my discussions of Locke and Adam Smith, there are a few funda-
mental problems with such social arrangements. Firstly, although life and liberty
are secured de jure through the protection of property rights, because access to re-
sources is asymmetrical, life and liberty are not necessarily guaranteed de facto to
all people. Secondly, and in addition to this socio-economic injustice, even if the
propertyless have the right to vote and elect representatives and thus ultimately
change their social conditions, the dependence of the propertyless on wage-labor
relationships makes them highly susceptible to having to subordinate their inter-
ests to the interests of their employers and the flow of capital. Historically, this
dependence on wage labor was a central reason why the propertyless were not al-
lowed to vote. The dependence on the movement of capital is what I previously
described as a structural constraint on democratic freedom. Third, the priority of
negative individual rights also radically constrains the abilities and powers of the
state to interfere in and influence economicmatters in order to alter these property
arrangements (J. Cohen 1989: 28).While this argument was originally used byMon-
tesquieu and Adam Smith to defend the freedom of a rising bourgeoisie against the
power of absolute monarchs and warring feudal lords, the freedom of property in
the form of capital is used by a small elite against the realization of life and lib-
erty for large populations today. Fourth, an extremely asymmetrical distribution
of property inherently leads to the possibility of capture – and thus corruption –
of the state by wealthy individuals. More correctly, we must note that the founda-
tion of the modern state has always been an imperative to fulfill the purpose of the
equal protection of the existing (unequal) distribution of private property. In this
sense, the state has never been a neutral mediator between conflicting interests
that has then been captured by the wealthy, but has rather been a strong protector
of property rights and laissez-faire capitalism for those with property in produc-
tive resources from the outset. Here, we are reminded not only of Herman Heller’s
term “authoritarian liberalism” (Heller 2015), but also of the dialectical relationship
underlying the state-market dichotomy.While universal individual property rights
and the market were presented as alternatives to the absolute power of the state,
the Leviathan is now revealed to be, not an alternative to, but more specifically a
key component of the self-regulating market.
Commons in the welfare state and a property-owning democracy
One historical and theoretical answer to the problems of a minimal, market-based
state is that of the welfare state and, more recently, Rawls’ notion of a property-
owning democracy. In very general terms, both models aim to mitigate those prob-
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lems by providing individuals access to resources.These resources can include pub-
lic goods such as housing, health care and education or more individualized re-
sources such as pension plans and productive capital. But while the welfare state
emphasizes ex post distribution schemes, the state in a property-owning democ-
racy supports the ex ante predistribution of resources. Here, I discuss the state-
commons relationship firstly with reference to the welfare state and then turn to
the concept of a property-owning democracy.
In order to grasp the concept of the welfare state, it is important to also un-
derstand its historical origins. Importantly, the welfare state did not develop from
individual property rights and self-regulating markets. Instead, these socio-eco-
nomic rights were often realized through the struggles of propertyless wage la-
borers against the negative rights of those with property in productive resources
(Lavalette/Mooney 2000). Furthermore, welfare rights were largely answers to the
chaos and destruction brought about by a laissez-faire capitalism that led to the
Great Depression of the 1930s and the Second World War (Flora/Heidenheimer
2009). After the SecondWorldWar various types of welfare state were developed in
countries throughout Europe and North America (Esping-Andersen 1990). The aim
of these efforts was for the state to provide its citizens with a minimal level of re-
sources in order for them to secure a minimum standard of living and, thereby, to
ward off many of the negative effects or ‘externalities’ of an open and competitive
market.
Let us now compare the welfare state to the notion of commons I have thus far
developed. From the perspective of the commons, the ideal-typical welfare state
socializes responsibility for the risks of “ill health, old age, disability or unemploy-
ment” on the basis “shared savings […] [often] financed by levies on employees and
employers and supplemented by revenue from taxes” (Weale 2013: 45). Addition-
ally, taxation enables the state to pool and redistribute wealth in the form of public
goods such as education and housing, if necessary. In this sense, the principles of
reciprocity and mutuality that underlie the commons are also fundamental to the
welfare system (ibid.: 47).
Nevertheless, there are a few important differences between the welfare state
and our notion of the commons. Firstly,while some goods are provided for based on
a basic right of access to resources (e.g. education), other welfare goods are some-
times provided for according to the contributions principle and, thus, according
to proportional, distributive justice (e.g. old age pensions, unemployment com-
pensation) (ibid.: 46). Here, the ability to receive support is relative to the amount
paid and not according to one’s needs. While this might be considered fair in a
rather egalitarian society, the principle is problematic when substantial inequali-
ties limit one’s ability to contribute to the pooled resources. Secondly, it must be
recognized that the welfare state limits socio-economic asymmetries through re-
distribution schemes. Nevertheless Albert Weale is right to argue that the welfare
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state is a “device of horizontal rather than vertical redistribution”, because it redis-
tributes income “across the life-cycle rather than between income classes” (ibid.:
46). Despite the important measures in redistribution, the welfare state appears to
leave the underlying asymmetrical distribution within society relatively untouched
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 23-6).2 This implies that welfare rights can be interpreted
as a compromise that provides access to basic goods “as compensation for exclu-
sion” (Brettschneider 2012) from the productive resource systems that were once
– or could be – held in common. Thus, the satisfaction of people’s everyday needs
is not based on democratically negotiated self-organization by the affected, but is,
rather, largely subject both to the arbitrary powers of proprietors and to growth
mechanisms inherent to market competition.
Third, owing to underlying asymmetries in property ownership, the distribu-
tion of the resources and capabilities that enable people to participate in the demo-
cratic codetermination of the welfare state is also highly asymmetrical. In Rawls’
terminology, “welfare-state capitalism […] rejects the fair value of political liber-
ties” (JF: 138-9). Although the welfare state jumps in to assist and support those in
need, people are not provided with the resources needed to be able to partake in
the democratic definition and organization of these common goods. In this sense,
welfare can be seen as a type of charity that supports dependencies rather than a
basic right that enables self-determination. Furthermore, the lack of democratic
participation in the provision of these common goods leaves welfare open to the
previously mentioned criticism that state-provided goods are quite uniform. Iron-
ically, however, this critique is often voiced not by those demanding the democra-
tization of common goods, but rather by politicians who codetermine the welfare
provision itself. Their answer to this problem is, however, not a greater democra-
tization of wealth, but rather a limitation of state welfare and a provision of these
goods through the market.
In contrast to this move, Rawls attempts to deal with these problems of the
welfare state not through market mechanisms, but rather through an increase
in ex ante distribution of resources as part of the property-owning democracy
he proposes (Rawls 2001). Yet, in contrast to the distinction he wishes to make
between these ideal models, I would agree with several authors that Rawl’s at-
tempted contrast does not hold (Jackson 2012: 47-8; O’Neill 2012: 91-2; Weale 2013;
Krouse/McPherson 1988). On the one hand, the classical welfare state, for example,
also provides for a predistribution of education and skills training; on the other,
one-off predistribution schemes also require continuing redistribution in order
2 Gosta Esping-Andersen even goes so far to say that “the welfare state is not just amechanism
that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of inequality; it is, in its own right,
a system of stratification. It is an active force in the ordering of social relations.” (Esping-
Andersen 1990: 23)
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to mitigate unforeseen misfortunes. As these authors argue, the promotion of a
property-owning democracy should not weaken the achievements of the welfare
state, but rather supplement it with an increase in direct access to resources that
are provided to individuals early on in their lives. In the welfare state as well as in a
property-owning democracy, society’s resources are continuously pooled, divided
up and distributed again. Yet, in a property-owning democracy, the basic right to
life and liberty is understood as a basic right to access resources at the beginning
of one’s life, and not only when one is in need. Ideally, this should enable people
to determine their life plans and transform wage laborers and consumers into
active producers, entrepreneurs and investors. Furthermore, it should also provide
people with the ability to participate in the democratic organization of the state
and its background structures.
Despite these major advantages that result from combining the welfare state
with a property-owning democracy, a serious problem, which I have already dis-
cussed in my analysis of Rawls, remains: the competitive market’s tendency to
propagate perpetual economic growth. I have already discussed this problem in
detail in the last chapter. Simply put, both theWSC and POD distribution schemes
nevertheless encourage people to overuse society’s common, socio-ecological re-
sources. For this reason, I would argue that the organization of common resources
through a welfare state or a property-owning democracy is inherently unsustain-
able.Wemust therefore shift our notion of predistribution from individual owner-
ship of productive assets to access to basic common goods that are held and cared
for in common.This implies that we not only need to rethink public goods as com-
mons but also the role of the state in their provision. For this reason, let us now
investigate the difference between public goods and commons, which I illustrate
with reference to the examples of housing, health care and education.
7.2 Public goods versus state-supported commons:
housing, health care and education
From ideal theory to non-ideal, civic co-creation of public goods
In order to understand the role of the state in a commons based society, I will
briefly discuss the role of philosophy and philosophical methodology in such mat-
ters. Although I do greatly appreciate Rawls’ extraordinary and quite radical theory
of justice and his notion of a property-owning democracy, he himself emphasizes
that his theory of justice is an ideal theory (TJ: 216). In a similarmanner, I could draft
an ideal theory of commons and make a list of numerous common goods that peo-
ple must have access to in order for them to enjoy life and liberty.Themost obvious
goods would be clean air and a healthy environment, education, health care, hous-
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ing, food and a basic transportation system. A more ambitious list might include,
for example, clothes, culture, childcare services, basic banking services (including
credit), travel opportunities and the like. As with any ideal theory, the activity of
defining and defending a specific list of necessary (common) goods is a fine and no-
ble task because it provides orientation amidst a rather confusing reality. I believe,
however, that there are certain problems with this procedure.
Firstly, a central limitation of an ideal theory is voiced by Rawls himself. In A
Theory of Justice Rawls discusses the two principles of justice and the guidance that
these principles provide for people in non-ideal situations. Nevertheless, he admits
that “in the more extreme and tangled instances of nonideal theory this priority of
rules will no doubt fail; and indeed, we may be able to find no satisfactory answer
at all” (TJ: 267).This concession concerning the large gap between an ideal and non-
ideal theory leads us to the second problem of ideal theories. So long as people do
not perceive there to be any connection between their highly complicated “tangled”
reality and ideal theory, the focus on ideal theories may possibly disempower in-
dividuals, because they only see the great discrepancy between the two. Third, by
defining a list of goods that people should have, one is automatically making oneself
vulnerable to the criticism of being paternalistic. Rawls’ strategy for this problem is
twofold. On the one hand, he resorts to his original position, which provides him
with the legitimation that everyone should come to a similar conclusion. On the
other hand, he merely develops a “rough” (TJ: 216) notion of justice and remains
somewhat vague by speaking of “productive assets”, while those who have further
developed his ideas have focused on “productive capital” or, rather, money (O’Neill
2012: 80; Hsieh 2012: 156; Freeman 2013: 23; Thomas 2017: 307). Money is handy
in this regard because it is supposedly neutral and provides individuals with the
freedom to choose how to use it. Yet, as we have already discussed, in the form of
invested capital it also conceals an immanent logic of growth.
Fourth, I admit that by defining an ideal theory one also makes oneself vul-
nerable to the grave criticism of wanting to implement a utopian social design in
a top-down and technocratic manner against the will of the people. Obviously, I
am not saying that this is Rawls’ intention. But the focus on the rational, the right
and the ideal from an original position leads to the formulation of a somewhat
static political order. For this reason, Amartya Sen describes Rawls’ ideal theory as
“transcendental institutionalism” (Sen 2009: 7), which appears, at least to me, to
sidestep non-ideal historical contingencies, democratic deliberation and political
resistance. Again, we are reminded of the civil tradition of democracy in which
there is a dichotomy between transcendental background institutions of a society
and the individual who acts within these institutions. Although Rawls deals with
the tension between the state and society in his detailed discussion of the social
preconditions for a just society, ideal theory nevertheless demands of individu-
als “strict compliance” with the just background institutions (TJ: 216). This focus
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therefore neglects not only the question of how just institutions are created and
reproduced, but also the non-ideal realities of social inequalities, concentrations
of power and the destruction of socio-ecological livelihoods that impede the real-
ization of such arrangements.
For these reasons, I believe it to be necessary to change our perspective when
discussing the state-commons relationship and the provision of resources by the
state from ideal-theory to what Amartya Sen has described as a “realization-fo-
cused” (Sen 2009: 7) approach, which aims at overcoming injustices, domination
and exploitation. Sen describes this approach as comparative because it compares
various existing and emerging institutional arrangements in different contexts and
analyzes how specific injustices can be overcome given present possibilities. Here,
freedom, justice and commons are not implemented from without or above, but
rather grow out of the “crooked timber of humanity” (Berlin 2013; Kant 2006: 8:23).
In order to overcome injustice, Sen argues that we should focus on democratic
deliberation and the arguments exchanged by affected people via both local and
global public spheres of contemporary societies. In line with Habermas and many
others, Sen defines this deliberative understanding of democracy as “public reason-
ing” and his understanding of the state as “government by discussion” (Sen 2009:
321-337). Sen argues that the organization of state and social arrangements is thus
not merely dealt with through periodic elections of competing elites, but rather
through the perpetual expression of concerns and the exchange of ideas. Through
participation in this process of democratic deliberation, people develop their ca-
pacities to define the legal framework of the state and the goods that best satisfy
their needs. In short, people develop capacities for democratic self-governance and
are thus able to overcome injustice and improve their security and social welfare
(Sen 2009: 345-54).
I would argue that to systematically realize this, broad public deliberationmust
be institutionally secured through the inclusion of different groups of people in
both the legislature and executive functions of government. The integration of cit-
izens in such functions could occur through the inclusion of representatives of
different affected groups (ethnic groups, socio-economic classes, consumer asso-
ciations, neighborhoods, environmental groups etc.), for example by volunteering
or sortition. In contrast to free association, the latter is an age-old form of politi-
cal selection in which people from a population are semi-randomly nominated to
take office in different political functions (Buchstein 2009; Dowlen 2008). One se-
rious drawback of such a mechanism is the lack of accountability to the public due
to the inability of those selected to be reelected. Despite this drawback, sortition
and other forms of political inclusion can undermine the capture and corruption
of the state by politico-economic elites (Lockard 2003). More importantly, it can
enable a broader population to codetermine and participate in the coproduction of
the goods and services provided by the state. Here, top-down provision of public
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goods through experts is replaced by or, rather, supplemented with, local knowl-
edge of needs, desires and the contexts of ‘common’ people. Classical examples of
such forms of codetermination and coproduction are habitat conservation plan-
ning, participatory budgeting and functionally specific neighborhood councils for
education, policing or health care (Fung/Wright 2003). With reference to Michael
Walzer’s work, we might see this as the socialization of the welfare state (Walzer
1988). Within democratic theory, this kind of inclusion is often referred to as par-
ticipatory democracy (Pateman 1970; Barber 1984; Roussopoulos/Benello 2005) and
is seen as an important means of “deepening democracy” (Fung/Wright 2003). Al-
thoughmany theories of participatory democracy go beyond the state,we can argue
here that such political inclusion can transform the state provision of public goods
into state supported commons through commoning. Last but not least, these prac-
tices of commoning enable people to develop the necessary civic virtues that help
uphold and reproduce the democratic institutions of the state and of a commons-
creating society (Benkler/Nissenbaum 2006).
In summary, the implementation of a democratic, commons-based society re-
quires us to shift our understanding of the state from ideal theory to a realization-
focused approach that deals with injustices and other non-ideal realities through
public deliberation and broad political participation. I argue that a “realization ap-
proach” would ultimately transform the provision of public goods by the state into
commons. In order to better understand this difference between public goods and
commons, I will now analyze and discuss concrete examples of housing, health care
and education. I choose these three goods because there is a widespread consen-
sus in many Western countries and across numerous political camps that they are
necessary resources for people to lead a life in liberty.3 By analyzing these three
basic goods, I hope to flesh out the concept of commons and their relationship to
the state. Let us begin with the example of housing.
From public housing to housing commons
In general, public housing is provided for by the state for people in need, which is
often interpreted to mean people with low incomes. To understand the problems
of public housing, let us begin with the more commonplace criticisms of this kind
of state provision.
3 Along these lines, articles 25.1. and 26.1. of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights state
that access to housing, health care and education are considered to be basic human rights
(UDHR 1948). Article 25.1. of theUniversal Declaration ofHumanRights states that “everyone
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of
his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services
[…]”. Article 26.1. affirms that “every one has the right to education. Education shall be free,
at least in the elementary and fundamental stages” (ibid.).
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Proponents of economic liberalism often criticize the provision of public hous-
ing because it supposedly distorts the self-regulating mechanism of the market.
While this might be true, it is also the intention of public housing to provide hous-
ing to people who, owing the discrepancy between their low wages and the high
rents of a home, could otherwise not afford a home on the ‘free’ market. If we value
the satisfaction of needs over the functioning of unregulated market processes,
then we can rather easily discard this criticism. Another more relevant criticism
of public housing for our discussion here lies in an assumption I have mentioned
several times already: that state services are uniform and unresponsive to individ-
ual needs and particular contexts. Although this may be true, one can say, con-
versely, that unregulated market processes are also unresponsive to individuals in
need. While markets cater to those with more purchasing power, the state caters
to those with less – the market as well as the state each being uniform and un-
responsive in their own profit-oriented or bureaucratic manner. Aside from this
common criticism, we must also acknowledge the concentration of poverty and, in
turn, criminality, that results from both housing markets and more generally, mis-
guided urban planning (Goering et al. 1997; Hui et al. 2015; Freedman/McGavock
2015).
I would say that the answer to these problems characteristic of property-own-
ing democracy would be to provide people with housing capital so as to enable peo-
ple to buy and design their own homes wherever they want. All citizens would thus
become independent homeowners. Yet some problems arise from this independent
housing model, such as suburban sprawl, long travel distances from home to work
and the increased dependency on automobiles, to name just a few (Williamson
2010). Another problem is, however, the explosion of the cost of housing through
real-estate speculation, which would be increased due to the provision of capital
for all citizens. The ‘neoliberal’ and anti-egalitarian interpretation of a homeowner
property-owning democracy has been realized since the 1980s in the USA, Britain
and many other European countries by deregulating the banking sector and sys-
tematically keeping interest rates low, thereby enticing people with low wages to
buy houses that they could not afford in the long run. This “privatized Keynesian-
ism” (Crouch 2009) led to a run on real estate, which created a property bubble and,
ultimately, the financial crisis of 2007/8 (Howell 1984; Streeck 2013; Levitin/Wachter
2012; Jackson 2012: 47).
What, then, are alternatives to the problems of uniformity, urban sprawl,
poverty and speculation? These problems are obviously very complex and cannot
be settled with simple solutions. Yet I believe that the systemic and process-
oriented approach of commons could provide us with insights to fix at least some
of these problems. So, what would a commons approach to the housing question
look like? As I have emphasized, commons should not be understood as particular
entities (e.g. public housing), but as a systemic and process-oriented approach
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to creating common goods. In the case of public housing, this implies, first and
foremost, the integration of potentially affected people into the development and
design of a housing complex, a residential area or an entire neighborhood. Certain
housing cooperatives are already developed in this way. The future inhabitants ap-
ply for an apartment, for example, before the complex is built instead of after. They
are – or should be – able to express their various needs and negotiate how these
can be accommodated within the existing financial and ecological budget. In some
cases of public housing, lack of funding is a major problem, and one that leads to
uniformity and ‘ghettoization’. I do not believe, however, that a lack of funds per
se must necessarily lead to these problems. The problem of ‘ghettoization’ could,
for example, be rather easily alleviated by building in the centers of cities, which
would mean that city planning would not be left to the planning of real estate
speculators and unregulated market forces.
In turn, while it is often assumed that a lack of funds necessarily leads to uni-
form administration and provision, the integration of prospective dwellers into the
development and design of such a complex enables people to explore the existing
possibilities within whatever ecological and financial limits are agreed upon. And
where money is lacking, it should be possible for people to literally determine and
shape their living conditions with their own hands. Moreover, given a systemic ap-
proach, the layout of a housing commons would also provide various spaces for
people to come into contact with each other and develop their living spaces not
just before the building process, but also while they live there. This could include
shared spaces for shared goods (shared tools and household appliances, a repair
workshop, shared cars etc.), but also shared gardens, playgrounds and wild green
areas, or possibly even a weekly local market and a café. These examples might
sound trivial, but my main point is that the environment would never be entirely
brought to completion but always open to the continual and evolutionary process
of co-creation that can be adapted and developed by the different people that live
in such environments.
The belief that the management of such a diverse and creatively assembled
habitat would be impossible for the state to manage is, to a certain extent, cor-
rect. It would be difficult and costly for state authorities to administer such self-
organized groups.That is one reasonwhy governments often realize uniform goods
with uniform rules. But this is where Elinor Ostrom’s ideas about commons man-
agement come in: the costs of management can be significantly reduced while in-
creasing the robustness of the institutional structure of an ecologically diverse re-
source system by enabling (and requiring) the dwellers to democratically manage
their own commons, in this case their housing. This would necessitate that both
institutional and physical space for public deliberation are provided for and main-
tained. Responsibilities would be devolved and delegated to different subgroups
for different resources, goods and services. More importantly, these groups would
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provide the institutional space needed so that problems can be voiced and con-
flicts resolved: such groups would maintain the mutual monitoring and graduated
sanctioning necessary to reproduce commons on different levels. They would also
provide the state with information for the background administration and support
of housing commons. But would everyone have to participate in these deliberations
and administrative processes? The right to dwell in such a housing commons could
be made contingent on the inhabitant’s committing to fulfill certain basic duties
that would go beyond the mere compliance with basic rules. These could include
minimal participation in the comanagement and reproduction of the housing com-
mons. But the precise nature of these commitments would have to be defined by
the inhabitants themselves.
Another question that arises in this discussion is whether housing would be
provided free of charge and whether the state or the residents would be the propri-
etors of the housing commons.This is a central question that distinguishes housing
commons from public housing. Simply put, a central feature of commons is that
the people who use the resource system also manage it. Ideally, the people who use
the common also collectively own it in the form of common property or a trust. I
suggest that a housing commons could be arranged in the following manner: the
land could be owned by the state in the form of a Community Land Trust. The
Community Land Trust manages the land on behalf of the people of the village or
the city and leases the land to the residence of the housing complex at affordable
prices.The Community Land Trust would be comprised of politicians, experts, res-
idents and other people from the broader community.The housing complex would
then be owned as a cooperative by the people who live there (Conaty/Bollier 2014:
14-16; Lewis/Conaty 2012: 85-110).They would have to buy themselves into the coop-
erative. Yet, as numerous examples of housing cooperatives and other cooperative
enterprises demonstrate, this amount will not be extremely high because the prices
for real estate will not be driven up by speculation, and because the costs of hous-
ing will be shared by the many residents. For those who lack the necessary funds,
there could be other means of accessing this capital – hopefully without falling into
debt traps. To avoid this problem of debt, it is also imaginable that citizens would
be provided with housing commons coupons of a certain value (e.g. $20,000) at
the age of 18 years in order for them to become a member of a housing commons
project. If the cooperative share exceeds this amount, the individual would have
to pay the difference. But these are only some ideas of what the specific arrange-
ment might look like. The important point, then, is that people have actual stakes
in the housing commons that they live in. This not only cultivates responsibility
for the management and maintenance of the commons, but also frees the inhabi-
tants from the arbitrary interference of external owners such as the state or private
investors.
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Now, let us analyze the role of the state in such a housing commons scheme.
According to my sketch above, its role should be conceptualized as providing hous-
ing commons with administrative and institutional support. The function of the
state is to ‘be there’ for the commoners: to initiate and, in certain cases, to sup-
port the processes of self-governance, to aid the realization of certain large-scale
projects and,most importantly, to democratically develop urban and regional plan-
ning policies that provide adequate land for housing commons. The state would,
therefore, not manage people and their habitats, but would rather provide people
with the opportunity to democratically manage their own lives and habitats. Coer-
cive power would not be exercised by the state itself in the form of a monopoly, but
would provide citizens with the necessary opportunities and powers with which
to democratically govern their own habitats. Here, the state is not understood as
an authoritarian leviathan, but rather as a partner in realizing the democratic and
interdependent freedom of its citizens.
Having discussed the idea of a housing commons, let us now turn to the ques-
tion of how the public provision of health care can be conceptualized as and trans-
formed into a common.
From public health care to health commons
The right to health care is generally based on the right to life and well-being. More
technically it can be expressed as a “positive right to basic human functional capa-
bilities” (Ram-Tiktin 2012). While this might sound rather reasonable for some, the
public provision of health care is highly contested (Epstein 1997). After discussing
the problems of both market and state provision of health care, I will develop the
notion of a health commons in relation to medical research and development, on
the one hand, and in relation to the idea of community health center commons, on
the other.
One central problem of the public provision of health care in many, if not most,
Western countries is its increasing costs (Qidwai 2013). A common reason given
for these substantial costs is the increase in demand for medical services. Garrett
Hardin, for example, describes this problem as the “laissez-faire” provision of state
services according to the Marxist principle “each according to his need” (Hardin
1977b; Hardin 1993: 242-3). In Hardin’s words, “it takes no great insight to realize
that hypochondriacs, as a class, will victimize the healthy in such a system” (Hardin
1993: 243).4Without testing the empirical validity of this rather cynical explanation,
4 To be precise, Hardin actually sees the problem in rising expenditure on health care in the
in lawsuits of people against their doctors, on the one hand, and in expensive insurance and
diagnostic tests as a means to protect doctors against these lawsuits on the other (Hardin
1993: 242-3).
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I would argue that the reasons for the rises in costs in health care are notmerely due
to “hypochondriacs”. Other important factors include, for example, the increase in
population size, longer life expectancy and higher standards of health. Yet, some
academics see the problem notmerely on the demand side, but rather in a feedback
loop of supply and demand in which greater investments in health care lead to
improved health (and longer lives, larger populations and higher expectations) and
thus require even greater expenditure in medical care. This is what some call the
“Sisyphus Syndrome in Health” (Zweifel et al. 2005; Zweifel 2007). Zweifel et al.
explain this feedback loop in the following way:
Initially, politicians decide to allocate more resources to health. If effective this
intervention causes people that would have otherwise died to survive. With more
survivors around, there will be additional demand for health care services. To the
extent that this is financed out of private resources, there is not too much of a problem.
Individuals will adjust their health insurance policies accordingly and allocate a
greater share of their income to health care. However, most of these services are
covered by public health insurance. Rather than accepting to pay themselves, es-
pecially older voters have an incentive to get politicians to reallocate the public
budget in favor of health. The increase in health care expenditure (HCE) again
creates survivors. Thus, the Sisyphus syndrome can go into its next turn. (Zweifel
et al. 2005, 127; emphasis added)
Despite the plausibility of this hypothesis, their conclusion seems somewhat pecu-
liar: the central problem does not necessarily lie in rising medical costs, but more
specifically in the increasing public expenditure on health care. According to Zweifel
et al., one solution to this problem is, therefore, the privatization of health care.
Expenditure on health care then depends on one’s purchasing power and the ‘free’
choice to spend one’s money on one’s health. Here, it is assumed that through pri-
vatization, supply and demand will eventually balance each other out. Generally
speaking, this belief that privatization will yield better outcomes in health care has
become increasingly popular since the 1980s in many Western and non-Western
countries (Collyer/White 2011).
The problem is, however, that agents competing on an open market must pur-
sue profit-maximizing strategies in order to survive economically. It can therefore
be assumed that the profit maximization strategy would not lead to a decrease in
health-care costs, but rather to an increase in costs. The reason for this is that pri-
vate firmswho are in themedical and pharmaceutical industries are not necessarily
interested in lowering private expenditure on health services and products but, in-
stead, in a perpetual increase in expenditure. Aside from using their monopoly
power in patents to raise the prices of drugs, this is also achieved by develop-
ing highly specialized and exclusive treatments for those with greater purchasing
power. Similar to the housing market, this implies that medical and pharmaceu-
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tical companies are not interested in the needs of those in need, that is, of those
with ill health and little money.The necessary care for these people will be – and is
being – left to charity organizations or, as is mostly the case, to untrained and often
already overworked family members of the less well-off. However, in other cases,
these people in need will not receive any care services or medicinal treatment. A
privatized health-care system thus cannot fulfill its proper function of providing
all people with adequate health-care services. Instead, it will turn – and has turned
– good health into a means of social distinction and possibly even a luxury good
for the affluent.
However, and more fundamentally, a health-care system that is structured ac-
cording to profit maximization is, ironically, not necessarily interested in a long-
term and sustainably healthy society. This is not to say that general levels of health
in Western countries have not increased over the last two hundred years or that
pharmaceutical and biomedical corporations produce malfunctioning or harmful
drugs. The point being made here is another. The reason for this underlying dis-
interest of businesses in a substantially healthy society lies in the problem that if
everyone were healthy, people wouldn’t go to a doctor or need drugs. Sales would
sink and profits would plummet – and people would lose their jobs.The underlying
and long term interest of a profit-oriented health industry is therefore not healthy
citizens, but, rather, sickness and a perpetual increase in desire for more medicine
and more health-care services (Brownlee 2007). Put somewhat bluntly, profits feed
off the sick.
However, the problem I am describing is not limited to entirely privatized sys-
tems of health-care provision. If profit-oriented corporations provide the drugs,
machines and material infrastructure for a public health-care system, the supply-
side problem of perpetually rising health-care expenditure remains. This problem
is otherwise known as the medical-industrial complex (Relman 1980; Wohl 1984;
Geyman 2004; Moskowitz/Nash 2008; Ehrenreich 2016: 39-77). Here, we are re-
minded again of Hardin’s “double C–double P game” in which the profits of the
health industry are privatized while the costs are communalized. As we see, with
a background arrangement based on profit maximization, both private and public
systems are unsatisfactory and lead to rising costs in health – either at the cost of
increasing public expenditure or at the cost of an unhealthy and run-down lower-
class population. Contrary to Zweifel et al., we can therefore conclude that it is not
simply public spending that leads to the “Sisyphus Syndrome”, but also a profit-
oriented health-care system that leads to ever-rising costs for society.
Parallel to the problem of housing, a possible answer to this conundrum could
be the conceptualization of health care as a commons. But what would such a
health-care commons look like? I cannot provide a blueprint for how a health-care
commons should look.Nevertheless, I can provide a few ideas that might be helpful
in understanding how a health-care commons could be organized. For this, how-
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ever, let us take a step back: the more general problem we are faced with is how
to create a healthy society that cultivates well-being instead of a society that val-
ues efficiency gains and economic growth. From a systemic perspective, a health-
care commons implies a general and fundamental right to a clean and healthy envi-
ronment (Weston/Bollier 2013). As Smith-Nonino notes, “certainly, a de facto public
health commons exists in every municipality that provides clean water, sewage dis-
posal, or subsidized inoculations for communicable disease – services often taken
for granted by most citizens” (Smith-Nonini 2006: 233). In this sense, we must
emphasize that health care is not something that is realized simply through the
provision of medication or an operation, but that it is, rather, an ongoing process
and interaction of individuals with their socio-ecological environment. While not
denying individual responsibility for one’s health, a commons approach recognizes
that individuals live in a complex webs of interdependent relationships that influ-
ence their well-being and the well-being of others. From this perspective, good
health is not merely an individual effort, but is also achieved through social in-
teractions and arrangements. To gain a more detailed understanding of what this
might mean, let us analyze two facets of a health-care commons: medical research
and development and community provision of health-care services.
As just discussed, a central problem of profit-oriented health-care systems is
that they cater to the needs and desires of those clients with greater purchasing
power rather than focusing on widespread diseases that primarily affect poorer
people. This problem is accentuated by another related issue: the privatization of
research and development or, more specifically, complex and overlapping patent
rights in the medical sector. Intellectual property rights are often understood as
important incentives because they secure property rights in one’s labor, or rather
one’s discovery, and enable those who invest in research and development to reap
greater benefits from it. The flip side of these patents is, however, that they simul-
taneously prevent other researchers and organizations from accessing and using
the knowledge that has been gained. This is one case of what Michael Heller has
described as the “tragedy of the anticommons” (Heller 1998; Heller/Eisenberg 1998)
or the “gridlock economy” (Heller 2008: 49-78). In contrast to the tragedy of the
unregulated commons which leads to the overuse of resources, the tragedy of the
anti-commons leads to the underuse of resources. Here, highly fragmented exclu-
sive ownership rights impede innovation that could enable researchers to develop
cheaper or possibly even better drugs. It is in this sense that Heller argues that
fragmented patents can literally cost lives (ibid.: 55).
One commons-based answer to this would be – parallel to the open-source
software movement – to organize medical R&D as an open-source health com-
mons where information is shared freely among researchers and health organiza-
tions (Tenenbaum/Wilbanks 2008). Marty Tenenbaum and John Wilbank explain
this idea in their white paper on health commons:
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We envision a Commons where a researcher will be able to order everything
needed to replicate a published experiment as easily as ordering DVDs from
Amazon. A Commons where one can create a workflow to exploit replicated
results on an industrial scale – searching the world’s biological repositories
for relevant materials; routing them to the best labs for molecular profiling;
forwarding the data to a team of bioinfomaticians for collaborative analysis of
potential drug targets; and finally hiring top service providers to run drug screens
against those targets; with everything – knowledge, data, andmaterials –moving
smoothly from one provider to the next, monitored and tracked with Fed-Ex pre-
cision; where the workflow scripts themselves can become part of the Commons,
for others to reuse and improve. Health Commons' marketplace will slash the
time, cost, and risk of developing treatments for diseases. (Tenenbaum/Wilbanks
2008: 3-4)
However, the point of such open-source health commons would not only be to cut
costs or to producemore, but also to democratize themedical industry. Here, it can
be assumed that the open-source structure of a health commons in research and
development would enable more people to participate and collaborate in the ‘peer
production’ of more innovative medical knowledge and needs-oriented treatments.
From a more systemic perspective, the democratization of health care can also
more generally be encouraged by empowering people to take control of individual
and social causes of illnesses. On a very basic level, this can begin with preventative
health education in schools. With reference to medical training, this could imply
the development of a profession of community doctors,5 who would combine the
knowledge of the family doctor, the care worker, the pharmacist and the therapist.
The community provisioning of health care services could, for example, be orga-
nized in community health care centers. Here, a community doctor and other care
workers would provide basic and accessible health-care services to the public. Fur-
thermore, the people seeking help in such community health commons would not
simply be consumers, but would be integrated in empowering processes involving
the diffusion of knowledge and practices of self-help.This could include, for exam-
ple, groups like Alcoholics Anonymous, in which people with common,widespread,
complex problems such as chronic back pain, migraines, burnout, (minor) depres-
sion and obesity can discuss their problems and how they deal with them. An im-
portant advantage would be that people would learn to listen to themselves and
their peers instead of having to entirely depend on expensive experts. Such a com-
munity health commons could also provide simple health activities led by volun-
teers that aim to increase people’s individual well-being. Because care work is very
5 As an example of such community doctors see, for example, the “barefoot doctors” that used
to exist in China (Zhang/Unschuld 2008; WHO 2008).
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time-consuming and care workers are rather limited in number, a time bank or
exchange circle could be organized in which people could offer their help in simple
care services in exchange for other goods or services. But these are merely some
fairly concrete ideas of how such a community health commons could be organized.
On a more general level, the principles of democratic planning and self-organiza-
tion would lie at the heart of community health commons. This would, in turn,
enable affected people to define for themselves how they would like to organize
their local health-care services.
Aswe see, the cultivation of health andwell-being requires, if not a lot ofmoney,
then still a lot of time for caring activities. This leads us to the more political side
of the idea of a health commons and the necessity of an institutional framework
that supports the creation of a healthy society. Although the notion of a ‘healthy
society’ is, at present, often associated with awareness campaigns, a systemic ap-
proach to the notion of good health would go beyond the focus on single, isolated
problems and would avoid the top-down implementation of certain ideas of the
good. Instead it would, for example, aim towards opening up more space for peo-
ple to care for themselves and for others. First and foremost, this needs to include
the limitation of the working day, which would provide people with the time for
these activities. Other elements of such health policies could include, for exam-
ple, walking and bike paths and parks for people to exercise and relax in. In more
general terms, city and regional planning is also an important aspect of the cre-
ation of a healthy and ecologically sustainable environment. All of this might sound
quite self-evident and mundane, but a commons twist to these policies would en-
tail the democratic inclusion of the people who actually live in these environments.
Furthermore, a commons approach to health, well-being and public space would
involve a transformation of our understanding of public space. From the commons
perspective, public space is not understood as a neutral space for everyone and
no one, but rather as a common space that is shaped by the people who use it.
How these different aspects of democratic participation, common space, commu-
nity building and health issues are integrated can be illustrated with the example
of urban gardening, which has gained a certain popularity (Lewellen 2016; Baier et
al. 2013; Seitz 2009). As we see, we have moved from the question of health via that
of community organizations to that of city planning, which would normally ap-
pear to have little to do with one another.The point of the commons is, however, to
see the systemic relationships between its individual components. More generally,
the democratic inclusion of affected people in such processes of community-health
commoning implies that people can define and develop their own understanding
of health and wellbeing. But beyond this, it implies that individuals’ health and
well-being is not only an interdependent component of a healthy society, but also
of a healthy and sustainable environment.
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To sum up: the notion of a democratic health commons clearly goes beyond
state provision of basic health-care services. Nevertheless, its emphasis on open-
access medical research and development, on the one hand, and community pro-
visioning, on the other, could provide strategies to improve the health of citizens
without perpetually increasing health-care costs.
From public education to an education commons
Having analyzed housing and health care as potential commons, now let me turn
to my final example: education. In contrast to housing and health, however, it can
generally be said that education is one of the most acknowledged public goods
in Western countries. In this section I compare the notion of public education to
an education commons. In order to do this, I firstly discuss arguments for and
against education as a public good. Secondly, I argue that access to knowledge is a
central aspect of public education.Here, I focus on the problem of the privatization
of scientific knowledge in academic journals and argue that scientific knowledge
must be organized as an open-access commons. In a third step, I discuss howpublic
schooling can be organized as a commons.
The defense and critique of public education
The general conception of education as a universal public good is based on the cri-
tique of earlier social arrangements, most importantly of feudalism, in which only
aristocrats could afford to educate their children, and the children of peasants and
lower social classes learned only those skills necessary to fulfill their occupations.
This conception is expressed quite clearly by Adam Smith, not so much because as
in spite of his defense of private enterprise and a free and competitive market. As
I have already pointed out, Smith argues that an increase in the division of labor
leads to the problem that laborers become “as stupid and ignorant as it is possi-
ble for a human to become” (Smith 1994: 840). A Smith appreciates, the tragedy
of an unregulated education commons makes state provision of mandatory public
education necessary in order to overcome the problem of an entirely private ed-
ucation that leads to the exploitation of lower classes. We will come across this
problem again when discussing vocational education and the competitive market
in the next chapter on markets. According to Smith, a “civilized and commercial
society” therefore requires the “education of the common people […] more than
that of people with rank and fortune” (ibid.: 841). He continues,
But though the common people cannot, in any civilized society, be so well in-
structed as people of some rank and fortune, themost essential parts of education,
however, to read, write, and account, can be acquired at so early a period of life,
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that the greater part even of those who are to be bred to the lowest occupations,
have time to acquire them before they can be employed in those occupations. For
a very small expense the public can facilitate, can encourage, and can even impose
upon almost the whole body of the people, the necessity of acquiring those most
essential parts of education. The public can facilitate this acquisition by establish-
ing in every parish or district a little school, where children may be taught for a
reward so moderate, that even a common laborer may afford it […]. (ibid.: 842-3)
The aims of a public education are therefore, according to Smith, to educate people
in order tomake them “more decent and orderly”, “more respectable” and “therefore
more disposed to respect […] superiors” (ibid.: 846). Although Smith concedes that
the state “derives no advantage” from public education, these qualities do, however,
provide for a more stable and orderly society. More generally, educated people are
“less liable […] to the delusions of enthusiasm and superstition” and “more disposed
to examine, and more capable of seeing through, the interested complaints of fac-
tion and sedition” (ibid.). In turn, public education enables people of lower social
classes to be “less apt to be misled into any wanton or unnecessary opposition to
the measures of government” (ibid.). Here, we see the enlightened impetus that
has continued until today in which education is believed to create more reflective,
more critical citizens who, in turn, uphold an orderly and civilized society.
While this basic defense of public education has become widespread since the
18th century, its concept has been greatly expanded since then. Today, public edu-
cation is not simply limited to the basics of reading, writing and arithmetic, but
includes general knowledge of history, politics and society and sometimes extends
to vocational training, university education and further, adult education. Here, ed-
ucation is not only provided to increase social stability or, in Rawls’ terminology,
a “well-ordered society”, but, more importantly, in order to provide people with
“fair equality of opportunity” (JF: 139). Put somewhat more generally, public edu-
cation should provide people with necessary intellectual resources in the form of
the knowledge and the cognitive skills needed to enable them to develop and real-
ize their capacities and to freely choose their occupation (TJ: 243, 374). Like Smith,
Rawls argues that resources in education should be allocated so “as to improve the
long-term expectation of the least favored” (TJ: 87). Here, educational and voca-
tional training are defined as central aspects of a property-owning democracy that
should be dispersed widely throughout society by the state (JF: 139). As Rawls ex-
plains:
I assume […] that there is fair (as opposed to formal) equality of opportunity. This
means that in addition to maintaining the usual kinds of social overhead capital,
the government tries to insure equal chances of education and culture for per-
sons similarly endowed and motivated either by subsidizing private schools or by
7. The role of the state in a commons-creating society 231
establishing a public school system. It also enforces and underwrites equality of
opportunity in economic activities and in the free choice of occupation. (TJ: 243)
Not only should access to educational resources create a just background structure
for a free society, but it should also support the reproduction of the system over
time. As Rawls explains:
Their education should also prepare them to be fully cooperating members of so-
ciety and enable them to be self-supporting; it should also encourage the political
virtues so that they want to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in their re-
lations with the rest of society. (JF: 156)
The role of public education is therefore both an institutional and a moral one:
institutional access to educational resources should support the social cooperation
necessary to uphold a just system. This is, at least, Rawls’ ideal theory of a public
education provided by the state. Although not always realized in this ideal form, the
widespread provision of public education by the state in many Western countries
can be understood as an extraordinary achievement.
Despite “the great aspiration” (Oelkers 1989) embodied in these ideals, which
developed during the 19th and 20th centuries, public education has been accom-
panied by its critics since its beginning. As with most public institutions and
services, a common ‘progressive’ criticism has always been that state education
is bureaucratic, uniform and unresponsive to the needs of the children and the
community (Oelkers 2010; Hayes 2007). Often, these criticisms focus on the dis-
ciplining techniques of educational practices and the overall aims of educational
policies that produce subservient and diligent workers in the name of economic
utility, productivity and growth, but not critical, creative, and free citizens for a
democratic society (Illich 1972; Dewey 2008; Freire 2012). Furthermore, and in spite
of the widespread expansion of public education since the Second World War,
state provision of education has appeared unable to counter social inequalities.
In contrast, numerous studies have demonstrated how public schools merely
reproduce the inequalities that already exist in society (Bernstein 1973; Willis 1981;
Bourdieu/Passeron 1990; Lareau 2003).
Increasingly in Anglo-Saxon countries since the 1980s, this critique of public
education has, however, been used by ‘conservatives’ to support an economic liber-
alization of the provision of education (House 1998; Apple 1996, 2000, 2006). Caught
in the state-market dichotomy, the only alternative to the top-down state provi-
sion of education is therefore thought to be ‘free choice’, which is interpreted as
the introduction of competitive market mechanisms and the privatization of pub-
lic education (Friedman 1955, 2002; Murray 1984; Walberg/Bast 2003). With David
Bollier, we can understand this process as an enclosure of state-provided educa-
tional commons (Bollier 2013; Björk 2017). At elementary and high school levels,
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this can occur through the influence of corporations on educational policy (includ-
ing curricula and textbooks) and school campuses (Neumann 2014; House 1998).
More generally, a market-oriented public school system focuses on the output and
comparison of grades (e.g. PISA), the competition between schools and, most im-
portantly, the free choice of schools through voucher systems. At a higher level,
this can be seen in decreases in public funding of college and university educa-
tion, and higher tuition fees and student debt in Anglo-Saxon countries (Morten-
son 2012; Goodnight/Hingstman 2013). Further effects include a general increase
in the competitive acquisition of external, third-party funds for scientific research
in Europe (Boer et al. 2007; Bolli/Somogyi 2010) and a boom in expensive, private
academic journals (Tenopir/King 2000; Guédon 2001; Kranich 2007). We will dis-
cuss the problem of these journals shortly. Although not all of these reforms and
developments can be declared to be simply wrong, the general tendency towards
privatization of education brings us back to the problem we initially attempted to
overcome through a widespread provision of public education: the inequality of ac-
cess to educational resources. By declaring that the “government has not solved the
problem[s] of education because government is the problem” (Maclaury 1990: ix),we
end up in the same position we originally found ourselves in: a private provision of
education is not interested in the needs and desires of those less well-off. As Adam
Smith already argued from a utilitarian standpoint, this is problematic because it
decreases society’s productive or, for us from a commons perspective, caring ca-
pabilities and threatens the social order. From Rawls’ normative perspective, this
inequality denies the less well-off the opportunity to develop their capacities.Thus,
the privatization of education appears to be something like an attempt to put out
a fire with burning sticks.
What, then, is the alternative to a top-down provision of education by the state
and a more private provision based on competitive market mechanisms? Here, we
must again bring in the notion of commons as an alternative to the state-market
dichotomy. For education, this generally implies a democratization of governance
processes, institutions, and educational practices and resources. A commons in-
terpretation of education builds on some of these critiques, yet places democracy
at the core of its arrangements. To understand what this could mean in more con-
crete terms, let us begin with higher education and the informational resources on
which it depends, and then turn to the governance, institutions and contents of
elementary and high school education. We will discuss vocational education in the
following chapter.
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Open-access information commons:
scientific knowledge and academic journals
Higher education can generally be understood as one of the key ways that a society
creates experts and intellectuals in diverse fields of knowledge. In the tradition of
the Enlightenment, a central aim of universities is to produce scientific knowledge
that will hopefully advance people in their understanding of the world. It is as-
sumed that this knowledge will make people freer in both the sense that it will free
them from false beliefs and increase the range of possibilities for action. This oc-
curs through the broad dissemination of information and knowledge to the wider
public – and the ability of non-experts to access this information. Scientific infor-
mation is thus a vital resource for political participation, critical deliberation and
effective policy-making in democratic societies (Dewey 1946: 208-9). In this sense,
we can say that universities and scientific information have a public function: to
educate society.
If we look at the state of higher education and scientific information in many
countries around the world today, it is unclear whether universities currently ful-
fill this purpose. Here however, we will not focus on the well-known problems of
soaring university fees and student debt. My focus will, instead, be on what some
might consider a sideshow: academic journals. Simply put, the problem of aca-
demic journals is that they enclose and privatize scientific information. The costs
of access to individual scientific articles for people who are not affiliated with aca-
demic institutions (which is the greater part of the world’s population) are gen-
erally very high.6 One reason for these high costs is, largely, the concentration of
ownership of academic journals in the hands of a few corporations (Larivière et
al. 2015). As can be expected, profits in this field are therefore also very high.7 But
the more fundamental reason for these large profits is that the knowledge is pro-
vided to these corporations for free. Importantly, and in contrast to newspapers, for
example, the information is not created, reviewed or edited by the journals them-
selves, but instead provided for free by academics (Bergstrom 2001;McGuigan/Rus-
sel 2008). Additionally, copyright in articles is usually handed over to the journals
(Hilty 2007). Academics, universities and the public are therefore obliged to buy
their own research back from corporations that merely package the publicly funded
6 The price for a single article can reach up to $35 a piece (Monbiot 2016: 194). In 2011, British
university libraries spent up to 65 per cent of their budgets on academic journals (Economist
2011) which can range in prices from $500 to over $20,000 a year (McGuigan/Russel 2008;
Monbiot 2016: 194).
7 Some estimates speak of a turnover of $10 billion worldwide (Björk 2017: 101), while in 2008
others estimated the revenue of these companies in North America alone to be $11.5 billion
(McGuigan/Russel 2008). In 2010 Elsevier, the largest publisher of academic journals world-
wide, had an operating-profit margin of 36 per cent (Economist 2011).
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information. It appears, therefore, that private journal publishers extract profit
from research communities by enclosing and restricting access to publicly funded
scientific knowledge commons (Berg 2012). From a socio-economic perspective, and
analogously to the problem of research and development in the field of health and
medicine, I would argue that the privatization of information can limit collabora-
tion and innovation and lead to the tragedy of an anti-commons – not necessarily
between researchers, who often have access to the journals, but rather between the
scientific community and the broader non-academic public. From a socio-political
perspective, expensive, private academic journals ultimately undermine the edu-
cational function of universities and research in an informed and self-reflective
democratic society.
The widespread privatization of scientific information in academic journals is
unique in two respects. Not only are the infrastructure and the labor that go into
research often funded by the public. Furthermore, digital information –and knowl-
edge in general – is often considered to be the exemplary non-exclusory and non-
rival good (Stiglitz 1999; Hess/Ostrom 2007). In our terminology, we could say that
digital information and knowledge are highly inclusive and additive. The fact that
one person can consume information and simultaneously enable other people to
benefit from it makes it an ideal resource to provide in an open-access manner
(Verschraegen/Schiltz 2006). The best contemporary examples of this are the free
online encyclopediaWikipedia and Project Gutenberg, which can be understood as
an open-access information or knowledge commons (Safner 2016).The philosopher
Peter Suber defines open access in the following manner:
Open access (OA) is free online access. OA literature is not only free of charge to
everyonewith an Internet connection, but free ofmost copyright and licensing re-
strictions. OA literature is barrier-free literature produced by removing the price
barriers and permission barriers that block access and limit usage ofmost conven-
tionally published literature, whether in print or online. (Suber 2007: 171)
If we thus understand open access information in this manner, what would dif-
ferentiate its organization as a public good from a commons? According to Suber,
one main difference lies in the author’s rights. When work is put in the public do-
main, no rights are retained: there are authors, but no legal owners of the text.
In contrast, a commons is constituted when the author consents to all legitimate
scholarly uses. The author thereby voluntarily gives up certain rights (which they
also do when publishing in private journals), but retains the right to block the dis-
tribution of falsified or misattributed copies and block the commercial reuse of
such copies (ibid.: 171, 179). From this perspective, the intellectual commons is pos-
sibly more attractive for authors because they remain the owners of the text, while
still being able to provide the information to a wider public.
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Aside from the question of the ownership of texts, public provision of open-ac-
cess information differs from commons provision with respect to ownership and
management of its infrastructure. One form of public provision of access to scien-
tific information would require the state to set up and manage open-access inter-
net platforms for the general public. This is often done with in-house government
research that is funded by taxpayers. It is questionable, however, whether govern-
ments should also do this for academic journals. If we look at other OA projects,
Project Gutenberg is, for example, a private non-profit corporation that is financed
through donations and managed by its CEO and Board of Directors. Wikipedia,
also a non-profit organization funded by donations, is administered by a seven-
member board of trustees. For academic journals, it is evident that the academic
community itself ought to provide and manage the infrastructure for open access
to scientific information. Managing boards can also include members of public li-
braries and the wider public in order to ensure relevance and accessibility of the in-
formation.The existing expenses could be covered by public funds (e.g. in the form
of salaries of university and library employees), publication grants and donations.
Importantly, open access implies free access to information,whichmeans that there
would be no subscription fees – for readers or libraries. Yet, because much of this
publishing work is already done for free by academics, we can assume that the re-
maining costs will be rather low. But as Suber says, “there is not just one way to
cover the expenses of a peer-reviewed OA journal” (ibid.: 174). While the contents,
in all of these cases, are provided for in an open-access manner, the management
is conducted either through government officials, entrepreneurs, civil society or
professional societies.While all this information should be understood as an infor-
mation commons, I would argue that open access created through peer production
and managed by those largely responsible for and affected by this content should,
more generally, be considered commons in their institutional sense. In relation to
our four examples, it appears that Wikipedia and open access scientific journals
would come closest to this notion of a commons.
Lastly, however, it must be noted that from the perspective of access to educa-
tional resources, the value of open access to information stands above its organiza-
tional provision.The question of how this intellectual resource should be managed
is therefore secondary. Despite the risks of tragedy inherent in creating intellec-
tual commons (Wenzler 2017; Suber 2007: 183-7), the advantages of a commons over
public provision are also based on the innovation that results from the inclusion of
citizens in research, also known as public science or participatory action research
(Kindon et al. 2007; Lawson et al. 2015). In this sense, an information commons
can ideally decrease the knowledge gap between scientific experts and the wider
population, not simply by educating the public but also by providing people with
the means to participate in and use science for the democratic co-creation of their
shared, common reality.
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Schools and schooling in an education commons
Having discussed information commons in higher education, let us now turn to the
more general question of how public schooling can be organized as a commons.
On the institutional level, this implies, first and foremost, that the people affected
by public education should have the right to codetermine its arrangements. Demo-
cratic participation must be understood as the answer to top-down uniform state
provision of education and as an alternative to market mechanisms and privati-
zation that cater to the well-off. By understanding public education as a common,
welfare recipients and market consumers are, ideally, transformed into active, par-
ticipating citizens or, in my vocabulary, commoners. This principle of democratic
codetermination can be applied to numerous levels of decision-making: educa-
tional policy at national, state and municipal levels, the administration of school-
ing districts and themanagement of individual schools. Because it is often believed
that political participation is more difficult on the national level, political partic-
ipation in educational affairs is most commonly achieved through organizational
bodies such as local school councils, parent-teacher associations and inter-school
student councils. Another type of organizational body could be a Local Education
Forum as discussed by Richard Hatcher, which “would be a body open to all with
an interest in education, including of course teachers and other school workers,
school governors, parents and school students”, enabling these people to “discuss
and take positions on all key policy issues” (Hatcher 2012: 37). The general aims
of these organizations and instruments are to increase the effectiveness and ac-
countability in the provision of education according to the needs and desires of
the affected people. Despite the importance of this idea for the provision of edu-
cation by the state, I will not focus on these issues because the ideas are not new
and there is already a rather large body of international literature on this topic
(Golarz/Golarz 1995; Brehony/Deem 1995; Fung 2003a; Lewis/Naidoo 2006; Arvind
2009; Smit/Oosthuizen 2011; Long 2014; Jung et al. 2016). However, it is impor-
tant to note that despite this emphasis on local, democratic control of education, a
national government is necessary to mitigate substantial inequalities between dif-
ferent school districts. Decentralized democratic bodies are incapable of dealing
with this problem, which arises at a higher level between districts. The question,
then, is how democratic participation can be strengthened not only on the local
level, but also on the national or even at supranational levels of educational politics
and policy-making. In general terms, democratic participation should hopefully
transform a top-down provision of public education into an education commons
structured as a multilayered and polycentric governance system.
Aside from policymaking and the management of schools, it is also necessary
to discuss the notion of an education commons in relation to schooling. In very
general terms, I would like to emphasize the importance of democratic and eco-
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logical knowledge and values for schooling in an education commons. The reason
for this should hopefully be rather clear from the preceding discussions. Never-
theless, let me briefly summarize my reasons again. In general terms, democracy
should enable people to co-create and codetermine their socio-ecological condi-
tions. The importance of democracy in educational matters lies not only in its in-
strumental value for overcoming social dilemmas and tragedies, but also in the
intrinsic value of collective action and convivial modes of living. When school ed-
ucation focuses on democracy, it should emphasize the importance of individual
freedom in relation to the freedom of others.This is what I have defined as ecologi-
cal freedom: the freedom in, through and against others.The underlying value that
a democracy should cultivate is thus the recognition of and respect for oneself and
the other. This reciprocity lays the foundation for the deliberation and negotiation
over other social values and the organization of interdependent individual lives in
a shared reality. As I mentioned in my discussion of democracy, the principle of
autonomy should, however, be integrated in a larger framework that includes not
only the human world but also the non-human world. This, in turn, leads us to
the importance of ecology in educational matters. Essentially, ecology is a princi-
ple that should enable people to recognize environmental limits, understand the
relational functioning of eco-systems and negotiate the intrinsic and instrumen-
tal value of other interdependent living beings. In terms of norms, ecology should
cultivate the values of diversity, reciprocal interdependence, care and sustainabil-
ity. This is what Capra, Mattei and others have called eco-literacy (Capra/Mattei
2015: 174-8; Kahn 2010; Peacock 2004). As we see, however, ecology and democracy
should not be seen as two separate entities, but rather as complementary means to
realize a just and sustainable evolution of life.Thus, the principles of ecology should
be combined with those of democracy, ultimately fostering an understanding for
ecological democracy in education (Houser 2009).
Let us briefly discuss what that implies for schools and teaching. On the one
hand, it would imply that democracy and ecology would be taught at schools as
subjects. In many schools, this is already the case: democracy is a theme in what
is called civic or citizenship education, which is sometimes subsumed into history
or some other subject; ecology, in turn, is normally taught in geography or biology
class. Here, democracy and ecology are treated solely as educational contents or
as objects that exist ‘out there’ in the world. I believe this to be the traditional ap-
proach to these topics. Although sometimes pedagogically necessary, this approach
is somewhat problematic since it reproduces the Cartesian divide between res cog-
itans and res extensa or subject and object that underlies the false dichotomy that
divides our common ecological reality into human being on the one side and nature
on the other. For this reason, an education commons would interpret democracy
and ecology not merely as educational contents, but also as educational forms, as
ways of learning. This would imply, on the other hand, that learners not only ac-
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quire knowledge of democracy and ecology, but also experience and practice these
principles in an interactive and systemic manner. As John Dewey already argued
over 100 years ago, this means that democracy is not simply taught, but that it is
also a way of learning and, more generally, a way of life (Dewey 2008). Similarly,
we could say that ecology is not merely something to be learned about, but also a
way of learning.
A democratic and ecological education would thus attempt to recognize the ne-
cessity and importance of each person in collaborative learning processes. Learn-
ing would not simply occur as independent self -organization, but rather as an in-
teractive and interdependent cooperative process that is negotiated between the
pupils and teachers in a way that recognizes their real diversity. Admittedly, this
notion of cooperative learning is not new (Slavin 1996; Gillies 2007; Johnson/John-
son 2009). An ecological twist to this approach, however, would integrate one’s en-
vironment into these interactive processes. For elementary school children, this
could imply co-designing and helping to build a playground that fulfills their needs
and desires – and, possibly, integrates ecological niches for plants and animals
(Lozanovska/Xu 2013). For high school students, cooperative, ecological learning
could involve projects in which the school itself is altered to become more sustain-
able. Pupils could, for example, plan and organize the installation of solar panels
on the school’s roof – possibly they could even learn how to assemble solar panels
themselves.8 In this sense, the aim of a democratic and ecological approach to edu-
cational praxis would be to foster engaged citizens who can collaborate with others
and develop skills in order to actively co-create and transform their common reality
in a sustainable manner.
In sum, an education commons would differ from public education in two sig-
nificant ways. As we saw in the discussion of information and knowledge, an open
access information commons would provide the wider public with access to aca-
demic research that is, in turn, managed by the researchers and institutions that
generate this information. Secondly, I have argued that an education commons
would imply the democratization of educational policymaking and the manage-
ment of schools. This would expand the opportunities given to the wider public to
organize their education according to their needs and desires. Furthermore, I have
contended that democratic and ecological knowledge and values should be inte-
grated into schooling. This should provide children and young adults the chance
to learn in an individualized yet cooperative manner in interaction with their en-
vironment. At all levels, the aim of education in an education commons is thus to
empower people to become commoners for a commons-creating society.
8 While this might appear to some as too complex and thus unrealistic, the construction of
solar panels is learnt and practiced at the “Barefoot College” in Tilinia, India (O'Brien 1997;
Roy/Hartigan 2008).
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7.4 Creating commons in a non-ideal world – in and against the state
I must admit that my ‘realization-approach’ portrayal of a state-supported com-
mons-creating society might appear rather rosy and utopian. Returning to our
preliminary discussion of ideal and non-ideal theory, it might seem as though I
have slipped back into a ‘transcendental institutionalism’ inmy comparison of pub-
lic and common goods. Nevertheless, I hope that this discussion has provided us
with a better understanding of the relationship between the state, public goods and
commons.The question that now arises is, however, what the relationship between
the state and the commons looks like in non-ideal world. Or more concretely: How
can such a social arrangement be realized when democratic participation is not
given? Does global warming force us to give up our notion of democratic partici-
pation in a commons state? And does this focus on local, nation-state answers not
forget the large, global picture of immense poverty and ecological degradation in
other countries? In this last section on the state-commons relationship I will there-
fore touch on these issues: the ‘urgency’ of climate change, the role of commons
for ‘developing’ nations, the threat of state oppression and opportunities to reclaim
and cultivate commons.
The urgency of climate change
Let us begin with the problem of climate change. As I have already mentioned,
there exists an unequal distribution of ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ in the world: 20 percent
of the world’s population produce 80 percent of the world’s GHG emissions (Sat-
terthwaite 2009). A part of this 20 percent belongs to the middle class in Western
countries, while the rest belongs to the affluent people who reside throughout the
world. While there might be a growing population that longs for socio-ecological
change in the direction that has been portrayed in this book, there are, neverthe-
less, many people who prefer to cling to their habits, privileges and power. If this is
true, the small difference a few experiments in tool sharing, repair workshops, co-
housing and democratic city planning might make can appear somewhat laugh-
able. We are confronted here with a few concrete and serious questions regarding
non-ideal political theory: how can the socio-ecological injustices that result from
this relatively affluent global population be overcome?What if a large portion of this
population – including many of its political representatives – is not interested in
such a democratic socio-ecological transformation? And finally, do we have enough
time considering the urgency of climate change? In this section we will focus on
the last question.
In the eyes of some, these interrelated socio-ecological problems – and espe-
cially climate change – are so urgent that we do not have the time to deal with them
through democratic means. IvoWallimann-Helmer, for example, explains in his ar-
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ticle “The Republican Tragedy of the Commons –The Inefficiency of Democracy in
the Light of Climate Change”:
Although the normative ideal of republican democracy provides resources to over-
come the risk of such tragedy, it is inefficient all along the line. It is potentially inef-
ficient both in guaranteeing adequate decisions concerning international agree-
ments formitigating GHG emissions andwith regard to the discussed possible re-
design of its institutions to overcome its inefficiency. On a global level, where ne-
gotiations on international agreements tomitigateGHGemissions are concerned,
respecting the relevance of democratic legitimization in republican democracies
makes it very plausible that not all nation-states (democracies) will subscribe.
This shows why […] the intragenerational dimension of climate change should be
treated as if it were a tragedy of the commons even though under optimal cir-
cumstances it could become a simple coordination problem. It should be treated
this way because there is a risk that in republican democracies necessary politi-
cal decisions are not reached in due time. (Wallimann-Helmer 2013: 14; emphasis
added)
Interestingly, Wallimann-Helmer does not, however, provide us with an answer to
this very serious problem. He leaves us hanging at the end of his article with the
passage quoted above.
Considering the urgency of the problem and the supposed inefficiency of demo-
cratic change, what can be done? One option could be, at least theoretically, a type
of eco-dictatorship, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, though achieved
either through a single democratic vote or a revolution. This is obviously not very
attractive; we would sacrifice our liberty for ecological sustainability, yet without
being assured that the dictator will be wise and benevolent. Another apparently
more pleasant option might be what John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse
call “Stealth Democracy” (2004). In a nutshell, their thesis is that people are fun-
damentally uninterested in politics and simply want to be left alone (ibid.: 129).
According to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, the only reason why people would never-
theless choose to participate in politics is to limit corrupt and rent-seeking behavior
on the part of politicians. But if these people had the illusory option of “government
by non-self-interested elites” (ibid.: 130), a majority would choose it. In such an ar-
rangement, we could simply allow scientific experts who were neutral, yet of good
will, and who were familiar with the facts of climate change and the importance of
equality for our individual and social well-being to govern. Here it is believed – or
hoped for – that intelligent scientists would not be dictators, but friendly experts,
who would slowly but surely implement the correct evidence-based policies that
would turn us into a good and sustainable society in no time. And their benevo-
lent and subtle art of “nudging” (Thaler/Sunstein 2008) would make it seem as if we
wouldn’t even have to seriously change our way of life or have lost our privileges
7. The role of the state in a commons-creating society 241
and power on the way. Such a political arrangement would free people from the
time-consuming and dirty conflicts involved in democratic debates and negotia-
tions – providing us with more time for self-development and convivial activities.
Ideally, these experts would also implement a robust firewall that would forever
shield politics from big money and private interests. This is at least how I envision
a stealth democracy.
The obvious problem with such a political model, however, is the same one that
we confrontedwith the eco-dictator and as Vincent Ostrom alreadymade clear with
reference to the monocentric and hierarchical state: elites who are neutral and ‘of
good will’ do not exist. Such an arrangement is only attractive if the experts’ opin-
ions correspond with one’s own opinion. If this is not the case, I have no possibil-
ity of influencing policy-making processes. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that
such experts could ‘peacefully’ implement rules and regulations that would funda-
mentally change people’s lifestyles, privileges and powers without them noticing or
resisting. A few examples of such rules and regulations that come tomind could be:
a strict limitation of wealth accumulation in the name of equality; the prohibition
of real estate speculation in order to provide access to affordable housing for all
citizens; the definition of decent minimal living wages and the limitation of work-
ing hours so that people have more free time for caring activities and commoning;
the prohibition of specific things that are ecologically detrimental (i.e. plastic bags,
throw-away coffee-cups, eating too much meat, the creation of new fashion every
season, unjustified use of SUVs or flying by airplane etc.); and, lastly, the commu-
nalization of individual property in certain consumer goods and in the means of
subsistence and production more generally. Overcoming social and ecological in-
justices would require at least some, if not all, of these rules and regulations. Nev-
ertheless it is highly unlikely that people would accept these changes implemented
from above without much resistance. As we see, even if people deeply desire to be
freed from political responsibilities, conflicts, and burdens, stealth democracy is
an illusion.
To the reader, the trajectory of the argumentation so far will have appeared to
be quite circular: the urgency of the issues involvedmakes us desire strong national
and, even better, international laws that would simply prohibit socio-ecologically
unjust activities, while we can generally assume that a large portion of the popula-
tion in affluent Western countries would vehemently oppose such radical changes.
So where is the way out of this conundrum? Assuming that neither an eco-dicta-
torship nor stealth democracy is either desirable or realistic, the options we have
appear to be rather limited. It seems there are no quick answers to these problems.
But how should social change occur if more affluent and powerful people resist the
loss of their privileges, despite their negative effects on many other people and
ecosystems around the globe? I will attempt to answer this question shortly, but
before that let us now turn to another problem in the non-ideal world that is in-
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terrelated with this problem: the global socio-ecological inequalities and the role
of the commons for ‘developing’ countries.
Commons-oriented strategies in ‘developing’ countries
As I have just said, the lion’s share of the world’s resources is consumed by a small
but affluent section of its population.This is not to say that themore affluentWest-
ern countries are at fault for all the problems that occur in the rest of the world.
Nevertheless, an analysis of the global flows of commodities, capital and green-
house gas emissions create a fairly clear picture of this global disparity: while the
goods (cheap products, capital etc.) flow to the wealthy populations and most often
to Western countries in the northern hemisphere, the ‘bads’ such as pollution and
poverty are often externalized to the South. Obviously, there are no simple answers
to such complex and historically entrenched problems. Nevertheless, I assume that
the commons perspective may possibly provide some basic insights into how some
of these problems can be alleviated.
In principle, the concept of commons remains the same, whether we are speak-
ing of countries in the North or the South: the commons approach generally entails
that the local people dependent on and affected by a specific resource system should
have the collective rights in property and the ability to democratically manage these
resources (Wenar 2008; Hendrix 2008). In order to minimize rent-seeking corrup-
tion, these resources should be held under democratic stewardship in the interests
of the larger community and the eco-system (Weis 2015; Westra 2011). This might,
however, imply that a community could nevertheless have the right to exploit their
resources within certain ecological limits if the entire community desires to do so.
The difference between such exploitation and the existing system of “plunder” (Mat-
tei/Nader 2008) would be that the financial returns from this exploitation would
not flow to those who are already wealthy, but go directly to those who are overus-
ing – and therefore losing – their material means of existence.
Thus, the general policy that is proposed here to alleviate poverty in the global
South is by “realizing property rights” (Soto/Cheneval 2006). A good point of refer-
ence, here, is the report Empowering the PoorThrough Property Rights (Cheneval 2008),
which was produced by the working group of the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme and the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor. As the report
acknowledges, a major problem in developing countries is that “the absolute ma-
jority of the people in developing countries are not [legally] protected in theory or
practice” (Cheneval 2008: 64). This makes people economically and politically vul-
nerable, most notably women, indigenous people and urban slum dwellers (ibid.:
65). One main feature of this report is its recommendation that states recognize
informal or “extralegal property systems” (Cheneval 2008: 66) based on customary
tenure and “vernacular law” (Weston/Bollier 2013: 104). This principle is basically
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a reformulation of Elinor Ostrom’s seventh design principle, which supports the
recognition of people’s rights to devise their own institutions (E. Ostrom 2008a:
101). Importantly, the report emphasizes the necessity of a wide “range of pos-
sibilities of ownership by individuals, members of collectives, and by collectives”
(Cheneval 2008: 87). Simultaneously, the report repeatedly emphasizes the impor-
tance of common property arrangements (ibid.: 71, 73, 83-4, 87-9, 105). These can
be realized through the recognition of existing, collective, “indigenous tenure sys-
tems” (ibid.: 79). Echoing the work of Elinor Ostrom, the political philosopher and
rapporteur of the report, Francis Cheneval, writes:
The majority of the rural poor depend to a large extent on non-arable resources
such as forests, pastures, swamplands, and fishing grounds. These resources re-
quire careful management to avoid rent-seeking and corrupt practices that result
in environmental degradation and economic inefficiencies. The state should en-
hance the asset base of the poor by enabling community-based ownership and
management of private commons, but it will have to play the role of conflict man-
ager among the communities and among individuals. (ibid.: 71)
While these examples focus on the rural poor, in the case of slum dwellers and
the urban poor the report supports the promotion of “associative property struc-
tures” (ibid.: 87). Such arrangements can be created not simply through the formal
recognition of their property rights, but also through “leverage by pooling assets”
(ibid.).
As the report mentions, however, the process of realizing such arrangements
is not easy. The report mentions a few problems, of which I would like to focus
on one specifically: “protecting customary or indigenous rights while enacting the
ability of communities and individual households to explore new economic oppor-
tunities”9 (ibid.: 90). This can also be understood as a reference to the opportunity
for individuals to opt-out of common property arrangements. I believe this to be of
central importance, because support for common property arrangements cannot
be understood as a top-down matter. Hence, while I emphasize the importance of
commons in order to enable ongoing democratic self-governance, it is also neces-
sary to underline the prior democratic deliberation over the desired mix of individ-
ual and common property. Accordingly, Cheneval writes, “For implementation at all
levels, reforms must be based on deliberation and inputs from those that they are
intended to affect.” (ibid.: 70) The emphasis on democratic deliberation in the real-
ization of property arrangements is central if we are to avoid the implementation
of institutions that do not correspond with people’s needs and environments.Here,
9 The other difficulties include: “identifying communities and evolving practices”; “balancing
respect for local decision-making with human rights and accountability”; and the “challenge
of capacity and conflict” (Cheneval 2008: 90).
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we are reminded of Elinor Ostrom’s second and third design principles (E. Ostrom
2008a: 92-3). The report understands the legal reforms it recommends as “context-
based” (Cheneval 2008: 69). In my view, such an approach should be considered as
essential in all attempts to alter property arrangements and realize commons.
Related to the question of the mix between individual and communal property
is also the question of the role of the market in such policies. While the UNDP re-
port emphasizes the importance of common property arrangements, it also under-
lines the importance of markets for entrepreneurial activities and “value addition”
(ibid.: 74). That being said, the rapporteur also admits that there existed “conflict-
ing views” on the “role of the state [and] the market” (ibid.: 75). While some argued
that the market provides opportunities for the poor, others emphasized the “fact
that market forces marginalize the poor and drive them into misery” (ibid.). In
this sense, this ambivalent approach contrasts somewhat with the approach prop-
agated by Hernando de Soto, who largely focuses on the legal recognition of indi-
vidual private property in order to provide those in poverty with security and access
to markets (Soto 2001). Considering the problematic effects of individual private
property coupled with market access that we have already extensively discussed, I
would argue that it is more desirable to support the livelihoods of individuals from
a “subsistence perspective” (Mies/Bennholdt-Thomsen 1999) and the structural in-
terdependence of individuals through communal property rights and community
wealth building. As in the report Empowering the Poor, “through sustainable own-
ership and/or security of tenure individuals and communities becomes more au-
tonomous” (Cheneval 2008: 73). Here, autonomy can be understood to mean both
independence from market mechanisms and democratic codetermination. This
would not prohibit individuals and communities from producing goods that they
also sell on the market. Instead, the focus on democratic rights, community-build-
ing and economic self-sufficiency intends to make people less vulnerable to the
negative effects of the open-access, competitive market. Or, again with reference
to the UNDP report: “The idea [of associative property structures] is to provide a
form of ownership to balance the interests of the individual or family with those
of a broader community.” (ibid.: 87)
While the notion of subsistence might sound somewhat backward-looking
here, I in no way intend to imply that the poor should remain poor. Instead, it
aims to conceptualize an alternative understanding of sustainable development
based on ecological democracy (Kothari 2014; Kothari/Demaria 2017; Kothari 2018).
Strengthening democratic practices and institutions within local communities
empowers people, giving them the ability to determine how they desire to develop
and grow as a community. Coupled with economic subsistence through common
property arrangements this can potentially free people from the necessity of per-
petual monetary growth. Importantly, however, these strategies of democratically
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codetermined development do not simply apply to countries of the South but can
and should also be developed in more affluent Northern societies.
While this process of recognition might sound grand for people with informal
tenure rights and small resources that can be pooled, this is not the case for those
without any property in external resources. As Cheneval writes, “increasing security
of property rights will have limited direct benefits for those who do not have any
real assets at all” (Cheneval 2008: 105). In order tomitigate this problem of no direct
access to material resources, the commission supports not only rental markets and
the recognition of informal settlements, but also a community-based land reform
(ibid.: 105-6). The aim of such a reform would be to provide people with access to
material resources,more specifically “real property” (ibid.: 105), i.e. property in real
estate. In order to do this, they suggest that people be provided with funds in order
to then access resources. Recognizing the potential negative side-effects of a “mar-
ket-based” strategy, the report argues that the solution is “legally less complicated
and politically less sensitive than in compulsory acquisition programmes” (ibid.:
106). Although I would absolutely agree with this insight, it nevertheless remains
questionable where these funds will come from and if the state will have the ability
and the will to provide these citizens with such funds. The question then arises
how substantial property rights can be realized for those without much political
and economic power. This problem brings us to the next topic in my discussion of
the state-commons relationship: the problems of elite resistance and state oppres-
sion in attempts to realize common property arrangements.
Reclaiming the commons
As Francis Cheneval recognizes in the UNDP report on Empowering the Poor, a cen-
tral difficulty in realizing property rights for the poor is the “resistance of powerful
social actors” (ibid.: 80). In relation to the realization of commons arrangements, it
can be argued that this problem is accentuated, because it conflicts with the prior-
itization of individual private property and the principles of free trade (McCarthy
2004; Mattei/Nader 2008; Driessen 2008). Moreover, it can be said that this prob-
lem of resistance ‘from above’ exists not only in developing countries but also in
more developed countries (Heyn et al. 2007; Gerbasi/Warner 2007). Generally put,
the reasons for elite resistance are that the realization of commons arrangements
not only limit their appropriation of more wealth but also often require the ex-
propriation of their existing individual private property. Put somewhat differently,
elite resistance is a reaction against the transformation of appropriated resources
back into commons. In general, I see two methods of dealing with this problem
of resistance and oppression from politico-economic elites and state authorities:
confrontational and ‘interstitial’ commoning. In this section we will focus on the
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strategy of confrontation. But before that let us discuss the role of the state in elite
resistance in a little more detail.
It is noteworthy that in comparison to ‘bottom-up’ resistance in the form of
social movements, elite resistance appears to be much less documented. I believe
the difficulty in conceptually grasping elite resistance lies in its interwoven struc-
ture with the state. While bottom up resistance is often visible because it occurs in
public spaces, top-down resistance is much more ‘civilized’ and invisible because
it takes the form of “investment strikes” (Streeck 2013: 50) and (supra)national gov-
erning bodies. This might be a reason why there is significantly less explicit ref-
erence in academic literature to elite resistance to commoning than to social re-
sistance to privatization. That being said, the two can be interpreted as two sides
of the same coin. Interestingly, however, the widespread focus on bottom-up re-
sistance implicitly naturalizes privatization tendencies and normatively connotes
social protest as a resistance to this natural development. I would argue that this
naturalization occurs due to the interwoven interests of powerful economic and po-
litical actors. Because individuals with more resources can use their greater power
to influence politicians and politics through non-democratic means, the state and
supranational governing bodies are sometimes discretely and illegitimately used as
a means to defend individual property arrangements and competitive markets. I
have already discussed this problem of ‘capture’ in relation to the minimal, market-
based state. Here, powerful social actors use state authority to uphold the often
invisible and seemingly natural background of social arrangements. Attempts to
realize common property arrangements are therefore sometimes confronted not
only with elite resistance but also with state oppression.
In such cases, bottom-up confrontation can provide a means to protest against
illegitimate social arrangements and grave injustices that are often neglected by
politicians, the media and the public. Such confrontation can occur either through
the work of NGOs who spread information on such injustices or, more classically,
through protest and demonstrations on the street. This latter form of confronta-
tion is a performative and collective means of expressing one’s opinion, yet without
reverting to the exchange of arguments. While protest is often understood as un-
democratic because it is performative and not based on reciprocal deliberation, it
must nevertheless be understood as a democratic means of bringing suppressed
issues and conflicts to the fore. More importantly, it is also a means to force pow-
erful actors who free-ride and resist democratic deliberation to the negotiation
table (Tully 2014: 70). In our discussion of socio-ecological justice, protest can thus
be understood as a strategy to shame and blame people, corporations or institu-
tions for their destruction of livelihoods and the environment. Confrontation could
therefore, more generally, be a means of creating public awareness of socio-eco-
logical injustices and possibly alter the legal framework to limit appropriation and
transform individual into common property.
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Although confrontation is often necessary to create public pressure on political
representatives to act in a certain manner, the question still remains whether this
will suffice for broader social-ecological transformation in general and the devel-
opment of a commons-creating society more specifically. In order to deal with this
problem, I would suggest that it is necessary to widen our traditional understand-
ing of confrontation to include the practice of “reclaiming the commons” (Klein
2001). Reclaiming the commons is generally a practice of legal or illegal occupa-
tion and re-appropriation of goods, services and institutions that are considered
to be originally held in common yet have been ‘enclosed’ trough privatization or
nationalization – and, in most cases, a mixture of both, as in public-private part-
nerships. Historically, this process of reclaiming the commons is a phenomenon
that has, most likely, existed since time immemorial in struggles waged by people
(‘commoners’) against the expropriation of their basic resources by elites. One well-
known example of reclaiming the commons are the activities and demands of the
Diggers – and, to a certain extent, also the Levellers –during the enclosures of com-
mon lands during the English Civil War (1642–1651) (Hessayon 2008; Macpherson
2011: 107-159). A less well-known but possibly more significant historical example is
the re-establishment of subsistence rights to enter and use forests for commoners
in the Charter of the Forest of 1217, which was a central yet forgotten sub-article of
the Magna Carta (Linebaugh 2008; Babie 2016). These activities of reclaiming the
commons are not to be written off as a thing of the past, but must be understood
as struggles that are presently occurring all over the world in relation to numer-
ous private and public goods and services such as water, land, seeds, information,
public space, education and health care (Łapniewska 2015; Shiva 2005; Harvey 2013;
Assies 2003; Wolford 2010; Karaliotas 2016).
In the case of public goods, we might assume that they are already a form
of commons, but as our discussion has shown, public goods are often not to be
equated with commons, either because the goods are simply not provided by the
state or because the provision is not oriented to the needs of those affected or sub-
ject to their democratic administration. In cases where the state and government
officials do not grant citizens the right and the ability to democratically manage re-
sources, the activity of reclaiming the commons becomes a central aspect of com-
moning in which people take (back) democratic control over the socio-ecological
conditions of their lives. This sheds new light on collective civic activities, which
James Tully also calls “cooperative democracy”. Here, democracy is not limited to
deliberation, but is based on the activity of “joining hands and working together”
(Tully 2014: 97).The strength of this activity is that it empowers people to take mat-
ters into their own hands without having to wait for benevolent government offi-
cials to kindly provide citizens with the opportunity to participate in democratic
management orchestrated by governmental officials and kept within predefined
boundaries. Here, commoning must be understood as a constituent power of so-
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cial movements (Bailey/Mattei 2013) that opens the political field for the democratic
redefinition of the boundaries between the private, public and common, ultimately
reconfiguring the organization of social reality.
Interstitial Commoning
Because confrontational ways of reclaiming commons can, in some cases, be chal-
lenged with severe opposition by the state and politico-economic elites, it is impor-
tant to support these activities with more subtle, yet just as important ‘interstitial’
commoning. In his book Envisioning Real Utopias (2010), Erik Olin Wright describes
interstitial strategies and activities as “various kinds of processes that occur in the
spaces and cracks within some dominant social structure of power” (Wright 2010:
322). The aim of these activities is to “build […] alternative institutions and delib-
erately foster […] new forms of social relations that embody emancipatory ideals
and that are primarily created through direct action of one sort or another rather
than through the state” (ibid.: 324). From a historical perspective, traders and en-
trepreneurs have used this strategy to open markets in highly regulated feudal so-
cial arrangements (Braudel 1986). Considering the pressing socio-ecological injus-
tices we face today, I would argue that it is therefore of the utmost importance to
not only focus on confronting and transforming the state, but also on independent
and interstitial forms of commoning. With reference both to the inability of our
limited political options to deal with the problems we face within the existing po-
litical and legal frameworks and to the injustices that result, I agree with James
Tully that
the remedy to this injustice is not only to exchange public reasons in hopes of
influencing governments, for this has its limits. For cooperative democrats, the
response is to non-cooperatewith this undemocraticmode of production and con-
sumption, to withdraw one’s producing and consuming capabilities from com-
modification and to exercise productive and consumptive capabilities ‘in common’
in democratically run cooperatives and community-based organizations that are
re-embedded in social relationships. Such grass roots democracies then produce
and distribute the basic public goods that are privatized under the dominant form
of democracy: food, shelter, clothing, health care, clean water, security and so on.
(Tully 2014: 91)
As in my discussion of Amartya Sen, Tully argues that “this tradition [of civic co-
operative democracy] is also practice based and ‘realization focused’, yet in a more
immediate way, and it works around, rather than within, the basic structure” (Tully
2013b: 223). Obviously, such activities must also be understood as ways of reclaim-
ing commons, yet the focus has shifted from confrontative re-appropriation to the
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collective creation of commons – irrespective of state support and the existing legal
structure.
Here, the goods that we have generally understood up until now as objects of
a basic right to satisfy one’s needs and that originally should, in some form or
another, be provided for by the state are now provided as commons by the people
themselves through collective civic activities. Again, in the words of Tully:
This is the tradition of democracy as non-violent cooperative self-government: of
the people exercising the capabilities of self-government together in their social
and economic activities on the commons. This is the classic meaning of democ-
racy: of the demos exercising kratos (political capacities) in public reasoning and
acting together for the sake of public goods. (ibid.; original emphasis)
Here, Tully interprets public goods as commons because these goods are created
through democratic, collective action. As he emphasizes, this activity is non-vi-
olent because the cooperation necessary for democratic self-governance can only
occur through non-violent means of communication and interaction. It is clear
that one should, however, not over-romanticize these commoning activities, since
they often arise when people are in distress and misery due to the breakdown of
older forms of provision, whether through communal ties, the market or the state
(Karaliotas 2016). Yet, whatever the motivation for these activities may be, they still
must be understood as a central answer to the unresponsiveness of the state and
politico-economic elites to the basic needs of people. But as I have already said,
the goal is not for the state or economic elites to paternalistically provide goods
and services for people, but for citizens to be able to democratically provide for
themselves – ideally with the support of a democratized state and the aid of what
we have previously called eco-law.
In this sense, I must reaffirm more generally that democratic and socio-eco-
nomic rights themselves were rarely, if ever, simply granted to people by those in
power, but were often developed by people in need and finally realized through non-
cooperative confrontation with state authorities. For example, the development of
the welfare state since the times of Otto von Bismarck should be understood not as
a well-intentioned and benign gesture, but as a bribe that was intended to pacify
the masses by increasing their loyalty to the state and by simultaneously under-
mining workers’ demands for more democratic self-management over their living
conditions (Palier 2010: 36-7). Put in this perspective, although the satisfaction of
basic needs could be understood as a basic right that should be provided for by
the state, state provision can, ironically, if not organized in a democratic manner,
easily undermine the democratic skills and institutions necessary for a commons-
creating society. For this reason, interstitial commoning activities are of funda-
mental importance not only for people to be able to satisfy their own needs, but
also to cultivate the experiences, skills and institutional examples necessary for the
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widespread development of commoning and commons – both in and against the
state.
8. Commons and the market
Having discussed the relationship between commons and the state, let us now turn
to a central question that has been touched upon repeatedly yet incompletely so far:
the relationship between commons and the market. Since I have already discussed
both justifications of the open and competitive market and some of the problems
it engenders, let me be brief in recapitulating the arguments. Most importantly,
the open and competitive market has been justified as a way to bring peace and
unleash productivity. It has been assumed that wealth is generated through the
protection of individual negative rights in private property and through the self-
regulation of supply and demand on the market. Yet, while this negative freedom
has increased the freedom of individuals with direct access to property in external
resources, other individuals have become increasingly dependent on hierarchical
wage labor relationships to secure their existence. Furthermore, the competitive
dynamic of the open market forces firms to perpetually grow in order to survive.
This requires that ever more resources are extracted and appropriated from the
store of common goods that other people depend on, ultimately reproducing the
original discrepancy between haves and the have-nots and increasing the deteriora-
tion of peoples’ socio-ecological habitats. As we have seen, the priority of individual
negative rights and the self-regulation of the market also undermine and severely
limit people’s abilities and opportunities to collectively solve these problems and to
democratically co-create and codetermine their shared living conditions.
Therefore, the questions that we face now are, firstly, whether these problems
are a result of the market per se or of the specific social arrangements of the open
and competitive market. Secondly, we must ask how the concept of commons can
provide us with insights that enable us to transform our understanding and orga-
nization of markets. To answer these questions, I will begin by analyzing the role
of the market in commons literature. After this, I will discuss the relationship be-
tween commons and the market from a historical perspective. In a third step, I will
develop the notion of a market commons that will, hopefully, provide us with an
alternative and democratic concept of economic relationships.
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8.1 The market in commons literature
Generally speaking, there is no single understanding either of markets or the rela-
tionship between markets and commons within the literature on commons. After
discussing the various interpretations in the literature, I nevertheless hope to de-
velop a more general notion of the relationship in the analysis that follows.
As the reader will recall, the Ostroms make only marginal references to market
arrangements. Elinor Ostrom rarely discusses the market, although in one passage
she does describe the open and competitive market as a “straightjacket” that leads
to “maximization strategies” (E. Ostrom 2003: 25). In contrast, Vincent Ostrom
defends competitive market arrangements for a polycentric order (V. Ostrom 1991:
229-231), while elsewhere he advocates the notion of a “moral economy” and the
democratic self-management of economic activities (V. Ostrom 1997: 106, 145). As
we see, the Ostroms’ views on the market are mixed and rather vague.
From Capra and Mattei’s point of view, the legal system underlying the open
and competitive market enables people to “exploit and plunder the web of life”
(Capra/Mattei 2015: 29). Yet elsewhere, they also mention local farmer’s markets
as examples of institutions that exist for the satisfaction of common needs (ibid.:
143). In relation to economic activities in general, they espouse a notion of economic
democracy or “democratic oversight of the economy” (ibid.: 162). Here, it appears
that they understand economic democracy as a type of commons. Furthermore,
they clearly state that a commons “may be anything a community recognizes as
capable of satisfying some real, fundamental need outside of market exchange” (ibid.:
150; emphasis added). So it can generally be said that their stance is highly crit-
ical of open and competitive markets or “global capitalism” (ibid.: 115-117) – and
the legal institutions that uphold these – while defending local markets and the
democratization of economic activities.
If we turn to other scholars who work on commons, a similar mixture of views
and positions can be found. In his influential book The Wealth of Networks (2006),
Yochai Benkler, for example, defines individual private property and commons ar-
rangements as opposites (ibid.: 60). At the same time, he argues that open com-
mons (i.e. information and material infrastructure such as roads and the internet)
play an essential role for economic growth in market societies (Benkler 2013). An-
other influential commons activist and scholar, Peter Barnes, criticizes the detri-
mental ecological impacts of unregulated markets while maintaining that “private
corporations and organized commons [should] enhance and constrain each other”
(Barnes 2006: 77). He understands this type of market as “capitalism 3.0” (also the
title of his book), which enables trade within limits (ibid.). The public intellectual
Jeremy Rifkin argues that inherent contradictions within capitalism will help the
spread of commons lead to an “eclipse of capitalism” (Rifkin 2015: 3). In his bookThe
Zero Marginal Cost Society, Rifkin writes, “While the capitalist market is not likely to
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disappear, it will no longer exclusively define the economic agenda for civilization.”
(ibid.: 27) Rifkin thinks that the realm of the commons will expand, yet exist side-
by-side with the “capitalist market”. In their book Green Governance: Ecological Sur-
vival, Human Rights and the Law of the Commons (2013), Burns H. Weston and David
Bollier are quite critical of the market and also develop the notion of the “tragedy
of the market” (Weston/Bollier 2013: 6-15). Accordingly, they argue for democratic
control over economic institutions within commons arrangements. They explain:
Commoners shall have collective control over the surplus value they create
through the collective management of their shared wealth and resources. To
this end, commons- and rights-based ecological governance shall not be cash-
driven or market-mediated except with the explicit consent of commoners and clear
rules for personal use and resource alienability. The freedom of commoners to
limit or ban the monetization of their shared assets shall not be compromised.
(Weston/Bollier 2013: 277; emphasis added)
According to Weston and Bollier, then, the question whether commons are to be
monetized or market-mediated is left up to the commoners. Meanwhile, however,
the role of the market outside of the commons remains undefined.
Other scholars emphasize the antagonistic relationship between markets and
commons and openly call for an end to capitalist market arrangements. As with
other authors, commons are understood here as “beyond” or “outside” the market
(De Angelis 2007: 240; Bollier et al. 2012).The emphasis is, however, on the idea that
commons are interpreted as a new “cellular”mode of production that will eventually
lead us beyond capitalist markets (Euler 2016). In line with this argument, Paul
Mason titled his book on commons “Postcapitalism” (2015). Similarly, Nick Dyer-
Witheford argues in his article “Commonism”, for example:
If the cell form of capitalism is the commodity, the cellular form of a society be-
yond capital is the common. A commodity is a good produced for sale, a common
is a good produced, or conserved, to be shared. The notion of a commodity, a good
produced for sale, presupposes private owners between whom this exchange oc-
curs. The notion of the common presupposes collectivities – associations and as-
semblies – within which sharing is organized. If capitalism presents itself as an
immense heap of commodities, ‘commonism’ is amultiplication of commons. The
forces of the common and the commodity – of the movement and the market –
are currently in collision across the three spheres we mentioned before: the eco-
logical, the social and the networked. (Dryer-Witherford 2007: 82)
As we see, the literature seems to assume that there is a strict, categorial contradic-
tion between markets and commons. The antitheses it presents oppose scarcity to
abundance, exclusion to inclusion, subtraction to addition, the ‘commodity form’
to the ‘commons form’, atomism to relational systems, competition to cooperation,
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productivity to care, exchange to reciprocity, hierarchical marketmonopolies to de-
centralized peer-to-peer relationships, profit to needs orientation and many more
(Euler 2016; Helfrich 2012b). In commons scholar and activist Stefan Meretz’s un-
equivocal formulation, “markets are not commons – and vice versa” (Meretz 2012).
He justifies this point in the following manner: “The fundamental principle of the
commons is that the people who create the commons also create the rules for them-
selves.” (ibid.) While commons are institutions that can be democratically adapted
by those affected by them,market arrangements are understood as institutions that
are abstract and unalterable. As has become clear in my argument so far, I would
generally agree with these ideal juxtapositions. Nevertheless, I ask myself whether
these dichotomies can be upheld for all economic activities and, more generally,
whether markets can be entirely replaced by commons.
Simply put, it seems unlikely to me that the existing problems of competi-
tion, inequality, exploitation and perpetual growth can be overcome by replacing
all market relations with commons arrangements. I find this highly unlikely be-
cause, if we assume that life in commons is not entirely autarchic and self-suffi-
cient, there must be interactions with other organizations or commons that pro-
duce other goods. It is then often argued with reference to people like Andre Gorz
that the dependency on markets – and especially wage labor – could be minimized
if people were provided with an unconditional basic income and people could par-
ticipate in multiple forms of production (Gorz 1989: 2005). Obviously, the concept
of a basic income is very attractive because it can balance the asymmetrical bar-
gaining positions in wage-labor relationships or even free people from wage labor
entirely (Van Parijs 2003; Widerquist 2013). For a commons-creating society, a ba-
sic income would be ideal because it would enable people to engage in volunteer
care activities and commons-based peer production. While a basic income might
lessen the dependency on hierarchical wage-labor relationships, it would not, how-
ever, free us entirely from (re)production processes and the exchange of goods and
services.
The question also remains of who will produce the tools such as sewing ma-
chines, fishing boats, pasta machines, computers and cars for these (re)production
processes. Here, some people argue that these “convivial tools” (Illich 1973) could
be built with 3-D printers (Rifkin 2015) or open hardware (Siefkes 2008), ultimately
making a market for such tools and machines superfluous. Although I support
these aspirations and endeavors, I nevertheless believe social arrangements with-
out any form of monetary exchange between people and groups to be somewhat
unrealistic.The answers to this problem of necessary exchange could be time banks
(Amanatidou et al. 2015), local exchange trading systems (also known by the initial-
ism “LETS”) (Pacione 1997) or overarching “commons associations” that unite indi-
vidual commons and largely replace money exchange with “contributions” (Siefkes
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et al. 2016). Again, I must repeat that my argument here is not against the devel-
opment of these non-monetary exchange systems.
The point I wish to make is simply that, despite all my criticism, I do actually
believe money and the market to be quite useful instruments and institutions that
enable people with different skills and goods to interact with each other without
having to exist in compact social relations (Demsetz 2002). I must concede this
much to market advocates such as Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek. Yet, despite
this concession, the question then arises of how to shape the social institutions of
money and the market to satisfy people’s needs without leading to tragedy.1 Or, in
other words, the question arises whether markets can be organized as commons
and what this would imply.
Interestingly, it appears that this fundamental question is often grossly un-
der-theorized and neglected in commons literature. I believe that this may have
something to do with the actual predominance of market relations in our everyday
lives. The neglect of the market in commons literature might be due to a desire to
change the symbolic framework through which we see and constitute reality. As is
well known, it is ‘the norm’ today to perceive reality not as a common, but rather
through the prism ofmarket relationships.We often interpret reality as scarce, hos-
tile and competitive and value the world according to monetary costs-benefit anal-
yses.The commons critique of this worldview is often expressed in pejorative terms
such as privatization, commodification, exploitation, valorization, marketization
and, more generally, economization. In opposition to these negatively connoted
processes, the focus on commons is an attempt to enable us not only to “see the
commons” (Mattei 2012b) but also to “think like a commoner” (Bollier 2014). More
generally speaking, this focus is an attempt to bring about an epistemological rev-
olution that constitutes a commons-oriented reality (Mattei 2013a: 17). Although I
agreewith all of these critical analyses and intellectual efforts, I nevertheless believe
that if we disregard the question of the precise role and organization of markets in
a commons-creating society, we might be disregarding the elephant in the room.
I believe it necessary, therefore, to not only ‘reclaim the commons’, but also to ‘re-
claim the market’. My point is that by understanding the market as a commons we
can, in turn, justify the re-appropriation, democratization and transformation of
this dominant social institution.
To understand this relationship between markets and commons and how mar-
kets could be interpreted as commons, I would like to back up a little and discuss
the historical development of open-access competitive markets.
1 Because a discussion of money would exceed the scope of this analysis, I will not discuss
money, but focus solely on markets instead.
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8.2 Enclosing commons and opening markets
A widely-quoted account of the development of a competitive market economy has
already been discussed: John Locke’s somewhat idyllic portrayal of the individual
appropriation of commons. Locke understands the commons as a res nullius which
belongs to everyone and no one. By conceptualizing the commons as a res nullius
in a state of nature, Locke legitimizes the individual appropriation of communal
resources through labor. In a second step, he describes money as an answer to
the problems of barter, introduced through “tacit consent”, which then led to the
spread of markets. Despite the increasing scarcity of access to natural resources
for many people, the Lockean narrative supposes that an increase in productivity
will lead, or has led to an overwhelming abundance that can, in turn, be accessed
with money derived from wage-labor relationships. This is the prevalent narrative
that supposedly explains and legitimizes our contemporary market-based social
arrangements.
In contrast to this rather mythical tale, a more historical account of the devel-
opment of open and competitive markets in Western societies tells us a slightly
different story. I have already discussed this historical process in my critical dis-
cussion of Locke, so there is no need to repeat it here in detail. As I mentioned,
this historical development is most famously described by Karl Marx as “so-called
primitive accumulation” and by Karl Polanyi, more generally, as the enclosure of
commons which has been occurring at least since the 12th century in England, and
later on the Continent and in European colonies (Marx 1982a: 871-940; Polanyi 2001;
Neeson 1996; Linebaugh 2008). Here, peasants were violently dispossessed of their
rights to use commons, which primarily took the form of fields and forests. Marx
argues that although this process freed numerous people from feudal bonds, it
also separated them from their means of subsistence. Polanyi, in turn, describes
this development as a process in which land, labor and money were dis-embedded
from their webs of interdependent social and ecological relationships and trans-
formed into commodities, ultimately re-embedding them in “abstract, competitive
and non-democratic global market relationships” (Tully 2013b: 227).
While this enclosure movement is sometimes understood as the “dirty prehis-
tory” of capitalism (G. A. Cohen 1995: 121), other scholars argue that dispossession
is an ongoing process that enables the creation of profits and their accumulation.
More contemporary forms of enclosure occur, for instance, through land grabbing,
gentrification, patents on genes, seeds and medical knowledge and the privatiza-
tion of water, scientific research and public services.The general point being made
in this literature is that the vast amount of wealth that is accumulated by certain
people is not simply due to labor, but is more precisely, gained through perpetual,
systematic and sometimes violent enclosure, privatization and commodification
of common resources. According to this narrative, as I have already discussed, the
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answer to this problem then lies in ‘reclaiming the commons’ and the ‘decommod-
ification’ of our resources and relationships by organizing the reproduction of life
so that it does not depend on market relationships.
What this commons-oriented narrative partly neglects, however, is the ques-
tion of the role of markets in both pre-capitalist societies and a future commons-
creating society. Let us therefore analyze this historical development not from a
commons but, rather, from a market perspective. Generally, the creation of an ab-
stract, competitive market was not only possible due to the enclosure of commons,
but also through the opening up of highly regulated local markets. Karl Polanyi and
Fernand Braudel are right to argue that, although most of human history has been
based on subsistence and gift economies, exchange, trade and certain types of lo-
cal markets are not necessarily a new phenomenon (Polanyi 2001: 66; Polanyi et al.
1957: 257-70; Braudel 1986: 32-5, 41). Nevertheless, we should not equate all forms of
money and markets with an open and competitive market economy that is struc-
tured according to a self-regulating “supply-demand-price mechanism” (Polanyi
1977, 124). As both authors demonstrate, local markets simply bring production and
consumption together and enable the acquisition of “goods that are not available
on the spot” (Polanyi et al. 1957: 257, Braudel 1986: 42). To be more precise, the local
market is a place that enables people to exchange goods that they do not produce
themselves either through barter or with money. For most of human history, the
exchange of goods was socially embedded and highly regulated by customs and
social institutions.
One such example of an exchange-based market is the guild system that devel-
oped during the process of urbanization in western Europe between 900 and 1300
CE (Schulz 2010). In her highly insightful article “The Silent Revolution: A New
Perspective on the Emergence of Commons, Guilds, and Other Forms of Corpo-
rate Collective Action in Western Europe” (2008), Tine De Moor argues that in the
Netherlands the development of guilds on the one hand and commons on the other
exhibited similar institutional forms of regulation of common resources through
collective action. De Moor understands commons as highly regulated natural and
agricultural resources such as water, pastures and forests (i.e. common-pool re-
sources). In contrast, craft guilds are urban institutions that regulate common re-
sources such as labor, skills, technology, prices, information and, ultimately, the
market itself. With reference to Dutch historians Lourens and Lucassen, she gen-
erally defines craft guilds as
organizations that – with the agreement of the local authority – unite members
of the same occupational group, with as their most important goal the furthering
of their economic interests, but not without taking into account the general well-
being of their group as well. (Lourens/Lucassen in De Moor 2008: 187)
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Although de Moor admits that it is difficult to prove whether guilds always fulfilled
this function, the principles she locates in guild practices nevertheless fit into our
understanding of relational and interdependent freedom in which the thriving of
the individual depends on the flourishing of the community – and vice versa. Ac-
cording to De Moor, despite the differences, the goals and regulative mechanisms
of guilds were rather similar to those of commons:
To make their collective projects work, guilds and commons relied heavily for en-
forcement mechanisms on group norms, as opposed to formal legal enactments.
They designed most of the rules themselves, with or without the involvement of
the local powers […]. With a large set of rules, commoners and guild members
tried to regulate the behaviour of their fellows – to prevent them from free riding
– and to control the effect their surroundings could have on the behaviour of the
members. They developed a system of market regulation in order to protect their
‘own little world’. Measures were taken by both guilds and commons to achieve a
reasonable income for their members and to eliminate the disruptive effects of
the market, which was still at an early stage of development when commons and
guilds were set up in Europe. Institutions such as guilds could make functioning
within those settings less risky, thoughwithout losing toomany of the advantages
the market offered. (De Moor 2008: 197)
These similarities between guilds and commons are noteworthy because they pro-
vide us with an historical example of social organization that utilized the market
for the exchange of goods in order to satisfy basic needs. Here, the market was
not regulated ‘from without’ by the state, but rather by the producers themselves
to protect them from the negative dynamics of free riding and competition such as
poaching, hoarding and price and income instability. At the same time, collective
action aimed at generating positive effects through pooling resources in order to
share risks and create advantages of scale (De Moor 2008: 202-5).
If we understand a commons, in the general sense, as a resource system that
is democratically self-governed by those significantly affected by it, we could also
define medieval guilds as a type of labor commons.2 Parallel to fisheries in which
the individual fishermen own their own boats and equipment, the craftspeople
in the guilds also own their own workshops, yet share and regulate the specific
knowledge, technologies and skills of a specific craft. Although this skilled labor is
used to produce things that are sold on the market, it could nevertheless be argued
that a guild limits the commodification of labor power through its self-defined
rules and regulations.
2 For a more recent example of labor commons, see Dario Azzellini’s analysis of worker-recu-
perated companies in Latin America and Europe (Azzellini 2016).
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Aside from the regulation of labor within the market, however, we can also un-
derstand pre-capitalist markets themselves as second-order commons institutions.
In contrast to the concept of a labor commons, the notion of a market commons
appears to be – at least at first glance – inherently contradictory. The reason for
this seeming paradox lies in our contemporary and rather narrow interpretation
of markets as institutions structured according to competition, commodities and
profits while commons are based on cooperation, concrete goods and use-values.
Furthermore, a market is often understood as institutionally open (North et al.
2009), while the goods that are exchanged must be private and closed (Demsetz
1967).
According to some academics, however, an open-access market can also be in-
terpreted as a commons (Carroll et al. 1979) or, more precisely, as an Hardinian
unregulated and open-access commons. Although the members of guilds do pro-
duce private goods that are exchanged on the market, the pre-capitalist market
itself is more or less closed. Sellers and prices were generally defined in advance by
the guilds to protect producers from competition and the ‘tragedy of the market’.
Through their self-defined rules and regulations guilds created a type of “embedded
market” (Polanyi) or “moral economy” (Thompson 2010) that was organized accord-
ing to the satisfaction of needs instead of a self-regulating price mechanism and
profit maximization. In this sense, and depending on its institutional framework,
I would argue that a market could theoretically be defined as a democratically self-
regulated commons. Yet, despite this similarity, I would argue that medieval mar-
kets regulated by guilds should not be understood as commons because they did not
include a large group of people who were significantly affected by this resource sys-
tem and its institutional regulation: the consumers. This was the reason for Adam
Smith’s critique of guilds; they did not act in favor of consumers. Yet, while Smith
advocated the deregulation of markets in the name of lower prices for customers,
I argue in favor of the integration of consumers in the democratic regulation of
markets. We shall return to this problem later, but first we must understand how
regulatedmedievalmarkets were transformed into open-access, capitalistmarkets.
With historian Fernand Braudel, I would argue that in Europe, parallel to the
enclosure movements that privatized common pool resources, medieval markets,
which up until the 15th century were quite closed, at that point began to be grad-
ually opened. This transformation occurred, most importantly, through private
or “counter-markets” for foreign goods, which existed outside of local medieval
markets. Here, individual traders became middlemen between producers and con-
sumers outside of the traditional, collectively regulated circuits of exchange. Both
the access to mobile capital and the superior knowledge of both ends of the ex-
change relationship gave the merchant an unequal, quasi-monopoly position in
trade and enabled him to accumulate large profits (Braudel 1986: 50-53).The ‘priva-
tization’ of local markets was in turn supported by state colonialism and its foreign
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trade relationships. Furthermore, both Braudel and Polanyi show that the mercan-
tilist nation state also opened local markets, ultimately creating a protected yet
internally open domestic market (ibid.: 88, 97; Polanyi 2001: 63-70). Due to grow-
ing criticism of this state intervention in economic matters articulated by people
such as Adam Smith, the state slowly withdrew and relaxed its protectionist mea-
sures, gradually and carefully transforming the internal open market into a more
open international market regime (Chang 2002; Shaikh 2007). Over time, the so-
cially embedded and collectively regulated local markets of the guild economy were
transformed into one open, ‘common’ capitalist market.
With this very simple sketch of the development of markets in recent history,
I hope to have shown that we must speak of markets in a differentiated manner.
Furthermore, I hope that I have shown that markets often were and, thus, can be
collectively regulated in order to serve social needs and desires. The importance of
this short excursion in the history of markets for my argument is that we can, or
rather should, integrate these insights into our understanding of a possible com-
mons-creating society. So let us now turn to the concept of a market commons.
8.3 The market as a commons
Ecological foundations of a market commons
By defining the market as a commons, we assume that economic activities are
primarily to be understood within an ecological framework. The economy is thus
not only understood as a subsystem of society, but also as a subsystem of an even
larger and more encompassing ecosystem. This notion can best be understood by
considering an idea put forward quite recently by Kate Raworth: “doughnut eco-
nomics” (2017). In order to do justice to the fact that the world’s resources are lim-
ited, Raworth pictures economic processes as describing paths that trace out the
shape of a doughnut – in contrast to an ever increasing linear movement. Hence,
she portrays the economy in the following manner:
In Raworth’s depiction, the commons exist as one segment of the economy be-
side the household, market and the state. While I find Raworth’s portrayal of an
embedded economy accurate on the whole, I have argued here that a democratic
and ecologically sustainable society should expand its commons both in the sphere
of the state and the sphere of the market. Nevertheless, a strength of this model is
that it embeds economics within society and society, in turn,within a larger ecosys-
tem, which is limited. Here, the dynamic reproduction of systems is understood
as the metabolic flow of matter and energy within and between systems.
More fundamentally, because matter and energy are limited on planet earth,
economic activities are generally understood as a zero-sum game: some people’s
gains are other people’s losses. The question that results from this problem is how
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Figure 3: Kate Raworth’s diagram of the embedded economy (Raworth 2017: 62)
to minimize the losses and create a relative abundance despite the absolute limi-
tations set by the resources that exist. It is important to bear in mind that when
we are talking about a capitalist market, we are talking about both material and
symbolic (monetary) relationships.Moreover, the accumulation of wealth in a capi-
talist context involves both the monetary accumulation of ‘good’ matter and energy
in the hands of a few and the widespread distribution of ‘bad’ matter and energy in
the form of pollution and ecological degradation. In this way, we can understand
profits as the extraction, privatization and accumulation of previously non-com-
modified goods such as individual labor power (including physical strength and
creativity), genomes, water, land or fossil fuels. On a symbolic level, this implies
the unequal distribution of access to resources (matter and energy) through one’s
purchasing power. One form of such an unequal distribution of symbolic wealth is
found in the large asymmetries between creditors and debtors. Similarly, profits
earned through speculation can be understood as gains that increase the costs of
goods (e.g. food) and, in turn, decrease the access to this resource for numerous
other people. The accumulation that results from speculation can thus be inter-
preted as a form of extraction from other people’s purchasing power and access to
a certain good or resource.
In line with this ecological conception of the economy, we might understand
the flow of resources with the help of the metaphor of an irrigation system. This
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irrigation system can either be democratically organized according to the needs
of individual users and therefore be very finely tuned in distributing water to all
regions of an ecosystem. Or, conversely, it can be organized according to supply
and demand, purchasing power and the Matthew Principle in which the irrigation
system is modeled with increasingly large levees and dams that contain and accu-
mulate the water for the use of only a few. Using such a metaphor, migration can,
for example, be understood as people simply following the metabolic flow of ‘good’
matter and energy on the planet earth. These people are coming to drink from the
dam of accumulated matter and energy. If we take an ecological perspective of this
kind, we have to abandon the belief that economic growth will solve socio-eco-
logical problems, because, as we have seen, accumulation and the highly unequal
distribution of wealth inherently lead to socio-ecological conflicts. In the face of
these serious problems, the concept of a market commons provides us with an un-
derstanding of markets that attempts to take these ecological limits into account
by democratically negotiating the market’s institutional framework and the coor-
dination of its basic activities. Thus, the aim of a democratic market commons is
to transform absolute scarcity into a relative abundance through the mechanisms
of cooperation, sufficiency and conviviality.
The general point of such a market commons, however, is not merely demo-
cratic inclusion, but the reconceptualization of the market itself as an institution
that must fulfill basic needs such as the provision of decent, respectable and, ide-
ally, meaningful and fulfilling jobs, as well as access to essential goods and services
– within certain planetary boundaries. This is what one group of scholars has de-
scribed as the “foundational economy” (Bentham et al. 2013), which is “that part of
the economy that creates and distributes goods and services consumed by all (re-
gardless of income and status) because they support everyday life” (ibid.: 7). When
we conceptualize the market as a commons, we see that the market’s primary func-
tion is not to endlessly increase wealth, but to satisfy needs by bringing people who
desire things together with people who produce them.This is the basic function of
markets that was, at least in theory, originally intended to be realized by open and
free markets. Free markets are supposed to fulfill this function better than other
markets and better than other institutions such as the state or the community. Yet,
in contrast to the intellectuals who believe that this can only occur when the mar-
ket is self-regulating, I would argue instead that it requires the support of demo-
cratic governance mechanisms to perpetually adapt the institutional framework
to changing social needs and socio-ecological conditions. Furthermore, a focus on
market commons transforms the overarching and often abstract rules and regula-
tions of an open competitive market into decentralized socio-ecological niches in
which the default rules of the institutional framework foster cooperation, fairness
and the sustainable reproduction of socio-ecological systems. We could call this a
type of “democratic experimentalism” (Dorf/Sabel 1998) in economics.
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Within the context of open and competitive markets, such strategies are often
pejoratively called protectionist. In this critique, protectionism is conceived of as a
situation in which one party protects its gains while harming others. In contrast,
when the market commons landscape is understood as diverse and contextually
interdependent, the rules of a specific market should always attempt to protect
the sustainable reproduction of its resource system within its interdependent re-
lationships to other socio-ecological overarching systems. The precise aim of the
endeavor is to protect sustainable and (re)generative forms of economic activity
that enable the thriving of their members without harming other living beings
elsewhere. Lastly, I would argue that a market commons would shift our focus,
whenever possible, from global commodity chains to local or regional economic
cycles.The relocalization of economic activities and market interactions would not
only have a positive ecological effect due to shorter transportation routes, but could
also provide affected people with greater incentives and opportunities to govern
the institutional framework of their market commons in democratic ways. As with
democracy in the political sphere, the more local the relationships and the shorter
the chains of accountability are, the greater the trust and the more effective mutual
monitoring and sanctioning can be.
Nevertheless, a market commons must not solely focus on the local or regional,
but should enable people throughout the world to codetermine and adapt their eco-
nomic institutional frameworks through networked forms of governance in order
to fulfill their similar yet conflicting needs. That being said, it is important to em-
phasize that an economy built up from interconnnected market commons requires
a larger, overarching political framework that fosters the decentralization of eco-
logical economic activities. But as I have already said in relation to the commons-
based provision of basic goods and services such as housing and health care, a
market commons cannot simply be implemented top-down from a single center of
authority, but must be demanded and jointly developed by people who take their
own socio-ecological habitats as starting-points.
Market commons and corporatist-Associative democracy
In order to better understand this idea of a market commons and its democratic-
economic governance, I will now compare it to the idea of corporatist and associa-
tive democracy as presented by Streeck and Schmitter (1985) and Paul Hirst (1996).3
As in these theories, the notion of a market commons must be understood as a cri-
tique of the strict separation of the ‘private’ and economic from the ‘public’ political
3 For other notions of associative democracy see also Cohen andRogers (1995) andArchon Fung
(2003b).
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and political sphere. Here, economic activities are not understood as strictly pri-
vate, but rather as public or common affairs that affect a large range of people.
Yet, in contrast to top-down state regulation, people can negotiate and coordinate
their economic activities themselves, through associations. Paul Hirst’s description
of the inclusive character of such associative governance bodies has similarities to
my notion of the democratic management of a market commons:
Associationalism tries to view the economy from the standpoint of the interests
of a wide range of economic agents including thosewho are economically inactive
as well as the active, the consumer and the producer, the worker and themanager
– and does so in terms of a wide range of substantive goals. It is democratic in
that it seeks to incorporate the widest possible range of actors as full participants
in economic governance, and not just as the objects of decision-making andman-
agement. (Hirst 1996: 97)
A key aspect of this inclusion is not only the inclusion of those who are particularly
affected, but also the negotiation over matters in which people exist in interde-
pendent relationships. By bringing people with apparently antagonistic interests
together (e.g. cheap products for consumers, jobs for workers, profits for man-
agers, livable neighborhoods for the people who live there etc.), it is assumed that
negotiated answers will be able to be found that satisfy different and conflicting
needs. Philippe Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck discuss these relationships and
functions in their comparison of a local community, the market and the state with
corporatist-associative organizations:
In a first approximation, this logic can be characterized as follows. In a community
order, actor preferences and choices are interdependent, based on shared norms
and jointly produced satisfaction. In amarket order, the actions of competitors are
supposed to be independent since no one singular action can have a determinant
and predictable impact upon the eventual allocation of satisfactions. In a state or-
der, the actors are dependent upon hierarchical co-ordination which makes their
choices heteronomously determined and asymmetrically predictable according
to the structure of legitimate authority and coercive capability. In a corporative-
associative order, actors are contingently or strategically interdependent in the sense
that actions of organized collectivities can have a predictable and determinant ef-
fect (positive or negative) on the satisfaction of other collectivities’ interests, and
this induces them to search for relatively stable pacts. […] Basically what seems to
happen is a shift in the ‘rationality’ of social choice. In communities, the calculus
rests on ‘satisfying identity’, in markets, economic or political, on ‘maximizing ad-
vantage’/building ‘minimumwinning coalitions’, in states on ‘minimizing risk’ and
‘maximizing predictability’. What associations in a corporative order strive for is
somethingmore prosaic, but quite rational given the structural complexity and in-
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formational overload ofmodern society, namely ‘satisficing interests’. By deliberate
mutual adjustment and repeated interaction, these comprehensive,monopolisti-
cally privileged actors avoid the temptation to exploit momentary advantages to
the maximum, and the pitfall of landing in the worst possible situation. In short,
they avoid the prisoner’s dilemma through inter-organizational trust backed by what
we shall call […] ‘private interest government’. (Streeck/Schmitter 1985: 125-7; em-
phasis added)
As we can see, corporatist-associative organizations are created due to the contin-
gent interdependence of affected people and parties.This would overlap with what
we have otherwise called the networked community that shares a contingent real-
ity. Furthermore, with the aid of a “private-interest government”, which we have
otherwise called a background partner state, problems of free riding and exploita-
tion can, at least theoretically, be mitigated. For these reasons, Waheed Hussain
argues that such a corporatist system is the “most just stable regime” and should
be integrated in a Rawlsian theory of justice in order to stabilize and democratize
the competitive market (Hussain 2009).
Just as important, with Axel Honneth I would argue that such an arena of de-
liberation in economic associations would bring forth a “discursive flexibilization
of seemingly objective [economic] constraints” (Honneth 2014: 193). Through this
democratic deliberation and negotiation, non-monetary values can be integrated
into the evaluation and organization of economic activities and goods (Anderson
1993). Economist Diane Elson calls this the socialization of the market. As she ex-
plains in her more demanding model of a democratic market,
the social relations between buyers and sellers must be changed so that they
are not antagonistic; the price formation process must be a public process, not
one controlled by enterprises; and information must be shared, with the nexus
of trust, reciprocity and goodwill setting the limits within which the market op-
erates, rather than being subordinate to the market. (Elson 1988: 27; original em-
phasis)
According to Elson, the “invisible handshakes” by which prices are confirmed in
exclusive gentlemen’s clubs and across corporate networks should be replaced by
the democratic deliberations of public bodies (ibid.). She calls these public bodies
Price and Wage Commissions, and gives them the task of bringing fragments of
information in the market together and making the creation of prices transparent.
I believe that the collection of and debate over information should not, however, be
limited to prices, but must include other information about non-monetary, con-
flicting values, for example in relation to the quality of living of and respect for
the non-human world. In brief, the three functions of such a commission would
be “facilitation of information exchange; enforcement of information disclosure;
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and an interactive role, in this case in the design and specification of goods and
production” (Elson 1988: 34). Importantly, such a commission would enable people
to codetermine which goods will be produced and how they will be produced and
accessed. Accordingly, a shift occurs from individualistic and contractual ex post to
collective and democratic ex ante decision-making.The shift, however, does not lead
to a negation of individual ex post price-oriented decision-making, butmerely com-
plements and democratically embeds it. This process can therefore be understood
as a re-embedding and partial decommodification of economic goods and activi-
ties. More generally, the associative democratic management of economic activi-
ties makes it possible to mitigate the coercive mechanisms of open markets, which
are merely structured according to competing prices and geared towards perpetual
growth.
To a certain extent, we could argue that corporatist-associative governance
mechanisms transform the open, competitive and liberal market into what Peter
Hall and David Soskice have called a coordinated market economy in their theory
of the “varieties of capitalism” (Hall/Soskice 2004). However, there are a few im-
portant differences between the notion of a coordinated market economy and a
market commons. Firstly, the coordination that occurs in coordinated markets fo-
cuses on labor and the ways it is governed, whether through collective wage bar-
gaining or the maintenance of vocational education and training (VET), which we
will discuss in more detail shortly. In contrast, a market commons would not only
deal with labor and skills but would aim to democratically coordinate all economic
activities and goods. Second, a coordinated market economy is still structured ac-
cording to the principles of competition and perpetual growth – although possibly
to a lesser degree than liberal markets are. A market commons therefore attempts
to replace the competitive core of coordinated market economies with democratic
cooperation. This obviously does not connote that all economic competition will
be transformed into cooperation, but rather that the forms and extent of compe-
tition will be democratically negotiated over and institutionally regulated. Third,
although the notion of a market commons builds on the model of corporatist regu-
lation of a coordinated market, it pushes the notion of participation much further
and bases the concept on more social and ecological grounds. It is an attempt to
transform the stale backdoor politics of corporatism into more dynamic open-door
politics of collaborative network governance.This is what Paul Hirst has attempted
to do with his idea of associative democracy. Put somewhat differently, the meet-
ing room in a skyscraper filled with older white men in suits should be replaced
by a more accessible meeting place close to home and, more importantly, a more
diverse crowd. In this sense, my notion of a market commons is much more akin
to Paul Hirst’s concept of associative democracy than to either Elson’s Price and
Wage Commissions or Streeck and Schmitter’s corporatist-associative model.
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To elucidate this concept of a market commons in contrast to corporatism a
little more, let me refer to a more concrete issue that is often raised in this context:
skill formation and the labor market. Skill formation or, more precisely, vocational
education and training, which have their roots in the guild system, have a long
history in German-speaking countries and Northern Europe. Both the apprentice-
ship systems of guilds and those of VET were developed to reproduce high quality
skills through socially regulated corporatist institutions. While in guilds these in-
stitutions and regulations were largely defined by craftspeople, the VET system is
based on corporatist intermediary institutions between the market and the state
that bring people with conflicting interests together, including those of competing
firms, employees and municipalities.
Historically, corporatist institutions for the collective management of skill for-
mation were developed as an answer to the problem of economic liberalization
after the banning of guilds.4 The bans led to the problem of skill degradation and
employee poaching (Ritter 2014). Due to competition with large factories, smaller
producers wanted to increase the specialization of their workers to make them
more efficient and thus to provide products on the market for lower prices. Fur-
thermore, if more energy were invested in a worker to develop their skills in a
specific field, there would also be the risk that this worker would then be stolen or
‘poached’ by competing firms who did not invest in their worker’s skill formation.
Regarded within the framework of the tragedy of unregulated open-access market
commons, we could therefore say that skill degradation was a result of the over-
use of labor power through specialization and employee poaching as a form of free
riding. As an answer to these problems, the development of the collective man-
agement of skill formation was an attempt to defend and upgrade the quality of
craftsmanship in workshops and manufactories against the threats of the tragedy
of the competitive market.
For these reasons, affected actors including small businesses, wage laborers
and certain politicians attempted to solve these problems through collective ac-
tion. Here, the conflicting needs of firms and workers (e.g. the balance between
time on the job and time for general education in school) are expressed in bodies
that possess the legal authority to define, implement and regulate the education
of workers. This does not only occur in semi-public vocational schools, but also in
private training associations (Ausbildungsverbünde) in which numerous firms have
pooled their resources to provide more professional institutional support for their
apprentices (Leemann/Imdorf 2015). More generally, the ‘supply’ of skills is coor-
dinated with the ‘demand’ for skills in a decentralized and democratic manner –
4 The literature that I refer to here is based on the example of Switzerland, but I proceed under
the assumption that VET mechanisms and historical development of VET systems out of the
guild system are similar in other central European countries.
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with the support of the state, yet without abolishing the labor market and price
mechanisms.Through the inclusion of municipalities and the state into the bodies
that oversee skill formation, it can generally be said that economic planning has
also become more democratic and more accountable to the wider public.
The importance of the VET system for our discussion of market commons
should be fairly obvious. First, it provides us with a very concrete understanding of
how market regulation can occur where an economic good (skills and labor power)
is produced and organized in a decentralized and democratic manner. Second, the
historical development of the VET system – at least in Switzerland – also shows
that it was not simply implemented by the state, but was developed via a strenuous
process of confrontation, negotiation and deliberation between several parties with
diverging interests. In this sense, VET is a superb example – and one that is rather
widely acclaimed – of a well-functioning system for the democratic regulation and
coordination of economic goods and activities.
However, despite the similarities, I would argue that the contemporary VET
systems in many countries would have to realize more of their democratic poten-
tial to become part of a market commons. First, this would involve the inclusion
of those most affected by its policies: the apprentices themselves. Second, the dis-
course of the VET system often revolves around the question of the needs of ‘the
economy’. Here, it is implicitly assumed that if the needs of businesses are sat-
isfied (competitiveness, efficiency, productivity, profit maximization etc.), people
will have jobs and society will prosper. I would contend, however, that although
people do appreciate having a job, the interests of private businesses are not equal
to those of society in general or to those of ecosystems. For this reason, I would
emphasize the importance of the integration of other civil society associations in
the democratic governance of VET systems. The question a VET system must then
deal with is not merely one of how to satisfy the needs of businesses, but also of
how to develop the capabilities and skills of the wider population to provide every-
one with sustainable livelihoods.This would, however, go beyond merely “greening
skills” (Evans/Stroud 2016) and would integrate more complex social skills that are
founded on more democratic and ecological principles of interdependent thriving.
This is not to say that these efforts and tendencies do not already exist, but simply
that a VET system would need to be developed in this manner to reproduce the
necessary institutional framework and practical skills for a market commons.
Social and solidarity economy as a market commons
To develop my notion of a market commons further, I would like to turn to an-
other example of what a market commons could look like: the social and solidar-
ity economy. The social and solidarity economy (SSE) is generally understood as
encompassing organizations and companies that pursue economic goals that are
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based on social and ecological values. Concrete examples of the social and solidarity
economy include organic farming and fair trade networks, community economic
development organizations and socio-ecological investment funds as found, for
example, in the Social Economy of Quebec (Simon 2001; McCall 2003; Neamtam
2005; Raynolds et al. 2007; Mendell/Neamtam 2008; Reed 2010; Parvathi/Waibel
2013; Wilson 2013). The United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on Social and Sol-
idarity Economy defines SSE in the following manner:
SSE refers to the production of goods and services by a broad range of organiza-
tions and enterprises that have explicit social and often environmental objectives.
They are guided by principles and practices of cooperation, solidarity, ethics and
democratic self-management. SSE includes cooperatives and other forms of social
enterprise, self-help groups, community-based organizations, associations of in-
formal economy workers, service-provisioning NGOs, solidarity finance schemes,
among others. (United Nations 2014: iv)
Despite the general goals of integrating social and ecological values into economic
activities, SSE’s emphasis on democratic participation means that its goals can be
realized in a plurality of forms that are best fitting to people’s diverse needs and
conditions. A social and solidarity economy is therefore not a negation of the mar-
ket but a transformation of the relationships that constitute it. It aims to replace
narrow self-interest with negotiated cooperation, reciprocity and mutual interests
(Exner/Kratzwald 2012: 38; Nyssens/Petrella 2015: 184).
Importantly, a social and solidarity economy is therefore quite different from
liberal or market socialism in which individual firms are owned by the workers
and democratically run (Pateman 1970; Dahl 1985; Miller 1990). Democratic self-
management of firms is an important aspect of the democratization of economic
activities and institutions because it overcomes the antagonism between labor and
capital. Nevertheless, it leaves the antagonistic and conflicting interests between
other isolated economic agents intact (e.g. producers vs. consumers and produc-
ers vs. producers). Simply put, democratic self-management leaves the isolation
paradox at the heart of the open and competitive market untouched, which, in
turn, brings about the tragedy of the unregulated market. In contrast, the social
and solidarity economy attempts to deal with this problem of competitive markets
by fostering cooperation between conflicting economic agents. In this sense, the
previously mentioned mutual interests are not a result of a homogenous and har-
monious group but rather come about by bringing different individuals and groups
with diverging interests together and enabling them to discuss and deal with their
problems collectively. In their article “The social and solidarity economy and Os-
trom’s approach to common pool resources” (2015), Marthe Nyssens and Fracesca
Petrelle explain that in a social and solidarity economy various stakeholders are part
of the organs of governance: “the direct beneficiaries of the activity, the employees,
270 Democracy, Markets and the Commons
the volunteers, the public authorities, donors or the local community” (Nyssens/Pe-
trella 2015: 181). In contrast to the competitive market that suppresses conflict and
transforms it into competition, social and solidarity economy and market com-
mons bring conflict to the fore and attempt to solve problems through deliberation,
negotiation and cooperation.
Furthermore, this more inclusive democratic network of stakeholders also has
implications for property arrangements, which differ as between capitalist and
democratic firms: “the property regimes of the SSE […] also deviate from the princi-
ple of joint possession of the right to residual control and residual earnings” (ibid.).
More concretely, in the social and solidarity economy, “investors are not the own-
ers of the organizations” (ibid.). This is reminiscent of my discussion of common
property arrangements that are not based on ownership but rather on stewardship
and guardianship on behalf of the wider community and the environment. In the
social and solidarity economy, it is not the shareholders who determine the rein-
vestment and distribution of residual earnings, but the association’s membership,
which is made up of the significantly affected stakeholders. In this sense, an SSE
is not per se against profits. As the UN Task Force explains in this wider frame of
reference:
Rather than assuming that the benefits of growth will ‘trickle down’, or rely on
safety nets to protect the vulnerable and on technological fixes to protect the en-
vironment, SSE seeks proactively to mobilize and redistribute resources and sur-
plus in inclusive ways that cater to people’s essential needs. Furthermore, SSE pro-
motes environmental protection and the economic and political empowerment
of the disadvantaged and others concerned with social and environmental jus-
tice. While profitability is a feature of many types of SSE enterprise, profits tend
to be reinvested locally and for social purposes. […] SSE is an economic approach
that favours decentralization and local development and is driven by ethical val-
ues such as solidarity, fair trade, voluntary simplicity and Buen Vivir. It is holis-
tic in the sense that SSE organizations, enterprises and networks simultaneously
pursue some combination of economic, social, environmental and emancipatory
objectives. (United Nations 2014: ix)
In a social and solidarity economy, profits are thus not pursued for the sake of
profits, but rather to improve the concrete living conditions of a wider community.
Profits are merely one aspect of enabling people to lead a good life, where what ‘a
good life’ means is something that they decide upon together. Additionally, the
broad inclusion of a variety of civil society associations in the internal, democratic
governance of SSE organizations makes it possible for them to include ecological
aspects in their calculations, and thus to attempt to align economic and ecological
demands.
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As we see, many of the values and goals of SSEs overlap with those of a
commons-based economy, including social and ecological justice, democratic self-
governance, economic decentralization and sufficiency. SSEs attempt to bring
economic activities in line with principles of social development and ecological
thriving. Furthermore, the property arrangements underlying social and solidarity
economies resemble the principle of guardianship in commons. However, if a
social and solidarity economy appears to uphold and exemplify the underlying
values of a commons inmarket arrangements, why use the term ‘market commons’
at all and not simply stick with SSE? Despite the similarities and strengths of
the social and solidarity economy, I would nevertheless advocate the use of the
term ‘market commons’. The main reason for this is that although SSE projects
attempt to change relationships from ‘within’ the market, SSE thinking appears to
lack the theoretical framework to more fundamentally transform and democratize
the entire market. Simply put, it seems to remain – both in theory and practice
– a niche within open and competitive markets. In order to change the broader
institutional framework of open and competitive markets, I would therefore argue
that it is necessary to conceptualize the market itself as a commons. The most
important reason for this is that defining the market itself as a commons implies
that people have the right to reclaim and codetermine its institutional framework
in order to satisfy their needs and maintain their livelihoods within the ecological
systems that they inhabit.
Market commons and community-supported modes of production
Finally, I would like to discuss one last example of such a market commons that
goes beyond previous examples of corporatist coordination and social and soli-
darity economy: community-supported agriculture (CSA). Here, in contrast to the
previous two models, I will argue that community-supported modes of production
demonstrate how supply and demand can be democratically coordinated through
subscription systems, ultimately enabling people to relocalize economic activities.
Community-supported agriculture is a concrete answer to the problems of
farming in an open and competitive market. Without going into detail, it can
generally be said that the open and competitive market is extremely problematic
for farming and agriculture. The reason for this is the mechanism inherent in
the tragedy of the open and competitive market that I have already discussed.5
5 Here farmers compete against each other to produce cheaper food for customers. As in other
markets, one can find antagonistic relationships between both individual producers among
themselves and between producers and consumers. This antagonism leads to a ‘race to the
bottom’ in which farmers are forced to produce more and more output for less and less
money. This is euphemistically referred to under the heading of ‘efficiency gains’ and ‘struc-
tural adjustments’ in agriculture. The effects are often, however, rather problematic, and in-
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One commons-based answer to this wide-scale tragedy is community-supported
agriculture (CSA) which has been developed since the 1970s in Japan, Switzer-
land, North America and, more recently, in other countries (Balázsa et al. 2013;
Dyttrich/Hösli 2015; Monson 2017; Krul/Ho 2017). Simply put, CSA organizations
enable producers and consumers to come together and democratically negotiate
over and collectively organize the production and distribution of food. The main
feature of this system is actively co-creating a decentralized and democratic “food
commons” (Vivero Pol et al. 2019) in which people take (back) control over their
local food systems. Although models of CSAs vary widely, most CSAs require
that consumers become members of the specific food cooperative and subscribe
to a weekly ration of food that can either be individually determined or that is
put together according to what is momentarily ripe and available on the farm.
From an ecological perspective, this system is attractive because it creates short
distances between producers and consumers which minimizes transport routes
and greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, all the edible goods are passed on to
consumers, which reduces food waste that occurs when goods are not accepted by
retailers due to their imperfect appearance or are simply not bought by customers
at the market or in grocery stores. Lastly, CSA farms typically produce organically
(Monson 2017: 83).
Aside from the ecological aspects, the financing scheme of community-sup-
ported agriculture is extremely interesting because it solves many problems that
result from normal market arrangements. The subscription system provides pro-
ducers with definite consumers for an entire season or year, which constitutes a
type of “guaranteedmarket” (ibid.: 85).This implies that the costs for the enterprise
are paid for in advance and that the risks are shared among all the members of the
organization: “If part of the crop fails, then the consumer receives a smaller share.”
(ibid.) The commitment of consumers to their subscription also frees farmers from
uncertain sales, volatile market prices and powerful middlemen. More generally, a
subscription system enables farmers to decrease expenses (e.g. inmarketing, pack-
aging and delivery), secures their income and frees them from the necessity to grow
clude the exploitation of humans, animals and ecological systems, the use of poisonous pes-
ticides, the increase in pollution, the creation of unemployment, hunger and migration for
those who cannot compete with larger andmore industrialized farms – and obesity for those
consuming the cheap goods. Other problems in agriculture that arise fromaprofitmaximiza-
tion imperative include, for example, land grabbing, the deforestation of rainforests for large
soy or palm-tree monocultures, the privatization of seeds and the increasing concentration
of power of a few large multinational agri-businesses (Friedmann 1993; Shiva 2002, 2005,
2009; Otero 2008; Bello 2009; Lang/Heasman 2009; McMichael 2009; Maurin 2011; Duflot
2011; Ziegler 2011; Ziegler et al. 2011; Sekinger et al. 2014; MultiWatch et al. 2016; Torrado
2016). From this perspective, a food regime based on the open and competitive market re-
sults in socio-ecological devastation and relationships of dependency and domination.
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in order to survive on a competitive market.This not only allows the money to flow
directly to the producers but also allows them, if possible and necessary, to create
new jobs for others.
In community-supported agriculture, the price of a subscription is democrat-
ically determined and primarily aims to provide producers with living wages that
are often higher than normal market wages. Because intermediate buyers are by-
passed, products can be less expensive than products of equal quality sold in stores.
Nevertheless, due to the smaller scales of production, this is not always possible.
One interesting answer to this problem is the notion of ‘offer rounds’ that is, for
example, practiced in some CSA projects in Germany. At the yearly general as-
sembly of the organization, each member of the cooperative contributes however
much he or she can give. If the necessary amount of money for the yearly pro-
duction process is not attained, another round of ‘gift-giving’ is required (Siefkes
et al. 2016). Interestingly, according to classical economic theory, this would in-
herently lead to free riding, but practice has shown that it not only works, but is
also a method to practice concrete solidarity between members with different pur-
chasing power. Another means to deal with cheaper food prices on the competitive
market is the ‘unpaid’ participation of members in the production process. From
a commons perspective, we could understand this as a form of commons-based
peer production. This not only sinks costs, but also provides the participants with
enriching experiences of community and nature. This active participation enables
goods and production processes to be valued differently, creating a “non-mone-
tary profit” (Bloemmen et al. 2015: 113). This non-monetary surplus results from an
increase in knowledge and skills, new friendships and social networks, the connec-
tion to a place and landscape and a sense of meaning, efficacy and responsibility
(Cone/Myhre 2000). For farmers, this can also include an increase in recognition
for their work and appreciation of their products. In general terms, this democratic
and non-monetary form of accounting aims to replace quantitative forms of value
with more qualitative notions that are based on the “enjoyment of life” (Bloemmen
et al. 2015: 113). Following our discussion of the conviviality that results from com-
mon property arrangements, we might call this a socio-ecological surplus value
that results from commoning.
The fields in which the community-supported agriculture model could be ap-
plied are basically endless: a bakery, the production of pasta, clothes and shoes or
even a restaurant at which people subscribe for lunch or a dinner once a week.
But can these projects still be consideredmarket commons, or have they not simply
done away with fundamental market mechanisms – such as the price mechanism
– and become commons associations? The question is difficult to answer because
community-supporting organizations dissolve the original market-commons di-
chotomy. Some features of the market remain, such as the opportunity to exit re-
lationships, the existence of prices and the exchange of money for goods. Yet, at the
274 Democracy, Markets and the Commons
same time, people do not buy their individual goods at the (super)market. Instead,
they commit to a subscription that provides them simply with what is produced –
similarly to a subscription to a newspaper or magazine. Yet, in contrast to these
familiar types of subscriptions, prices are not solely defined by producers and the
market, but also by consumers.The contract understood as quid pro quo or exchange
of equivalents is replaced by a type of social contract resulting from deliberation.
Here, not merely prices, but also the technology, the institutional framework, the
uses to which surplus value is put, and the products themselves are collectively de-
termined.Maybe we could understand this as the democratic development of what
is otherwise understood as bargaining between two parties at a farmer’s market or
in a bazaar. And in contrast to collective bargaining between trade unions and em-
ployers, the democratic negotiation of prices in these community-supported as-
sociations is not an attempt to shortchange the other party but, at least ideally,
to solve problems that more or less suit the divergent needs and demands of dif-
ferent parties. In the case of offer rounds, the notion of market prices and costs
are even further undermined. Therefore, it is not exactly clear whether we can still
consider such organizations to be markets. While money is still used in all these
projects, the exchange of equivalents is partly dissolved and economic activities
and goods partly decommodified. In the end, however, I believe that it might not
actually matter if such organizations are still understood as market arrangements
or not. The emphasis in all these projects should be laid on their commons aspect
and on their ability to overcome the tragic, vicious circles brought about by open
and competitive markets.
8.4 Responses to possible critiques of the market commons
Having discussed different economic arrangements that can provide us with in-
sights into what a market commons might look like, I would now like to turn, in
a final step, to possible criticisms of this concept. Some of the central problems
of the democratic management of economic activities that are often expressed are
that freedom of choice is reduced for consumers, that the motivation to innovate
diminishes for producers and that not all goods and services can be planned in ad-
vance. Most importantly, it is said that the democratic management of economic
affairs is inefficient. Other limitations are that people lack the time and interest for
democratic participation and that such a model cannot be scaled up to encompass
a global economy. I will address each of these problems one at a time.
Let us begin with the problem of consumer choice. Here, it can be argued that a
consumer loses the freedom to choose if production and distribution arrangements
are organized through democratic forms of governance. Firstly, I would answer
that consumer choice is not eradicated because people can still buy their goods in
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stores or order them in subscriptions. A market commons merely enables people
to codetermine the default settings and institutional framework of the market –
and not to pre-determine what each person shall consume. Similarly, subscription
systems are voluntary economic associations that not only provide different goods
to choose from, but can also be exited. In this case, while the consumer does vol-
untarily give up some of their freedom to choose what they wish to buy every day,
they are also freed from the necessity of shopping. More fundamentally, however,
the most important function of the democratic management of economic affairs
is precisely to overcome the problems that would arise if all economic decisions
were made on an individual basis. In the case of subscriptions, this implies that
while the individual might ‘lose’ a part of their consumer sovereignty, they never-
theless gain access to a world of production that is otherwise closed off and acquire
the ability to collectively codetermine the way in which the specific good is being
produced and distributed.
On the producer’s side of the relationship, it is often argued that the demo-
cratic management of economic affairs undermines innovation and product diver-
sity: entrepreneurs and producers are limited in their creative potential. One main
problem of this criticism is that it rests on a misconception regarding democracy.
Democracy is sometimes misunderstood as the implementation of the will of the
majority over the will of all: the collective dictates what the individual must do
(Queralt 2018: 288-9). However, as I have already mentioned in our discussion of
ecology, democracy should be understood as the negotiation of interests and the
flourishing of each individual within overlapping socio-ecological systems. Within
the framework of negative rights, this can be interpreted as the pursuit of individ-
ual interests as long as they do not harm other individuals. This individual nega-
tive freedom is the principle that also underlies the open and competitive market.
Here, the freedom to innovate is always bound by the ability to sell one’s goods and,
more importantly, to generate profits to survive on the market. In turn, innovation
is perpetually required to maintain economic growth. In such a system, however,
innovation is also limited – to those with the skills and free capacity to innovate
while others implement and realize these inventions. In contrast, the democratic
organization of a market commons aims to mitigate the existential competition
in economic activities to provide more space for innovation in goods and services
that people need and desire – rather than those merely goods and services that are
profitable. In subscription schemes, the financial security provided by the commit-
ment of consumers provides producers with more free time and energy to develop
new and better goods which ultimately leads to a greater diversity in their prod-
ucts, as existing CSA projects demonstrate. Furthermore, in a market commons,
the knowledge, skills and capabilities for innovation are, at least ideally, distributed
among the affected participants: each member has the opportunity to bring in new
ideas for products or for how to optimize the organization and institutional frame-
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work of the existing economic activities. Collaborative peer-to-peer networks in a
market commons thus provide fertile ground for an even broader dispersion of
innovative potential than a competitive market economy.
In response to this, it is sometimes said that democratic management of eco-
nomic activities is impossible because economic affairs are too complex and there-
fore cannot be planned (Hayek 2013: 34-52). Simply put, I believe the argument
from complexity to be a theistic argument that aims to veil and immunize eco-
nomic affairs from democratization. The problem of complexity has not stopped
human beings flying to the moon, deciphering the genome – and developing the
stock exchange. The question whether we can should not replace the normative
imperative that we should democratize the economy. As previously argued, it is
clear that the tragedy of the competitive market can only be overcome through the
democratic management of economic affairs. Here however, we must differentiate
between democracy as an institutional arrangement and the democratic planning
of economic activities. Democratic control of the institutional framework of a mar-
ket commons does not imply that all future activities are planned in advance, but
rather that the institutional arrangement of the market is perpetually adapted to
the changing conditions of the ecosystem and the needs and desires of people who
are affected. Prices can, for example, be democratically negotiated without deter-
mining in advance what each individual will consume. In more general terms, a
market commons increases the ex ante democratic management of economic af-
fairs without negating the possibility of people ‘spontaneously’ buying goods ex
post. However, a market commons can also support democratic planning in the
form of democratic network collaboration and coordination between producers
and consumers. In such scenarios, everyday economic planning activities within
a firm are simply extended to a wider community of agents. Both the democratic
management of themarket commons and the collaborative democratic planning of
individual networks must be understood as decentralized and overlapping bodies
that renegotiate their interests when novel issues arise. Hence, democratic man-
agement and planning in a market commons should not be interpreted as a top-
down five-year plan developed and implemented by states and large corporations,
but rather as an interactive and ongoing process of negotiation and coordination
between different actors and on different levels.
But can the democratic management of economic affairs be efficient? This is
a classical rhetorical question that implicitly assumes that all forms of allocation
that are not based on the open and competitive market are inefficient. As we have
already seen in our discussion of the justification of the open and competitive
market, efficiency is one of the main sources of legitimation: competition forces
enterprises to produce more efficiently to survive on the market.This criticism ap-
plies not only to the model of community-supported agriculture, but also to the
social and solidarity economy and to the concept of market commons in general.
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Despite this general assumption, our discussions of the problems of privatization
and the market have demonstrated that an open and competitive market might
be efficient in perpetually generating and concentrating monetary wealth in the
hands of a few, but not necessarily efficient in maintaining sustainable livelihoods
and ecosystems. Considering this fundamental inefficiency of open and competi-
tive markets, our examples of democratic management of and active participation
in production processes provide us with positive models of how to organize eco-
nomic activities and the institution of the market in more efficient ways. A market
commons is thus more efficient than a competitive market in two central ways.
Firstly, widespread democratic control of economic production is efficient because
it enables people to express their needs and desires before the production process
occurs, rather than after all the goods have been brought to and in the hope that
they will be sold on the market. Collaboration and coordination can increase the
production of goods that people want and decrease the large number of goods that
are not sold. Second, in open and competitive market arrangements, well-being is
assumed to be realized via economic growth, deferring it to a later date and trans-
forming economic activities into means to future ends. It can be said that this
set-up is, in itself, rather inefficient. In contrast, democratic management of eco-
nomic activities and institutions enables people to codetermine processes and co-
create outcomes that include non-monetary values that are often neglected in com-
petitive price-formation and quantitative measurements of prosperity (e.g. GDP),
including well-being, conviviality or sustainability. In a market commons, the aim
is to realize well-being both efficiently and in the here-and-now – paradoxically by
decreasing the “rationality” of economic efficiency and profit-making.
But do people have the time to partake in so many democratic negotiations and
other unpaid productive activities? Here, it might be important to note that it is
not expected that everyone will participate in all processes everywhere. This would
obviously be impossible. In relation to democratic participation, a rather simple
answer to this problem would be the representation of the affected either through
election or through sortition. Nevertheless, the problem of time for these activi-
ties remains, considering the demands of contemporary jobs and the necessity for
many people to work long hours to pay their bills. This is a reason why, for exam-
ple, we find that it is mostly women in full-time housekeeping positions or who
work part-time that actively participate in CSA projects (Cone/Myhre 2000: 193).
This is also the reason why it is mostly educated, middle and upper class families
who both desire and are able to partake in such projects (Monson 2017: 87). The
unequal distribution of time, money and education is a fundamental socio-polit-
ical problem that limits people’s participation in both parliamentary politics and
the democratic management of economic activities. One rather simple answer to
these problems is that participation in these activities be rewarded in some man-
ner, be that in the form of money, vouchers, free subscriptions or recognition more
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generally. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that a market commons – let alone in-
dividual projects therein – cannot fundamentally solve or mitigate these problems.
To structurally provide people with more resources (e.g. better education, higher
minimum wages, fewer working hours per week), collective political action is nec-
essary. Despite these limitations, it must be noted, however, that people often do
have time outside of wage-labor relationships that they spend on different activ-
ities such as shopping, hobbies, sports and volunteer work in other associations.
The question that then arises is how this time is spent and what priorities are set.
The energy that many people already devote to such activities could be channeled
into the co-creation of democratic market commons.
But are people interested in these forms of participation in economic affairs?
This question reminds us of our short discussion of stealth democracy. Here, it
might suffice to note that people will probably not experience the necessity of ex-
erting time and energy in democratic economic governance as long as an open
and competitive market appears to be more or less functioning. The more people
perceive and experience the ecological and economic crises that result from an eco-
nomic system based solely on individual negative freedom, the more willing peo-
ple might be to invest time and energy into coordinated, collective action. There-
fore, interest in democratic economic governance is not merely an abstract ideal,
but also an attempt to alleviate real insecurities and injustices, by solving concrete
problems of hunger, unemployment, exploitation and environmental degradation.
This does not mean that we must wait until things get much worse for a mar-
ket commons to develop, but rather that interest in democratic participation often
arises out of a desire to change and improve existing social arrangements.
Let us now turn to the final criticism of democratic management of a market
commons: the problem of up-scaling. It is often argued that the open and compet-
itive market is global and that it is therefore impossible to create democratic in-
stitutions that can coordinate and regulate these economic activities. My response
here is similar to what I said in answer to the complexity argument. The problem
of global commodity chains should not necessarily hinder people who want to take
control of their economic activities at home and in collaboration with people else-
where. While some of my examples were rather local and small-scale, this should
in no way imply that larger institutional frameworks could not be developed to
foster socio-ecological enterprises in different places. Although such community-
supported commons associations would generally imply a relocalization of eco-
nomic activities, they could theoretically also be developed with producers on the
other side of the world. Such associations already exist.The same can be said,more
generally, for the democratic management of global market commons.This is what
James Tully understands as “glocal” cooperative networks of democratic economic
governance in which the global emerges out of the interaction and collaboration
between diverse local socio-ecological systems.
9. Conclusion
After this long journey examining the relationships between democracy, markets
and commons, let us now return to the original problem and question with
which we began our investigation. We commenced this study with the question
of whether democratic capitalism truly was the best and only social arrangement
that human beings could imagine and realize. With reference to diverse political,
socio-economic and ecological crises, we recognized that democratic capitalism
is facing fundamental challenges: decline in political participation, democratic
deficits, rising inequalities, economic instability, ecological degradation and, last
but not least, climate change. The question then arose to what extent democratic
capitalism brings these possibly interrelated problems about and whether the
institutional arrangements of democratic capitalism have the potential to solve
them. Assuming that this is not possible, we then asked whether the concept of the
commons could provide us with social arrangements that might be more adequate
for this task. More specifically, I asked whether – and if so, how – the concept of
the commons can strengthen democratic practices and institutions by limiting or
even overcoming the negative political, socio-economic and ecological effects of
open and competitive markets.
Generally put, the conclusion that we have arrived at is positive. We can con-
clude that commons are highly conducive to democracy,whichwe defined as entail-
ing that people have the rights and capabilities to codetermine their social condi-
tions or, in more ecological terminology, to co-create their shared socio-ecological
realities. The central reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, commons enhance indi-
vidual freedom in a limited world by giving people direct access to resources, ul-
timately enabling them to secure their interdependent lives and liberty. Secondly,
the democratic governance structures of commons allow humans to collectively
solve conflicts and problems, by perpetually adapting to changing socio-ecologi-
cal conditions. That, in a nutshell, is the conclusion to this book. But let me now
recapitulate its central arguments in a little more detail.
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Democracy
I began my examination of democratic capitalism with an analysis of the concept
of democracy.The reason for this was that democracy has historically and theoreti-
cally turned out to be one of the central means of legitimizing social arrangements.
As we saw, it is often assumed that democracy means representative democracy,
where people participate in periodic elections in order to elect representatives who
will define the rules and regulations of society. I pointed out, however, that al-
though representative democracy might be the most widespread form through-
out the world, this in no way implies that it is the most desirable. We therefore
asked ourselves what other concepts of democracies exist and discovered various
models and concepts of democracy, each of which is contested. With reference to
the work of Wolfgang Merkel and others, I grouped these concepts according to
a three-tier system of minimal, medium-range and maximalist models of democ-
racy. Simply put, the minimal model understands democracy as a competitive sys-
tem through which elites are formed; the medium-range model emphasizes just
procedures and civil rights; and the maximalist model underlines substantive so-
cio-economic rights as a central component of democracy. Merkel argued that the
minimalist model is unsatisfactory because it remains unclear to what extent peo-
ple possess the opportunity to influence political affairs. In turn, he also criticized
the maximalist model for being too demanding and therefore unrealizable. Thus,
he concludes that we should uphold a medium-range model of democracy. I argue,
however, that this conclusion is problematic because it transforms the historically
contingent existing form of democracy into a universal model of the best political
arrangement. Unsatisfied with this conclusion, I argued with Mouffe and Laclau
that democracy has an underlying “surplus meaning” that always has the tendency
to dynamically go beyond and transform its existing form. Furthermore, I argued
that a dichotomy opposing the form of a democracy to its substance (e.g. formal
civil rights versus substantial socio-economic rights) cannot be maintained, be-
cause all forms of democracy endorse specific substantial values. Thus, I conclude
that there exists a notion of democracy that lies at the heart of all three mod-
els democracy. With reference to David Held, we ultimately defined this notion
of democracy as the “principle of autonomy”, which requires that people have the
rights and capabilities to codetermine their social conditions. In light of this defini-
tion, however, democracy cannot be limited to the sphere of politics and the state,
but rather must be understood as a principle that applies to all spheres of life.
The open and competitive market
Having arrived at this definition of democracy, I then turned to the concept of
capitalism or, rather, the open and competitive market and its relationship to both
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the state and democracy. With reference to Hobbes, we discovered that an abso-
lute state is of central importance for the protection of individual private property
and the creation of a competitive market. In turn, the justification of the market
was discussed with reference to Adam Smith and more recent economists such as
Friedrich August von Hayek. We discovered that individual private property cou-
pled with competitive markets brings about social order and a perpetual growth
of wealth. Within this framework, social order is created through the free or self-
regulating interaction of producers and consumers, which is not only supposed to
bring about the most efficient possible allocation of resources but also disciplines
market agents to be more productive. Importantly, the self-regulating mechanism
of the market requires that state intervention in ‘private’ economic affairs is lim-
ited and thatmarkets are opened up beyond the level of the nation-state. I therefore
call this economic institution the open and competitive market. After discussing
the relationship between the market and the state, I then analyzed its relationship
with democracy. Here, we discovered the interesting fact that both Adam Smith
and Hayek recognize that most people do not necessarily desire such competitive
market arrangements, because of their ‘egotistical’ interest in leading a secure and
stable life.The question then arises who can politically implement and uphold such
a social order. In view of the resistance to these arrangements,Hayek openly argues
that democratic politics must be “dethroned” and replaced with wise and impartial
rulers, who are elected once in their lifetime. Due to the substitution of democratic
politics with economist quasi-kings, I argued with reference to HermanHeller that
thismarket-state arrangement can be interpreted as a type of authoritarian liberal-
ism. But we then discovered that even with periodic elections the opportunities for
politicians and the state to influence economic activities and correct market out-
comes are extremely limited. The reason for this is the free movement of private
property that enables investors – or what, with Streeck, I’ve called the Marktvolk –
to move their capital to places where the rates of accumulation are the highest. As
we saw, when the Staatsvolk and politicians attempt to limit accumulation strate-
gies and redistribute wealth, this second constituency can indirectly punish them
simply by withholding investments, thereby causing unemployment and economic
crises. Hence, I contended that the structural constraints of open and competitive
markets severely limit and undermine peoples’ ability to alter and codetermine
their social arrangements in democratic ways. Accordingly, I then concluded that
democratic capitalism and its underlying state-market dichotomy is most likely
quite incapable of institutionally adapting and solving the diverse social, economic
and ecological problems that exist.
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Commons
Given this conclusion, I asked whether the concept of the commons provides us
with different social arrangements that might mitigate or possibly even solve the
antagonism between the market and democracy. In order to answer this question,
I began my investigation with a discussion of Garrett Hardin’s 1968 article, “The
Tragedy of the Commons”. Simply put, this influential article or, rather, metaphor
presented uswith a situation inwhich individuals using a commonly owned yet un-
regulated, open-access pasture find that it is rational for each herder to put more
and more cows on the field despite its limited carrying capacity.The reason for this
is that each herder can privatize the benefits (e.g. milk and meat) and externalize
the costs (e.g. degeneration of soil fertility). Because it is assumed that each will
act in this manner, the herders are compelled to pursue maximization strategies in
order to survive, which, however, paradoxically leads to the overuse and destruc-
tion of the resource system. From this perspective, it can thus be assumed that
unregulated resources held in common inherently lead to tragedy and therefore do
not present us with a viable alternative to democratic capitalism. This is at least
a widespread interpretation of Hardin’s article. That being said, Hardin’s answers
to the tragedy also remain caught in the state-market dichotomy of democratic
capitalism: privatization or socialization (i.e. nationalization).
Another answer to this problem is that presented by Elinor Ostrom and, to a
certain extent, her husband Vincent Ostrom. Expressed in the most general terms,
Elinor Ostrom demonstrates that the sustainable and democratic self-government
of commons is a possible alternative form of organization “beyond markets and
states”. In her work, commons are more technically defined as common pool re-
sources (CPRs) such as pastures, forests and water, on the one hand, and common
property arrangements, on the other. CPRs are characterized by the fact that their
goods (e.g. fish, wood) are rival and that it is difficult (i.e. costly) to exclude others
from using the resource system. As Hardin demonstrated, the difficulty of regu-
lating these resource systems often leads to tragedy. The vast empirical work of
Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues shows however, that tragedy can be averted and
overcome – not through privatization or nationalization, but through democratic
self-government. Or more precisely, democratically structured common property
arrangements can enable the sustainable management of common property re-
sources. We saw that Elinor Ostrom develops eight design principles that support
the sustainable use of such resource systems.Here, I would like to focus on one im-
portant feature in her findings for our concluding reflections on her work. From a
normative perspective, the most significant insight is that the people who use and
are significantly affected by resources should also have the rights to democratically
regulate them. This enables people to develop and enforce rules and regulations
against free riding and unlimited appropriation. This enables not only the eco-
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logically sustainable use of the resource system, but also the fair appropriation of
goods within a specific group. When the people who use the resources can define
the rules, they are able to continually adapt these rules when conditions change
since they often have muchmore knowledge of the specificities of the relevant con-
texts than others would. As we see, this understanding of the democratic process
comes very close to our previously developed definition of democracy, according
to which democracy requires that people have the right and the capability to code-
termine their social conditions. It can be said that Ostrom provides the empirical
evidence that this form of democratic self-government is not simply possible, but
also socially and ecologically robust. From these insightful findings, it can gener-
ally be concluded that commons provide us with a viable alternative to democratic
capitalism.
As I showed, however, there are some limits to the Ostroms’ work on the com-
mons. Despite their focus on existing and functioning commons arrangements,
their work either lacks a critique of markets or, to the extent that such a critique is
present, it is executed in a problematic way. Although the Ostroms do defend com-
mons as a superior form of organization to hierarchical monocentric orders, they
do not fully deal with the problems that arise through privatization and the com-
petitive market. Let me briefly summarize these arguments again. The Ostroms
argue that hierarchical, monocentric orders often define unified rules that are ei-
ther not adapted to specific contexts or not implemented at all. If implemented,
this then leads to a form of oppression; if they are, however, not implemented, this
then transforms state-owned resources into a de facto open-access common that
will probably be overused. I called this the tragedy of hierarchical and monocentric
orders. As an alternative to this problem, the Ostroms propose a type of overlap-
ping multi-scalar and polycentric governance system. Although I agree with their
critique of hierarchical and uniform management schemes, Vincent Ostrom’s ve-
hement critique of the state is somewhat problematic because it risks throwing the
baby out with the bathwater. As we discovered with Elinor Ostrom’s work on the
commons, a pooling of individual coercive power is necessary in order to limit free
riding and overcome tragedy. In this sense, the model of commons also provides us
with a monocentric structure. For questions of democratic governance beyond the
nation-state this insight becomes rather central, for it implies that the arrangement
must be monocentric while simultaneously being multiscalar and overlapping.
But more importantly, a central problem in the Ostroms’ theory lies, as previ-
ously mentioned, in their lack of a critique of privatization and competitive mar-
kets. Vincent Ostrom remains silent on the topic. Elinor Ostrom, in contrast, ar-
gues that privatization might not occur in common pool resources, because it is
rather costly. Obviously, this economic reasoning provides a rather weak argument
against privatization. For this reason, I argued that privatization is problematic
because it excludes others from access to important resources that are necessary
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for their life and liberty, ultimately creating power asymmetries and enabling dom-
ination. We may call this the tragedy of privatization. In relation to markets, how-
ever, Elinor Ostrom provides us with a little more insight. Using the model of the
prisoner’s dilemma,Ostrom argues that highly competitivemarkets force people to
pursuemaximization strategies and create a “straitjacket situation” inwhich people
have “no alternative” (E. Ostrom 2003: 25). Despite this insight, she does not pur-
sue the problems of markets any further. For this reason, I developed an argument
that aimed to bring the models of the open and competitive market and the unreg-
ulated commons together. Both institutional arrangements are structured accord-
ing to what is technically called the prisoner’s dilemma or the “isolation paradox”
(Amartya Sen) and lead to the necessity to perpetually appropriate and accumulate
more and more wealth. Yet while Adam Smith and other economists praise this ar-
rangement for its ability to perpetually generate more wealth, Hardin’s metaphor
presents this same competitive dynamic as one that increasingly destroys ecolog-
ical resources and other resources held in common. I argued, however, that this
would also occur if all the goods in the world were privatized, because the com-
petitive growth dynamic between proprietors would remain. In existing societies,
this market mechanism also leads to the increase in socio-economic inequalities
and the destruction of livelihoods and economic crises, thereby ultimately under-
mining the institution of the market itself. Last but not least, I argued that the
incessant necessity to increase productivity reinforces structural constraints on
democratic deliberation and government. Here, we clearly see how various eco-
logical, economic and political crises are interrelated. And again, we see that the
open and competitive market places strict limits on people’s capabilities to alter
their intuitional arrangements in order to solve problems in collective ways. I thus
argue that the tragedy of privatization ultimately also leads to the tragedy of the
(open and competitive) market.
If we return to the Ostroms, it must now also be said that even with a bet-
ter-formulated critique of hierarchical monocentric orders and competitive mar-
kets, two fundamental problems remain in their work. Firstly, the Ostroms also
lack explicit normative arguments for democratic commons arrangements. Sec-
ondly, their focus on the management of common pool resources, makes it appear
as though only goods that are rival and non-exclusory (e.g. waters, forests, alpine
meadows etc.) should be managed with common property arrangements. The two
problems are obviously interrelated. The lack of general, normative arguments for
common property arrangements inherently supports the assumption that com-
mons are merely something that refer to pastures and forests. Accordingly, com-
mons will most probably maintain a rather marginal, niche existence despite the
possibility of applying the concept to a wide range of goods and resources, thereby
potentially creating not only a more sustainable society, but also one that is freer
and more just. After recognizing these shortcomings of the Ostroms’ work I there-
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fore attempted to develop a more explicit and elaborate normative argument for
the commons.
Nature
In order to do this, I began by developing a normative argument for the com-
mons from an ecological perspective. The aim of this step was to break with the
framework provided by Hardin in which nature is portrayed as a background stage
and, ultimately, a limit to human freedom. Furthermore, the problem with such
a Malthusian model is not only that nature is dealt with in an instrumental and,
possibly, exploitative manner, but also that the basis of existence is assumed to be
the antagonistic conflict between all living beings. Simply put, I argue that this is
not only false, but also cannot lay the foundation for a sustainable and democratic
society. Here it must again be acknowledged that the organization of the world
will not be changed as an automatic consequence of us changing our conceptions
of the world. To assume that would be solipsistic and naïve. Nevertheless, it cannot
be denied that concepts, models and metaphors play a central role in our interac-
tion with one another and the arrangements of the world. If this were not the case,
we would not have to take on the trouble of writing books and discussing ideas. Ac-
cordingly, I argued that our understanding of nature is extremely relevant not only
because of its implications for our relation to the environment but also because it
provides a type of symbolic backbone for all other relationships. I therefore argue
that we must shift from a dualistic and anthropocentric to an interrelated and eco-
centric model of nature. With reference to Andreas Weber and others, I elaborated
the notion of self-organizing organisms that dynamically adapt in and with their
environments, ultimately taking an active part in the interdependent co-creation
of reality. The concept of interdependence provides us with a key principle for de-
veloping an understanding of abundance in a limited yet shared common reality. In
this approach, other living beings are understood as a precondition for one’s own
freedom and flourishing. From there, I developed an ecological understanding of
freedom, which I defined as freedom with, through and against the other. Within
this framework of interdependence, the central principle of care for the other was
apparent. Yet despite my emphasis on empathy, cooperation and shared, common
realities, by combining intrinsic, instrumental and antagonistic principles in the
one notion of freedom, we were able to comprehend our interactions with other
beings in a complex,multivalued and conflictual manner.Here, the simple fact that
we share a common reality does not imply that people always cooperate, but rather
that conflicts arise and must be dealt with. Freedom is thus defined as an ongoing
process of negotiated cooperation in the co-creation of a shared common reality.
This presents us with an ecological reinterpretation of our original definition of
democracy, which we defined as the codetermination of social conditions. With
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reference to the work of James Tully, I understood this as a civic notion of democ-
racy that emphasizes the dynamic adaptation and transformation of institutions
through civic practices of collective action.This civic understanding of democracy,
in turn, provided us with an adequate theoretical framework for the commons.
Here, I discussed Ugo Mattei and Fritjof Capra’s notion of eco-law as a second or-
der commons that is based on the civic activities of democratic negotiation and
cooperation.This ultimately led us to a new interpretation of the commons, which
was not understood merely as a resource, an institutional arrangement or the re-
lation between the two. Instead, commons are comprehended as a performative
civic activity of self-organizing or commoning that brings common goods and our
common reality about through a process of co-creation.
Common property
After presenting this ecological reinterpretation of freedom, democracy and the
commons, I then attempted to elaborate a commons theory of property. With ref-
erence to my previous discussion of socio-ecological interdependence, I argued
that a commons theory of property revolves around the concept of access to and
democratic governance of shared resources for the satisfaction of people’s similar
yet conflicting needs.With this general notion, I then sought to critically reflect on
and reinterpret John Locke’s famous labor theory of property. In a nutshell, Locke’s
theory of property declares that in a state of nature people have the right to individ-
ually appropriate resources from a commons that was originally given to everyone.
I discussed this theory in relation to three central concepts: (self-)ownership, non-
interference and labor. With reference to G. A. Cohen, I argued that the concept of
self-ownership is based on the prioritization of freedom from all non-contractual
claims and obligations towards the wider community.This is basically the principle
of non-interference, which lies at the heart of conceptions of negative freedom. Put
somewhat differently, ownership frees the individual from considering the nega-
tive effects of one’s actions on the other. I argued that in light of my notion of
ecological freedom this is particularly problematic, because it denies the inherent,
pre-contractual interdependence between beings and the underlying conflicts that
result from constituting this shared reality.While the owner of individual property
can enter cooperative relationships through contracts, she is systematically freed
from having to deal with existing conflicts. For this reason, I argued that we must
develop another notion of property that is more suited to the principles of inter-
dependence. With reference to Michael Sandel I then contended that the concept
of guardianship or stewardship is more adequate for a commons theory of prop-
erty, because it aims to integrate other affected beings into the structures by which
resources are governed.
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In a second step, I discussed the notion of non-interference in more depth.
Here, I argued that non-interference is problematic, because the un-interfered-in
or unlimited appropriation and accumulation of resources by individuals inher-
ently interferes with the freedom of other people. The reason for this is that it
changes the quantity and quality of the resources that other people have access to.
Simply put, if someone appropriates a plot of land, I cannot use it; fewer resources
are now available to me. Assuming unequal opportunities to appropriate, access
to resources can, as a consequence, become highly unequal. Those without direct
access to resources must then pursue wage labor in order to exchange labor for
money and money for food. Owing to their dependence on wages, people without
resources must enter wage-labor relationships. And due to the underlying power
asymmetries between the employer and the employee in such a constellation, I
argued – with reference to Philipp Pettit – that wage labor relationships are prob-
lematic because of the threat of arbitrary domination that they carry. In short, non-
interference can lead to serious forms of arbitrary interference and, importantly,
domination. I therefore argue that a commons theory of property must replace the
principle of non-interference with the notion of non-domination.
In a third step, I argued that we must replace the central category of labor in
Locke’s theory with that of needs. According to Locke, labor is the central justifica-
tion for the right to appropriate resources.With reference to Carol Gould, I argued
that a commons theory of property would emphasize the social appropriation of
resources in joint activities. The problem that arises here is, however, that people
and groups have highly unequal productive capabilities. This could theoretically
lead us to a similar asymmetrical distribution of resources and thus to relations of
domination. As an answer to this, I argued with Jeremy Waldron that this special
right to appropriate resources through labor must be replaced with a general right
to access resources according to need. Yet in contrast to the unlimited access to re-
sources as conceptualized in Locke’s original commons, in this scenario, commons
would be democratically regulated.
After this critical reinterpretation of Locke’s theory of property, I then turned
to John Rawls. For me, Rawls’ property-owning democracy presents an interesting
social arrangement that also emphasizes positive freedom that consists in having
access to resources as a precondition for life and liberty in a democratic society.
Schematically portrayed, in comparison to the ex post distribution schemes of the
welfare state in the form of housing and health care for those in need, Rawls con-
ceptualizes this positive right as an ex ante or predistribution of “productive as-
sets”. While I agree with much of his reasoning, I contended that the coupling
of these individualized resources with competitive markets is highly problematic
because it leads to maximization strategies and perpetual economic growth as al-
ready discussed in relation to the tragedy of the market. For this reason, I argued
that not only must we be critical of the emphasis on the competitive market, but
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we must also shift our focus in such a predistribution scheme from productivity to
care. I interpreted care, however, not as the supposedly ‘unproductive’ activities of
housekeeping and social work, but rather as the emphasis on the sustainable re-
production of resources through labor activities. Accordingly, I argued with Sibyl
Schwarzenbach that this is best done with common property arrangements that
are more conducive to care and sustainability due to their inclusive and democratic
governance structure.
In order to avoid possible misunderstandings, I would like to mention some-
thing important about my numerous claims that we must ‘shift from X to Y’.
Throughout my investigation I have argued that we must change concepts that
underly other concepts. These ‘shifts’ include, for example: from anthropocentric
to ecocentric, from dualistic to systemic, from ownership to guardianship, from
non-interference to non-domination, from labor to needs and, finally, from pro-
ductivity to care. I must admit that this sure is a lot of shifting. Critical readers
of my argument will have noticed, however, that I regularly fall back on old terms
that I had just criticized. Often enough, the shifts that I argue for rarely imply that
a term should be entirely annulled. Let me illustrate this with reference to a few
examples. In my discussion of nature and ecology I argue that we must replace
our dualistic understanding of nature with a systemic concept. This does not,
however, mean that all linguistic distinctions between mind and body or culture
and nature simply disappear. The point is that although we differentiate these
things symbolically, they remain organically interrelated parts of a whole. In my
discussion of Locke, I argued that we must replace the special right to resources
through labor with the general right to access resources according to needs. While
I maintain that this is true, I do not, however, intend to imply that all rights to the
fruits of one’s labor should be denied. Instead, the shift to a needs-orientation in
property theory simply implies its prioritization over the value of labor, without
necessarily negating it. This is also the case in relation to non-interference, which
should be replaced by the notion of non-domination: obviously, non-interference
remains an important value, but should be positioned under non-domination
in the ordering of principles. Similarly, my critique of the focus on productivity
in Rawls’ property-owning democracy does not free me from using this term. I
cannot simply replace the word productive with care, because no one would then
understand what I was talking about. I do not intend to banish the word produc-
tivity from our vocabulary. Instead, my discussion hopes to replace its connotation
with endless monetary growth with one of care, sustainable reproduction and
qualitative growth. That being said, let me now turn to summarize the last section
of my discussion of a commons property theory, in which I, again, use the term
productive.
In the final step in my commons theory of property I discussed the relation be-
tween productive and consumptive goods. Here, I asked myself whether we should
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organize only some activities and goods by means of common property arrange-
ments. In this discussion, I referred to the problem of greenhouse gas emissions
and their unequal distribution: the wealthiest 20 percent of the world’s popula-
tion produces 80 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. This problem
provides us with the insight that strategies of accumulation do not only occur in
the sphere of production, but also in the sphere of consumption. Furthermore,
strategies of consumption maximization are largely interrelated with accumula-
tion strategies in production. I argue that this maximization strategy occurs in
the sphere of consumption because it is assumed that my freedom is increased,
if I extend my reach over my possession of goods. More goods equal more free-
dom. And because the access to these consumption goods is normally structured
according to the principle of individual private property and non-interference, the
central means to access more goods is simply to buy them. This leads to the situa-
tion where everyone strives to own increasingly more and more things. As we well
know, this is problematic in a world of limited resources. A commons approach to
this problem is rather simple: if people share these goods, they can increase their
access to resources, without necessarily having to produce and buy more goods.
Thus, the direct access to common goods can substantially expand the range of
people’s individual freedom. This is a concrete example of how abundance can be
created within planetary boundaries.
Commons and the state
Having developed a commons theory of property I then turned to analyze the rela-
tionship between the state and commons.The focus here was not the organization
of governmental bodies, but rather the question if and how the state should provide
citizens access to common resources. Before turning to this question, however, it
is important to briefly mention the theoretical organizational structure of a state
in a commons-based society. As previously mentioned in my discussion of Vincent
Ostrom’s critique of hierarchical monocentric orders, from a commons perspec-
tive the democratic state should be interpreted as a pooling of coercive abilities
through collective action. Ideally, democratic state power is then understood as
a form of reciprocal and public coercion. Importantly, in order to deal with the
problem of free riding, the state must be structured in a monocentric manner.
The problems of a monocentric order therefore result not from its monopoly on
the use of force, but rather from its undemocratic internal organization. In order
to uphold a democratic structure within, the internal organization of the mono-
centric state should, however, consist of multilayered, overlapping democratically
governed bodies. This is normally understood as federalism. The unity of the su-
perstructure would, in turn, aim to limit free riding on the part of individual units
and competition between them.
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Before continuing with the summary of my argument, I would like now to
touch briefly on an issue that is under-examined in my analysis: supranational
global governance.Theoretically, the insights above also apply to a system of global
governance. But since this issue was underdeveloped in my investigation, I would
like to briefly consider the problem here. To my mind, the insights I have con-
sidered imply that in order to overcome global tragedies, a type of monocentric
global government is theoretically required. A democratic organization of such a
federal, supranational structure can be understood with the help of David Held’s
notion of a cosmopolitical order (Held 1995) or with Francis Cheneval’s concept of
a “demoicracy” (Cheneval 2011). At first glance, this conclusion might seem to im-
ply a rather important break with the Ostroms’ theory of a polycentric order. Here,
we might ask ourselves why the Ostroms did not see this inconsistency in their
theory. One reason for their emphasis on polycentricity could have been of prag-
matic nature. Knowing that the world is messy and supranational collective action
can be difficult to realize, they simply opted for a more viable alternative. Another
explanation could, however, be that an overarching global government is not nec-
essary, because only the different global commons (e.g. air, the Internet etc.) need
governing bodies and not the world per se. Here, the concept of territorial units
would be replaced with functionally defined jurisdictions. To be fair, I can imagine
that it is this notion of a plurality of functional governing bodies over commons
that they imagined. It can nevertheless be asked whether the coordination of these
diverse bodies does not also require a higher level monocentric order. According to
the arguments I have presented here, my assumption is that they would. Whether
such a monocentric order is realizable is, however, another question.
Let us now return to the level of the nation-state and examine the role of the
state in the management and provisioning of commons. I began this analysis with
a recapitulation of various models of the state and their principles when it comes
to organizing common resources. Let me briefly summarize these findings. As we
know, the hierarchical andmonocentric state manages common resources in a top-
downmanner according to unitary rules.Theoretically, the range of commonsman-
aged by the state depends on the will of the sovereign. As I have alreadymentioned,
the problems here can range from oppression, through paternalistic provisioning
to tragedies of over- and underuse. In a minimal, market-based state common re-
sources are generally minimalized.Within the Lockean framework, we can say that
the resources of the original commons have largely been enclosed and privatized. A
possible later expansion of commons by the state is constrained by the structures of
the open and competitive market. In contrast to the minimal market-based state,
both the welfare state and a property-owning democracy aim to provide individu-
als access to resources that have been pooled through the collection of levies. The
distributed resources are often understood as public goods that are provided for
by the state and often consumed individually (e.g. housing, health care etc.). While
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this model provides people with access to resources, the criticism is often made
that this occurs in a paternalistic manner. A property-owning democracy aims to
mitigate this problem by providing people with productive assets. As we have seen,
coupled with competitive markets this leads to the problem of perpetual growth,
which tends to overuse society’s common, socio-ecological resources.
After having gone over thesemodels, I askedmyself how the state could provide
access to resources in a commons-creating society. Furthermore, I asked which re-
sources and goods a state should provide. Beginning with the second question, I
briefly discussed the problem of ideal theory in political theory.Mymain claim here
was that ideal theory can not only disempower people, but can also lead to a type
of paternalism in which people (e.g. philosophers) create lists of the goods that the
state should provide. For this reason, I argued with Amartya Sen that instead of
such a “transcendental institutionalism”, a “realization approach” might be more
suitable to answering these questions. According to Sen, a realization approach fo-
cuses on injustices and aims to overcome them throughwidespread democratic de-
liberation and participation. In thismanner people can express their own concerns,
needs and desires and are empowered in their democratic capabilities. From a com-
mons perspective, this also includes the civic activities of commoning in the state
provisioning of public goods.This would generally imply the democratic coproduc-
tion of public goods. In order to understand this in more detail I then compared
three examples of the provision of public goods with state supported commons
arrangements: housing, health care and education. In most general terms, public
goods as commons implies that the significantly (and potentially) affected people
have the rights and capabilities to create and manage the common resources. The
state would provide an enabling role. For this reason, I refer here to the notion of
a background partner state. In the case of housing, this would imply that the peo-
ple actually co-owned their housing units; the land could in turn be organized as a
Community Land Trust.The access to a home could occur, for example, through the
provision of housing commons coupons. In the case of health care, I discussed the
problem of rising costs and the tragedy of the anti-commons caused by an increase
in the registration of patents in medical research and development. As an answer
to this, I presented the notion of an open-access health commons for research in
which information can be shared freely. Another example I described was a model
of community health centers that can be understood as a commons. Lastly, I dis-
cussed education as a commons. With reference to the problem of the enclosure
of scientific information through private academic journals, I again propagated a
model of an open-access information commons. In relation to schools and school-
ing I emphasized the democratic participation in education policymaking and the
actual governing of schools. Furthermore, I discussed the importance of ecolog-
ical and democratic principles in schooling, both in relation to teaching content
and the organization of learning processes. Importantly, this would imply the in-
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dividual and collective self-organization of learning in relation with one’s concrete
environment. In most general terms, I conclude that the state should not simply
provide commons, but rather support the co-creation and maintenance thereof.
After having fleshed out the difference between public goods and commons, I
then turn to some final questions of the state-commons relationship in a non-ideal
world. Firstly, it is important to recognize that, in a non-ideal world, possibilities
to democratically participate in the processes of commoning are not necessarily
given. It can also be expected that powerful social actors resist these practices, be-
cause they largely limit their appropriation possibilities and might even transform
some of their resources back into commons. Due to the power of such actors, they
are often able to influence politicians and politics, ultimately illegitimately utilizing
the state monopoly to protect their private interests. Considering such illegitimate
social arrangements, it can be expected that both fewer common resources are pro-
vided to citizens and that democratic participation is limited. In such cases, I argue
that it is necessary to widen our understanding of democratic participation. This
can include, for example, practices of confrontation. Confrontation understood as
social protest can provide people with a means to criticize injustices and illegiti-
mate social arrangements through collective action. When politicians do not hear
these voices, another strategy that is practiced is that of ‘reclaiming the commons’
in which privatized resources are (re-)appropriated, either on the supposition that
they were originally held in common or because it is said that they ought to be held
in common.Besides confrontation, another strategy of dealing with elite resistance
and state oppression is through ‘interstitial’ commoning. Here, people actively cre-
ate commons in the cracks of existing social arrangements by pooling resources
and collectively organizing common goods and services for the satisfaction of their
needs and desires.
Market commons
Finally, in the last step of our investigation I examined the relationship between
the market and commons. Despite my rather thorough-going critique of open and
competitive markets, in this chapter I asked whether the institution of the market
could be organized in a different manner. The reason for this is that I believe that
the basic principle of contractual exchange of goods and services is a very practical
social institution. The question therefore is whether we can have democratically
regulated exchange-based markets without having the self-regulation of supply
and demand through competitive prices as the dominant form of social organi-
zation. Interestingly, a quick review of commons literature on markets shows that
many authors criticize the market and defend democratically organized firms, but
few deal with this rather important issue. In order to develop an understanding of
this problem I approached the topic from an historical perspective. With reference
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to Karl Polanyi and Fernand Braudel I argued that markets have existed throughout
human history, even if they have often only been on the margins of society. This
is not to say that exchange or markets are inherently ‘natural’ practices or institu-
tions, but rather that an historical perspectivemight provide uswith illustrations of
other market arrangements. Importantly, the competitive market developed only
slowly from its inception in the 15th century; it has gained importance and influence
only since the 18th century. I interpreted this development as a process of opening
up socially embedded markets, a process that occurred parallel to the enclosure
movements that transferred common fields and forests into private property. In
order to comprehend how markets may have been organized before the existence
of open and competitive markets, I discussed the role of guilds in medieval mar-
kets. Importantly, guilds defined rules and regulations that limited competition
and stabilized prices in particular markets; the guilds did this in order to protect
themselves from potential economic instabilities and existential threats. Impor-
tantly, market institutions were regulated and adjusted in order to satisfy people’s
‘egotistical’ needs and desires. Although it can be questioned to what extent this
regulation was truly democratic, it nevertheless was a means of institutionaliz-
ing an exchange system yet without allowing market competition and monetary
growth to determine economic activities.
After this rather short historical excursion, I then attempted to develop a con-
cept of a social embedded and democratically regulated market, which I call the
market commons. The aim is thus to transform the open, common market into
a market commons. By defining the market as a commons I argue that we must
conceptualize the market within an ecological framework. Here, we must keep in
mind the flows of matter and energy that are brought about through monetary ex-
change. Furthermore, I argued that a market commonsmust be structured accord-
ing to the democratic regulation of the people who are significantly affected. Ide-
ally, democratic management of economic institutions provides people with ways
to collectively organize their economic activities in order to satisfy their similar
yet conflicting needs and desires. In this situation, the concept of wealth would
itself be democratically defined, thereby replacing a purely quantitative monetary
notion of growth with a plurality of forms of qualitative development. The aim of
such arrangements is to enable people to maintain local and regional economic cy-
cles without, however, negating interregional and global exchanges. In this sense,
the democratic management of the market commons transforms the overarching
and transcendent rules and regulations of an open competitive market into de-
centralized socio-ecological niches, in which the default rules of the institutional
framework foster cooperation, fairness and the sustainable reproduction of socio-
ecological systems. Acknowledging the problems of uneven development and re-
gional disparities, such a decentralized arrangement would, however, necessarily
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also require higher-level democratic governing bodies for the codetermination and
perpetual adaptation of its overall framework.
After laying out this somewhat idealized model, I then discussed some other
concepts and examples of markets in order to flesh out the idea of a market com-
mons. I began this exploration with a corporatist-associative notion of democracy.
Viewed in a general way, Paul Hirst’s understanding of associationalism comes
quite close to my own concept of a market commons in that it emphasizes the
widespread democratic inclusion of significantly affected people in the governing
practices it describes. Similarly, Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter discuss
the notion of corporatist-associative organizations that aim to overcome the pris-
oner’s dilemma in competitive markets through processes of negotiation between
conflicting parties. Put somewhat differently, a market commons enables people
to complement ex post individual decision-making in the market with ex ante col-
lective decision-making about the market. With Axel Honneth, I described this as
a “discursive flexibilization” of market mechanisms, in which other non-monetary
values can be expressed and integrated into the evaluation of resources, goods and
services. More generally, I grasped this as a re-embedding and decommodification
of economic goods and activities.
In general, this notion of corporatist-associative democracy can be interpreted
as a transformation of the competitive, liberal market into a socially embedded, co-
ordinated market. As Hall and Soskice argue in their Varieties of Capitalism (2004), a
classical example of such coordinated market is the labor market and,more specif-
ically, the production of skills through a vocational education and training (VET)
system. VET was interesting to me insofar as it exemplifies concrete corporatist
‘intermediary’ institutions between the market and the state that possess legal au-
thority to define, adapt and enforce its own rules and regulations. Importantly,
VET is a governance system that was historically developed in order to mitigate
employee poaching and overcome the tragedy of skill degradation that results from
competitive markets. Yet despite these similarities to a market commons, there do
exist fundamental differences between corporatist arrangements and existing VET
systems. A major problem in existing VET systems is their focus on the needs of
‘the economy’, that is firms, and not on the needs and desires of the wider public,
due to their limited democratic inclusion, on the one hand, and the structuring
principles of the wider competitive market in which they are enmeshed, on the
other.
For this reason, I then turned to another example of what a market commons
could look like: the social and solidarity economy. The social and solidarity econ-
omy aims to organize market arrangements according to the principles of fairness,
ecological sustainability and democratic self-government. A central feature of its
institutional arrangements is the satisfaction of basic needs. Classical examples
of the social and solidarity economy are fair trade and organic farming networks,
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community development organizations and socio-ecological investment funds. In
contrast to the notion of market socialism, in which firms are democratically run
in a competitive market setting, here, the isolation paradox is overcome through
negotiated cooperation between producers and consumers. Other, diverse stake-
holders are also integrated into the governance schemes thereby creating arenas
for conflict management and collective action. Importantly, the governing bodies
of these market arrangements often have the right to collectively codetermine the
reinvestment strategies that firms may pursue, thereby democratizing the flow of
capital. As we remember from our original discussion of the state-market relation-
ship, the private control over capital is a central cause of the structural constraints
on democratic government. An inclusive, democratic governance structure for such
economic activities provides the institutional framework that can foster principles
of guardianship towards the wider community and ecological systems.
My last example of a market commons is what can generally be called commu-
nity modes of production.Themost prevalent type of this is community-supported
agriculture (CSA), which can be understood as a practical response to the diverse
and severely negative effects of open and competitive markets in agriculture. CSA
can generally be understood as a ‘food commons’ that aims to re-appropriate the
control over one’s local food system. A central feature of CSAs is that consumers
normally subscribe to a weekly ration of food, which finances the enterprise prior
to production processes.This small change in the payment structure frees the pro-
ducers from having to sell their goods ‘on the market’ and thereby enables them to
plan the production process in accordance to the needs of the members of the as-
sociation. Importantly, this interesting ‘trick’ suspends the coercive market mech-
anisms that force one to perpetually produce more and more goods for less and
less money. Furthermore, the payment in advance leads to a socialization of the
entrepreneurial risks between all the members of the group. Acknowledging that
such organizations might not be affordable to everyone, some CSAs have even in-
stitutionalized ‘offer rounds’ in which the members pay for their subscription ac-
cording to their abilities. These offer rounds provide a somewhat new interpreta-
tion of monetary exchange that replaces competitive prices with practices of gift
giving. Furthermore, the opportunities often provided for CSA members to par-
ticipate in the production process not only decrease the costs of the subscriptions
but also demonetize the value of the goods being produced and consumed. All in
all, production and consumption become social activities that are not organized
simply according to efficiency gains, but rather according to shared notions of a
convivial, good life. Even though it must be recognized that this model cannot be
used for all economic activities, it can nevertheless be applied to many other goods
and services.
Now, inmy very last section I will bringmy paper to a close with a short recapit-
ulation of the defense of market commons against possible criticisms. A first crit-
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icism that might be raised is that a democratic market commons limits and erad-
icates market choice. Here, it must be emphasized that choice is not eradicated,
because the buying of goods ‘on the market’ (or in the supermarket) still remains.
Instead, amarket commons aims to alter the institutional framework of themarket
and those of its principles that structure the choice of products. Furthermore, the
democratic governance of these institutions provides people with the abilities to
codetermine these arrangements according to their shared and conflicting needs
and desires. Lastly, in some cases feedback loops exist in which consumers can in-
fluence the creation of products before they are even produced. From an ecological
perspective, this ex ante choice and codetermination is of great importance because
it coordinates supply and demand through democratic deliberation and negotia-
tion processes, ultimately replacing the invisible hand of the competitive market
with the transparent and democratic self-determination of people.
A second criticism is that economic affairs are too complex to be democrati-
cally regulated. I argue that this widespread belief is nothing other than a theistic
argument that aims to immunize economic activities from democratization. The
question is not necessarily if we can, but rather if we should (attempt to) break
up the complexity into more transparent and manageable units. Nevertheless, it is
important to make a distinction here between democratic institutions in general
and the democratic planning of economic institutions and activities in particular.
The mere fact that the institutional framework is democratic does not imply that
all activities will be planned in advance. Instead, it connotes that the institutional
framework can be perpetually adapted to the changing socio-ecological conditions.
While prices can be democratically codetermined, the ex post choice in the market
is individually and ‘spontaneously’ chosen – often in reference to these prices. Be-
yond this, however, democratic economic institutions can also provide producers
and consumers with opportunities to coordinate their economic activities in over-
lapping networks. In this sense, democratic planning must not occur in a uniform,
top-down manner, but can occur in decentralized organizations that are created
through the free association of consumers and producers.
A third criticism that is often heard in these debates is that democratic gover-
nance of economic activities is not efficient.This is another knock-down argument
that aims to silence all challenges to the competitive market. As we have seen from
our extensive discussion of the open and competitive market, this institutional ar-
rangement might be efficient in generating wealth for the few but not at maintain-
ing sustainable livelihoods for themany. In this sense, the democraticmanagement
of economic activities is more efficient in two ways. As just mentioned, democratic
governance can, firstly, increase the ex ante deliberation over what shall be pro-
duced, thereby short-circuiting the rather energy-intensive, time-consuming and,
thus, costly feedback loop of markets that are based on purchasing choices. Sec-
ondly, democratic governance can allow people to codetermine their economic in-
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stitutions and activities according to non-monetary values that competitive prices
and regular commodities cannot take into account. In this sense, we can conclude
that democratic economic governance is significantly more efficient in satisfying
people’s diverse and rich needs than one-dimensional competitive markets.
A fourth criticism is that people do not have the time for or interest in such
time-consuming commoning activities. But time is used for a plethora of activities.
The question of time is therefore more a question of priorities in the valuation of
these activities.This leads us to the actual key question: will people desire to partake
in such democratic activities of economic governance?This is a question that theory
cannot answer. But assuming that people are reflexive, sentient beings that aim to
solve problems, it can be assumed that they will take interest in commoning as an
answer to the various socio-economic, ecological and political challenges that they
face.
Last but not least, market commons will most likely be criticized because it
is assumed that they cannot be scaled up. Here, we are dealing with the general
problem of globalization. If we interpret globalization as a unified entity, it will
be a difficult nut to crack. But fortunately, globalization can be broken down into
existing commodity chains and real, interdependent relationships. While some or
most of my examples might have appeared to focus on the local, regional and na-
tional, this is because it is in the local that the global social relations are anchored.
The global and the local are interwoven. Taking democratic control over one’s lo-
cal economy in no way negates the possibility of communicating and collaborating
with people on the other side of the world. When we understand the market as a
glocal commons, we can aim to provide people with the rights and capabilities they
need to reclaim, codetermine and adapt their institutional frameworks on vari-
ous scales in order to satisfy their needs and maintain their livelihoods within the
changing ecological systems that they inhabit.
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